“From the Analysis of Revelation to Consensual Truth in the Thought of Dr. Soroush” by Hossein Hosseini

From the Analysis of Revelation to Consensual Truth in the Thought of Dr. Soroush

In this short piece, a schematic outline of some of Dr. Soroush's later views on revelation, naturalism, and the theory of truth is presented, and its detailed and critical exposition will take the form of a book or an article.

1- Soroush's Revelationology

Regarding the speech of God, theologians who say that God does not ordinarily speak point not to a deficiency in God but to a deficiency in language. Language is always limiting. When language comes into play, limitations also become apparent. Languages arise from the shared experiences of a people. If we begin with simple and familiar examples, for instance, in Arabic, because they deal extensively with camels, there are hundreds of words to describe the attributes of camels and their age categories that do not exist in other languages. In Kurdish, this same breadth of vocabulary and concepts exists for other livestock such as sheep and goats, and in Gilaki, there are all sorts of words and concepts concerning fish. Meanwhile, some languages are more practiced in the realm of science (like English) and some in the realm of poetry (like Persian), and so on. On the one hand, because language and speech arise from the collective experiences of human beings and have limitations, and on the other hand, God, by definition, is beyond limitations, in this context, we can say with a brief formulation:

1.1. Logically and philosophically, it is not possible for God to perform certain actions or possess certain attributes; for example, God cannot swear by one greater than Himself, or create one greater than Himself, or have a body, or commit injustice, or annihilate Himself!

2.1. It is better to say that God is omnipotent, but the aforementioned matters do not have the capacity or possibility of being brought into existence; that is, the deficiency is not from God but from the matters we mentioned. For example, donning the garment of a body is not befitting of God. The defect and shortcoming here pertain to the body, not to God, or tyranny and annihilation are incompatible with God's essence.

3.1. Another example of such matters is speech. Speech always has a human aspect and is the product of the experiences and usages of human beings in society. For this reason, the breadth of vocabulary in languages concerning matters with which the users of that language deal less or more increases or decreases, or languages, again due to collective experience or greater use, become prominent and develop in specific aspects.

4.1. From these premises, it can be concluded that language cannot have a private aspect and always takes shape in the context and home of human society, and is limited to the experiences, usages, and human concepts within a temporally and spatially bound community (even if over a long time and space), and of course, God is transcendent beyond time and space and free from the aforementioned limitations. In Dr. Soroush's interpretation, for example, when we see the fruits mentioned in the Quran or read its examples, we realize that fruits or examples incomprehensible to the Arabs of that time were not used, and the capacity and tongue of the addressed people were taken into account. As is evident, fruits and vegetables that belonged to distant regions and of which the Arabs of that time had no image or conception are not mentioned in the Quran, or instead of dark-eyed maidens in tents (Al-Rahman, 72), for instance, there is no mention of blue-eyed women in lofty towers, and in describing God, instead of King (Malik / Al-Jumu'ah, 1), words like President were not used. The reason for this is clear. Because if the words and concepts used did not fit within the categories and mental concepts of the addressed people, no communication or address with the audience would have been realized.

5.1. So, just as the garment of a body is too short for God's stature and His dignity is higher than being corporeal, speech, in this sense, is also not befitting of God. Up to this point, the discussion has been negative and apophatic, but this discussion also has an affirmative and positive part.

6.1. In religious language, we use an important word: “āyah” or sign. That is, we regard the world and everything in it as a sign and indication of God. For example, a flower or a tree is a manifestation of His beauty. Yet at the same time, we are aware that a flower or tree is not God Himself; it is only His sign and indication. God is transcendent and beyond His manifestations. Thus, we clearly distinguish between a sign (icon) and an idol, and we do not freeze or confine God within a single sign. (This distinction is from the contemporary phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion in this book: Marion, Jean-Luc. The Idol and Distance. Trans. by Thomas A. Carlson. Fordham University Press, 2001.)

7.1. Regarding the sacred text, it can also be said that this speech is sacred because it is a manifestation and sign of God, but the entirety of God and His words are not confined and contained within it. It is stated in the Quran: “If the sea were ink for the words of my Lord, the sea would surely be exhausted before the words of my Lord are exhausted…” (Kahf, 109). A thinker like Nāṣir-i Khusraw also paid attention to these points and expressed them well. In his book Zād al-Musāfirīn, he writes:

“So we say that the ignorant of the community claim that Gabriel spoke to the Messenger of God with voice and letters… (p. 198). And knowledge reaches people either through speech or through writing; and speech, voice, and letters are impossible and inconceivable from God Almighty, while writing is a trace inscribed upon dust, and God’s inscription is upon dust, and that is this sensible world. Thus, it is incumbent upon everyone to read this divine writing (p. 211)… Revelation to the Messenger, peace be upon him, was spiritual, not corporeal, and voice comes from the body, not from the spirit. So it is evident… that revelation was an indication, not a voice, and since this speech was not with a voice, it was an indication towards this divine writing, which is the world… And we say that no one has fully read this divine writing, which is creation, and the meanings within this writing are endless, and each of the messengers has read a portion of this writing… And it is for this reason that all the messengers said, and it is established in the Quran, that the speech of God is inexhaustible: ‘Say: If the sea were ink for the words of my Lord, the sea would surely be exhausted before the words of my Lord are exhausted, even if We brought the like of it as a supplement.’ And if all the seas were to become ink and the trees pens, all would be exhausted, and the exposition of God’s writing could not be completed.” (pp. 214-219). (Nāṣir-i Khusraw, Zād al-Musāfirīn. Edited by Muḥammad Badhl al-Raḥmān. Maḥmūdī Publications. Also see: Nāṣir-i Khusraw’s Theory on the Quran, Muḥammad Mujtahid Shabistarī, on the website of the Center for the Great Islamic Encyclopedia)

8.1. Thus, with this theory, one should not worry about the sanctity of these texts; on the contrary, from the perspective of a religious person, one should be glad that these texts gain life and vitality and can offer new and unlimited meanings. Because they are a gift from God, and God is unlimited.

9.1. On the other hand, if these texts inevitably bear the color and scent of the limitations of their own time and place, God’s essence remains pure and absolved of these limitations.

This was the first point, which more or less appears in the book The Expansion of the Prophetic Experience. But Dr. Soroush's reflections on revelation continue, and in the subsequent stages we witness The Parrot and the Bee and Prophetic Dreams. The Parrot and the Bee is derived from an image and allegory that considers the process of revelation to be bee-like rather than parrot-like. Incidentally, revelation being like a bee, as opposed to parrot-like repetition, is an image that appears in the Quran (An-Nahl, 68), and with this image of the bee, Soroush points to the prominent role of the Prophet and his surrounding environment in the production of revelation; an image that plays a role just like the bee in producing honey. It is the bee, contrary to the parrot, that, according to the Quran's account, becomes the instance of revelation. Just as the bee has its own function but, at the same time, in religious language, receives revelation, the prophets also have their own way, character, personality, mechanisms, and communications, yet are considered recipients of revelation. In other words, just like the bee, it is the very existence of the prophets that is God's revelation. Of course, in Soroush's interpretation, "the fact that the Prophet has agency does not mean he fabricated the content himself! Rather, it means he is an agile hunter, not a passive listener" (Soroush, Abdolkarim. The Language of Dreams, the Language of State, Zeitoon website, 2018). Here, the Prophet's connection with God is not the connection of a courier and a king, receiving words from one side and delivering them to the other, but a closer, more internal connection that the Prophet has with God, bearing God with him in all states. Soroush here speaks of the "metaphysics of union" and distances himself from the image of God as a king sitting in a corner, separate from the world.

Regarding the words in the Quran that indicate quotation (such as "Say"), Soroush, by referring to the likes of Rumi and Ghazali, shows that here we are dealing with the "language of state" (zabān-e ḥāl) and not the "language of speech" (zabān-e qāl). The language of state is a kind of soliloquy that we also see in the likes of Rumi, where he says to himself: "Hark, speak, for the Articulate Self is seeking," or "Listen to this reed as it complains." From Soroush's perspective, the Quran is the language of state of the prophets, not the language of speech. We are all familiar with the language of state: the dialogue of the candle and the moth, the garlic and the onion (in Parvin E'tesami's poetry), the drop and the sea (in Saadi's poetry), Rumi and Iqbal (in Muhammad Iqbal's Javid Nama), Muawiyah and Satan (in Rumi's Masnavi), are all of the kind of the language of state, not speech. For example, regarding the verse "And there is not a thing but celebrates His praise," Ghazali says: This is the language of state, but "a narrow-minded person imagines that inanimate objects also possess life, speech, and intellect..." (Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din, Vol. 1, Arrangement of the Degrees of Belief, Dar al-Ma'rifah, Beirut, 1983). Ghazali also considered God's speech with the progeny of Adam on the Day of Alast and their saying "Yes" to be in the language of state. (Pourjavady, Nasrollah. The Covenant of Alast, pp. 243-247, Farhang-e Mo'aser Publishing, 2014). Soroush's next step is Prophetic Dreams, where, relying on a deep-rooted tradition found in sacred texts concerning dreams and revelation, he considers revelation to be of the nature of dreams, and by doing so, he unties many insoluble knots he sees in the apparent conflicts and contradictions within the sacred text.

2- Soroush's Naturalism

There are prominent strands of naturalism in Dr. Soroush's recent views, which appear to be a strength of his theory and represent a complex intellectual effort to resolve theological and philosophical dilemmas. Whereas the dualism (the metaphysics of separation or the divide between nature and the supernatural) that has been strongly present in the dominant jurisprudential perspective and literalist narratives does not untie any knot of moral and theological problems. Soroush's naturalism is apparently more complex than some critics have imagined. Soroush does not reduce revelation to the mechanisms of nature; rather, he elevates natural mechanisms from a mechanical, dead, and inanimate state. In other words, he seeks the supernatural in the extraordinary depth and profundity of nature itself. Soroush's project is a continuation of the project of moving beyond dualism on the one hand and reductionism on the other; a project we see in many modern philosophers (for example, Nagel, Searle, and Whitehead in analytic philosophy, Merleau-Ponty in continental philosophy, and even Iqbal in the Islamic world). These philosophers are either emergentists or panpsychists and have moved beyond the dilemma that existed in both dualism and reductionism. That dilemma was that both reductionism and dualism failed to recognize a specific dignity and status for matter and nature. Both schools consider nature and matter to be dead and devoid of consciousness, and their difference is that one does not recognize mechanistic, inanimate, and unconscious nature and exits and seeks deliverance from it (dualism), while the other considers dead, unconscious, mechanistic nature as the only possible option and, of course, ignores matters such as life, consciousness, value, meaning, and will within it (reductionism). However, currents such as emergentism consider the dignity and status of nature and matter, and their capabilities and possibilities, to be far greater and higher than the two aforementioned currents (dualism and reductionism). This new perspective also unties the knot of theological problems like revelation, without reducing revelation (reductionism) or making it alien, magical, and entirely incomprehensible (dualism). [1]

3- Soroush's Theory of Truth

In two lectures at the New Perspective Circle in February 2023, Dr. Soroush defends the consensual or confirmatory theory of truth and considers truth to be the product of the agreement and confirmation of rational beings in the general sense (not just the educated or elites). Unlike the correspondence theory of truth, which considers truth to mean correspondence with reality, the consensual theory does not believe in any truth beyond the agreement of rational beings. Truth in this sense is not discovered, but is constructed through the agreement of rational beings. Dr. Soroush explains that there are serious objections to the correspondence theory of truth, including that correspondence is always between two things, one of which is not present to us. We have our own perceptions, and these perceived objects are only one side of the matter; the second side is absent from us.

In Soroush's theory of truth, truth is neither objective nor subjective, but rather intersubjective and constructed. Using an illustrative analogy, this theory is not a mirror but a marketplace. The mirror theory is the correspondence theory of truth, which considers a proposition true if it mirrors reality and corresponds to it or reflects the image of reality. But in the marketplace theory, the value of truth is determined by a market whose merchants are the rational beings themselves. It is in this market that prices are determined based on agreement. Here, the fluid collective intellect is the criterion and standard of truth, and beyond the agreement of rational beings, we have no refuge, recourse, or support upon which to consider something real or true.

Soroush's theory of truth is entirely connected and linked with his intellectual system and in line with his previous discussions. To understand his theory, perhaps an explanation of some philosophical foundations is necessary. It is more or less clear that awareness and cognition are achieved by the mind, and the mind does not take shape without language, and language is not a private matter but a product of society and takes shape and consolidates within the context of the community. Mind, awareness, language, and understanding (using concepts) are interconnected and interdependent. With the explanation that to be aware of something, we must know what kind of thing it is and under what description it falls; that is, that thing is A, and not B or C. In other words, we can know something when we have a concept of it. A mental concept also requires language and an expression that we use about it. Our language and expression, in turn, presuppose participation in a linguistic community where dialogue and justification take place. Therefore, our awareness and mind are tied to concepts, language, social participation, and the space of reasons, dialogues, and justifications that are exchanged, and indeed are woven into its very fabric. It goes without saying that external realities independent of our mind and language also exist and are at work, but we have no direct and unmediated access to them, bypassing our mind, language, and concepts.

Of course, we have a very raw, elementary, and pre-linguistic type of awareness that is common between humans and amoebas (single-celled organisms), and that is the absorption of raw data from the external environment. To explain this matter, the famous duck-rabbit image, which was also used by Wittgenstein, is an interesting thought experiment. We, who have seen both a rabbit and a duck, recognize both in this image. But, for example, what does an infant who has no conception of a rabbit or a duck see? Such an infant probably sees only black spots. (Of course, one can ask how seeing a color like black and a shape like a spot is possible without the mediation of mind and language?). This is the same raw, elementary, pre-linguistic awareness devoid of interpretation and understanding that also exists in amoebas, and in this state, sensory stimuli respond to environmental stimulations. But as soon as the mind and language become active, we enter human-level awareness, which is accompanied by understanding and interpretation. Human-level awareness discerns what type the thing it sees, hears, or senses is: is it a duck or a rabbit? This is where language, thought, interpretation, and categories of understanding come into play. In the raw awareness of the first type, we only deal with external causes and stimulations. (Space of causes) But until these external causes and stimulations are articulated, don the garb of language, are understood, and find justification in the arena of society and dialogue, they remain at the level of those raw stimulations in the sensory realm and have not entered the space of reasons. (Space of reasons).

Empiricism in its positivist mode was a belief that imagined we are directly in the embrace of realities through sensory experience. Oblivious to the fact that experiencing itself is based on a heavy burden of concepts. When we experience A, it means we can place A under a description or category and have a "concept" of it. Having a concept is accompanied by the application of language. The application of language requires participation in a linguistic community that has culture, justification, and rules. It is from here that "justification" in a linguistic community finds a fundamental role that is not comparable to that raw sensation mentioned at the beginning. Of course, the objects of our thought exist externally and also have causal power and affect us. But until these external objects don the garb of understanding, are articulated in language, and step into the realm of dialogue and justification in the linguistic community, they remain at the level of those mute spots that the aforementioned infant saw; because without mind and language, we do not perceive or comprehend any movement, relation, position (understanding time and space), connection, correlation, structure, or order.

Therefore, we have no way to attain truth except by presenting it within the linguistic community. Since we have no private language, any understanding or comprehension we have of truths is already enveloped and clothed in the mental and linguistic categories we learned in society and derived from the community. There is no understanding or comprehension without mind and language; even when, in our own estimation, we make a discovery in our private world, we understand it with the categories we already possess in mind and language, and which we have derived from society. Mind and language are like the sun, without which, it seems, we neither see nor understand. In the poet's words:

If the bat veils itself from the sun,

          it is not veiled from the idea of the sun.

We do not see or find realities in a naked form, stripped of the categories of language and understanding. Our access to realities is not without some kind of description or another, and we cannot lay claim to a non-linguistic reality. Thus, in principle, we have no access to truth and rationality outside the bounds of mind and language, beyond the intersubjective space, and apart from dialogue. Let alone the ethical advantages of this view, which does not permit any ruler who is not a sage, or any sage (in his own estimation), to impose truths he has attained in his private world (while we have no private language or world) or reached in the realm of Forms, upon society by force, without dialogue and persuasion, thereby violating the foundations of democracy. A truth that is independent of mind and language; an alien truth that seeks to impose itself; a wholly other truth that does not engage in dialogue, does not persuade, but imposes, can become the source of historical catastrophes. Even slavery, which in ancient Greece was more or less accompanied by public consent, justification, and persuasion, seems better than the state of abolishing slavery at that time in the name of a moral truth, but without dialogue, justification, and persuasion, and through force, violence, and torture.

The claim is that we have no escape from understanding and interpretation. We all understand and interpret. Undoubtedly, some interpretations are better, more precise, and more correct than others. But we never reach a point where we are free from perception and interpretation, where we can boast "I am the Truth" and consider ourselves in the embrace of absolute truth, independent of understanding, subjectivity, language, and human community. We can test for the existence of justification, freedom, and dialogue, but we have no test at hand for the existence of truth. Even in the realm of science (and especially in the realm of science), which is considered the most robust domain of knowledge, we face this same uncertainty. Now, almost no one believes in the seven Ptolemaic heavens or geocentrism, whereas these were once part of certainties. Similarly, our present-day certainties may well be entirely swept away. For this reason, when an era or paradigm of science passes, we deem the beliefs of the previous era invalid and superstitious.

We always have a perception and a concept of truth, and this perception and concept of ours can, of course, gain a wider scope and be more or less valid in everyone's eyes. Yet, it is still a perception and a "concept" whose connection to our perspective and mental concepts is not severed; it is still a "concept" expressed through our "language," and when concept and language come into play, mental and cultural limitations inevitably accompany them. In other words, we may attain a broader view and a perspective that is, more or less, from everyone's eyes, but we do not attain a view from nowhere or from God's eyes, and we do not shed the inevitable human limitations, nor do we step out of human garments as long as we are in human form.

To better understand Dr. Soroush's view on truth and reality, it suffices, in discussions concerning revelation and the Word of God, this time in a philosophical rather than a theological context, to examine the concept of "reality" in the same manner in place of "God." Reality, as it is, cannot be fully grasped by any single language or culture. It is from this that cultures need one another. Because their domains and spheres of experience are different, and they can and must learn from each other. It is also from this that a humility and ethics takes shape which is absent in positivism and the naïve realism that considers reality to be within its own grasp and language, and pays no heed to the "other" (another culture, other learnings, other experiences). The positivist individual sees no need within himself to refer to the other, because he considers his own reason, understanding, and language to be a perfect mirror of reality; a reality he regards as uninterpreted and seen through the eyes of the gods. Whereas such an understanding and perception, free of concepts and directly in the embrace of realities, does not exist. Reality and truth are not something within anyone's private access; rather, they take shape, persist, or change within the intersubjective realm of the human mind and language. This formation, persistence, and change is not independent of mind and language, nor is it realized in a private world (which is an incoherent expression) or in a Platonic world of Forms, and it always requires dialogue in the public sphere.

Dr. Soroush's theory of truth is an invitation to replace absolute and objective concepts of truth with social participation, persuasion, and collective dialogue, to substitute justification for truth, and to replace the direct and unmediated individual confrontation with truths with conversation and mutual understanding between persons—a confrontation which, as mentioned, fundamentally does not seem possible. The political, ethical, and theological implications of Dr. Soroush's theory of truth are a detailed discussion requiring extensive research and study.

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[1] . In this regard, one of the best works is the book Dream, Metaphor and the Language of Religion, written by Dr. Maziyar, who, in expounding and elaborating upon Dr. Soroush's theory, writes:

"Why should we suppose that transcendence has a place and location beyond our human existence? Why should we consider the transcendent world to be outside human existence and outside the world before us? This conception of the transcendent world and the unseen world means spatializing these matters, which is philosophically invalid. What problem would arise if we considered our human existence, the experiences of this complex organism, and the world in which we live and which is the source of our experiences, to be so vast and complex that the experience of transcendence takes shape from within it? Our human self may possess data and experiences from this great world full of unknowns that do not manifest in the usual way and in all humans, and for this reason, are considered super-human. The conception of the unseen or the world of the unseen as a place outside of us or outside the material and sensible world is certainly not an accurate and correct conception of the relationship between the material and the abstract world, or the manifest and the hidden.

So we have experiences of the world. These experiences differ from our ordinary experiences; they are not entirely subject to our will and desire, and they possess contents that lie beyond our usual awareness. Moreover, the impact and transformative effect of these experiences may be entirely different from the effects of our other experiences. If ... we also understand dream experiences, in accordance with the view of modern neuropsychologists, as brain-based, we can still defend the possibility of the sanctity of dream experiences in the same manner and method as Muslim philosophers. Our brain has data at its disposal beyond ordinary perceptual data, which it displays in the form of dream-like simulations possessing shape, form, and narrative. Even if we have not arrived at proving the transcendent realms of the world in its metaphysical sense, that is, the world of immaterial entities, the path to considering dream experiences as sacred is still not closed. Under this assumption, we can say that our brain has not produced these experiences spontaneously and gratuitously based on its own structures. These experiences are the result of the brain's complex and systematic reaction to external stimuli, the human mode of living, and, in general, the type of human life in the world. A world about which we have very limited information, and many of whose aspects and dimensions are