اندیشهفلسفهخردگفتگوحکمتمعناپرسشفرهنگ
In a preliminary critique of Soroush's theory of religion and power, Farhad Shafti challenges the reliance on weak narrations and the interpretation of verses on the triumph of religion, proposing that the concept of 'completing the proof' (itmam al-hujjah), rather than a quest for power, should be the basis for analyzing the Prophet's conduct and the relationship between religion and power.

The esteemed thinker, Dr. Soroush, in his two recent lectures (listen to the first - second) at the Saray-e Goft o Shenoud gatherings, spoke and discussed his latest views on religion and its relationship with power. At the time of writing this piece, both of his talks have been published on social media, and a summary of the first talk is available on the Zeitoon website. In this short article, I have raised some points regarding certain matters expressed in these two talks.
I wish to emphasize at the outset that I have absolutely no intention here of critiquing and examining Dr. Soroush's recent views. Noteworthy critiques of his theory of religion and power have been published so far; however, I believe that this theory, like the theory of the Prophetic Dream, needs time to be gradually further elucidated and refined before it can be examined and critiqued in detail and in full. The purpose of this article is merely a preliminary critique, that is, a very brief and cursory reference to points and perspectives that could be used for the critique and examination of this theory in the future. In future speaking and writing opportunities, I will elaborate on and explain some of these points. In what follows, I present these ten points without any particular order and very concisely:
1- In the first talk, Dr. Soroush, in several instances, quoted and cited narrations (hadith). In at least one case, he acknowledged that a narration he used as evidence was considered weak. We are in an era of religious knowledge, hadith studies, and history where merely deeming a narration to be mutawatir (massively transmitted) is not sufficient for citing it in a discussion at the level of religious studies, let alone a narration that is considered weak even by the traditional method of hadith criticism. Using transmitted reports as evidence for such a fundamental discussion seriously requires an examination and elucidation of the degree of authenticity of these reports, as well as contrasting them with different or contradictory reports that possess an equal or higher degree of authenticity. On this path, exercising caution in accepting and interpreting narrations that do not align with Quranic principles is particularly important. What our understanding is regarding the relationship between the Quran and Hadith is a secondary discussion here. The point is, based on the understanding we hold, what is the resolution for such a contradiction between Hadith and the Quran in this discussion (such as the narration concerning the killing of apostates).
2- Another significant portion of Dr. Soroush's first talk was dedicated to the exegetical, theological, and jurisprudential views of certain great Islamic scholars. In response to a question, he emphasized that Islam is the interpretations that have been made of Islam, and in this way, he underscored the importance of relying on these views. In our time, thinkers from both Shia and Sunni traditions have emerged who, with rational and transmitted arguments, emphasize a return to the Quran in religious understanding and in understanding the Quran itself. This return will, of course, culminate in the interpretation of the Quran, but what these thinkers have in mind is an interpretation that is based more on the Quran and less influenced by narrations, the famous opinion, and jurisprudence. At the very least, as the most important existing document of Islam, regardless of the extent to which we believe in its authenticity, comparing and measuring the views of Islamic scholars against the text and content of the Quran in such a fundamental discussion is not only helpful but necessary.
3- Part of Dr. Soroush's argumentation concerns verses of the Quran that promise punishment to opponents and describe the Prophet's mission as making his religion prevail over other religions (li-yuẓhirahu ʿalā al-dīni kullih). Dr. Soroush considers these verses evidence of a power-seeking spirit in the Prophet and the Quran. Now that we are re-examining our understanding of religion from the ground up, it is fitting to also address this fundamental question: based on the Quran's verses, and not the dominant understanding of Muslims, was the scope of the Prophet's mission all human beings throughout the world (the universal view) or the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula at the time of revelation (the local view)? Discussing and striving to find an answer to this foundational question can be highly decisive here. For example, according to the universal view, the promise of punishment for opponents includes all human beings in the world, and Islam must overcome all other religions, whereas according to the local view, the overwhelming majority of promises of punishment for opponents are limited to the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula, and Islam must overcome other religions in the Arabian Peninsula (especially polytheism). Determining the scope of the prophetic mission helps us understand the motive behind threatening opponents and the precise meaning of the Quran's emphasis on Islam's prevalence over other religions, and this in turn affects our perception of the relationship between religion and power-seeking (in another article titled "The Quran: Exclusivist or Pluralist", under the heading of the fifth proposition, I have examined the scope of the Prophet's mission based on an analysis of Quranic verses).
4- Dr. Soroush's explanation of offensive jihad, the Prophet being commanded to take up the sword, and harshness toward disbelievers in the Quran, centers on the keyword "power-seeking for the establishment of religion." I suggest examining the possibility of using another keyword to explain these matters, namely "the exhaustion of excuses" (itmām al-ḥujjah). According to one reading of the Quran, the divine tradition in sending prophets is depicted in this book as follows: prophets are tasked with exhausting excuses for their direct addressees, and after the exhaustion of excuses, which means the clear elucidation of the truth, divine punishment in this very world, by the hand of nature or (if the prophet's followers are sufficient in number) by the hand of the prophet and his followers (qātilūhum yuʿadhdhibhumu Allāhu bi-aydīkum), befalls the opponents. The opponents are here called disbelievers because, after the exhaustion of excuses, their opposition stems solely from obstinacy, arrogance, and concealing the truth (lima talbisūna al-ḥaqqa bi-al-bāṭili wa taktumūna al-ḥaqq). Based on such a reading, what Dr. Soroush refers to as the exceptional era of the establishment of religion by the Prophet and its consequences becomes the exceptional era of the exhaustion of excuses by the Prophet and its consequences. Those Quranic commentators who believe in this account of the exhaustion of excuses argue for it using many verses from the Quran and the Torah. The point is not to deny offensive jihad, the Prophet being commanded to take up the sword, or harshness toward disbelievers; rather, the question is which theory provides a more reasoned and comprehensive explanation for these matters. Both keywords, "power-seeking for the establishment of religion" and "the exhaustion of excuses," have the capacity for intra-religious and extra-religious discussion, are on par from this perspective, and are capable of competing in explaining the subjects under discussion. My impression is that the Quranic verses, in their multiplicity, meaning, and implication, are stronger in the keyword of the exhaustion of excuses than in the keyword of power-seeking. I also believe that with the keyword of the exhaustion of excuses, one can better conclude, by citing Quranic verses, that these authoritarian and aggressive behaviors were exclusive to the time of the Prophet (Dr. Soroush attempted to argue this very point through the theory of religion and power and the concept of the Prophet's finality). In fact, it seems that replacing "power-seeking for the establishment of religion" with "the exhaustion of excuses" would reduce the discussion of religion and power to the influence of power on the understanding of religion, rather than on religion itself. I will try to address the importance of the discussion of the exhaustion of excuses in reading the Quran's addresses in detail in another article.
5- In the title “Religion and Power,” would it not be better for the phenomenon under study to be the Abrahamic religions rather than Islam? It seems that Dr. Soroush sees a rupture between Islam and the other Abrahamic religions. In his second lecture, he identified one of the dominant discourses of the Quran as a monarchical discourse. Could one not argue that the discourse of the Torah is also monarchical? The Torah does not have a specific discussion of heaven and hell, but did it not, based on the covenant and pact with the Jewish people, promise them reward and punishment in this very world? Is it not the case that most of the Quran’s stories about the worldly punishment of earlier peoples appear in the Torah, often in greater detail? I think if we expand the phenomenon under study in the subject of religion and power from Islam to the Abrahamic religions, we will arrive at more precise, more defensible, and more comprehensive results. Looking at Islam and Islamic history in isolation, separating it from Judaism, Christianity, and their tumultuous histories, and ignoring the connection that the Quran formulates among these three religions, limits the scope of thinking in the discussion of religion and power and inadvertently makes it dogmatic.
6- Alongside the monarchical discourse, Dr. Soroush calls the other types of discourse in the Quran the caravan discourse (guidance and misguidance) and the commercial discourse (profitable trade with God). I find these terms very apt and defensible, but is there another type of discourse in the Quran as well? For example, the verses of love, the verses concerning the meeting with God, “I breathed into him of My spirit,” “Return to your Lord, well-pleased and pleasing [to Him],” … do not fit into any of these three types of discourse. Dr. Soroush pointed out that such verses are few compared to other verses of the Quran, but the question is: on what basis do we consider the scarcity of verses on a subject as a reason for that subject’s lack of importance? It seems that a distinction must be made between the importance of a subject and the importance of the repetition of a subject. If the repetition of a subject was necessary for the direct audience of a speech, does this necessarily mean that the importance of that subject is greater than another subject whose repetition was not necessary? Another point is that the frequency of subjects and expressions is certainly a necessary, and perhaps sufficient, criterion for delineating the profile of a speech or text, but is frequency also a sufficient, or even necessary, criterion for extracting the subjects or discourses of that speech and text? It seems to me that, whether in critiquing or in developing the theory of religion and power, ignoring such verses damages the argument.
7- In the second lecture, Dr. Soroush considers the Prophet to possess authority in legislation and to be free in choosing the means to achieve an end. Two reminders and then a question: Those knowledgeable about the history of the Arabs at the dawn of Islam, as well as jurists, say that about eighty percent of Sharia rulings are confirmatory, meaning their origin is neither God nor Muhammad but the Arab society that was the audience of the revelation. Also, many rulings of the permissible and forbidden in the Quran are identical or similar to the rulings of the Torah. Based on this, what are the limits of the Prophet’s authority in legislation? Dr. Soroush concludes from the story of Moses and the righteous servant that the Prophet, in the position of authority, can act like the righteous servant and, for example, kill an innocent child because he knows that child will become an evil person in the future. Two questions for further reflection: In the story of Moses and the righteous servant, was Moses rebuked for his objection to the servant? More importantly, was the Prophet tasked with being the Moses who had no access to the unseen and was sometimes rebuked by the unseen of his people, or someone who has a hand in the knowledge of the unseen and is concerned with ordering worldly affairs? Why, instead of likening the Prophet to another prophet (Moses), should we liken him to the human or angel whom the Quran mentions with ambiguity?
8- Dr. Soroush began his remarks with "Bismillah" (In the name of God). From the perspective of a believer in God, another question that requires reflection is: what is His role in all of this? If, as Dr. Soroush interpreted, while Muhammad is the author of the Quran, "the author of Muhammad is God," is it acceptable that the God of Muhammad, in Dr. Soroush's words, left him completely to his own devices in his revelatory dream, so that the verses of the Quran were shaped entirely based on the "psyche of Muhammad," who "was an authoritarian person," and the Quran thus became a "book of fear"? Is it a far-fetched claim to say that the Transcendent interacts with its audience in a way that is bearable and within their mental and cultural framework, and that the audience here is not only Muhammad but also the society of the Arabian Peninsula at the time of revelation? In that case, the Quran being a "book of fear" (which is what the Quran calls "indhar" [warning], and I think is an appropriate term) would not be the product of the psyche of an authoritarian Muhammad, but the product of interaction with the psyche of the Quran's audience, including Muhammad.
9- He pointed out that Islam, in the sense of submission, is submission to power, and faith (iman) means heartfelt belief, and that submission to power, even without heartfelt belief, was, from the Prophet's perspective, an acceptable response to the Quran's call. It would be beneficial if, in examining the difference between Islam and faith, attention were paid to the meaning and usage of Islam and "becoming a Muslim" in the Quran, and not to suffice with just one verse ("Say: You have not believed, but say: We have submitted [aslamna]"), and also, in examining this very verse, attention were paid to the preceding and following verses and the context of the speech. Some commentators who did so recognized different levels of meaning for Islam in the Quran, some of which were higher than meanings of faith.
10- Dr. Soroush stated that the Quran provided the wing of fear and awe for religion, and early Islam lacked the dimension of love and affection, but that Sufism of love "gave Islam two wings." The question worthy of discussion here is (acknowledging that the roots of Sufism reach outside of Islam) whether the heavy reliance of many Sufis and their works on the Quran and Quranic verses could not be a sign that they did not create the wing of love in the Quran, but rather revealed and cultivated it? This is not merely a minor difference of interpretation. These different interpretations each carry different semantic loads, implications, and theoretical consequences.
As I wrote at the beginning, the purpose of this piece was not a detailed critique but a concise preliminary critique of Dr. Soroush's discussion and theory of Islam and power. I hope that the ten points above and other valuable points being raised these days in the examination of this theory will pave the way for a better formulation and arrangement of this theory, and for its critique and revision.
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Discussion6 comments
سلام جناب آقای دکتر سروش در مورد مغایر نبودن دو صفت قدرت گرایی و مهربانی توضیح دادند.خداوند قادر مطلق است ولی هرگز دستور به ظلم و ستم نمی دهد.پس اقتدارگرایی پیامبر اسلام لزوما به معنای صدور مجوز برای ظلم کردن به دیگران و خشونت طلبی نیست. لذا تمام آیات قرآنی که جناب آقای عبد العلی بازرگان و دوستان دیگر از رحمان ورحیم بودن و بخشنده بودن و ...مطرح می کنند مغایرتی با نظریه اخیر جناب آقای دکتر سروش ندارد.
و اساسا طرح این بحث با چه انگیزه و به قصد چه اهداف مثبتی می توندباشد و چه گره ای را می تواند از مشکلات امروز و فردای مسلمین بگشاید؟ حکما می باید در نو آوری خود ابتدا به افق های روشن و مفیدی بیندیشند که خردمندان محتاج به آن هستند و مسلمین از آن بهره می برند. این که ثابت کنیم پیامبر رسولی قدرت طلب بود و درحالی که غیر قابل تکرار است ؛ چه ایده ای را می تواند پیش روی ما بگذارد.آیا درست است متفکری چون سروش وارمباحثی شود که ماحصل آن جز کنکاش و نظر بازی ترمغانی ندارد ؟
آقای عبدالعلی لازرگان در یک سخنرانی می فرمود واژه های قرآن به همان تعدادی که مثلا از عذاب سخن گفته به رحمت و صلح هم سخن گفته است. . و به همان اندازه از واژه کفر استفاده شده که از واژه ی ایمان. اگر این سحن درست باشد ؛ مفهوم آن این است که دردیانت محمدی نگاه خشمگی نیمی از نگاه مهرورز به انسان است. علاوه بر این که قرآن صراحت دارد که رحمت خدا بر غضب او سبقت دارد. حالا این سوال مطرح است که چرا دکتر سروش متمایل به اثبات آن نیم از اسلام است که مورد نفرت بشریت قرار دارد ؟ و چرا از این حدیث مصهور " الییس الدین الا الحب " چشم پوشی می کند! و چرا مردی را که کودکان نیز از او ترسی نداشتند و بر دوش او سوارمی شدند، می خواهد قدرت طلب معرفی کند ؟ آنکه می گوید الفقر فخری چه نیازی به طلب قدرت دارد ؟ دیگر این که ما می توانیم شمای محمد را در چهره شاگرد و جانشین او بهتر ببینیم. سخنان علی مرتضی دایر بر این که حکومت بر مردم کمتر از عطسه ی بز برای او ارزش دارد ؛ و ابای او از پذیرش حکومت ایا نشان از قدرت طلبی او دارد ؟
باسلام , این نقد براین سخنرانی اخیر آقای سروش واردنیست هرچند بر نظریه روئیای رسولانه او نقد جدی وارداست که جناب سروش معنای وحی را نفهمیده است و اما در آیه قولوا اسلمنا.... همان است که سروش گفته اند یعنی کلمه شهادتین . و اما معنای تسلیمی که بالاتر از ایمان است که همان تسلیم محض پروردگار بودن است وآن آیه واذقال له ربه اسلم قال اسلمت لرب العالمین ,, گفتار ابراهیم ,ع, است که در آیه ۱۳۱ بقره آمده استاست ویا در آیه ۲۰آل عمران که اسلام پیامبر اسلام است و پیروانش وبه اهل کتاب هم این اسلام و تسلیم را مایه هدایت دانسته است . و لذا کلی گوئی و تعیین نکردن موارد خاص معنای اسلام و تسلیم و از این قبیل استدلال ها نقدی بربیان اخیر سروش نیست و این نویسنده فقط به خودشان زحمت داده اند والسلام
هر اندیشه و سنت فکری را بایست اول خوب و کامل و ب اساس هدف و منظور مطرح کننده آن فهمید. اسلام عفو، رحمت، نگاه انسانی و گذشت و باور به رحمانیت و رحیمیت خدا را وجهه همت خود قرار داده است. دست گذاشتن روی یک یک واژه و تعمیم دادن و distortکردن کل برخوردی paranoid به یک perspectiveنسبت به هستی است. تفسیر بایست نسبت به محتوای کتاب و یا تفکر مورد تفسیر قرار گرفته وفادارانه سخن گوید و رفتار کند. قطعا آقای سروش وفاداری را فدای twistکردن موضوع مورد تفسیر برای القاء جزمی آراء افرادی مانند شلایر ماخر بر کتابی است که اصولا موضوع مورد مطالعه آن ها نبوده. همانطور که ایشان ترجمه و ترکیب آراء دیگران و ارائه آن به جامعه کشور شما بعنوان تالیف را پیشه کار خود کردند تحریف و تحمیل نگاه جزمی خود بر متن را به این بیان غیر منصف افزوده اند. روشنفکر ، روشنفکر دینی، فیلسوف، و جاعه شناس در کشور شما برای کسب social acceptance بایست خود را از دانشجو و اساتید جدا کند و جایگاهی authoritarisn معتبر دست یابد . این رتبه و شأن بوسیله تاختن به ارزشها و احترام های ایرانی حاصل میشود. تاریخ فلسفه پس از رنسانس شاهدی برای بروز همین رفتار در جامعه خراج از کشور شماست. دریدا بر افلاطون و غیره می تازد ، بر ارزشها میتازد و اعتبار جعلی کسب می کند. نیچه بر مسیح میتازد تا جایگاه او را بدست آورد. هر چه آن چه به آن انتقاد می کنید بالاتر باشد قدرت و شهرت و جایگاه اعتبار رفیع تری حاصل میشود. manifeastation این academic practice در کشوری ترسو نسبت به اتخاذ موضع فکری مستقل تاختن به آخوندها در کشور شما بوده است. ترجمه آثار دیگران و مخلوط کردن آن ها برای پنهان کردن رد پا و متهم نشدن به انتحال. این بتلاترین رتبه فکری است که این clique میتواند تصور کند. اوج دستاورد یک فیلسوف اوج هنر یک استاد جعلی دانشگاه. همانطور که دکارت به ارسطو تاخت و پدر فلسفه مدرن شد تو به چبز معتبری حمله ور او را خراب کن تا جایگاه بدست آوری. نیچه دست بالا را گرفت به بالاترین تاخت تا بالاترین اعتبار تا بیشترین ارضاء روانی را به چنگ آورد. خدا را پایین بکش تا جایگاه خدایی بدست آوری. تظاهر انگیزه شیطان
یکی از شاخص های قدرت طلبی ،جاه طلبی است. شخص قدرت طلب باید روحیه جاه طلبی هم داشته باشد در غیر این صورت نمی تواند قدرتی را طلب کند.یعنی شهوت قدرت پیش زمینه جاه طلبی است.دکتر سروش که به پیامبر برچسب قدرت طلبی می زند به نوعی او را جاه طلب نیز خطاب می کند.همه پیامبران تسلیم امر اللهی بودند و قدرتشان بسته به قدرت اللهی است .در داستان موسی و فرعون ،آنجاییکه که موسی از رویارویی با فرعون دچار ترس و هراس می شود و خدا می فرماید:لا تخف و لا تحزن .قدرت موسی در رویارویی با فرعون با قدرت خداوند هماهنگ می شود . در مورد پیامبر اسلام نیز همین گونه است.پیامبر خودش نه قدرت طلب است و نه جاه طلب بلکه قدرت او بسته به قدرت خداست.اگر پیامبر قدرت طلب و جاه طلب بود در دوران حکومتش قطعا به کشورهای همجوارش یورش می برد. یا مثلا آنجائیکه پیامبر برای کافران دعا می کند و خدا می فرمایید:ای محمد اگر ۷۰ بار برای کافران طلب استغفار کنی هیچ فایده ایی ندارد و من کافران را نمی بخشم.در این آیه به خوبی نشان می دهد که پیامبر از خودش هیچ قدرت مطلقی ندارد بلکه قدرت او نسبی است.قدرت پیامبران در نسبت با قدرت خداوند هماهنگ و همسوست. دکتر سروش با این برداشتها و تفسیرهای خودش می خواهد به نوعی تفسیر زیباشناسانه ایی از نوع خودش به قرآن بدهد و به نوعی قرآن را آرایش و بزک کند،آن هم یک آرایش و بزک اغراق شده ،در صورتی که ایشان از این مسئله غافل است که با آرایش و بزک نمی توان چهره اصلی را نشان داد.دکتر سروش تفسیر به رای می کند..