Why this book?
- It offers a fresh definition of religiosity that does not depend on theism.
- It distinguishes the explanatory part of religion (the origin of the world, miracles, creation) from its value part (how to live).
- It defends the objectivity of moral and aesthetic values.
- It examines the legal implications of this view for "freedom of religion" and "moral independence".
- It is short and dense, and can be read in a single sitting.
About the book
"Religion without God" is Ronald Dworkin's last work, published after his death in 2013. The book is short but dense, and it raises a fundamental question: does religion necessarily mean belief in God, revelation, miracles or a personal creator? In clear, philosophical language, Dworkin proposes that at its deepest level religion is less a set of theological doctrines than a serious, committed attitude toward value and meaning.
In his view, a religious person is someone who believes that human life has real meaning and importance and who sees the world, with all its grandeur and complexity, as possessing splendor and value. Anyone who denies God yet holds a deep conviction in truth, beauty, morality and the meaning of life can therefore, in an important sense, be counted as religious. To explain this view, Dworkin divides traditional religion into two parts: the explanatory part, which makes claims about the origin of the universe and God's intervention in history and which conflicts with modern science, and the value part, which addresses questions such as how to live and what is worth valuing. He holds that the second part can be taken seriously without the metaphysical, theistic part.
One of the book's key concepts is "religious atheism". Pointing to figures such as Einstein and Spinoza, Dworkin shows that wonder before the order and beauty of the universe, or a deep commitment to morality, does not necessarily require belief in a personal God. At the same time he distances himself from a dry, contemptuous atheism that considers every spiritual feeling naive. Another major part of the book concerns the objectivity of values: for him, moral values are not mere taste, social convention or a product of biology, and right and wrong, justice and injustice, beauty and vulgarity have a real truth. This faith in the objectivity of values is the book's central pillar.
In the end, Dworkin turns the discussion to law and asks what freedom of religion means in legal systems if religion is not limited to theism. His answer is that the law should not grant privileges only to traditional religious beliefs but should defend a broader right, that of human moral independence, a right that covers both the traditional believer and the ethically committed atheist.
The book's strength lies in opening a middle path between religious fundamentalism and reductive atheism. Instead of rejection or mockery, Dworkin builds a new vocabulary for dialogue. Still, an important criticism applies: he may stretch the concept of religion so far that its boundary with moral philosophy fades. The book suits readers who do not believe in God but do not want to see the world as empty of meaning, value and splendor. Students and enthusiasts of philosophy of religion, moral philosophy and philosophy of law will also benefit from it.


