اندیشهفلسفهخردگفتگوحکمتمعناپرسشفرهنگ
The three words—woman, life, freedom—serve as an entry point for re-examining religious understanding. The contrast between static and dynamic approaches to Sharia law, particularly regarding women's rights, illuminates how these keywords are employed by thinkers.

The first time I heard the slogan "Woman, Life, Freedom," although I knew its origins extend far beyond religious discussions, I found a close connection between these three words and contemporary debates on revising religious understanding. As I see it, each of these three words, alongside the several noteworthy messages and concerns they carry, also relates to one of the precious aspects of religious understanding. In fact, I see these three words as representing some of the most important topics in religious studies today.
In many scholarly discussions, a number of keywords play such a prominent role in the analytical process that they gradually become the entry points for those discussions. A word that gradually establishes itself as an entry point to a discussion plays an effective role in the coherence of that discussion, in explaining its importance, and in finding suitable analytical paths to address it. In this essay, my aim is to briefly explain the connection of these three words with the contemporary debates in the arena of religious understanding. In this way, I endeavor to call upon thinkers and scholars in the field of religion to use these words and their meanings and concepts as entry points for rethinking religious understanding. I do not intend here to express my own opinion on the subjects raised. This essay serves only to pose the question and does not aim to provide answers. For this reason, in this essay, I will confine myself to a general statement of the intended topics and will not enter into the detailed and technical discussions of these topics. Another point is that in these discussions, we are faced not with a duality but with a spectrum of viewpoints. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarifying the claim of this essay, in explaining each of these topics, I will only address two viewpoints that stand completely opposed to each other and will not bring the middle viewpoints, which have a relative agreement with either of those two, into the discussion. Therefore, explaining the issues in the form of dual approaches does not mean denying the approaches situated between those two poles.
In what follows, I will take up each of these three words in turn and explain their connection to one of the prominent and contentious debates in religious understanding. The inquiries for each word are presented in six parts: introducing the opposing approaches, providing an example, pointing to a sample of reasoning in each approach, some theoretical challenges, some practical challenges, and finally, emphasizing the connection of the keyword. To clarify the structure of the discussion, each of these six parts is presented in a separate paragraph.
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- Woman: The laws of Islamic Sharia were revealed fifteen centuries ago for the Arabs of the peninsula, especially the inhabitants of Mecca and Medina and the surrounding areas. A major part of these laws was based on the cultural and social structure of the time and place of revelation. The traditional view considers these laws to be independent of time and place and, in its most generous form, only permits the adjustment of some details. Dividing rulings into foundational (tasisī) and confirmatory (imḍāʾī) and entering into jurisprudential debates on the definition of this categorization, its affirmation or rejection, and, if affirmed, the explanation of its instances, are among the favored topics of this view. In this view, even confirmatory rulings are not very flexible or subject to revision. This approach can be called the "static approach" to the laws of Sharia. In contrast to this static approach to the law of Sharia, another group of religious thinkers is attached to a "dynamic approach" to the laws of Sharia. In this approach, the laws of Sharia, especially social laws, are entirely dependent on the conditions of time and place. Believers in the dynamic approach to the laws of Sharia hold that ignoring the conditions of time and place can render the social laws of Sharia fruitless and cause the wisdom behind these laws to vanish. In this approach, the categorization of rulings into confirmatory and foundational provides a good ground for beginning the defense of this viewpoint, but this jurisprudential categorization is not the main basis of this approach's claim. The main basis is the dependence or independence of rulings on the conditions of time and place, and this discussion can even extend to foundational rulings.
Two of the most significant categories of Sharia law that are the subject of this debate are penal laws and laws pertaining to women. Penal laws, such as capital punishment or rulings that lead to bodily harm, are the main point of contention. Among the laws concerning women, one can mention inheritance law, the status of a woman in relation to her husband or “guardian,” the right to divorce, and the ratio of a woman’s testimony to a man’s in financial matters. Beyond this, such laws broadly affect the social rights and status of women in society. Based on the dynamic Sharia perspective, all these rulings were compatible with the cultural and social conditions of the time and place of revelation, and in a time and place where this compatibility does not exist, these rulings cannot and should not be enforced; otherwise, it would be an injustice to the social rights and status of women.
The static approach does not accept this dynamic conception of Sharia laws and accuses it of trivializing Sharia and minimalizing religion. The critical question of the static approach toward the dynamic approach can be summarized in the phrase, “How do you know?” The static approach emphasizes that the original bringer of these rulings is God, the Wise and All-Knowing, and also stresses the theological implications of the finality of prophethood, and on this basis, considers Sharia laws, including those related to women, to always be in the interest of society and in the interest of the rights and status of women. In contrast, the dynamic approach points to the role of reason and rational people in religion and Sharia laws, and sometimes resorts to terms like “the discretionary zone of reason” to limit the protective domain of Sharia based on reason. This approach usually leads to limiting the static laws of Sharia to acts of worship and revising non-worship rulings.
In the realm of theory and argumentation, one of the main challenges for the static approach is justifying the appropriateness of Sharia’s social laws in contemporary times while acknowledging their compatibility with the conditions of the time and place of revelation. In contrast, the dynamic approach needs to justify the silence of religion’s textual sources regarding its concerns. For this purpose, followers of this approach are sometimes compelled to turn to theological discussions and issues related to the philosophy of religion.
Among the most important practical challenges of the static approach to Sharia laws is responding to the impracticality or inadvisability of implementing certain social rulings. In reality and in practice, many of these rulings in Muslim countries are effectively suspended with the help of jurisprudential and legal tools. Conversely, the challenge for the dynamic approach is explaining how to discern expediency based on the understanding of rational people, how to identify rational people, and formulating a process for moving along the path of dynamic Sharia.
Since issues related to women’s rights are among the most famous and contentious topics in the conflict between the static and dynamic approaches to Sharia law, the word “Woman” can serve as a keyword and an entry point for addressing this dispute and advancing the arguments of both sides of the contention.
- Life: The question of what the purpose of religion is and where its boundaries lie has always been a matter of debate among the faithful and religious scholars. It appears that two distinct views exist regarding the purpose of religion and the scope of religious affairs. In a “school-centered” (ideological) approach, religion is a comprehensive system that governs all aspects of life. From this perspective, the religious person always sees themselves on a mission from religion to correct the affairs of life wherever possible. This is an unending struggle to extend what they consider the dictates of religion over their own life and the lives of others, and a battle (not necessarily in the sense of war) against anyone they deem an opponent of their faith. In this way, religion comes to dominate every part of the individual’s life, and wherever they look, they see nothing but the struggle between truth and falsehood. The scope of the religious mission such an individual assumes for themselves is global and unlimited, for they see everyone as belonging to one of the two camps of truth and falsehood. In contrast, there is a “path-centered” approach to religion. In this approach, religion is a method for the purification of the soul, and of course, for the purification of the soul, certain aspects of life must also be regulated and controlled. The main difference, however, is that in the school-centered view, intervention in all aspects of life and that global mission are intrinsic to religion, whereas in a path-centered view, intervention in life’s affairs is not an inherent necessity. The result of this view is that the religious person sees themselves more as a wayfarer on the path of religion than as an agent tasked with propagating and establishing it. On this path and in this spiritual journey, wherever they can take another’s hand, they do so, but they do not consider themselves commissioned to extend religion into everyone’s life. They see the most important battlefield between truth and falsehood within their own soul and do not divide the world and its people into the ranks of truth and falsehood.
The first view tends toward a disciplinary outlook on life. In this understanding, the concern for establishing and consolidating religion overshadows other concerns of daily life. Participation in rituals, programs, and ceremonies (not merely devotional, but also) ideological, a tendency toward admonition and reproach aimed at making society religious, and efforts to keep the banner of religion flying high are usually, more or less, characteristics of this approach. Those inclined toward the second approach, although they may have the concern for establishing and consolidating religion, do not see it as the foremost and leading concern among life’s other cares. Among them, those who are more diligent in religion are inclined toward the individual educational aspects of religion for themselves and their close ones, more than the propagational aspects related to establishing and consolidating religion. The point is not which group is more religious or more pious. Among both, there are abundant examples of excellent religiosity and piety. What separates these two groups in form, behavior, and thought is not the degree of their religiosity and piety, but each one’s understanding of the center of gravity of religion.
The school-centered approach does not tolerate the path-centered approach and considers it “marginalizing religion.” By highlighting the anti-oppression and propagational aspects embedded in religious texts and the history of religiosity, the school-centered approach tries to uphold its viewpoint. On the other hand, the path-centered approach accuses the school-centered approach of drifting away from the essence and purpose of religion and, by utilizing the introspective and afterlife-oriented aspects embedded in religious texts and the history of religiosity, strives to fortify its own viewpoint.
In theoretical inquiries and discussions, one of the challenges both approaches face is demonstrating the alignment of the sacred text and religious concepts with their own viewpoint. It appears that words and concepts such as enjoining good and forbidding evil, arrogance and the oppressed, jihad, and propagation carry very different meanings and applications for each group.
Among the practical challenges the school-centered approach faces is independence from state politics, especially the politics of a religious state. Their dependence on state politics, or the perception of observers that such a dependence exists, shakes the theoretical foundations of this approach. On the other hand, one of the practical challenges of the path-centered approach is confronting the accusation of not standing for the truth and not caring about the salvation of others.
Undoubtedly, each of the school-centered and path-centered approaches influences the religious person's conception of the necessities of their own life and the lives of others. Which type of concern overshadows and directs individuals' lives undoubtedly gives a particular color to the individual's life and to the very concept of life. From this perspective, the word "life" can serve as a suitable entry point for setting forth these two approaches and the exchange of arguments between the proponents of each.
Freedom: A society that had the direct experience of the Prophet's presence and the reception of revelation is fundamentally different from Muslim societies today. The Qur'an expected its direct addressees to answer the Prophet's call and aid him, and the Prophet was tasked with establishing Islam in the land of revelation and in that society. The first Muslim community, formed about fifteen centuries ago in a part of the Arabian Peninsula, was the standard-bearer for preserving the religion of Islam and consolidating and strengthening the Muslim Ummah. The degree to which the individuals of that community were compelled to religious observance is itself a matter of debate. Nevertheless, it is not far-fetched to hold that the Muslim individuals of that community were expected, through adherence to the new religion, both to bring joy to their own souls and to play a role in safeguarding the religion. The main question is to what extent the citizens of a Muslim society, in this time, have the right to individual freedom in choosing their way of life. Based on a "dependent" approach, none of the above points have any bearing on this matter, and the individuals of a religious society, in choosing their disposition and method, are, like the individuals of the Prophet's community in the age of revelation, dependent on religious commands, and the degree of their freedom is also within the framework of those same religious commands. In this view, the devout may, at their discretion, tolerate certain freedoms they deem contrary to Sharia, but they have no doubt that ultimately the limits of freedom are determined by religious understanding. Those attached to this view may even hold that it is expedient for the freedom of citizens in choosing their way of life to be even more restricted than the freedom of the individuals of the first Muslim community. In contrast, based on an "independent" approach, there is an essential difference between the conditions and duties of the Muslim community of the Prophet's era and Muslim societies today. In this view, the extent of freedom in one's way of life is determined not by religious understanding but by society's or the wise's perception of public morality. Based on this perspective, the individuals of a religious society, in choosing their disposition and behavior, have the right to consider themselves independent of religious commands, even if some religious people do not deem this to be in the interest of those individuals' religion and afterlife. Some of those attached to this view believe that even in the Prophet's era, people were freer in their disposition and behavior than what the proponents of the other view suppose.
In the time we are living in, perhaps the most prominent example for explaining the difference between these two approaches is the discussion of the hijab law. Assuming that hijab is a religious obligation, the question is whether the individuals of society should be compelled to this obligation or not. Based on the dependent approach, the answer to this question is obviously yes. The issue of hijab is also a good example of cases where, based on the discretion of this approach, society is made even more obligated and restricted than the first Muslim community. Based on Islamic jurisprudence, which is itself based on the verses of the Qur'an, elderly women can remove the hijab, and non-Muslim women are not obligated to wear the hijab. However, based on the dependent approach, and at the discretion of those attached to this approach, both groups of these women in today's Iranian society are required to wear the hijab. This requirement even includes non-Muslim, non-Iranian women visiting the country. In contrast, the independent approach may recommend the hijab but does not push this recommendation to the boundaries of compulsion, because it holds that we have no firm basis for having the same expectation of today's Muslim as was had of the Muslim of the Prophet's community. I emphasize that this example assumes the obligatoriness of hijab; if this assumption is undermined, then this example will have little relevance to the subject under discussion.
Adherents of the first approach absolve themselves of this notion and consider it a cause for weakening the pillars of religion. They can demonstrate that no exception for future generations is mentioned in the sacred text, and they maintain that the obligating addresses of the Qur'an and the injunctions found in other religious texts are universal in wording. In contrast, adherents of the independent approach employ arguments based on the Prophet's specific role and mission among his people and the compatibility of religion and Islam with the right to freedom within the framework of society's ethical norms, in order to differentiate between Muslims of today and Muslims of the Prophet's era in terms of what can be expected of them.
Among the most significant theoretical challenges for the dependent approach is confronting rival arguments concerning the Prophet's specific role and mission for his own society and the scope of his mission. For the independent approach, defending the right to freedom (within the framework of ethical norms) against text-based arguments is sometimes challenging.
The practical challenge of the dependent approach is what we witness in a segment of Iranian society: a lack of adherence to, and even defiance of, what those attached to the independent approach consider essential to religion. Adherents of the independent approach have also consistently faced the question: if the basis is society's ethical norms, where is the boundary and limit, and to what extent can a religious society remain compatible with ethical norms?
The word "Freedom" serves as a suitable focal point for inviting proponents of each of these two approaches to present their arguments and reasons before one another and to strive to fortify their own view against the opposing view.
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I wish to emphasize once more that in this brief piece, in explaining each of the headings, I have only addressed two viewpoints that stand in complete opposition to one another, and I have not brought into the discussion the intermediate viewpoints that have partial agreement with either of those two views. I also add that the three topics raised in this writing are interconnected, and each of the approaches in one topic is deeply linked with the approach presented in another topic.
A living and thriving society is always in pursuit of revising past approaches. "Woman, Life, Freedom" has the capacity to become a suitable entry point for some of the most important and up-to-date discussions on revising religious understanding. "Woman" will serve as the entry point for static versus dynamic Sharia, "Life" for the entry point of school-oriented versus path-oriented religion, and "Freedom" for the entry point of the dependent versus independent approach (to religious injunctions). The young generation of our homeland has arrived at a slogan that, alongside all its other origins, possesses such latent potential as an entry point for revising religious understanding. The history of religions, and particularly the history of Islam, has always witnessed the enrichment of religious understanding through dialogue and debate. The enrichment of religious understanding both invigorates and delights the religious, and puts the non-religious at ease. May it ever be so.
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رویکرد قرآن محور میتواند رویکردی با سندیت امروزی وخالص باشد...پویایی و خالص بودن این رویکرد یعنی میزان قرار دادن پیام الهی با رعایت همواره اتصل قول درآن...اتصال اجزاء هر ایه و اتصال آیات هر سوره و کلین قرآن یعنی فراموش نشدن هیچ آیه یا عبارتی از آن...رعایت اتصال آیات در آن به پیوستگی انسانها و نه فراموش شدن کسی ، منجر میشود... با این رویکرد همزیستی با گروههای غیر دینی با شروطی امکان پذیر میشود : لَا يَنْهَاكُمُ اللَّهُ عَنِ الَّذِينَ لَمْ يُقَاتِلُوكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ وَلَمْ يُخْرِجُوكُمْ مِنْ دِيَارِكُمْ أَنْ تَبَرُّوهُمْ وَتُقْسِطُوا إِلَيْهِمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُقْسِطِينَ ﴿۸﴾ إِنَّمَا يَنْهَاكُمُ اللَّهُ عَنِ الَّذِينَ قَاتَلُوكُمْ فِي الدِّينِ وَأَخْرَجُوكُمْ مِنْ دِيَارِكُمْ وَظَاهَرُوا عَلَى إِخْرَاجِكُمْ أَنْ تَوَلَّوْهُمْ وَمَنْ يَتَوَلَّهُمْ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ ﴿۹﴾ ممتحنه از انجا که در این رویکرد بین خود مومنین رعایت رضایت اجتماعی و بهره مندی هر نیازمندی با شورای اجتماعی پیگیری میشود ، با گروههای سوسیال یعنی طالبین رضایت اجتماعی همزیستی امکان دارد...ملزم بودن به اقتصاد اجتماع محور و پایبندی به اخلاق و آداب عرفی ...نه بی قید و بند بودن در اقتصاد و رفتار در جامعه.... بطور خلاصه و در لسان امروز ، موازین سوسیال دموکراسی در حاکمیت میتواند حداقلی از شروط همزیستی باشد ، همزیستی احزاب و دارندگان رویکرد قرآنی و اجتماع گرایان... این همه ریشه در آن دارد که لزوم پاک شدن اموال در جهت رضایت الهی و رفع فقر و محرومیت در جامعه ، موجب پاک شدن رفتار میشود...رقابت های اقتصادی بی قید و بند به اخلاق و رفتارهای رها و بدون کنترل نیز منتهی میشود... quranmizan[.]com