A report on a lecture by Javad Heidari, the Persian translator of *Religion Without God*, on Ronald Dworkin's final book. Rather than walking through the book chapter by chapter, Heidari recounts the moral core of Dworkin's thought: the distinction between having a good life and living well, product value and performance value, human dignity and ethical independence, and the question beneath them all: by what standard should we measure our own lives?

"Religion Without God"
An Introduction to and Review of Ronald Dworkin's Book: A Lecture by Javad Heidari
Organized by the Ghadir Charity Association
This report summarizes the lecture "An Introduction to and Review of the Book Religion Without God by Ronald Dworkin," organized by the Ghadir Charity Association. The speaker, Javad Heidari, is also the book's Persian translator; his translation was published by Tarh-e No in 1405 (2026), in 184 pages and a first printing. In this session, Dr. Heidari introduced the book and examined the author's most important views, above all his moral thought.
The session was held online, and a period for questions and answers followed the speaker's presentation.
Religion Without God is Dworkin's last book, published after his death.[1] Its text is based on the "Einstein Lectures" that Dworkin delivered in Bern, Switzerland, in December 2011.[2] The book's central point is that a "religious attitude" does not necessarily depend on belief in God, and that the foundation for defending freedom of religion should be sought in a more general right, namely "ethical independence." The Persian translation was published by Tarh-e No in 1405 (2026), in 184 pages, as a first printing.
Ronald Dworkin, the American legal philosopher, is regarded by many as the greatest philosopher of law of the second half of the twentieth century. He studied at Harvard, practiced law for several years, and in 1969 took up the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford, a chair previously held by his teacher, H. L. A. Hart.[3] He also taught at New York University and later at University College London, and wrote in The New York Review of Books on the controversies of the day, including abortion, freedom of speech, affirmative action, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He died of leukemia in London in February 2013.[4]
Javad Heidari is the book's Persian translator and, by his own account, has spent years studying, researching and writing in the field of ethics and the good life. In the translator's preface he also stresses the book's importance, and he regards Dworkin's account of "living well" as "the most precise and profound account of the good life." Near the end of the session, the speaker mentioned that he has submitted the translation of another book to a publisher (see the Q&A section).
Rather than walking through the book chapter by chapter, the speaker recounted the moral core of Dworkin's thought, that is, the foundation on which the book's discussion of religion and ethical independence rests. The structure of the lecture was as follows:
• Framing the problem with the story of a reunion of old friends and the question "By what standard should I measure my life?"
• Introducing Dworkin and his place as the "hedgehog" of moral and political thought.
• Six main axes: the distinction between having a good life and living well; product value and performance value; two rival models, impact and challenge; volitional and critical well-being; dignity and its two pillars; the link between individual and collective ethics; and ethical independence.
• Seven practical recommendations for everyday life.
• Questions and answers.
A methodological note: through everyday examples and analogies from art and sport, the speaker sought to make abstract concepts tangible for a general audience. The Iranian examples (such as the radif of Persian classical music) and the historical examples (such as Semmelweis and van Meegeren) were his own additions in elucidating the ideas.
The speaker opened with a story: the members of a high-school class, twenty years after the last bell, gather at a distant restaurant. The first hour is full of jokes and memories, but gradually the "unannounced game" of comparison begins: one talks about his new clinic, one shows a photo of his house in Vancouver, and one sets his car keys on the table so that the logo can be seen. In the midst of this, Saeed, the former top student, now a physics teacher in a small town who is doing the work he always loved, stays quiet, and that night lies awake with the feeling that "perhaps he has lost his life." The bitterer point is that the owner of that famous car key also stares at the ceiling that same night and asks: "What was all this running for?"
The speaker formulated this shared question thus: Am I living rightly? Am I wasting my life? And by what yardstick, in the end, should life be measured? In his view, Dworkin's answer is neither a recipe for success nor motivational slogans but a "new yardstick" for measuring life, one that, once acquired, makes it impossible to look at reunions, failures and oneself in the old way.
Why does a philosopher of law take up a question that usually belongs to popular psychology? The speaker's answer was that Dworkin did not regard life as made of "drawers": one for law, one for politics and one for personal ethics. He believed one cannot defend justice and stay silent about the worthwhile life, or speak of the worthwhile life while ignoring the dignity of others.
This outlook is pursued in his last great theoretical work, Justice for Hedgehogs.[5] The book's title alludes to a line attributed to the ancient Greek poet Archilochus, popularized by Isaiah Berlin: "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing."[6] Berlin divided thinkers into two kinds: foxes, who see the world as fragmentary and full of contradictions, and hedgehogs, who understand everything in light of one big idea. Dworkin openly declared himself a hedgehog, and the "one big thing," in his view, is this: living well, treating others well, justice and dignity are all tied together. A person cannot be one person at home, another in the marketplace and a third with friends; and cannot value his own life while holding the lives of others cheap. The speaker stressed that this very boldness makes Dworkin's words applicable to everyday life.
The heart of the matter, in the speaker's words, is the distinction Dworkin draws between "having a good life" and "living well." In Dworkin's own formulation: living well means striving to create a good life, but only within the constraints that are fundamental to human dignity.
The speaker explained this distinction with the card game hokm: the cards dealt to us are not in our control (we may hold a hand full of aces and kings or one full of twos and threes), but how we play those cards depends entirely on us. "Having a good life" concerns the cards: health, a warm family, income, love, friendship, success and a safe shelter; a large part of these depends on luck (country, decade, family, body and genes). But "living well" concerns how we play; it is a responsibility, an effort, and a way of meeting the challenge called life.
The speaker's example: set a contractor who has amassed a fortune through substandard materials and bribes, who is healthy and owns a villa overlooking the sea, beside a nurse who spent the Covid years on back-to-back shifts and whose salary barely covers her rent. If we ask which of them "has a good life," the answer is the first; but if we ask which of them "has lived well," the answer is clear: the second. The extreme case is Stalin, who in a technical sense had "a good life" (he rose to power, got whatever he wanted and died at the height of his power) but in no sense lived well.
For this reason, Dworkin resolves an old puzzle: why does a person who is successful in capital, title, fame and popularity sometimes feel hollow inside, and why do some apparent failures live and die with astonishing serenity? Because the two are not talking about the same thing; one concerns the cards received and the other the way of playing. A suggested exercise: divide a sheet of paper into two columns with a line; in one column write "what was given to me" (family, city, health, talent, opportunities and bad luck) and in the other "what I have done with them." Most of us have for years measured ourselves by the first column; Dworkin says look at the second.
Dworkin, who was passionate about art, understood life as akin to the making of a work of art, and distinguished two kinds of value: product value (the value a thing has as an object) and performance value (the value that lies in the very act of doing, creating and striving).
To show how serious this distinction is, the speaker told the story of Han van Meegeren, the Dutch painter. In the 1930s and 1940s he sold several paintings, as newly discovered works by Vermeer, the great seventeenth-century painter, at fabulous prices; one of them reached Hermann Göring, one of the Nazi leaders. After the war, when he was arrested on the charge of selling a national treasure to the Nazis, he confessed to save himself that he had painted the pictures himself, and to prove it he painted another "Vermeer" in the presence of witnesses. The point is that not a speck of paint had moved on the canvases themselves, yet their value collapsed overnight; for we value what lies behind the work, the human achievement that created it, not the mere object.
Another example: Uccello's paintings were damaged in the Florence flood, and Leonardo da Vinci's Last Supper has been deteriorating for centuries. But even if the Last Supper were to vanish tomorrow, what Leonardo did would not be erased; it is an event inscribed in history. Dworkin brings this same logic to life. From a key sentence of his that the speaker quoted, the following sense can be drawn: we do not prize lives well lived for the sake of their final narrative, as though another story could have taken its place, but because in them we see a performance: rising to meet a challenge that must be lived. The value of our lives is adverbial, not adjectival.[7]
Adjectives are labels that others stick on our foreheads (successful, rich, famous, failed, unknown), whereas adverbs describe the manner of our movement: honestly, bravely, patiently, generously and, above all, with dignity. The speaker's witness is the funeral gathering: no one speaks of the deceased's square footage or the model of his car; they say his hand was generous, he never turned anyone away empty-handed, he brought honest bread to the family table, and he listened patiently to everyone; all of these are adverbs. Dworkin's question is: why not hold, throughout our lives, the scale we pick up at the moment of farewell?
The speaker's sporting analogy: two marathon runners; one took a shortcut midway and reached the finish line with the gold medal, the other ran to the last meter on an injured leg and came in last. The medal, the product, belongs to the first, but the spectators applaud the second, and they know where the value lies. Life, too, is not a finished painting hung on a wall but a live performance, like dance or musicianship; the value of a dance is not in the photograph taken at the end of the night but in the performance itself.
Dworkin does not settle for analogy and formulates this idea in two rival models (in the Tanner Lectures and then in the book Sovereign Virtue).[8] The impact model says that a good life is one that leaves a great and lasting mark on the world; the deeper the footprint, the more valuable the life. The challenge model says the value of a good life is that of a skilled performance, a value that lies in the performance itself, not in its consequences. Dworkin borrows this idea from Aristotle, who located happiness not in having things but in doing things well.
The example of Semmelweis. Ignaz Semmelweis was a Hungarian physician who in the 1840s worked in a hospital in Vienna.[9] He discovered that mortality among new mothers was horrifyingly higher in the ward where doctors came to the bedside straight from dissecting corpses. He ordered the doctors to wash their hands in a chlorine solution before examinations, and mortality fell sharply. But most of his colleagues refused to comply; the idea that the doctors' own hands could be the cause of death struck them as insulting. He fought for years, became isolated and finally died in a psychiatric asylum; years later, with Pasteur's discoveries, it became clear that he had been right.
If we take up the scale of impact on the day of his death, it rules that his life was relatively without effect; yet the same scale, years later, because of the work of others, suddenly grows heavy. Had his notes been burned, history would have forgotten him and his life would have remained forever light on this scale. This is the fatal flaw of the impact model: blind luck can empty a life of its value. And this cruelty does not touch only the heroes of history: the researcher who dies before announcing her result, the teacher in remote villages whose name no one has heard, the mother who raises her child through great hardship and loses him in a car accident at twenty, or the shopkeeper who never shortchanged anyone in a lifetime and goes bankrupt when a chain store arrives. About all of these the scale of impact has a single verdict: a failed and wasted life. Dworkin says this verdict is not only cruel but wrong.
By contrast, if the value of life lies in the performance, no external force, flood, war, illness or the forgetfulness of history, can take it from us; what we have done, we have done. The speaker called this "freedom from the tyranny of outcome." A subtlety that gets less attention is that "skilled performance" is not a uniform external standard imposed on everyone; each person's situation, era, culture, body, family and limitations are part of his challenge. To explain, the speaker used the radif of Persian classical music as an example: the tar player has received the radif from his masters, and the dastgahs and gushehs were made in advance, but the improvisation he draws from within that same radif each night is his own. That we are born in Mahur or Shur is not up to us; how we play within it is up to us. For this reason a single mother who makes ends meet with two jobs and still tells her children stories at night may give a more brilliant performance than a millionaire for whom everything is laid out. No one asks us to write the Ninth Symphony; we are asked to play as skillfully as possible with these very hands, in this very city, within these very limits.
Dworkin's distance from Aristotle also becomes clear here: Aristotle thought of a human being, like an acorn, as having a natural end whose happiness is the flourishing of that very nature. In Dworkin's picture, life is not a predetermined blueprint to be discovered but a challenge to be answered with skill. In the Aristotelian picture you must figure out what you are; in Dworkin's, you must decide what to make of what you have.
Having a Good Life | Living Well |
Product value | Performance value |
Adjectival value (successful, wealthy, famous) | Adverbial value (honestly, bravely, with dignity) |
Impact model: life is measured by its consequences | Challenge model: life is measured by the quality of its response to the challenge |
Dependent on the "cards" and on luck | Dependent on "how one plays" |
Volitional well-being: getting what I truly want | Critical well-being: getting what I ought to want |
Dworkin distinguishes between two senses of a life "going better."[10] In volitional well-being, my life goes better when I get what I truly want (a degree, a house, a car, the admiration of others, fame). But in critical well-being, my life goes better when I get what I ought to want, that is, achievements and experiences whose absence from my wants makes my life worse.
The speaker gave the example of a 38-year-old with a good income who goes to parties on weekends, travels abroad several times a year and whose photos get many likes, and who, if asked whether he is satisfied, immediately says, "What do I lack?" By the standard of volitional well-being he is doing well; yet he has never had a friend with whom he could unburden himself at midnight, never sacrificed anything for something he believed in, never begun a hard task at which he might fail, and never been honest enough with himself to ask what he really wants from life. Dworkin says such a person, though he has enjoyed himself, has not lived well in the important sense of the word. The sense of his key sentence is this: someone who has lived a dull and conventional life without close friendship, challenge or achievement, merely counting the days until the grave, has not had a good life, even if he himself thinks so and even if he has thoroughly enjoyed that life.
Before any judgment, the speaker recalled two points. First, Dworkin's objection is to the empty life (without friends, without challenge and without achievement); the simple life of a farmer or a housewife, if full of bonds, care and effort, does not fall under this description. Second, for Dworkin life is a responsibility placed on our shoulders, and wasting it is a failure to discharge that responsibility; the sentence "I was satisfied with my life" does not make up for that failure.
The speaker's real-world witness was the notes of Bronnie Ware, the Australian nurse, drawn from patients in their last weeks of life. These notes are not scientific research, but they are worth hearing.[11] The most frequent regret was: "I wish I'd had the courage to live a life true to myself, not the life others expected of me." Then: I wish I hadn't worked so hard; I wish I'd had the courage to express my feelings; I wish I had stayed in touch with my friends; I wish I had let myself be happier. In this list no one longs for a bigger house, a more expensive car or more fame; all the regrets are about the how. The speaker's question was why we should wait until the end of life; even today we can measure ourselves by the scale of critical well-being.
If living well is a responsibility, where does this responsibility come from, and who placed it on my shoulders? Dworkin's answer is one word: dignity. The speaker recalled that some have called Dworkin the "philosopher of dignity." For him, dignity is neither an emotional slogan nor an ornamental word in political declarations; it has a precise structure resting on two pillars.[12]
The first pillar: taking one's own life seriously. Each person must take his own life seriously and accept that what matters is that it be a performance, not a squandered opportunity. The importance of my life does not depend on how I feel today either; all of us have days when we do not get out of bed and say, "What difference does it make?" The speaker reads Dworkin as saying that on those days our worth has not diminished; it is only that our eyes cannot see it. Our lives matter not because we feel they matter but because they do. This sentence is not a reproach; it is a railing to lean on in hard days, and it has a practical upshot too: seeking help from a professional on gray days is not a sign of weakness but a sign of taking one's life seriously.
The second pillar: authenticity. Each person bears a special responsibility to determine what "success" means in his own life, and to build that life around a coherent narrative or style that he himself accepts, not one written by family, neighbors, Instagram or social habit. We know many ready-made scripts: "My son must become a doctor," "A girl past thirty..." "A sensible person becomes a civil servant," "Until you buy a house, you are not really living." But authenticity does not mean stubbornness or contrarianism. Consider two physicians: one has had "You must become a doctor" whispered in his ear by his father since childhood and has never dared to ask what he himself wants; the other, as a teenager, sat beside his grandmother's hospital bed and realized that through this work he would have a valuable life. Both are doctors, but the first plays a role others have written, while the second is the author of his own life.
The two pillars limp without each other: authenticity without taking life seriously becomes "whatever I feel like" and a freedom-dressed irresponsibility; seriousness without authenticity becomes the earnest performance of someone else's play. These are the two saddest ways of wasting a lifetime. According to the speaker, the root of the first pillar can be seen in Kant (the human being is an end in itself, not a means), and the root of the second in modern individualism (each person the architect of his own life);[13] Dworkin set side by side these two, which had earlier seemed rivals.
The speaker called this section "the cleverest move of Dworkin's project." The question: if I take my own dignity truly seriously, am I bound to take the dignity of others seriously too? Dworkin says yes, and there is no way out. The argument runs as a dialogue: I say my life matters. They ask, why? I cannot say it is because I was born into this family or this city or with this talent, since I did not choose any of these. The right answer is: because I am a being who can build a life for himself, imagine a future and accept responsibility for it. But the person behind us in the bakery line, the Afghan laborer across the street and a stranger at the other end of the world have this very same trait. If my life matters for this reason, theirs matters for the same reason; and if their lives do not matter, the reason my life matters collapses as well. One cannot say my time is gold and keep another person waiting an hour, or that my suffering matters while the suffering of people in the news is just "statistics," or that my child's future matters while being indifferent to the children of Gaza. Each time we do so, we pull a brick out of the wall of our own dignity.
In Persian we call both sides of the matter "ethics" (akhlāq), but Dworkin separates them in order to show their connection afterward: ethics, that is, individual ethics and the question "How should I live?"; and morality, that is, collective ethics and the question "How should I treat others?"[14] For centuries the two were regarded as rivals: as though the more you attend to yourself the further you drift from others, and the more you sacrifice yourself the further you drift from yourself. Dworkin's great claim is that these are two faces of one coin. A person who treats others dishonorably has not merely wronged them; he has also spoiled the performance of his own life, like a runner who takes a shortcut to win a medal but loses the race.
From this very bridge, Dworkin arrives at politics and draws two fundamental principles of justice out of the good life:
1. The principle of equal importance: it matters equally that every human life succeed. The government must treat the lives of all citizens as having equal importance. The life of someone born in a remote village is no cheaper than the life of a resident of a well-off neighborhood, and this must show in the hospital, the road, the school, education and health care.
2. The principle of special responsibility: each person has a special and final responsibility for making his own life turn out as he wishes. The government need only make the conditions just; it cannot live in his place or decide in his place.
In this way, from a wholly personal question ("What should I do with my life?") and the two pillars of dignity, and without any leap, we have arrived at a theory of social justice; and this is exactly what Dworkin does.
We have all heard that "love cannot be built by force." Dworkin says the same of every deep value in life. From the second pillar of dignity (authenticity) comes a conclusion he calls ethical independence: the general right of every person to be immune from having others' judgments about the right way to live imposed on him. In this very book, Religion Without God, he argues that this right is even more fundamental than freedom of religion, and that freedom of religion is only a special case of it; every deep choice, religious or non-religious, traditional or unconventional, must be possible under the shelter of this independence.
His reason is not that others' business is "none of our business," but a more deeply rooted argument: coercion destroys what it seeks to build, because the value lies in the performance, and a performance is a performance only when it wells up from within. The speaker's example: parents who, with threats and bribes, sit their son at the piano three hours a day may deliver a good musician to society, but what they have obtained is not playing; it is fingers that run over the keys out of fear. A child who picks up an instrument with enthusiasm and plays clumsily has something the first may never acquire. The same logic holds in the greatest matters: if I am forced into religiosity I do not become religious, I only become someone who performs religious behaviors; if I am forced into art I do not become an artist; if I am forced into virtue I do not become virtuous. Coercion can produce behavior, but it cannot produce performance.
The speaker stressed that this does not mean "everyone may do whatever he likes." Dworkin is not a "neutral" liberal in the usual sense and states plainly that politics must be built on a conception of the good life; namely, the challenge model. But because he seeks value in the "how" rather than the "what," he leaves room for thousands of forms of life. What it requires is that everyone take his own life seriously; and that seriousness can take many shapes. The implication for upbringing and management: our task is not "making people" but "setting the stage"; instead of "You must read books," we read books in front of them; instead of "You must be honest," we say "I was wrong" when we err; we invite, we serve as examples, and, the hardest part, we stand aside so that the other person can perform himself and the performance can be his own.
The speaker asked: what use is a philosophy that is of no use on an ordinary day (a day that is neither a wedding nor a funeral, only traffic and meetings and washing dishes)? And he translated Dworkin's teachings into seven everyday recommendations:
1. Change the nightly question. Before sleep, instead of "What did I gain today?" ask "How was I today?" and write the answer with adverbs, not adjectives: "In the meeting I honestly said the mistake was mine," "I listened patiently to my friend," "I dealt with my colleague hastily." As weeks pass, the inner scale slowly changes.
2. Choose three adverbs for yourself. Imagine what you would like people to say about you at your memorial: for instance, "honestly, generously, bravely." Write them somewhere you will see every day (your phone screen, the corner of the mirror, inside your bag), and whenever you stand at a crossroads, ask which road is closer to these three adverbs.
3. Draw two columns: "my hand" and "the world's hand." The night before a job interview, the day you receive test results, or the week of the university entrance exam, write in one column what is in your power and in the other everything else. Give all your energy to the first column, and when the result comes, measure yourself by the first column, not the second.
4. After every failure, write a "performance report." When something goes wrong (a shop closes, a relationship ends, a project is rejected), instead of writing "I am a loser," write what you really did well along the way and where you could have played better. In the speaker's words, this advice is for people who, like himself, have many failures.
5. Audit the script of your life. For big decisions (field of study, job, marriage, emigration, staying or leaving), say aloud the "should" that keeps repeating in your mind and ask: whose voice is this? Father, neighbor, Instagram, relatives or a friend? Then ask: do I myself accept it? If yes, from that moment it is yours and you can pursue it with a clear conscience; if not, at least you know whose role you are playing.
6. Once a day, take a stranger's dignity seriously. Learn the name of the building's doorman, ask the Snapp driver about his family, do not keep waiting someone who is waiting for you, answer the message of someone who can do nothing for you, do not cut in line even when no one is watching. These are small acts, but each one reminds you why your own life matters.
7. Invite, do not impose. If you are a parent, teacher or manager, this week turn one "must" into a "come": instead of "You must exercise," "Come, let's go for a walk"; instead of "You must be responsible," hand him responsibility for a real task and let him do it his own way, even if it does not turn out as you would like.
At the end, the speaker returned to Saeed. The temptation of consolation is to say, "Surely you have influenced your students' lives, and perhaps one of them will someday become a great scientist"; but this is the impact scale again with a different weight. Dworkin's point is more radical and deeper: even if no student remembers Saeed's name, the thousands of hours he has stood patiently and honestly at the blackboard over these twenty years are worth it; the performance has been given, and given in the best way. But this does not mean issuing a verdict of nullity against the other friend, the owner of the car key: the scale of adverbs is strict but not vindictive, and it is never too late to begin a good performance; until the last moment, the curtain is up.
The speaker noted that Dworkin never gives the final answer in our place, and the principle of authenticity does not allow it; he has only placed a "yardstick" in our hands. So if at night we ask "What did I gain today?" we measure with the scale of product, a ruthless scale that is never satisfied. But if we ask "How was I today?" we measure with Dworkin's scale, which is strict, yet does not make us hostages of luck and the times. In his own telling, the speaker added that Dworkin did not stop writing until the last days of his illness and handed the final version of this very book to the publisher in an ambulance on the way to the hospital. His closing sentence: life has been given to us, it is short, and there is no second chance; we did not choose its time and place or most of its conditions, but one thing is entirely in our hands, and that is how we live; and perhaps that is enough for a good life.
At the end of the presentation, the moderator asked those present to raise their questions and asked the first question himself. One of the participants also sent two questions in writing.
Question: In the modern world institutions play a prominent role, and part of our time and conduct is subject to the legal frameworks of the institutions in which we are active. How can individual ethics, whose principles may differ from those of institutional ethics, be managed alongside them so that, at the least, they do not conflict and are complementary? From Dworkin's perspective, is there any guidance on this?
Answer: The speaker recalled that Dworkin is also an important political philosopher and pointed to his book Is Democracy Possible Here? (on American politics).[15] Dworkin's most important achievement, in the speaker's words, is bringing together the "ethics within" and the "ethics without." In the history of thought, the Stoics, Epicureans and Cynics (with their emphasis on virtue, pleasure, or indifference to social conventions) stressed building the inner self and did not center on politics; after modernity and Machiavelli, the question of conduct toward others gained importance. Dworkin sees both as springing from one root: the pillar of "taking one's own life seriously" in individual ethics becomes, in collective ethics, "the equal importance of everyone's life"; and the pillar of "authenticity and writing one's own script" in collective ethics leads to "responsibility for our actions," since freedom and responsibility go hand in hand. The speaker added that in our society too some say "Build the inner self" and others say "Until political institutions are set right, talk of individual life is a luxury," and Dworkin's art lies in reconciling the two.
The speaker considered this question very important and pointed to a new book by Susan Neiman, whose translation he has submitted to a publisher and which will be published soon; a book on the concept of "evil" and on understanding the Trump era.[16] In his account, Neiman asks how it came about that someone who (as the speaker put it) regards power and wealth as the only real values rose to power. Her answer is that our culture has two pieces of "common currency": one, that "deep down everyone is after only his own advantage" (about individual life), and the other, that "power runs the world and the rest is empty talk" (about collective life). In her view two ideologies have crept this outlook into us: a flawed reading of Adam Smith that led to neoliberalism (pursue private gain and collective gain will follow) and a mistaken reading of Darwin (neo-Darwinism) that takes domination, survival and power to be the main goal. "Evil" in this book is not necessarily a monster like Zahhak in the Shahnameh; evil is creeping, like a fungus growing in a damp wall, unseen, and it means denying the possibility of goodness and concern for others; any creed or ideology that says you cannot live well and caring for others is, in her words, at the foundation of evil. The speaker deferred the book's proposed remedies to another time, after its publication.
[1] Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without God, Harvard University Press, 2013. According to the speaker himself, Dworkin handed the final version of the book to the publisher in the last days of his life.
[2] Einstein Lectures, Bern, Switzerland, December 2011. This information is background for introducing the book and was not stated in the text of the lecture.
[3] H. L. A. Hart (1907–1992), British legal philosopher and author of The Concept of Law. In 1969 Dworkin succeeded him in the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford.
[4] Dworkin died on 14 February 2013 in London, at the age of 81.
[5] Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, Harvard University Press, 2011.
[6] Isaiah Berlin, “The Hedgehog and the Fox” (1953). The line in question is attributed to Archilochus.
[7] In Dworkin's own words: the value of our lives is adverbial, not adjectival.
[8] Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, Harvard University Press, 2000. The discussion of the "impact model" and the "challenge model" appears in this book and also in Justice for Hedgehogs.
[9] Semmelweis worked at the Vienna General Hospital and died in 1865, at the age of 47, in a psychiatric asylum. The later discoveries of Louis Pasteur and others confirmed his theory.
[10] Dworkin distinguishes between "volitional interests" and "critical interests"; in the text of the lecture these appear, respectively, as "volitional well-being" and "critical well-being."
[11] Bronnie Ware, The Top Five Regrets of the Dying, 2011. The speaker also pointed to a similar account in The Wheel of Life by Elisabeth Kübler-Ross (1997).
[12] In Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin grounds dignity on two principles: "self-respect" and "authenticity."
[13] A reference to the "formula of humanity" in Kant's moral philosophy. Attributing these two roots to Dworkin is the speaker's own.
[14] In Dworkin's writing, "ethics" concerns the question of the good life and "morality" the question of how to treat others. Persian translations have rendered both as "akhlāq," and in this report "individual ethics" and "collective ethics" are used to mark the distinction.
[15] Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate, Princeton University Press, 2006. According to the speaker, some regard certain analyses in this book of the style of argument in American political life as having anticipated the later state of that politics.
[16] Susan Neiman is an American philosopher and director of the Einstein Forum in Potsdam. The title of the book and the details of its publication were not fully stated in the lecture; its particulars are not given in this report. The claim quoted about Trump's words is also on the speaker's account.
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