Examining the Differences Between Methods of Critique in the Empirical Sciences and the Humanities

Science, in its technical sense, is a systematic method of human understanding of nature, the aim of which is to establish relationships between phenomena. From the public's perspective, whatever is science is considered good. This is because, after the Industrial Revolution, science and technology became aligned. However, it should be noted that science and technology are not necessarily two sides of the same coin. Among thinkers, science has been evaluated from various aspects. These evaluations are, in some cases, shared. For example: universal validity, disinterestedness in analysis, and organized skepticism are among these. Likewise, causal explanation and the applicability of results are other factors in this evaluation. On the other hand, science can also be used in the sense of knowledge and practice. Some believe science means physical evidence perceptible by the senses. In sum, science can be summarized as the human endeavor to better understand the world. An endeavor that is sometimes not accompanied by economic profit and is undertaken solely to satisfy human curiosity. This endeavor manifests and updates itself in a novel form by criticizing old findings. Given the public's favor toward science, many try to present their claims as scientific to appear justified in people's eyes. For this reason, one must look critically at the manner of reasoning and critiques applied to various sciences. In other words, critique itself must also be critiqued. Now, what does this critique mean? How should critique be critiqued? Fundamentally, science is changeable. That is, science changes through critique. The question that comes to mind here is, how can a solid foundation be built upon these shaky results? Science, in some cases, is not absolute; in other words, it is something between doubt regarding previous results and absolute certainty. Now the fundamental question is this: Is the method of critique the same for all sciences? Can a single method be used to critique the empirical sciences and other non-empirical sciences? What differences exist between these sciences, and what kind of inquiry on this subject leads to science?

Although science cannot attain certain truths, it can provide strong and convincing evidence in favor of an idea. Often these ideas are by no means obvious and may contradict subjective perception. The primary and main function of science is to demonstrate the existence of phenomena that are not directly observable. There is no need for science to show us things we can see with our own eyes. Direct observation is not only unnecessary in science, but in many cases, direct observation is impossible. For example, many important scientific discoveries have been inferred from indirect observations. Yet this concept, in contradiction to intuitive understanding from over 2000 years ago, was considered a scientific truth (the Pythagoreans—followers of Pythagoras—were the first to scientifically deduce the sphericity of the Earth by observing the shape of the Earth's shadow on the moon during an eclipse. Pythagoras himself was probably the first to conceive of the Earth as spherical, though his reasons were more aesthetic than scientific). Quoted from Bertrand Russell's A History of Western Philosophy (The Copernican hypothesis of the Earth revolving around the sun has been accepted since the time of Galileo; however, this has not yet been directly observed. Direct observations are completely at odds with this. All of these are indirect inferences obtained using the scientific method. When the word "evidence" is used in this article, it means accessing that matter using the scientific method.

Since the Renaissance, the empirical sciences have undergone many changes. Reliance on empiricism and positivism is a primary characteristic of this era. Successive achievements in the natural sciences and discoveries became a reason for considering objectivity the sole method of proof and reasoning. This objectivity results from the continuation of experiments and the repetition of positivist methods, such that by using inductive logic we arrive at a general law. Another point that must be considered is that the empirical sciences seek to discover laws. That is, nothing is supposed to be produced, nor is a law to be constructed based on human need. The empirical scientist generally attempts, under fixed conditions, to establish a new law by repeating a procedure—based on prior evidence. In this process, they repeatedly encounter contradictory results and, through correction, redefinition, and re-experimentation, try to extract the general law in that domain. In other words, the empirical scientist in a specific field, by establishing fixed and conventional criteria accepted by all, at a specific time, based on the multiplicity of identical results grounded in the critique of prior evidence, presents a general law. Of course, this general law pertains to specific conditions and a specific time. That is, an empirical law is not fundamentally expected to be generalizable to all times and conditions. But the most important factor in establishing this law is the continuous critique of prior evidence. Even when a law is confirmed and demonstrates its application in various laboratories, it may still be critiqued after a period and bring about a fundamental change in the global perspective. An example of this is the violation of Newtonian laws by quantum physics. Physics, as the flagship of the empirical sciences, has repeatedly roused humanity from the dogmatic slumber that an empirical law can be permanent. That is, critique in the empirical sciences continues perpetually, even when we think we may have reached the end of the line. Every year, with the construction of new laboratory instruments and human entry into environments never before experienced, new issues and questions arise. Evidence is obtained that contradicts previous laws. These contradictions initiate a new critique and set the wheel of criticism in the empirical sciences in motion once again. Thus, we see that the structure of the empirical sciences is based on empirical critiques and their continuation. Specific critiques with predetermined (conventional) and universal frameworks that are endorsed by all critics worldwide. These critiques are sometimes structural and sometimes intra-discursive. That is, sometimes with minor critiques, without altering the entirety of the previous view, the prior law can still be applied in certain cases and exceptions. But in structural critiques, the entirety of the subject is criticized, and the scope of application of the previous law is completely invalidated. This phenomenon is more evident in physics than in other empirical sciences.

On the other hand, the humanities refer to bodies of knowledge whose subject is the analysis of paradigms of human relations. Distinguishing this group of sciences from the empirical sciences is difficult. After the beginning of the Renaissance, humans began to formulate various models in inter-human relations. This means that before the Renaissance, there was no need to create or codify specific social laws and analyze inter-human relations, because the sole model was considered to be revelation, and everything was described based on it. The only concern of pre-Renaissance humanity was the effort to extract various models based on the Word. Now conditions had changed. After the Industrial Revolution, social complexities had increased. The ethics of work and social relations had changed. Political relations were based on earthly principles, and God's representatives on earth had been stripped of governance. Thus, the sciences of managing society had to be created. Human needs were rapidly increasing: population growth, ethnic intermingling due to migration, the psychological afflictions left by wars, class conflicts, and so on. These were all problems facing modern humanity. But had humanity truly made no effort to construct a model for managing society and other human affairs before the Renaissance? The first surviving manuscript by humanity for this purpose was written by Plato. In his treatise The Republic, he provided a complete analysis of the politics, philosophy, and ethics governing society. Of course, several human sciences in the modern sense are absent from this treatise. Nevertheless, Plato had already made this effort. He shaped the structure of his analyses using the specific Socratic method of question and answer. After the Renaissance as well, we clearly began writing new analyses with fresh insights from modern thought. Perhaps John Locke, Rousseau, and Auguste Comte can be considered symbols of this movement to construct the inter-human sciences.

In the humanities, there is a striking difference for analyses. Analyses are still based on the critique of prior thought. But the conditions are very different from critical methods in the empirical sciences. Here, fixed and conventional conditions cannot be established. Due to cultural and historical differences rooted in geography, one fundamentally cannot set up a fixed condition to test a new model. Another issue is the manner of critique. In the humanities, because of social bonds, the critic tries to critique the subject under review—which is tied to an influential group in society—in a way that does not cast it out of the social framework. That is, by striving to preserve the prior intellectual tradition, they present a new model. It would not be an exaggeration to say that dialectical logic is the tool of critique in the humanities. This method of critique can be clearly observed in the majority of modern-era critics. Dialectics has a history dating back to ancient Greece. Even in Socratic methods, this approach was used for critique. Something that is fundamentally impossible in the empirical sciences. The humanities are structurally formed on the basis of critiquing prior thought. That is, the critic, by critiquing the previous method, presents a new method and fills the gaps and flaws of the previous thought or theory with their critique. Whereas in empirical science, the foundation of a theory is destroyed by critique, and the previous law loses its applicability. The existence of intellectual pluralism has caused thinkers to make every effort to prevent the elimination of various strata. This caution in critique has become a seasoning for their practice. This is precisely contrary to accepted empirical scientific principles. Another issue is the effort to create totality in the structures of the humanities. In other words, in the empirical sciences, using induction and a focus on particulars, we arrive at a general law that we do not necessarily expect to apply everywhere. But thinkers and critics in the humanities make every effort toward a universal law. Before the postmodern era, this effort was palpably understandable. Even today, many try, by critiquing postmodernism, to make a glorious return to modern history and totalism. In social analyses, the element of deduction is heavily utilized. This method is the exact opposite of the approaches presented for the empirical sciences. Another issue that differentiates the humanities from the empirical sciences is its universality. Due to differences between individuals, between peoples, regional history, and so on, one fundamentally cannot present a single universal law for all. Different conditions require the examination of different paradigms. One cannot even create similar conditions. Sometimes the degree of influence of a factor on a human category in a specific situation is more or less than the influence of that same factor in another situation, time, or on another individual. In other words, all the efforts of humanities thinkers to bring all strata of humanity under one umbrella have so far failed. Totalism is the historical tradition of the humanities. In recent years, there has been much talk of globalization. This globalization is entirely based on the homogenizing view of the humanities. It is precisely the point of divergence between the empirical sciences and the humanities. Even in the twentieth century, a tradition emerged to build the humanities based on empirical methods. These efforts also came to nothing. A fruitless endeavor that thought by creating unified criteria for critiquing and examining the humanities, the possibility of unified global productions could be provided.

In conclusion, perhaps the points of divergence between critical methods in the humanities and empirical sciences can be summarized in a few sentences as follows. The difference in the structure of the logic of critique is the greatest factor for distinguishing these two domains. Dialectical logic serves as the tool in the humanities, and Aristotelian logic as the tool in the empirical sciences. Fundamentally, the attempt to implement the method of one science in the other has so far been unsuccessful. Perhaps, borrowing from the Kantian tradition, it would be better to examine the domains of influence of logic and the methods of critique and examination for each separately.

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Author: Amir Soltanzadeh