A Philosophical Introduction to the Human Sciences: A Conversation with Hossein Sheikh Rezaei

 Monireh Panjtani: The selection and review of the book A Philosophical Introduction to the Human Sciences (Farhang-e Nashr-e No, in collaboration with Nashr-e Asim, 1396 [2017]) is an occasion to re-emphasize the importance and necessity of interdisciplinary studies[1]. In this work, Rom Harré primarily deals with the intertwining of four disciplines: philosophy of science, discursive or naturalistic psychology, cognitive psychology, and the modeling of thought using methods derived from artificial intelligence. Interestingly, to advance his program, he also draws upon certain findings from the fundamental chemistry of the brain, anatomy, and physiology. In this article, after a brief introduction on the necessity of familiarity with the issues of closely related disciplines and the connection between philosophy, psychology, and the cognitive sciences, I will examine the problem, stance, aims, and program of Rom Harré in the book A Philosophical Introduction to the Human Sciences and briefly review the relationship of the aforementioned important disciplines with Harré's book. The conclusion of this article provides a brief overview of the book's sections and considers for which audiences the work is most beneficial.

The specialization of the sciences had two important consequences. One was that individuals could no longer easily master all branches of knowledge as they had in earlier eras, and this closed the door to entering any field with a set of superficial data. But the other consequence was the significant gap that emerged between the various branches of science, knowledge, and art. This rift is more apparent and far more palpable between the experimental sciences and the human sciences. Nevertheless, scientists and thinkers in both domains, especially in the twentieth century, were compelled to engage more seriously with one another, or, to put it another way, to become acquainted with the problems, achievements, and frontiers of adjacent or opposing sciences. One aspect of the formation of thematic philosophies—or philosophies of—was a response to this necessity; for instance, the philosophy of science, which deals with the philosophical foundations of science, or the philosophy of art, which examines the philosophical foundations of art, and the results of these examinations are used by researchers and enthusiasts in various fields. However, in some cases, the necessity of such interaction has not yet become apparent to some. Those engaged in philosophical activity hold various views on the necessity of familiarity with the findings of the experimental sciences, or at least with the fundamental problems and questions of these sciences. For example, some may not see it as necessary, if they are studying the mind or cognition, to know what the findings of the experimental sciences in the field of neuroscience are, and may content themselves with delving into the thought of philosophers. But the actual intertwining of the various branches of science prevents such disregard. For instance, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson pose a very important and fundamental question that points to the importance of philosophers' a priori presuppositions and knowledge of them. In a section of the ninth chapter of their book Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought, titled "The Cognitive Science of Philosophical Ideas," regarding the nature of philosophical inquiry, these authors ask the reader to think about what happens when a philosopher answers the question "What is time?": in fact, "the word time has a meaning for that philosopher; this person already has a conceptualization process for time in their conceptual system. The meaning of any philosophical question depends on what conceptual system is used to understand and comprehend that question. This is an empirical matter, a subject that cognitive science in general and cognitive linguistics in particular address." [2] (Lakoff, 1393, p. 205) The very interesting point that Lakoff and Johnson raise in this work is that the answer to any philosophical question, such as "What is time?", in fact has a philosophical conceptual system in which that answer is meaningful, and "such a philosophical conceptual system is part of the conceptual systems of the philosophers who are engaged in inquiry." The authors' view is that in order to understand what a meaningful answer means, we must study the conceptual systems of philosophers. "This issue is also an empirical question for cognitive science and cognitive linguistics." (ibid., p. 205) They believe that if this empirical task is not carried out, we will not know "whether the answers that philosophers give to their questions are a function of the conceptualization governing the questions themselves or not. For example, if someone concludes that time is infinite, this answer is based on a prior conceptualization of time whose consequence is the infinity of time." (ibid., p. 206) Finally, they write: "We believe that a detailed study of the cognitive science of philosophical ideas will seriously change our understanding of philosophy as a commitment, and should also change the way philosophy is studied as well as the results of philosophical inquiries." (ibid.) Cognitive science is that very important field, intermingled with other disciplines, on which Harré focuses. To define what cognitive science and its philosophy are, I will draw on Mark J. Cain [3].

In his book The Philosophy of Cognitive Science, he writes: "Cognitive science is the scientific study of cognition, and the philosophy of cognitive science is that branch of philosophy which addresses the philosophical problems arising from the scientific study of cognition." [4]

The Main Problem of Rom Harré in the Book Cognitive Science: A Philosophical Introduction

As I mentioned earlier, examining the book A Philosophical Introduction to the Cognitive Sciences is a pretext for re-emphasizing the importance and necessity of interdisciplinary studies. In a word, the subject of this book is “cognition [5].” Harré also considers the subject of psychology to be cognition: “Psychology is the science of studying thought, feeling, perception, and action. The field of psychology is usually directed at only one of these four domains of psychological phenomena: the domain of thinking or cognition.” [6] But in answering the question of what cognition is, he draws attention to the point that in scientific subjects, presenting an uncontroversial and readily accessible definition is not reasonable, and cognition must be examined among numerous psychological phenomena such as remembering, reasoning, calculating, classifying, deciding, and so on. It is evident that each of these mentioned phenomena belongs to different domains and yet are interdependent. If we consider cognition as the common domain between philosophy and psychology, which philosophy addresses in terms of knowledge [7], and psychology in terms of cognition [8], both fields, in order to correct and refine their understandings and inquiries, need to be aware not only of each other’s achievements but also of research methods. In this work, Rom Harré draws upon four disciplines to find an answer to the question of the nature of cognition: philosophy of science, discursive or naturalistic psychology, cognitive psychology, and modeling thought using methods derived from artificial intelligence; and more interestingly, to advance his program, he also touches upon some achievements of basic brain chemistry, anatomy, and physiology. In this work, Harré shows the reader that if in the past it was sufficient to turn to philosophy or psychology to answer the question “What is cognition?”, now such a thing is no longer satisfactory, and the answer to this question is obtained at the intersection of findings from several fields.

Harré’s Position, Program, and Aims in This Work

To formulate Harré’s question about cognition and drawing on other sciences, it may be best to approach science and its presuppositions in his own manner. There is no doubt that science is a human activity, but the question is: of what kind are the presuppositions of science? Philosophers take two general positions on this matter. The first group holds that “science is the systematic study of indubitable facts, and only that which can be perceived by the senses should fall within the domain of science.” [9] This view is known as positivism [10]. The second group, however, does not grant the senses such an absolute role in perception; these individuals are proponents of realism [11] and hold that “the natural sciences, from their very beginnings in the ancient world, have been based on hypotheses about processes that do not readily yield to sensory perception.” [12] One might say the entire history of science is an interplay between these two perspectives. With this preamble, Rom Harré’s position in the book A Philosophical Introduction to the Cognitive Sciences can be identified. Harré belongs to the second group, or the realists, who not only view science as a human activity but also consider it to possess specific presuppositions, yet he has a particular method when confronting these presuppositions; namely, when examining a scientific program, he extracts its philosophical and methodological presuppositions because, in his view, “not only do philosophical presuppositions intervene in scientific practice, but there are also philosophical theories about the nature of science that exert considerable influence [13].” In short, Harré’s program in this work for explaining the cognitive sciences is a realist program that uses the established methods of physics, chemistry, biology, and geology in order to go beyond what is perceived by the senses and reach the deeper realms of material reality. In this book, he has two main aims: first, how to adopt a philosophical approach to examining the way humans think and act, and second, mastering the fundamental principles of a unified body of knowledge concerning the cognitive sciences.

Philosophy, Critical Thinking, the Cognitive Sciences, and Psychology, and Their Connection to Harré’s Book

Harré believes that psychology students rarely get the chance to reflect critically on the concepts in their curriculum. “Critical discussions of standard research methods are also not at all common in methodology courses.” On this particular issue, Stanovich agrees with Harré that although the media pay considerable attention to psychological science, psychological knowledge has largely remained hidden from the public eye: “Few people know that most of the books in the psychology sections of many bookstores are written by people who have no standing in the scientific psychology community. Few people know that many of those whom television labels as psychologists are not considered psychologists by the American Psychological Association or the American Psychological Society.” [14]  (Stanovich, 2009, p. 12) This very issue leads to various confusions or, in some cases, uncritiqued data for psychology students. This is the same problem that prompted Harré to write the book A Philosophical Introduction to the Cognitive Sciences. In fact, in the early 1970s, he became deeply disillusioned with the low quality of research in both psychology and the social sciences; because, in his view, although these fields attempted to use the methods of the physical sciences, the result was sinking into a vortex of illusion. For this reason, Harré drew on his achievements in the philosophy of science, especially scientific realism, to propose an alternative methodology in the social sciences and psychology. He criticized the mainstream in psychology and, in the social sciences, opposed the two dominant approaches: following positivist models in research on human interactions and reducing the social space to atom-like identities and elements. Ultimately, his method is a kind of constructivist view of the social sciences. In his view, narratives and discourses play an undeniable role in shaping the social space and are, of course, accompanied by a kind of scientific realism. In his encounter with the cognitive sciences, Harré also adopts a perspective based on language, narrative, and discourse, and his goal in the cognitive sciences and psychology is “the development of a systematic research program for the study of human beings.” Harré’s effort in his book is to introduce the process of philosophical reflection in connection with examples drawn from branches of psychology, and indeed, those aspects of scientific psychology that align with specific philosophical interests are highlighted in this work.

A Brief Look at the Sections of Rom Harré’s Book

The book A Philosophical Introduction to the Cognitive Sciences is written based on Rom Harré’s multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approach to the study of human beings and their ways of living, and has been translated into Persian by Hossein Sheikh Rezaei and Majid Davoodi Beni. This work consists of 4 parts and 12 chapters. Following the translators’ note, instructions on how to use this book in the classroom are provided. The first part, titled “A Science for Understanding the Mind,” consists of three chapters with the titles: A Science for Understanding the Mind, The Natural Sciences, and Understanding the Scientific Method. The second part, titled “In Search of a Science of Human Behavior,” deals with psychology as the knowledge of mental substances, material substances, and the beginnings of cognitive science across three chapters. The third part is called “Towards a Scientific Psychology.” In this section, Harré examines grammar and cognition, cognitive science in the analytical stage, connectionism, and the brain. “Cognitive Science in Practice” is the title of the fourth part and includes three chapters: Machines and Memory, The Psychology of Classification, and Cognitive Disorders. At the end of each chapter, there is a section titled “Teaching Point” that summarizes the instructional material presented in the book.

For Whom Is This Book Useful?

The book A Philosophical Introduction to the Cognitive Sciences can be useful for those interested in cognitive science, especially newcomers to the field. Since this work was written for classroom teaching, it is very helpful for instructors seeking a suitable educational text. Moreover, because Harré presents the technical aspects of contemporary cognitive psychology in detail in this book, and the level of presentation is appropriate for undergraduate or graduate students who have taken courses in psychology or philosophy, it is highly beneficial for students of psychology, philosophy, and the philosophy of science, and serves as a useful text for strengthening a critical perspective and the necessity of familiarity with multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary studies.

.

---

.

[1] In previous issues of the monthly Ettela'at-e Hekmat va Ma'refat, I had several writings aimed at highlighting the importance of interdisciplinary studies, especially in the field of cognitive science and neuroscience. I refer to some of those that were dedicated to the mentioned topics: Philosophy of Mind: A Conversation with Hossein Sheikh Rezaei, Mehr 1393, Year 9, No. 7/ The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought: A Conversation with Jahanshah Mirzabeigi, Ordibehesht 1395, Year 11, No. 2/ The Real Place of the Mind: Science or Philosophy? A Conversation with Taghi Kimiaei Asadi, Azar 1395, Year 11, No. 9

[2] Lakoff, George, and Mark Johnson, (1393) Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought, translated by Jahanshah Mirzabeigi, Tehran: Agah

[3] In this same issue of the journal (144), I had a conversation with Hossein Sheikh Rezaei, one of the book's translators, and dedicated part of it to defining cognitive science, cognitive psychology, the philosophy of cognitive science, and the relationship between philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science.

[4] Cain, Mark J. (1396), Philosophy of Cognitive Science, translated by Mostafa Taghavi, Tehran:

[5] cognition

[6] p. 27

[7] episteme

[8] cognition

[9] p. 29

[10] positivism

[11] realism

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Stanovich, Keith E. (1388), Critical Thinking in Psychology, translated by Hamayak Avadisians, Tehran: Roshd. This book has twelve chapters, and the author's effort is a critical look at psychology and matters that might be mistakenly known in place of this science. Ultimately, the author tries to provide the reader with a critical framework for encountering this knowledge.

.

---

.

A Philosophical Introduction to Cognitive Science

A Conversation with Hossein Sheikh Rezaei

Monireh Panjtani

Note: The main goal of this conversation is to emphasize the importance of interdisciplinary studies and the necessity of interaction between the humanities and the empirical sciences. In line with this goal, I examined the book A Philosophical Introduction to Cognitive Science (Farhang-e Nashr-e No - 1396) and the approach of its author, Rom Harré, in a conversation with one of the translators of this book, Hossein Sheikh Rezaei. In this text, we addressed the definition of cognitive psychology, cognitive science, the areas of intersection and separation of these two fields, the relationship of philosophy with cognitive science, and also took a brief look at Harré's proposed program for cognitive science. Harré's focus in this work is on four main disciplines: philosophy of science, discursive or naturalistic psychology, cognitive psychology, and modeling thought using methods derived from artificial intelligence.

Dr. Sheikh Rezaei, to examine the book A Philosophical Introduction to the Cognitive Sciences, I will first pose a few preliminary questions about the importance of interdisciplinary studies and then turn to the book itself. One of the consequences of the specialization of the sciences is the creation of a gap between the empirical sciences and the humanities. Such that scientists and thinkers in both domains, especially in the twentieth century, were compelled to engage more seriously with one another, or, to put it another way, to become acquainted with the problems, achievements, and boundaries of adjacent or opposing sciences. This is very evident in the philosophies of—or philosophies applied to—specific subjects. A part of your record indicates your interest in these interdisciplinary discussions, to which I can specifically point to teaching science to children, the philosophy of science and mind, and now cognitive science. For my first question, I would like you to tell us why students and researchers in the empirical sciences should become familiar with the philosophical foundations of their field of study?

Thank you for your question. Of course, there are various points in your question that could be discussed, but let me address your specific question about the necessity for science students to become familiar with the philosophical foundations of their discipline. I can mention at least two main reasons. One relates to cultural and general literacy. Our expectation of the university is that it will cultivate its graduates as "cultured" individuals. Cultivation has various components, one of which is having cultural and artistic literacy, meaning that a graduate, regardless of their field of study, should be aware of literature, art, important junctures in the history of human thought and culture, turning points in science and philosophy, and so on. These are the minimum conditions for being cultured, which unfortunately are fading day by day, and students, professors, and higher education administrators think that the university should only train skilled workers. This topic requires a detailed discussion, but let me just say briefly that familiarity with philosophical currents, just like familiarity with artistic, social, and historical currents, is part of the process of cultivation at the university, from which science students are naturally not exempt. But the second reason specifically relates to the content of scientific disciplines. The history of science shows us that many great scientists, even in purely empirical fields, have had philosophical ideas and thoughts, and these ideas and thoughts have had a direct impact on their views in their area of work. From Newton, Darwin, and Descartes to scientists in the very field of psychology and cognitive science. For example, you cannot make sense of the efforts of the first generations of psychologists unless you know what larger philosophical and theoretical framework they were situated in and what conception and notion of science they had in mind. This conception and notion directly affect the content of science and the standards for evaluating scientific theories, and in fact, important parts of it are precisely the philosophy of science. So, in short, without having a conception, notion, and expectation of a desirable scientific theory, the work of doing science will not advance, and the discussion about this conception and notion takes place in the philosophy of science. In this way, even from a utilitarian perspective, science students need a minimal familiarity with the philosophical discussions of their own discipline.

This question can also be posed about students and researchers in the humanities. In your opinion, why should humanities students become familiar with scientific concepts and subjects, and where, in your view, is the boundary of this familiarity?

The point I made in response to the previous question applies exactly to humanities students as well. These students, too, need to know what the turning points of science in the contemporary world are, firstly for the sake of cultivation and general cultural literacy, and secondly because changes in the empirical sciences have a direct impact on our understanding and conception of the human being and the humanities. With new technologies and the virtual world (which today is, of course, more real than the real), you have a new understanding of the human being, and this new understanding certainly affects your theorizing about the human being in the humanities. The new world raises new questions, and if humanities scholars are to address them, they need to have a minimal familiarity with the scientific and technical aspects of this world.

Which books are more suitable for this familiarization? Also, are the philosophical foundations of science written by those engaged in philosophy, or by empirical scientists familiar with philosophy? In other words, what characteristics should the authors of such works possess?

In principle, writing books for non-specialists is a difficult task and a double-edged sword. It is difficult because not every specialist who is an expert in their work can necessarily express what they do in a comprehensible way for the general public and non-specialists. It is also a double-edged sword because the speaker might, among non-specialists, make imprecise and possibly superstitious and pseudoscientific statements, and in the absence of critical perspectives, effectively give the audience a wrong understanding and conception. But in answer to your question, I must say that two groups write such books. One is specialists who, in addition to their professional work, are able to express material in a language and manner comprehensible to others. For example, in the world of philosophy, Bryan Magee is an instance of individuals who, besides professional engagement with philosophy, also possessed this skill of making philosophical material comprehensible for non-specialists. Or among scientists, Dawkins and others have been like this. The second group are the so-called popularizers. These are people who do not themselves have professional activity in science or other academic disciplines, but possess the art and skill of expressing material in an engaging way for non-specialists, and are in fact bridges between different worlds. There are many authors in Western countries who, through extensive research and investigation, have written general yet at the same time credible and scientific books about specialized subjects for non-specialists. Unfortunately, we have few such intermediary circles in Iran, and this in a way reflects the fact that we have separate scientific departments and disciplines in Iran, and where these are supposed to connect, such a connection does not happen. Regarding the second part of your question, I should also say that books introducing the philosophy of science for empirical science students are usually written by philosophers of science, but these philosophers have in many cases themselves had education in one of the empirical science disciplines and are therefore familiar with both domains, although their primary professional work is engagement with philosophy.

So, ultimately, for the philosophical examination of the presuppositions of science, can one speak of a dominant "method"?

This is a difficult question. In the philosophy of science, we do not have something called a dominant method. In principle, we do not have such a thing in philosophy. Different schools and styles of philosophizing disagree about what the correct style and method of philosophical examination of a subject is, and each proposes a method that is more compatible with their theoretical foundations and philosophical perspective. For this reason, we have different approaches to the philosophical examination of the presuppositions of science and scientific work. In the human sciences and philosophy, one cannot use a single textbook that has stated the dominant method and style. Here we are faced with different schools, and as a result, the student needs to read a selection of the writings and works of great thinkers, and not necessarily a single textbook that has explained only one perspective. So, in answer to your question, I submit that the diversity of philosophical perspectives on science (the analytical view, the phenomenological view, the descriptive and social view, etc.) is part of the rule of the game in the world of philosophy, and this matter must certainly be taken into account in education and educational books as well.

Before we turn to the book A Philosophical Introduction to the Cognitive Sciences, if you agree, let us define a few key keywords that not only help us better understand the book, but also encompass part of the concern for the importance of interdisciplinary studies in this conversation. Let us start with the definition of cognitive psychology.

 Of course, I should first say that my specialty is not cognitive science, and if I say anything, it is mostly the result of personal study and, naturally, there is much room for debate in it. Cognitive psychology can be considered a branch and part of the science of psychology that seeks to study mental processes, such as perception, the use of language, remembering, categorizing, problem-solving, and so on. In other words, the study of those phenomena that we generally label "cognitive." Such study is generally carried out by conducting experiments on human subjects and collecting data from them, with the aim of seeing how the human cognitive system acquires cognitive information from the external world and what patterns are observed in performing cognitive tasks. I should also mention that drawing a clear line between cognitive psychology and cognitive science is not very precise or universally agreed upon. But perhaps cognitive science can be considered a broader and more interdisciplinary field that, besides cognitive psychology, is also involved with other sciences such as neuroscience, computer science, philosophy of mind, physiology, linguistics, anthropology, artificial intelligence, and so on, and may even sometimes deal with non-human subjects. In any case, however, significant overlaps are often seen between the methods, theories, and findings of these two fields.

 With these preliminaries, we can address our main keyword. Please define cognitive science for us in terms of its subject matter, method, and research goal.

As I said, cognitive psychology is the science of examining and describing cognitive phenomena and patterns in human subjects, but cognitive science attempts to "explain" these phenomena, in the sense of identifying the neural, discursive, physiological, and other mechanisms that cause the emergence of the phenomena and patterns whose description cognitive psychology has provided us.

What are the areas of intersection and divergence between cognitive psychology and cognitive science?

Of course, as I said, drawing a precise boundary is not possible, and the interdisciplinary nature of these sciences does not require it. But for a better understanding, the contrast between cognitive psychology and applied psychology can be illuminating. Cognitive psychology, through the experiments I mentioned, acquires data and descriptions of psychological phenomena related to cognition. In applied psychology, this data is used for clinical treatments. In cognitive science, an attempt is made to discover the causes that give rise to such phenomena and data, based on the fundamental assumption that there must be hardware and neural causes for all software and mental phenomena.

What is the relationship between philosophy and cognitive science? More precisely, on what subjects do these two macro and micro domains interact?

Cognitive science, as I mentioned, has an interdisciplinary nature, and one of the disciplines involved in it is philosophy, especially the philosophy of science and mind. Cognitive science is related to the philosophy of science because it claims and strives to be a "scientific" discipline, so it needs to be clarified what meaning of being "scientific" it has in mind and how this meaning affects methodology and theorizing in this field; but the philosophy of mind is also influential. The common subject of philosophy of mind and cognitive science is the examination of cognitive-mental phenomena, so it is clear that your philosophical position on the nature of the mind and how it interacts with the body can influence your research path in cognitive science. For example, if you are a strict materialist and consider every mental state to be nothing but a physical and brain state, you will have a different research program in cognitive science than if, for instance, you adhere to functionalism regarding the mind or fundamentally consider the mind and mindedness to be a social and discursive phenomenon. As it happens, Rom Harré, in this very book A Philosophical Introduction to the Cognitive Sciences, has addressed both of these intersections of the philosophy of science and mind with cognitive science.

Should we consider cognitive science a part or subset of the broader domain of the philosophy of science?

No. Cognitive science is a first-order activity, meaning it seeks to study phenomena in the natural world. The philosophy of science is a second-order activity, and its subject is the examination, conceptualization, and philosophical study of scientific endeavors undertaken to understand nature. The relationship between cognitive science and the philosophy of science is the same as the relationship between other sciences (such as biology) and the philosophy of science. With the sole caveat that parts of philosophy (not the philosophy of science) themselves address the subject of "mind" (such as the philosophy of mind), and as I said, these parts can have a thematic and possibly methodological entanglement with cognitive science.

If we consider the common ground and point of connection between cognitive psychology and philosophy to be the study of mind, thinking, or cognition, we know that in ancient times, philosophy alone bore the burden of defining and explaining these subjects. Today, in interaction with cognitive psychology and the cognitive sciences, how does philosophy examine cognition or thinking?

Let me give a specific example to answer your question more easily. In the philosophy of mind, we have various views and schools of thought in analyzing the nature of the mind and examining its relationship with the brain and body. For instance, we have a kind of dualism attributed to Descartes, which considers the mind or soul to be something entirely distinct from matter and a non-material entity. In this conception, the domain and realm of the mental possesses independence and self-sufficiency and can even exist independently of matter. If we accept this perspective and conception, then one of the assumed principles in cognitive science—according to which every cognitive and mental phenomenon must have a cerebral, neural, and material realizer—will face a challenge, because dualism tells us that a mind without a body is possible. Now, if we take the findings of cognitive science and neuroscience seriously, which support the thesis that every cognitive state has a neural and material realizer and basis, then if we still wish to defend a kind of dualism, we must turn to readings and versions in which there is no talk of a non-material substance of the mind. This means we must turn to non-Cartesian dualisms. If I want to summarize my point, I must say that our philosophical view of the mind must be compatible and consistent with our empirical findings in cognitive science and neuroscience. The findings and theories from each of these two domains must be used in the other so that we can ultimately claim to have a comprehensive view of the phenomenon of mindedness.

Let me ask a specific question following the previous one: generally and broadly speaking, which disciplines study the domain of cognition or thinking?

Apart from the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, there is psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, brain studies, anthropology, archaeology, and many other disciplines, each of which addresses cognition and thinking from the perspective of its own field.

Rom Harré, in the introduction to his book Cognitive Science: A Philosophical Introduction, writes: "The program set out in this work for describing the cognitive sciences is a realist one, in which the well-established methods of physics, chemistry, biology, and geology are used, so that by this means one can go beyond what is perceived by the senses and reach the deeper realms of material reality." From the author's statements, it appears that he has positioned the realist view in opposition to the positivist view. Now, two questions arise. First, what exactly does Harré mean by realism in the sciences he names?

Yes, this is an important point. In fact, one of the distinguishing features of this book from some other works in the field of cognitive science is precisely the author's commitment to and emphasis on a kind of realism. Even as noted in the translators' introduction, Harré, upon entering the field of psychology and the social sciences in the 1970s, was surprised at why there was such an emphasis in these domains on following the physical sciences, and particularly its instrumentalist and anti-realist variety. In the philosophy of natural science, Harré defends a moderate realism and argues that in scientific work we go beyond mere empirical and observational data, entering the domain and realm of unobservables, and even theorize about the relations between them and their nature. According to his view, such unobservable entities and the judgments issued about them in science should be considered as possessing truth and correctness, although one must simultaneously acknowledge the possibility of their being erroneous. Regardless of the technical details of such a position, Harré wants to maintain such a framework in the domain of cognitive science and psychology as well. In practice, this means that what are posited as unobservable entities in these sciences are real, the world is larger than merely observable matters, and the cognitive scientist should have no fear of positing unobservable entities. The reliability of our judgments in this domain is due to the fact that they say something true or relatively true about unobservable entities. Harré's point is that when the physical sciences themselves have such a style and method in doing science, why should the human, social, and cognitive sciences be more Catholic than the Pope and limit themselves only to observable matters and various forms of behaviorism and positivism?

Another question that can be asked about the above lines is whether cognitive science itself does not have an independent program or specific research methods?

Regarding this part of your question, I must say that Harré does not deny that cognitive science has its own independent methods, and he even emphasizes it. His point is that whatever these methods may be, the achievements and judgments resulting from their application can be viewed within a realist framework.

So, to make this part of the conversation more precise, let me also ask this specific question: the author's position is that for the "scientific extension of cognition, we refer to the philosophy of natural science as a guide to practice." What does he mean by a guide to practice?

That is, the very point I mentioned: natural scientists do not limit themselves to the realm of observable matters. So why should human, cognitive, and social scientists who claim to follow the natural sciences do so?

The author states in the introduction that four main disciplines are considered and examined in this book, which are: philosophy of science, discursive or naturalistic psychology, cognitive psychology, and modeling thought using methods derived from artificial intelligence. We did not address discursive or naturalistic psychology earlier. If possible, could you first define it and explain the main difference between this branch of psychology and cognitive psychology?

Introducing discursive psychology, alongside scientific realism, is Harré’s second innovation in this book. His main idea is that in order to understand and analyze many, or even all, cognitive phenomena, one must pay attention to the fact that there are judgments and evaluations concerning these phenomena; that is, if a certain cognitive phenomenon is performed in a particular way, we consider it correct and acceptable, and if performed in another way, we deem it incorrect and unacceptable. The example of “remembering” is a good one. The phenomenon of memory is subject to normative evaluation; meaning, if we remember a specific thing in manner A, such remembering is correct, and if we remember it in manner B, it will be incorrect. But Harré’s point is that these criteria for evaluating correctness and incorrectness regarding cognitive phenomena are local, situated, and discursive criteria; that is, for instance, in a specific context and a specific community, there is a discursive agreement on what kind of remembering is considered correct, whereas in another context and another community of users, different criteria for correct remembering are agreed upon. What serves as the criterion for correct remembering in the context of a courtroom and the discourse of law and judgment is not the criterion for correct remembering in the context of defining personal memories and the discourse of a friendly gathering. It is this very point that Harré calls the discursive aspect of cognitive phenomena. Cognitive acts and phenomena always occur within a discursive framework, and consequently, their comprehensive analysis cannot be merely neurological and physiological. Physiological realizers do not impose values, correctness, and incorrectness. Normative, evaluative matters, and those pertaining to judgment, originate from the social world and the discourses in which individuals participate. For this reason, Harré repeatedly emphasizes throughout the book that cognitive science is inherently a hybrid and integrative discipline, in which at least three discourses are simultaneously present: the molecule-centered discourse, the organism-centered discourse, and the person-centered discourse. This means it is necessary to link the achievements of physics and chemistry with the achievements of biology and physiology, and ultimately with the achievements of psychology and discourse analysis.

I can also pose another question in continuation of this discussion of Harré, which relates to two important terms in his research; what do “intentionality” – based on your translation, of course – and “normativity” mean, and why is it necessary to address them in the cognitive sciences?

Yes, as you said, your question follows directly from my previous remarks. Harré says that when we look at mental and cognitive phenomena, we see two well-known characteristics in them. One is that many of them are “about” something; for example, my thoughts and beliefs are about things in the external world, or the signs I use represent things and are about those things. This is the intentional aspect, or the problem of aboutness or directedness. On the other hand, as I mentioned, my cognitive acts and actions are subject to correctness and incorrectness and normative evaluations. One type of remembering is incorrect, and another type is correct. This is the normative aspect of the mind and cognitive phenomena. Harré’s argument, which occupies parts of the book, is that these two aspects of the human mind cannot be explained solely through the discourse of neuroscience and biology, or solely through modeling cognitive phenomena based on artificial intelligence patterns. His proposal is that it is the discursive and social dimension of mind and cognition that explains such phenomena. To what extent Harré himself has succeeded in presenting a hybrid and integrative scheme for the cognitive sciences is another point that readers can judge for themselves, but in my opinion, introducing discursive and collective dimensions into the cognitive sciences is a very important point that distinguishes Harré’s project from that of many other researchers.

Who, in your view, is the primary audience for this work, and for which intellectual group is this work most beneficial?

This book can be useful for students of all disciplines that contribute to the cognitive sciences; including students of psychology (especially cognitive psychology), philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and the philosophy of science.

Although the book begins with the author's concise and useful note on using the book in the classroom, do you think A Philosophical Introduction to the Cognitive Sciences can serve as a handbook? That is, a book that someone interested in this field could study on their own?

This book is of the textbook variety, meaning it can serve as the core text for a course. A textbook usually requires an instructor or professor to teach it, clarifying ambiguous points during the teaching process, emphasizing certain sections, providing students with resources for further study, and so on. I think if someone reads this book on their own, they will certainly gain useful information, but in any case, the book was written for teaching.

In your opinion, do we have any suitable authored works in the field of cognitive sciences, or not? If not, what do you think are the main reasons for this?

As I mentioned, I am not a specialist in the field of cognitive science and cannot make a proper judgment. As far as I know, there are centers and faculties in Iran that offer this discipline, and we have specialists in Iran whose research is published internationally, but as far as I know, we do not have a textbook authored by an Iranian. I am not certain, but from what I have seen, this is the case. Perhaps the reason is students' use of English texts or the newness of this field in the Iranian university system, for which we still lack an authored book.

.

---

.

A Philosophical Introduction to the Human Sciences: A Conversation with Hossein Sheikh Rezaei

Interviewer: Monireh Panjtani

Published in Issue 144 of the Scientific-Specialized Quarterly of Hekmat va Marefat Information

.

---

.