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Religion
Death and God in the Thought of Swinburne
Death is universal, and some see it as an argument against the existence of God. Swinburne attempts to reconcile death with theism through arguments such as free will and self-sacrifice; however, his arguments fail and can even be turned into a case against theism.
Every human being will die. Whether you are good or bad, whatever your wish may be, your end is death. Although millions of people died in the Nazi and Stalinist prisoner-of-war camps, some were able to escape death at their hands, but their escape was temporary, for whoever sets foot on the earthly sphere will ultimately fall into the jaws of death. Billions upon billions of humans have died and will die. No human being will ever escape death forever.
The finitude of the world and the mortality of creatures can itself be considered a reason against the existence of God and theism, and give rise to this question: Does human mortality not call into question the assumption that a God—omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good—exists? Theists have tried not to answer this question in the affirmative, because an affirmative answer to this question would be considered a strong indication and a firm reason against theism.
Richard Swinburne—one of the renowned philosophers of our time—has entered into this important and, of course, difficult subject. In his book entitled "The Existence of God," in which he has developed and examined numerous arguments, including inductive and cumulative arguments, in favor of theism, Swinburne has also discussed and scrutinized our subject and says: "Does the one God have a reason for placing death in a creation where, on the one hand, natural laws prevail and, on the other hand, agents perform actions?"[1] He says God has a reason. Therefore, the existence of death in the world in no way causes ambiguity in the assumption that there is a God. In the article before you, Swinburne's approach will be presented, and I will show that the arguments put forth by him—whether individually or cumulatively—are not successful. Furthermore, I will argue that the claims put forth by Swinburne can themselves create problems for the theistic position and become a pretext for opponents to call into question the world created by God. Finally, I will argue that Swinburne's claims create separate problems for theists who believe in an afterlife.
The Argument from Superior Choice and Divine Trust
"Suppose God arranged circumstances so that no one could kill themselves or others. In such circumstances, there would be a kind of suffering that agents would not be able to access. They would be incapable of removing themselves or others from the scene of existence . . . These circumstances would cause free humans not to have complete free will and to be deprived of this gift. If this were so, it would indicate God's distrust of His servant"[2].
This argument leads to two unfortunate conclusions: first) God deprives free creatures of a very important aspect, which is having free will, and second) we witness the Creator's distrust of His creation.
Here, Swinburne has likened the relationship between God and His creatures to the relationship between parents and their child[3]. This analogy is somewhat dubious. Imagine a mother living in your neighborhood who has two children, and one child severely tortures the other child, kills him, and then kills himself, all while their mother witnesses this event but deliberately does nothing. I am sure that if readers read the next sentence, they will detest the action and reasoning of the mother of those two children. The mother of those two children is asked, "Why didn't you intervene to prevent this incident?" She replies, "If I had intervened in my child's affairs, he would have been deprived of free will." We all know that free will is very good, but that does not mean the misuse of free will should be permitted. If an argument like that mother's argument is presented, it is by no means acceptable.
There have been and still are doubts and misgivings here. First) we must also take into account many of the beneficial aspects of free will; for instance, we are not free to hang ourselves from somewhere and then let go, or to sprout wings the moment we wish to fly. No one can will to feed all the hungry people of the world, and none of us can choose to bring back to life all the innocent children killed by madmen. In cases such as these, the right to choose has been taken from us; many avenues for bringing about good or bad consequences are closed to us. In Swinburne's view, none of these instances count as a reason against the existence of God. But if the free ability to kill oneself or others were taken away from human beings, this very thing would count as a reason against God. This seems arbitrary. For, according to Swinburne, free choice is so valuable that God even permits Hitler's political supporters to murder a great number of human beings in a horrific manner, because if this free will were removed, it would defeat God's purpose; yet we should not expect human choice to extend to everything and be without limitation.
Second) We said earlier that Swinburne believes if free creatures were not permitted to kill themselves or others if they wished, this would indicate God's lack of trust in His creatures. He adds that allowing a person to carry a weapon is itself a sign that we have trusted them. But Swinburne would do well to remember that sometimes granting permission to carry a weapon to certain individuals is itself a sign of sheer folly and immorality. If there is a God, surely, given all the bloodshed human beings have caused throughout history, it would be warranted for God to lose His trust as well.
Third) Even if Swinburne's argument is accepted, the most his argument can show is that God has a good reason for permitting free creatures to kill themselves or others. However, Swinburne has not been able to show what that good reason is that God possesses, for the sake of which He has arranged matters so that everyone eventually dies. God could have arranged matters so that every human being lives forever, unless they kill themselves or are killed by another person.
The Argument from Sacrifice
"A world in which there is no death is a world in which, in the face of great dangers, sacrifice and courage do not occur. The highest sacrifice is giving up one's own life, of which there would be no trace in a deathless world . . . and there would be no generosity either. In the face of great calamities, there would be no patience and forbearance. A world without death would always have an alternative, and there would also be the possibility that the hardships brought upon an individual could be remedied by others."[4]
The above argument has flaws. Firstly, suppose Swinburne's statement that the highest sacrifice is giving up one's own life is correct; now consider the claim that "a world in which there is death would have no sacrifice." Its apparent meaning is: if no one dies, the option of sacrifice and selflessness will not present itself to anyone. But this does not seem to be a strong statement at all. For God could arrange matters so that every human being could live forever, unless they themselves choose to sacrifice their life for transcendent causes.
Secondly, consider again the claim that "the highest sacrifice is giving up one's own life, and this self-sacrifice does not exist in a deathless world." In my view, dying is not the highest sacrifice an individual can display in the real world—nor is it even the highest sacrifice in any kind of world God could create. The immense sufferings that last for decades, which some rational—and not foolish—human beings decide to escape through suicide, can also be considered a form of self-sacrifice, and this statement can push aside the claim that "death is the ultimate self-sacrifice."
The Argument from Irreversibility
"A world containing death is a world in which, if the agent performs a particular action, the importance and seriousness of that choice will be extraordinarily significant, because the act, once done, will be irreversible. If I have spent my entire seventy-year life doing harm, I will never have the opportunity to make amends, but if I live forever, I will have time to make amends. It is very good that the deeds people do should be significant, and if their lifespan is limited to a specific time, human choices and actions will be far more significant..."[5]
Here we witness a seemingly strong argument which, if successful, would prove that God had a reason for creating the world containing death. If you were to live forever, the deeds and choices you made would not be as significant as when you lived on the earthly sphere for a limited time.
Although at first glance this argument seems acceptable, the fact that a human being in a world containing death chooses to perform a good deed is of less importance compared to a decision made in a world without death. A world containing death allows evil people to escape justice; death is an important emergency exit for wrongdoers (like Hitler and his associates). If I mistreat others, I always know that if I kill myself, I can thereby escape punishment. If I harm someone, I know that person only has a short time to seek justice. I know that if I pollute the earthly world, future generations will pay the price more than I will. An individual can, after raping a woman, kill her and destroy her body so that no one learns of her fate and the matter remains a secret. If you become aware of my crime, I can kill you so that it does not leak elsewhere and others do not become aware. Death also has the function of freeing you from the feeling of guilt. I know that if I commit a sin, death will eventually deliver me from the sufferings inherent in the feeling of guilt. All of these serve as pretexts to say that making a decision in a mortal world to perform morally good deeds is less significant than decisions made in a world devoid of death. In a world devoid of death, the aforementioned cases have no place there, and for example, if a person commits a sin or crime, the feeling of guilt will accompany them forever.
Swinburne says that if death exists, the importance of making decisions and the deeds that are performed increases, but with the caveats he expresses regarding justice and wrongs, the importance of this matter is diminished. Swinburne could say that in a world devoid of death, our moral choices could never be of great importance. In a world devoid of death, there is the opportunity to oppress one another forever; in such a world, you could humiliate other human beings forever, and far worse evils could be inflicted.
The Argument Based on Creating Opportunity for New Generations
"A world in which there is no death, the older generations, by virtue of their experience and influence, will give no respite to the younger generations to assert themselves"[6].
Swinburne argues that God has a good reason for creating a world in which beings perform a particular activity and bring forth new generations. If the world's procedure were otherwise, a good thing, namely the birth of younger generations, would cease[7]. The statement mentioned relates to a world in which human beings come into existence through procreation. Swinburne's argument is that if there is no death, no opportunity is created for the leisure and freedom of action of the younger generations, and the elders, by virtue of their experience and seniority, will always exploit their position and not allow the younger ones to have leisure, forcibly dragging them into the same path they themselves are on.
This argument raises an important question: is the occurrence of death in the world the best way to create opportunity and freedom of action for the young? If the answer is yes, one can agree with Swinburne and accept the occurrence of death. But if better ways are available for younger generations to gain freedom of action, then Swinburne’s argument will fail.
One can easily imagine other ways to create freedom of action for younger generations. It is not necessary for the previous generation to be destroyed in order to create freedom of action; after a certain period, for instance after about every 80 years, instead of the older generations being destroyed, that generation itself could come to the view that affairs should be handed over to the young, or the situation could be such that after every 80 years, God transfers each old generation to another planet so that no interference occurs, and then again after about 80 years, this same new generation, which has now itself become the old generation, is transferred to another planet. Each planet could yield different situations and opportunities, or the course of the world could be such that after about 80 years, the old generation naturally loses its ability and strength, and in this way affairs fall into the hands of the next generation.
Other ways can also be imagined. If we were to draw up a list of ways to create opportunity and peace of mind for the young, the option of death that Swinburne proposes could be placed at the very end of this list. So it can be said that Swinburne’s argument is not very useful.
The approach Swinburne has adopted encounters even more difficult problems, as follows: the world depicted according to Swinburne’s wishes is an imperfect world because death forcibly removes agents from the scene. We saw that Swinburne values free choice; if that is valuable, then if it were freely chosen that the old generations be set aside and new generations take their place, this too would be valuable. Given that he defends free choice and, on the other hand, also defends a system that restricts this free choice, the matter becomes controversial here. If God seeks to show genuine trust in us, and for this very reason has granted us free will so that we may even torture and harm others if we wish, then the claim that He does not give new generations freedom of action and that it is the older generations who have freedom of action becomes problematic, because this very fact would indicate God’s distrust of the young generation.
The Argument Based on Imposing a Limit on Suffering
“If a powerful being gives an agent unlimited power to inflict pain and suffering on another agent, it is morally wrong . . . Parents who believe they must give their older son responsibility for their younger son may give him a free hand to inflict any kind of pain and suffering, but good parents are those who, when they witness their older son inflicting great suffering on their younger son, intervene in this matter. A God who imposes no limit on the infliction of pain and suffering is not kind. There must be a limit on the duration and the amount of suffering inflicted. When a certain amount of pain and suffering is inflicted, death occurs, and through this, suffering is stopped . . . God can impose a limit on the amount of suffering that agents inflict”[8].
According to this approach, in the world God created, one can expect a limit on the amount of suffering that agents inflict. Death imposes such a limit. In his latest book, titled Is There a God?, Swinburne says, “The limitation of our lifespan creates a circle of security and peace of mind for us; a human cannot inflict suffering for more than, say, 80 years”[9].
Among the arguments mentioned, Swinburne has emphasized this one more than the others and says: the very fact that death imposes the greatest limit on suffering and is the strongest terminator of the infliction of suffering greatly elevates the value of death[10]. But unfortunately, this argument also lacks the necessary sufficiency to justify the occurrence and existence of death.
First, Swinburne, at his best, has argued that God created a world in which individuals, after suffering for a time, are delivered from continued suffering by death. The main point here is that Swinburne has not offered an argument to prove why every human being dies. On this earthly globe, only a small number are tortured by others, suffer, and die over the course of 80 years; Swinburne has not provided a good argument as to why, in this world, everyone dies.
Secondly, consider Swinburne’s analogy of “parents who grant their elder son full responsibility for the younger son.” The question is: in what manner should we expect good parents to intervene? By following Swinburne’s reasoning, we could also arrive at a very absurd answer—for instance, we could conclude that perhaps it is better for good parents, in order to prevent the younger son’s suffering from continuing, to kill the younger son so that he is relieved of his torments. The parents could, by killing the younger son, free him from the elder son’s tortures and prevent the continuation of suffering. If we were to compile a list of solutions, this solution would be placed at the very end of the list.
At least two objections can be raised against the argument Swinburne has presented:
1) The aforementioned analogy is ineffective because good parents always intervene in affairs to establish love and affection between their children, not to bring about the elimination of one. Swinburne himself considers solidarity and concord desirable. If a good creator is like good parents, we can expect them to intervene in affairs with the goal of preventing the entry and continuation of suffering in another way, not by having the victim killed.
2) Swinburne’s statement is ambiguous. In the text mentioned, he argues that with the death of the victim, the individual is released from pain, and in this way, the continuation of suffering is prevented. But a God who is omnipotent could establish another way that, contrary to Swinburne’s statement, does not lead to the elimination of the victim and allows concord to take its place.
Another suggestion could be made to Swinburne: would it not be better for affairs to be arranged such that after 80 years, or a similar period, the torturer’s power wanes and the victim gains an opportunity to seek justice, while the torturer can also endeavor to make amends for their reprehensible deeds?
3) Even if we accept that death is a suitable solution for ending suffering, why does Swinburne say that this suffering ends with the death of the victim? Would it not be better for the torturer to die instead of the victim, so that the victim thereby gains an opportunity for a life without suffering?
The Argument Based on Cumulative Principles
Up to this point, the reasons have been individually subjected to criticism, and here we look from a different perspective. Swinburne resorts to cumulative arguments in favor of God’s existence; here, too, he might adopt a similar tactic regarding the existence of death, although he has not explicitly resorted to this. The question we are compelled to pose is: does connecting and accumulating Swinburne’s arguments justify the probability of death’s existence in the world? I consider an alternative world to the present one and compare it with the present world in order to examine the above question.
Consider a world where every individual lives forever unless they commit suicide or another person kills them. In such a world, we have the right to choose whether to kill ourselves or others, and if God were to create such a world, He would have shown immense trust in His servants. Moreover, the self-sacrifice performed in such a world is far nobler than the self-sacrifice that manifests in our present world. An individual’s choices in the world I depict are far more significant than the choices made in our present, mortal world.
Moreover, decision-making would also be more significant in the hypothetical, alternative world to our current one. In this world, older generations can freely choose whether or not to grant younger generations freedom of action, but in our current limited world where everyone dies, this choice is restricted because death forcibly removes older generations from the scene, and as we saw earlier, suffering in our world is also more limited.
The world we are describing is, at least in the respects mentioned, better than the current world where death is a scourge upon everyone. If better arguments are presented, then these very objections could be strengthened and count as a reason against the existence of God.
Conclusion
The arguments presented by Swinburne—whether individually or cumulatively—cannot justify the existence of death in a world created by God, and furthermore, despite Swinburne's arguments, one can still have reasons to consider the existence of death in the world as evidence against the existence of God. The theist must provide strong reasons in favor of God's existence to overcome the argument arising from the existence of death, or better justify the existence of death.
My conclusion is that it should be noted that the arguments presented by Swinburne themselves can be troublesome for theists who believe in an afterlife. It seems that Swinburne's arguments in favor of the existence of death in the world could lead to the conclusion that God could prevent an afterlife[11]. a) If humans enjoy an afterlife after death, then there would be a specific problem in Swinburne's statements, namely that agents cannot inflict suffering on one another—they will not be able to turn away from existence—so the result would be that God does not trust them[12] b) Furthermore, if sacrificing one's life is the highest form of self-sacrifice, then an afterlife would prevent us from self-sacrifice and the courage to undertake it[13]. c) If free choice and mutual interdependence—which are the most valuable characteristics and features of momentous events in Swinburne's view—are aspects of the afterlife, then life after death would mean that whatever suffering I inflict, I can always make amends[14], which, according to Swinburne's view, would diminish the importance of my actions. d) Moreover, in an eternal and everlasting world that includes free choice and mutual interdependence, new generations are always limited by the experience and influence of older generations. e) And finally, if God has a good reason to stop the suffering of the victim through death, then He would also have a good reason to stop the suffering inflicted upon the wrongdoer in the afterlife, because there must be a limit to the amount of pain and suffering inflicted upon an individual. It is not right for an omnipotent agent to give one agent unlimited power to inflict suffering on another[15].
* Department of Philosophy, University of Miami
[1]. The Existence of God, Richard Swinburne, rev. edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 193.
[9] . Is There a God? Richard Swinburne, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 106±7
[10] . The Existence of God, Swinburne, p. 194
[11] . This kind of argument was suggested to me by Prof. Mark Neunder of the University of Miami whom I thank for this and other comments.
[12] . The Existence of God, Swinburne, p. 193
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Source: Religious Studies 33 (3):293-302 (1997)
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Death and God in the Thought of Swinburne
Translation: Davoud Qarajalou
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Discussion1 comments
هیچ نیازی به پاسخهای فرضی بالا نیست.خدا علاوه بر موجوداتی مثل سنگ و چوب - انسان نیز آفریده است که دارای اختیار و عقل است.رسیدکی کامل به تمام رفتار های خوب یا بد به معنای پایان مرحله اول است.در غیر این صورت یا باید ظلم ها تا ابد ادامه می یافت ویا انسان مانند موجودات دیگر فاقد عقل و اختیار می بود.