Exclusive Sedanet Interview with Hossein Dabbagh, Part Two (Happiness and the Meaning of Life)

What is meant by the meaning of the meaning of life? / Faith is not a phenomenon that appears to a person once and for all and remains forever / It is not only theists who can discover cosmic meaning; such meaning can also be found by atheists and non-theists / Perhaps the meaning of life in its everyday and local sense can be revived with psychological methods and recommendations / I have so far been unable to find a justified reason for the meaningfulness of life in its universal or cosmic sense / My philosophical conjecture is that if an intrinsic meaning for the cosmos can be conceived, this meaning must likely lie outside the bounds of physics and matter / I imagine it is somewhat difficult to say that cosmic life is definitely and certainly meaningless / Unawareness and agnosticism about cosmic meaning have a very important philosophical requisite, and that is "hope" / Proving life after death is, I think, not such a simple matter. All that we can ultimately resort to philosophically is an argument against physicalism. That is, by rejecting physicalism, we open a window toward spiritualism.

Hossein Dabbagh* Institute for Cognitive Science Studies

Happiness, Well-being, and the Meaning of Life

Continuing our discussion on suicide, I think the issue of life's meaningfulness is highly relevant and important. It seems our conception of the meaning of life is also very influential in our conception of suicide. Is life inherently meaningful?

One could perhaps say that in recent years, one of the most frequent topics addressed by analytic philosophers has been the discussion of the meaning of life. The vast volume of articles and books written in this field testifies to this claim. In harmony with these same philosophers, it can be claimed that the era we live in is an era of a crisis of meaning. History has shown that humanity has been humiliated at least twice so far: once when it learned that the world it inhabits is not the center of the universe, and the second time when it understood its lineage traces back to apes. Alongside these, the current age, with its new coordinates (from politics to the environment), has created issues and afflictions for human beings that have jeopardized the meaning of life. Both philosophers and non-philosophers alike perhaps ponder whether our current life, under current conditions, is worth living or not. And, to put it more simply, whether it is meaningful or not. You asked whether life is meaningful "in itself." This qualifier "in itself" that you used is a very important qualifier, and I will try, as much as possible, to give a fitting answer to your question considering this qualifier. Of course, I am sure you do not expect that in an interview I can clarify the matter of this extremely abstruse question and wrap it up.

The question of the meaning of life, in the formulation we have before us today, was perhaps not present among the ancients or past philosophers. Even when we look at more recent centuries, for example at figures like Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Sartre, and Camus, who spoke to some extent about the futility of life, we do not encounter this new type of formulation of the problem. That is, it is as if the question of life's meaningfulness, in an analytic-philosophical form, was not posed to them. They wrote more about the absurdity and futility of life, and the question of what meaningfulness even means was not present in their minds. But the question we face is this: Can a reason for life's meaningfulness be found? Can something be done to make life meaningful? And fundamentally, what is the meaning of meaning? Interestingly, despite all the importance the discussion of the meaning of life holds, some analytic philosophers consider this question to be fundamentally baseless and believe that engaging with such questions is a waste of time. The reason is that these philosophers believe knowing or not knowing the answer to this dreadful question! has no effect on people's lives. Life is nothing but these daily tasks we perform, and it does not matter whether we know it is meaningful or not. I do not, of course, intend to argue with this group of philosophers here, although I imagine that even not addressing such a weighty question still requires philosophizing. Therefore, with your permission, I will assume that the question of life's meaningfulness currently holds philosophical importance, and we, as human beings who "think," must somehow determine our position on this question. You see, the question of the meaning of life is, in a way, a question about two key concepts and their relationship: one is the concept of life, and the other is the concept of meaning. On the one hand, we must show what life means, and on the other hand, we must clarify what we mean by meaning, or in the philosophers' terms, "the meaning of meaning." Let me begin with the simpler point, namely meaningfulness. I think I do not need much argument to tell you that when we ask about the meaning of life and inquire, "What is the meaning of life?", this question is grammatically and syntactically very different from the question we ask when we inquire about the meaning of a specific word in a dictionary; for example, "What does qalandar mean?". It is natural that the word "meaning" in these two questions is a homonym, and the interpretation of "meaning" in the question "Is life meaningful?" differs greatly from the interpretation of "meaning" in the question "What does the word qalandar mean?". The truth is that we could, philosophically, spend a great deal of time on the question of what the meaning of meaning is. I could, for example, defend a pragmatist theory in the philosophy of language and employ it to provide a suitable answer to this question. Or I could draw on a metaphorical conception and interpret meaningfulness. But allow me to set aside these philosophical scrutinies and dissections, which I certainly believe are very good, for a moment and offer a simple conception of meaningfulness. I think that when we ask about the meaning of meaning in the discussion of the meaning of life, our intention and what we mean by meaningfulness is one of these three things: "importance," "value," or "purpose." That is, when we ask about the meaning of life, we are sometimes asking about the "importance of life"; sometimes we speak of the "value of life"; sometimes we target the "purpose and end of life." This is, of course, not a point I have arrived at myself. Many philosophers, such as John Cottingham, Julian Baggini, Susan Wolf, and Terry Eagleton, who have written about the meaning of life, believe that when we discuss the meaning of life, what we mean by "the meaning of meaning" must likely be one of these matters. Although one can easily conceive of differences between importance, value, and purpose, I will employ a combination of these three here. That is, the meaning of life, in my view, relates to something (or must be sought in a matter) that is firstly important, secondly this importance is valuable, and thirdly this valuable importance can be considered as the purpose (of that matter). Thus, when I speak of meaningfulness here, I mean a combination of the three meanings above, and I imagine that, at least at first glance, there is no fundamental objection to this conception.

خب به مفهوم بعدی یعنی «زندگی» بپردازیم. زندگی یعنی چه؟ به گمانم می توان اینجا از دو قسم زندگی سخن گفت. ما یک وقت راجع به زندگی صحبت می‌کنیم و مقصودمان همین زندگی روزمره و فعالیت های روزانه ماست. این یک معنای بسیار ساده و تحت اللفظی از زندگی است. در این تلقی حداقلی شاید بتوان گفت که زندگی همان «زنده» بودن است. شما مادامی که «زنده» هستید و با همین امور روزمره گلاویز می‌شوید گویی دارید زندگی می‌کنید. اجازه دهید من این معنا از زندگی را معنای محلی (local) بنامم. این معنای حداقلی را ما خواسته یا ناخواسته تا به الان در همین کره خاکی تجربه کرده ایم. با این حساب، پرسش از معنای زندگی در یک تلقی می تواند مربوط به معنای همین زندگی روزمره باشد. اما یک وقتی هم هست که مقصود ما از زندگی، این زندگی روزمره یا محلی نیست بلکه مقصود پیچیده تر و وسیع تری در نظر ماست که کلیت این عالم یا کیهان را در بر می گیرد. در این تلقی اتفاقا زندگی این جهانی چندان مد نظر نیست بلکه نسبت زیست ما با کل هستی، خلقت و آفرینش در ذهن ماست. اجازه دهید این معنا از زندگی را من معنای جهانشمول universal)) بنامم. در این معنای جهانشمول کلیت کیهان اهمیت دارد و ما معناداری را تنها به این کره خاکی محدود نمی کنیم. اگر این تقسیم بندی بنده را بپذیرید، آنگاه سوال از معنای زندگی بر دو قسم می‌شود: در تلقی اول وقتی از معنادار بودن زندگی سوال می‌کنیم مرادمان از زندگی همین زندگی روزمره است. در تلقی دوم مراد از زندگی، کل این کیهان و نسبت ما با این کیهان است. در هر دو تلقی هم مقصودمان از معنا اهمیت، ارزش و غایت است. پس اجازه بدهید به ترتیب به این دو سوال پاسخ دهم.

Let us begin with a simpler question and ask: what is the importance (value and purpose) of everyday life? The truth is that I think we can give a fitting answer to this question by appealing to what moral philosophers have said about the concept of "goodness." As it happens, these philosophers do not differ much on this matter and have answered this question using various terminologies. Instead of addressing the meaningfulness of this-worldly life and asking how this life can be made meaningful, these moral philosophers have answered the question of how to have a better life, or in more precise philosophical terms, what we should do to have a "good" life. The term "good" here is, of course, an important and philosophical term. Setting aside the various theories about the meaning of "good," the "goodness" of life can loosely be considered here as equivalent to the value and importance of life. Moral philosophers have spoken at great length about the meaning of "good." From Aristotle, David Ross, and G. E. Moore to T. M. Scanlon, John Broome, and Daniel Kahneman, all have offered different theories about "goodness." Although these philosophers disagree about the "rightness" of moral judgments, they do not doubt the "goodness" of many common things in this world and are of one mind and one heart with each other. These good things upon which philosophers agree are, in my belief, the very things that can make our everyday life meaningful. You only need to take a glance at the history of moral philosophy and ask the great figures of moral philosophy what things are good. The answers you will hear will probably be these: love, art, beauty, knowledge, forgiveness, pleasure (sex, children, food), and so on. These are things that many philosophers have referred to in their theories as "intrinsic goods." That is, things that are good in themselves and do not need anything else to become good. There is another good thing among them that is greatly emphasized by utilitarian philosophers and, it seems to me, requires special attention. Utilitarians generally, in their discussions, designate and strongly emphasize happiness (felicity) and well-being as one of the intrinsic goods. That is, when you ask utilitarians what things are good things, some of them, alongside art, knowledge, and perhaps pleasurable things, will tell you happiness and well-being, and they place these two at the top of all things. Some philosophers and thinkers, for the sake of ease, generally use happiness and well-being in the same sense; even in English, these two concepts are sometimes used equivalently. But in my opinion, these two concepts have an important philosophical difference that should not be overlooked. Theories of happiness generally see happiness as a mental state that seeks something in the physical world; for this reason, these theories are one-dimensional and are more in pursuit of improving life satisfaction. But theories of well-being, which are generally also psychological theories, see well-being as a psycho-mental state. These theories are multi-dimensional and are more in pursuit of attaining positive emotions (of which happiness is one), stable relationships, meaning-making, and so on. This distinction is important because, in my belief, some mistakenly use happiness as equivalent to the meaning of life. One might claim that the practice of well-being makes life meaningful, but there is no necessary relationship between happiness and the meaning of life. Why? I think one can simply imagine a life that is meaningful but in which there is no happiness, or imagine a life accompanied by happiness in which there is no meaning. For example, some believe that, as it happens, the meaningfulness of life is summed up in suffering, and the more suffering you endure in life, the more meaningful your life will be. For figures like Buddhists and Ghazali, it is the experience of suffering that makes life meaningful. It is clear that in such a life, happiness in the common sense of joy does not have the upper hand. On the other hand, you can even be cheerful and happy in your life, yet your life may not be meaningful. A simple and oft-repeated example is wealthy individuals who have financial means and are happy on the surface but are hollow inside. Psychologists have made a very good distinction between the meaning of life and happiness, to which I believe philosophers should also pay attention. Psychological experiments have shown that happiness and contentment in this life (in its local sense) are more associated with gathering and taking, and precisely opposite to that, the meaning of life depends more on giving and detaching. In a mystical interpretation, happiness is more associated with "self-centeredness," and the meaning of life with "selflessness."

When you accumulate money, it may make you happier and strengthen your subjective state of happiness, but it does not necessarily increase the meaning in your life. Psychologists believe that when you give something of yourself away (or, in religious terms, give alms, endow, or donate to charity...), your life will, in fact, become more meaningful. Thus, meaning in life and happiness do not necessarily move in the same direction. As it happens, you may find someone who is both happy and finds life meaningful. Conversely, you can find someone who is happy yet has a meaningless life, or who is unhappy yet has a meaningful life.

Let us return to the question of the meaning of life in its local sense. I have so far tried to show, following many moral philosophers, that we can at least speak to some extent of meaningfulness in our everyday lives if we resort to the list of goods they have provided. These goods tell us, at least empirically, that a minimally meaningful life is possible. I have also shown that the meaning of life is not necessarily always synonymous and coincident with happiness.

But let us move on to the next question, which is a more difficult one. That is, let us ask whether life is meaningful in its universal and cosmic sense as well. It is here that, in addition to ethical discussions, the discussion of philosophy of religion and theology must also be taken into account. It is very likely that someone’s everyday life is meaningful, yet they have still not been able to find their relationship and their life’s relationship with this cosmos and existence meaningful. That is, while they consider everyday life to have temporary value and purpose, they regard the totality of this existence and cosmos as valueless and without an ultimate end. For example, imagine someone who, upon seeing the evils in this world (such as losing their child to cancer), finds their metaphysical relationship with this existence shattered and suddenly sees themselves without shelter, and meaning disappears from their life. That is, both the meaning of life in its local, everyday conception is endangered, and the meaning of life in its cosmic, universal conception. Perhaps such a person can revive the meaning of life in its everyday, local conception through psychological methods and recommendations, but the meaning of life in its cosmic conception is not necessarily revived through psychological advice. It is natural that when such a person seeks a cosmic meaning of life, some of the matters raised in the philosophy of religion and theology will manifest in their mind. You might tell me that only theists can discover cosmic meaning, and such meaning is not found among atheists and non-theists. The truth is that I disagree with such a view. Both the religious and the irreligious can experience the eclipse of the divine at moments in life. Yes, it is true that most religious people believe the cosmic meaning of life is summed up in God, but this does not mean that religious people necessarily find cosmic life meaningful. Faith is not a category that appears to a person once and for all and remains forever. Faith is so intertwined with our spiritual and existential states that it waxes and wanes with the ups and downs of human existence. Religious people are undoubtedly not exempt from this rule by virtue of being human. Nor is it the case that atheists and non-theists necessarily find life meaningless. It suffices to look at history and see, for example, that Marxists, who were often atheists, thought—rightly or wrongly—that a meaning was attached to this existence and cosmic life, and that its meaning was summed up in history, and this very dynamism and the vicissitudes of history were their meaning. Or if we sit with naturalist Darwinists, we see that they see the end, value, and importance of this existence as nothing but evolution. I do not now wish to examine whether their arguments were correct or not; what is important here is that these atheists or non-theists could attain a kind of meaning of life in its cosmic and universal conception. In truth, these individuals forged the meaning and end of existence and the cosmos with their theorizing.

With this preamble, how can one attain cosmic meaning? In my belief, there is one important point here that can help us in reaching a final answer for the meaningfulness of cosmic life. I told you above that regarding the meaning of everyday life in its local conception, there is almost a kind of consensus and unanimity among moral philosophers and masters of the field. But such a thing does not occur regarding the meaning of life in its universal or cosmic conception. On the contrary, here consensus is very scarce and disagreement abounds. Some resort to the concept of God, some to the concept of history, some to the concept of evolution, and so on. These disagreements, if they do nothing else, have at least one epistemic consequence, and that is that they make a person humble in their own opinion. That is, if someone thinks they have a strong reason for cosmic life being meaningful, these disagreements teach them to somewhat reduce the firmness of their reasons and to consider the rival’s claims as reasonable as well (provided, of course, that they are reasonable!)

Let me confess honestly here that, up to this very moment as I am speaking with you, I have not been able to find a justified reason for the meaningfulness of life in its universal or cosmic sense. Philosophically, I can hardly claim that life in this existence is meaningful in and of itself and intrinsically. Of course, I must also confess that I cannot say definitively that life in the cosmic sense is not intrinsically meaningful in some way. I do not deny that one can conceive of an intrinsic meaning for cosmic life, but in my view, this intrinsic meaning, even if it exists, is at least beyond the realm of our perception. It is as if meaning is seated somewhere, looking at us. It is like death, which you do not experience until it seizes you. If I may use Kantian terms, I think this intrinsic meaning of life is like something that lies at the boundaries of this world; like the noumenon, to which our phenomenal perception has no access. Individuals such as John Cottingham have apparently found a way into this realm of noumenal perception and believe that one can conceive of an intrinsic meaning for cosmic life, such as a divine plan that exists solely with God. It is as if God has considered an order and a purpose for this cosmos and existence. How we can become informed and aware of that plan, what the purpose of this universe is, is, of course, another matter. I, unfortunately or fortunately, have not yet gained access to that divine plan and do not know whether there is meaning in and of itself for this cosmos and cosmic life! Allow me to add this point and conclude my remarks. Despite seeing myself as skeptical regarding the issue of the cosmic meaning of life, I have a philosophical hunch. My philosophical hunch is that if an intrinsic meaning for the cosmos can be conceived, this meaning must likely be beyond the bounds of physics and matter. For this reason, I think that physicalism and materialism have a difficult path to providing a plausible theory of meaningfulness. I can hardly accept the theories of Darwinists, Marxists, and materialists for the meaning of cosmic life.

Let me summarize my remarks. I divided your question into two parts. On one hand, I spoke of meaning as the purpose, goal, value, and significance of everyday life, and I said that if I am asked what the value, significance, and goal of this everyday life is, I will answer that this everyday life is meaningful and has an intrinsic meaning, and this intrinsic meaning consists of the intrinsic goods I enumerated for you. But the second part of the question pertains to the significance, goal, and value of life in the cosmic sense. I said that, considering the various metaphysical theories presented in this field, I have not yet come to believe that these theories can inform us of the intrinsic meaning of cosmic life. Of course, I did not reject or deny it either, and I left open the possibility that such a meaning exists. I also concluded my remarks with a hunch, which was that, in my belief, if an intrinsic meaning exists, it is likely beyond this matter and physics.

What exactly do you mean by the meaning of life? The purpose, value, or function of life? What do you mean by value and significance?

As I mentioned, the meaning of life, as many philosophers have stated—and I certainly agree with them—generally comes down to one of these three things: significance, value, and purpose or goal. That is, the question of the meaning of "the meaning of life" can be reduced to these questions: Does life have significance in itself? Does life have value worth living in itself? Can a purpose and goal be conceived for this life? The question of the significance of life is, in truth, a question about what characteristics can make a life important. The question of the value of life is also, in fact, a question about the things that make life valuable. Naturally, each of these questions can be addressed independently. In this interview, to advance the argument, I have intertwined these three questions and assumed as if I am facing a single question. Although it is difficult, perhaps someone could imagine that life is significant but not worth living, or that life is not significant and has no value but has a purpose. I have temporarily set aside these divisions.

In the discussion of local meaning of life, it seems we have somewhat distanced ourselves from the original question, namely the value and significance of life, in the sense that what is the importance of good things at all? Why and how has this list that philosophers have provided been linked to the meaning of life (the value and significance of life)? Whereas it seems this list has been offered for getting through life, or better to say, for dragging the burden of the body. To elaborate further, I can say that with this explanation, the original question still remains in full force! What is the importance of applying these things at all? By applying these things, do we discover the meaning of life or do we construct it?

Of course, this list is a proposal for a better or good life. This list of goods helps us, at least to a large extent, to drag the burden of the body, to use your phrase, more easily in this everyday life. But why speaking of this list can answer the question of the meaning of life is, I think, somewhat clear: the effort for a better, easier, and good life can psychologically lead to making life more meaningful. Essentially, the importance of good things lies in the fact that through their inculcation and repetition, life becomes psychologically better, and a better life will most likely be more meaningful. It was for this reason that I mentioned above that the question of the meaning of life can be loosely considered the question of good things. I say loosely because, as I showed, at times one can have a pleasant and good life that is empty of meaning.

But as to whether we discover the meaning of everyday life, or in other words the list of goods, or construct it, I have deliberately remained silent. That is, my theory about the meaning of everyday life is indifferent to the category of construction and discovery and can ally itself with either. If you are a thoroughgoing realist in ethics and believe that moral values really exist somewhere out there in this world, then the meaning of life and the list of goods will be a matter of discovery for you. But this does not mean that the meaning of life and the list of goods cannot be constructed. If you are not a realist and suppose that the meaning of life and the list of goods do not exist in the heart of this world, but rather we humans are compelled to create them, then you will pursue construction. Regardless of what judgment I personally might have on this matter, the theory of the list of goods can kindly accompany both groups of realists and non-realists. What is important here is believing in a list of "objective" and intersubjective goods. For example, at one end of the spectrum, you encounter realist philosophers like Nagel, Scanlon, and Parfit who emphasize this objective list; on the other hand, non-realist philosophers such as Singer and Sinnott-Armstrong justify such an objective list.

I think the meaninglessness of cosmic life will not be without effect on our conception of the meaningfulness of local life; if we find cosmic life meaningless, it seems to me we will automatically find local life meaningless as well. In other words, if this whole (cosmic life) is meaningless, the part (local life) also appears meaningless. Will not cosmic meaninglessness affect the meaninglessness of local life?

Undoubtedly, cosmic meaninglessness affects our local, everyday lives. As I mentioned above, someone who loses heart for metaphysics and sees the universe as blind and deaf is very likely to find their everyday life darkened. But this does not mean there is a necessary relationship between cosmic meaninglessness and local meaninglessness. That is, it is not the case, as you put it, that as soon as someone finds the cosmos meaningless, meaning suddenly vanishes from their everyday life. Look, the issue of the meaning of local, everyday life has a deep and firm connection with our psyche and psychology. This matter is important because one can imagine someone who is completely indifferent to cosmic meaning, yet psychological (cognitive) doctrines, methods, and techniques provide and furnish the meaning of their everyday life. This claim of mine is an empirical claim. Let me tell you frankly, I know friends among the seminary students of Qom who, after philosophical-theological studies, became so unsettled and their existential states so altered that they abruptly closed the gates of metaphysics, and the universe became blind and deaf to them. Many of these individuals, unfortunately, became depressed and neurotic. But the important point is that these same individuals, after a while, somehow made peace and were able to overcome their depression to some extent. These individuals made peace even though they had lost their belief in metaphysics; some others tried to reclaim their lost belief, but who does not know that "a faith that is questioned is no longer the former faith"?

But historically, too, one can point to many philosophers who consider cosmic life meaningless, or are at least agnostic about this category, yet theorize about the meaningfulness of local or everyday life and think one can strive earnestly about one while remaining silent or unconvinced about the other. Conversely, one might even name individuals (like certain mystics) who accept cosmic meaning but see everyday meaning as absurd. Consider, for example, the famous American philosopher Thomas Nagel. At one time (1970), he was a serious atheist and considered talk of cosmic meaning extravagant. Moreover, everyday life was absurd to him. But go back a few years (2012) and see that in his book Mind and Cosmos, although he is silent about the meaning of everyday life, he somewhat abandons physicalism. Perhaps in this new conception of his, one can find the possibility of a kind of meaningfulness in the cosmos. In addition, look at the philosophers I named above. Most of these philosophers, like Julian Baggini, although they see everyday life as meaningful and theorize about it, see cosmic meaning as absent and are atheists in their metaphysics.

Now that you have so far found no convincing argument for cosmic meaning of life, it seems to me that, given these circumstances, we are condemned to life in this world! For on one hand, the path to suicide is closed to us, and on the other hand, we are faced with a life or a world overwhelmed by much suffering. We are condemned to endure a life full of suffering and, in the end, "nothing"!

I more or less share your feeling that we are "stuck" in this universe! On one hand, our coming was not by our own choice; on the other hand, our going, although within our power, we are unaware of its future, and perhaps such an act would not be rational. Muslim philosophers have aptly said that this universe has an inherent deficiency; it is as if it lacks something, which is accompanied by suffering. In Suhrawardi's terms, the nature of this universe is mingled with sorrow. But does this mean that our local, everyday life is completely worthless, futile, and purposeless? I don't think so. The fact that we are stuck in this universe and that present life is accompanied by sorrow and suffering cannot be a sufficiently justified reason for this life being worthless and futile. One simple reason is that suffering is not such a bad thing! Sufferings can sometimes give meaning to our lives and provide great motivation for our maturation. I showed above how one can conceive of a life with suffering and sorrow that is, in fact, not futile and is meaningful.

I imagine it is somewhat difficult to say that cosmic life is definitely and certainly meaningless. As I mentioned earlier, ultimately one can only say that they have not yet received any news of cosmic meaning or have not been able to find a reason for its meaningfulness. In other words, this person is relatively agnostic about the meaningfulness of cosmic life, and this agnosticism about cosmic meaning is, of course, very different from agnosticism about the existence of God. One can present a more or less justified argument for the existence of God and even believe that God has probably considered a purpose for this cosmos, but they are unaware of this purpose. The extraordinarily important point, in my belief, is that this unawareness and agnosticism can have a very significant philosophical requisite, and that is "hope." That is, someone who is agnostic about cosmic meaning can hope that one day a meaning will be revealed to them. Hope is one of those very important philosophical-theological-psychological categories whose due is sometimes not given in everyday political rhetoric. For a moment, set aside what is happening in our current political times and think: what does hope mean? Is hope of the nature of belief and considered a cognitive matter? Must having hope always be accompanied by an object? That is, must one always say, "I hope that..."? Or, can hope be considered a non-cognitive matter that, as it happens, has no object? That is, one can say, "I hope; that's all there is to it"; what I hope for is not important. It is this second conception of hope that, in my view, can be defended in the discussion of the meaning of life, and you can find an example of it in the works of Gabriel Marcel. In this non-cognitive conception, although you are agnostic about cosmic meaning, you have "hope" and you are simply hopeful; that is, sheer hope is what matters here. It is not the case that you are hopeful and, in addition, hope that the cosmic meaning or divine plan after this life will be of a specific kind. You are purely hopeful and cultivate this state within your psyche. But if you are asked what you hope for, you will likely have no answer in mind. Nevertheless, because you are hopeful, you do not think that one must spend a lifetime and then, in your words, nothing! The expression "nothing" refers to a kind of certainty that an agnostic hopeful person cannot hold. I suspect Hafez also had such an objectless hope in mind when he said: "No one knew where the beloved's abode is/ This much is certain, that the sound of a bell is coming." Likewise, Nikos Kazantzakis, the famous Greek writer and poet, in the poems he composed about Odysseus, the hero of the Odyssey epic, summarizes the meaning of life in seeking, even though there is no result. That is, it is enough to be hopeful and continue the search even if you do not reach the goal or destination. Sohrab Sepehri perhaps thought the same way when he proclaimed: "It is not our task to know the secret of the red rose/ Perhaps our task is this, to float in the enchantment of the red rose."

In monotheistic religions, the meaning of life is oriented towards the afterlife. It seems that the afterlife gives meaning to every single action and behavior of the faithful.... Now, please state what philosophical problem this description of creation, from a God with these attributes, has? Also, is the meaning of life in this general scheme philosophically defensible? Can the afterlife give meaning to human life?

As I understand it, in monotheistic religions, the meaning of worldly life is based on a kind of otherworldly teleology. That is, when a religious person performs a religious act, they do so according to instructions that religions have prescribed ultimately and finally for the betterment of life after death. What the faithful will experience in the afterlife is a reflection of what they have done in worldly life. In truth, religions try to direct the gaze of religious individuals from this world to another world and show them that the true meaning, importance, value, and ultimate purpose of life is closeness to God, and the meaning of life for the faithful is summed up in God. If the faithful perform their worldly deeds with the intention and for the sake of God, they will have a more desirable afterlife. This picture of human actions and deeds is found even in non-Abrahamic religions (such as Buddhism and Hinduism), because individuals' actions return to them elsewhere.

اما خدایی که عموما ادیان ابراهیمی در توصیف آن کوشیده اند خدایی انسان وار است که دینداران را در آخرت پاداش (یا احیانا عقاب) می دهد. بر طبق مدل ادیان ابراهیمی، خدای انسان وار به قدری در زندگی روزمره دینداران رسوخ و نفوذ می کند که گویی همه اعمال و افعال دینداران برای اوست. چنین خدایی با چنین اوصافی که شما آوردید می تواند به مقدار معتنابهی معنای زندگی دینداران را فراهم کند. اما شاید بپرسید با اینکه خدای ادیان به جهت روان شناختی معنای زندگی را تبیین می کند، به سختی می تواند به جهت فلسفی تلقی موجهی بدست دهد. اگر اثبات چنین اوصافی به جهت فلسفی ممکن نباشد، چگونه می توان معنای زندگی موجهی مبتنی بر آن داشت؟ ببینید اثبات اوصاف چنین خدای انسان واری به جهت فلسفی در حال حاضر در این مصاحبه مد نظر من نیست و بحث مفصلی می طلبد. آنچه مهم است بدست دادن یک تلقی موجه درباره معنای زندگی دینداران ادیان ابراهیمی با توجه به خصیصه حیات پس از مرگ است.

اثبات فلسفی حیات پس از مرگ به گمان من چندان کار ساده ای نیست. تمام آنچه ما نهایتا می توانیم به جهت فلسفی به آن متوسل شویم استدلال علیه فیزیکالیزم است. یعنی با رد فیزیکالیزم پنجره ای به سوی روح انگاری باز کنیم. اما اینکه این روح (بنا به فرض وجود) پس از مرگ چگونه باقی می ماند و چگونه اعمال و رفتار ما از آن متاثر می شود مسئله علی حده ایست. مضاف بر این، ما با تجربه های دینی بسیار گوناگونی مواجهیم که از حیات پس از مرگ خبر می دهد. نکته مهم در میان این تجربه ها وحدت و اشتراک موضوع میان آنهاست. یعنی اکثر این تجربه ها از چیزی و جایی دیگری خبر می دهد. اینکه صورت و شکل این «جای دیگر» به چه شکل است البته در این تجربه ها متفاوت است. از یاد نباید برد که این تجربه های دینی به خودی خود و به تنهایی نمی توانند دلیلی برای حیات پس از مرگ باشد. اگر این تجربه ها بتوانند در مصاف با باقی شهود ها و باورها و دلائل فلسفی-علمی پیروز شوند، جان سالم بدر خواهند برد والا رنگ می بازند و از قوت آنها کم می شود.

اما قبل از اینکه به طور خاص به مسئله حیات پس از مرگ و معنای زندگی بپردازم بگذارید یک امر کلی را در مورد دین و معنای زندگی برای شما روشن کنم. من در مواجهه با مدعیات دینی-متافیزیکی به یک عقلانیت حداقلی قائلم. یعنی لازم نیست برای تک تک مدعیات دینی-متافیزیکی دلیلی ارائه دهیم. همین که دلیلی قطعی علیه مدعیات دینی-متافیزیکی وجود نداشته باشد ما پاس حداقلی عقلانیت را داشته ایم و در دایره عقلانیت باقی مانده ایم. برای مثال فرض کنید فرد دینداری معتقد است باید صبح خود را با برخی اذکار آغاز کند (مثلا نوزده بسم الله) چرا که این عمل او را در مقابل حوادث محفوظ نگه می دارد و به او معنا می دهد. همچنین فرض کنید نتوان دلیل قاطعی علیه این عمل پیدا کرد. با فرض این مقدمات به باور من این فرد تا حد ممکن در دایره عقلانیت باقی مانده است.

برگردیم به بحث از دین و معنای زندگی: با توسل به آنچه در بالا آوردم فرض کنید با هر گونه تصوری که از خدا و اوصاف آن داریم، از خدای ادیان ابراهیمی گرفته تا خدای دئیستی، بتوانیم راهی برای روح انگاری باز کنیم و تجربه های دینی بتوانند نشانه ای-هرچند ضعیف- برای حیات پس از مرگ به ارمغان بیاورند. همچنین فرض کنید نتوان دلیل قاطعی علیه حیات پس از مرگ پیدا کرد. اگر چنین امری شدنی باشد یک فرد دیندار می تواند در دایره عقلانیت باقی بماند و همچنان از معناداری حیات پس از مرگ دفاع کند.

منظورتان از عقلانیت حداقلی چیست؟ همچنین گفتید با نادرست نشان دادن فیزیکالیزم می توان باور به زندگی پس را مرگ را موجه کرد؟ چگونه نادرستی فیزیکالیزم را نشان خواهید داد؟

به اختصار هرچه تمامتر کسی که قائل به عقلانیت حداکثری است معتقد است برای هر باوری باید دلیل موجهی ارائه داد تا بتوان در دایره عقلانیت باقی ماند و آن باور را معقول خواند. برای مثال فرض کنید من باور دارم مغز عموم انسان ها به طور متوسط تقریبا از صد میلیارد نورون تشکیل شده است. چون برای این باور خودم دلیل تجربی دارم، عقلانیت حداکثری باور مرا معقول و موجه می داند. اما فرض کنید من باور دارم اولین انسانی که پا به روی کره زمین نهاده چشمش آبی بوده است. همچنین فرض کنید برای این باور من دلیل موجهی در دست ندارم. عقلانیت حداکثری این باور من را معقول حساب نمی کند و از این حیث من موجه به داشتن چنین باوری نیستم.

اما قائلین به عقلانیت حداقلی در مقابل معتقدند لازم نیست برای هر باوری دلیل ارائه دهیم. همین که دلیل قطعی ای در تخالف با باور ما وجود ندارد ما در دایره عقلانیت باقی مانده ایم. برای مثال فرض کنید من به وجود خدا باور دارم ولی برای این باور خود دلیل مستقلی له آن ندارم. در عین حال تلاش می کنم دلایل گوناگون علیه باور به وجود خدا را به شکل موجهی رد کنم. بر طبق عقلانیت حداقلی در این حالت من در داشتن باور اصلی خود درباره وجود خدا موجه هستم و باور من معقول به حساب می آید. فیلسوفانی مثل درتسکی، آئودی و پوپر مدافع این نوع از عقلانیت اند.

توجه کنید در اینجا من درباره صدق هیچ نگفتم. آنچه در بحث حاضر از اهمیت برخوردار است مسئله توجیه است. یعنی اینکه باور ما صادق است یا نه فعلا مد نظر نیست. آنچه مهم است موجه بودن باور ما طبق مدل های معروف توجیه است. اینکه برای مثال آیا گزاره خدا وجود دارد گزاره صادقی است البته مهم است ولی از آنجا که فعلا دسترسی به صدق این گزاره نداریم تاکید را بر روی توجیه این گزاره می کنیم. شیفت از مسئله صدق به مسئله توجیه از شیفت های مهم در فلسفه دین تحلیلی معاصر محسوب می شود.

اما در مورد فیزیکالیزم: من نگفتم با رد کردن فیزیکالیزم زندگی پس از مرگ موجه می شود. عرض کردم با رد فیزیکالیزم راهی برای روح انگاری باز می شود. اما اینکه روح انگاری می تواند زندگی پس از مرگ را آن هم به شکلی که در ادیان ابراهیمی آمده است موجه کند مسئله دیگری است که من به آن نپرداختم و ترجیح می دهم در این باب سخن نگویم. نادرستی فیزیکالیزم یا ضعیف شدن باور به فیزیکالیزم با استدلالات گوناگونی که فیلسوفان ذهن و معرفت شناسان در این باره آورده اند قابل حصول است. من نمی گویم به راحتی می توان فیزیکالیزم را رد کرد اما دست کم می توان در باور به آن تردید کرد و همین ما را موجه می کند که به بدیل های آن فکر کنیم. از آنجا که بنا نداریم در این مصاحبه کلاس درس فلسفه ذهن بگذاریم! محض پیشنهاد به نظرم کارهای فرنک جکسون، گیلن استراسن، تیموتی ویلیامسن و تامس نیگل در این زمینه خواندنی است و تا حد معقولی می تواند باور به فیزیکالیزم را تضعیف کند. اما اینکه بعد از رد شدن فیزیکالیزم لزوما ما به چه بدیلی خواهیم رسید مسئله فلسفی دیگری است که بحث مستوفی و مستقلی را می طلبد.

در ادیان توحیدی، این دنیا عبث و بیهوده است و دنیای دیگر ارزشمند است. در واقع گویا خلاف نظر فیلسوفانی که شما فرمودید این زندگی محلی است که عبث و بیهوده و زندگی کیهانی است که ارزشمند است. یعنی درست خلاف آنچه شما فرموده اید. برای مثال در قرآن آمده است که دنیا بازیچه و عبث است یا در عهد عتیق آمده است همه چیز دویدن در پی باد بیهوده است... بیهودگی است! همه چیز بیهوده است! این تعارض چگونه مرتفع می شود؟

البته ادیان توحیدی اصالت را به دنیای دیگری می دهند و در مقام ارزش گذاری، ارزش زندگی اخروی را بیشتر و برتر از زندگی دنیوی می دانند. اما این اصلا به این معنا نیست که دنیای حاضر اصلا اصالتی ندارد و به تعبیر دیگر پوچ و بیهوده است. مگر می توان زندگی دنیوی را عبث و پوچ دانست در حالیکه در نظام ادیان توحیدی این دنیا مزرعه آخرت است و قرار است زندگی ما در آن دنیا بازتابی از حال ما در این دنیا باشد. این دنیا، در مدل ادیان توحیدی، با همه بی اصالتی اش یک اصالت دارد و آن هم شان مقدمه بودن آن است. اگر این دنیا مقدمه دنیای دیگر باشد دست کم باید حق مقدمه بودن آن را ادا کرد. به معنایی که رفت، به سختی می توان ادعا کرد زندگی دنیوی بالمره بیهوده است و هیچ شانی ندارد.

اما شاید شما اعتراض کنید در قرآن (سوره انعام، آیه 32) زندگی این دنیا تخفیف آمیز معرفی شده و آن را «بازی و سرگرمی» دانسته است. به عنوان نمونه، مرحوم طباطبایی در تفسیر المیزان لعب را نوعی «سرگرمی به موهومات» دانسته است. بغیر از مرحوم طباطبایی، اکثر تفاسیر نوشته شده بر این آیه «بازی» را امری منفی تلقی کرده اند. حتی جدا از بحث تفسیر قرآن کسی مثل خیام هم وقتی از این هستی خسته می شد گله مند ندا در می داد که «ما لعبتکانیم و فلک لعبت بار/ از روی حقیقتی نه از روی مجاز/ یک چند در این بساط بازی کردیم/ رفتیم به صندوق عدم یک یک باز». می بینید که حتی در نظر خیام بازی کردن امری منفی تلقی شده است. حقیقت اینست که من با این تفسیر از تعبیر «لعب» و «بازی» چندان همدل نیستم. من گمان می کنم در مقابل این تفسیر منفی می توان یک تفسیر «تکاملی» از بازی ارائه داد که از قضا جنبه مثبت مفهوم بازی را برجسته می کند و به بحث ما نحن فیه کمک می کند. همین ابتدا هم عرض کنم بنده هیچ قصد ندارم نشان دهم قرآن با تکامل همخوانی دارد پس خوشا به حال ما. آنچه برای من مهم است ارائه یک تفسیر موجه و غائب در کنار تفاسیر دیگر است.

ببینید اصطلاحی در بحث های مربوط به بیولوژی و خوشبختی مطرح است به نام Joie de Vivre. ژوا دِ ویوره در واقع همان وضعیت خوشی، فرح، طرب، تفریح و بازی است. فیلسوفان، عصب شناسان و جانور شناسان (بالاخص پرایماتولوژیست ها) درباره تکامل مفهوم «بازی» و مزیت بیولوژیکی آن تحقیقات بسیاری کرده اند. به عنوان نمونه، نیکلاس هامفری، فیلسوف دانشگاه کمبریج، در کتاب گَرد روح؛ معجزه آگاهی آورده است که ژوا د ویوره یکی از خصیصه های سازگار با آگاهی ماست و از قضا «بازی» از آن دسته اموری است که می تواند سطح ژوا د ویوره در مغز ما را فعال و فرحناک کند. هامفری معتقد است که گونه ها و انواعی که مغزهای پیچیده تری دارند-مثل انسانها- بازی ها را جدی تر می گیرند و از این حیث شاید لذت بیشتری ببرند. اما نکته جالب اینجاست که بازی کردن فقط مختص آدمیان نیست و حتی حیوانات و پرنده ها نیز در انجام بازی ها با آدمیان مشترک اند. ایزابل ایزکویردو، جانورشناس آکسفوردی اهل شیلی، در تحقیقاتی که بر روی میمون های بانوبو، شبیه ترین گونه به انسان، انجام داده به خوبی نشان داده است که حتی بازی و تفریح در سطوحی از آگاهی آنها نیز یافت می شود.

نکته مهمی که در تفسیر تکاملی از بازی وجود دارد این است که در انجام بازی با اینکه لزوما هدف و غایتی وجود ندارد و محض سرگرمی و تفریح است اما نوعی از معناداری و معنابخشی به زندگی در آن دیده می شود. چرا که به جهت بیولوژیکی نسبتی میان بازی و وضعیت ژوا د ویوره وجود دارد. این تفسیر تکاملی از بازی اتفاقا با آنچه من در بالا درباره خوشبختی و معنای زندگی گفتم همخوانی هم دارد. یعنی از آنجاییکه خوشبختی ربط و نسبتی با معنای زندگی دارد و مفهوم بازی نیز با خوشبختی بی ارتباط نیست، می توان نتیجه گرفت که بازی می تواند موید خوشبختی باشد.

نکته ای که از تورات و سلیمان درباره بیهودگی این عالم فرمودید از تجربه های نابی است که در تورات به سلیمان نسبت داده شده است. شبیه تجربه ای که در انجیل به عیسی مسیح نسبت داده شده است وقتی او در بالای صلیب اظهار یاس و نومیدی می کند و خداوند را به اعتراض می خواند که «خدایا چرا مرا رها کردی؟». با این همه فراموش نباید کرد که موقعیت سلیمان و مسیح در تورات و انجیل بسیار متفاوت است. مسیح پیامبر است اما سلیمان در تورات در نقش یک پادشاه ظاهر شده است و نه نبی. یعنی سلیمانِ پادشاه به این تجربه رسیده که دنیا امری بیهوده است نه سلیمانِ نبی. البته که تجربه سلیمان حتی به عنوان پادشاه امری حائز اهمیت است اما به بحث فعلی ما که درباره دین و معنای زندگی است مربوط نمی شود. آنچه از تجربیاتی مثل سلیمان و عیسی برای ما آشکار می شود این است که حتی اولیاء خداوند هم شاید برای لحظاتی نومید شوند و این عالم را تاریک ببینند چه برسد به دینداران عادی! اما فراموش نباید کرد که نومیدی برای اینان عموما حالتی موقت دارد. یعنی نومیدی به مثابه یک وضعیت ذهنی که در وجود اینان ساکن شود و اقامت کند در نیامده است. مثل تفاوت کسی که عشق به سروقتش می رود و به شکل موقت عاشق می شود و کسی که عشق در وجودش ساکن می شود و اصلا و اساسا فرد عاشقی می شود.

It seems that the afterlife as narrated by Abrahamic religions can at most dissolve the problem of life's purpose, but it cannot resolve the problem of value and function. What is your view?

It seems that, whether we agree or not, Abrahamic religions have, to some extent, settled the matter of life's end and value, and it is precisely this settlement that has exempted many religious people from reflecting on the nature of life and its meaning. Of course, this does not mean that all religious people are like this and do not reflect on this matter. Although Abrahamic religions have not presented worldly life as particularly significant in relation to the afterlife, the purpose of worldly life has been introduced, in a way, within the afterlife, such that the attention, consequence, and end of religious acts are directed toward another world. Likewise, the value of worldly and otherworldly life has been introduced in terms of God's satisfaction and the vision of Him. Of course, this does not mean that anyone who is religious has a meaningful life. Psychologists of religion have shown that most religious people are "happy" and "feel comfort" from having entrusted worldly affairs to the capable hand of the Almighty. But it is difficult to show that all religious people are like this. There is no logical and necessary relationship, in my belief, between religion and the meaning of life. The reason is that the problem of the meaning of life is also a psychological problem and has a complete and thorough relationship with the complex psyche of human beings.

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Exclusive Sedanet Interview with Dr. Hossein Dabbagh | Part Two | Happiness, Well-being, and the Meaning of Life

PDF of Part Two of the Exclusive Sedanet Interview with Dr. Hossein Dabbagh

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