Roundtable on Naturalism with Hossein Sheykh Rezaee, Ali Hossein Khani, and Hassan Amiriara

Roundtable on Naturalism with Hossein Sheykh Rezaee, Ali Hossein Khani, and Hassan Amiriara

Philosophy Under the Umbrella of Science

Source: Etemad Newspaper, Issue 5250, Wednesday, July 6, 2022

Mohsen Azmoudeh: Philosophical discussions and works are very popular among the cultured classes in Iran. However, among these widely-read works, the concept of naturalism is rarely mentioned, and the common term "naturalism" is mostly known among the cultured classes as a literary school or movement. This is while it seems that today, naturalism is the dominant tendency or discussion in academic philosophical circles worldwide. Consequently, this curiosity arises for the audience: what does naturalism mean, and why is it so highly regarded? In our society, which appears to be so interested in philosophical discussions, why is there so little debate about this, and why are there so few books or articles on it? To answer these questions, we approached three faculty members of the Iranian Institute of Philosophy. Hossein Sheykh Rezaee, Ali Hossein Khani, and Hassan Amiriara are philosophy researchers, and each has written notable works and articles in this field. One of our motivations for addressing this topic was a conference on naturalism held in March 2022 at the Iranian Institute of Philosophy. Many international philosophical figures attended this conference. This very event and the considerable reception by philosophy specialists from around the world indicate the importance and prevalence of the discussion about naturalism in our time. Those interested in the presentations given by those professors can visit the website of the Iranian Institute of Philosophy to access the audio-visual files of the conference.

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To begin, in order to disambiguate the meaning of naturalism and to clarify each of your perspectives, could you briefly state what naturalism means and where this discussion essentially originated?

Hossein Sheykh Rezaee: Every encyclopedia entry and book written about naturalism begins with this very point: that there is no firm, precise, and agreed-upon definition of naturalism. It is not that the term is vague, but rather that everyone has used it in their own way. In this respect, a position might be naturalistic for one philosopher but not for another. Therefore, finding a universally agreed-upon definition is difficult. On the other hand, naturalism is not considered a negative orientation. For example, today the term "reductionist" has acquired a negative connotation, whereas in the early twentieth century it was considered a positive term, or even the term "physicalist" might not have a positive resonance, but "naturalist," although close to the two aforementioned terms, still carries a positive connotation for many, and philosophers within the mainstream of analytic philosophy who call themselves naturalists or claim their positions are compatible with naturalism are in the majority. Another point is that in every branch of philosophy, including philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, ethics, philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophy of law, etc., you will find people who describe their work as naturalistic. But let us turn to your question: the core idea of naturalism is that science, or empirical science, is in a sense humanity's most successful achievement. That is, if we want to introduce one thing as the epitome of human progress and rationality that has improved our understanding of the world and life, the first and most successful candidate is probably science. Therefore, the mind is naturally drawn to the idea that we should proceed in other domains in a way similar to how we have proceeded in science. For instance, in the humanities, we should act similarly to the empirical or natural sciences. That is, what philosophy should model itself on is the empirical sciences.

According to this definition, is it correct to say that taking the empirical sciences as a model has two meanings: first, using the method of the empirical sciences in other sciences (the epistemological aspect of naturalism), and second, confining the scope of inquiry and research to the natural world (the ontological aspect of naturalism)?

Sheykh Rezaee: Yes, that's right. In its methodological aspect, the most important proposal is that the empirical sciences have no a priori or pre-experiential arguments, and their discussions are a posteriori, contingent, and subject to falsification. Philosophy, too, should be like this and should be sensitive to the findings of science. From this perspective, a philosophy that is indifferent to the research of empirical scientists about the mind, the world, and nature is unacceptable.

In its ontological aspect—that is, answering the age-old philosophical question of what the world is made of—ontological naturalism commits itself only to what science says. That is, if asked what exists in the world, one should only point to those things about which we have good scientific theories. An older reading of ontological naturalism says that supernatural entities do not exist. By supernatural entities, we mean those things that are not discussed in the empirical and natural sciences and about which we have no theories. Another version of naturalism, which might be a combination of the methodological and ontological versions, has been called metaphysical naturalism. The main idea of metaphysical naturalism is that everything in the world is natural, and reality is equivalent to the natural; therefore, there is no singularity or discontinuity in the world. This means that those things we historically think have a special and unique status in the universe—such as the realm of mind and spirit, or God, which were traditionally conceived as separate from nature, or society, or life—are in fact not so. It was traditionally imagined that these matters were not subject to natural laws, but metaphysical naturalism claims that the world has a kind of uniformity and homogeneity, and there are no singular points within it that are not subject to the laws and forces of nature.

Please also tell us briefly about the history of naturalism.

Sheykh Rezaee: Some have traced it very far back, taking it to the period of the physicists (naturalists) before Socrates, thinkers who believed the world was composed of material elements; for instance, the atomists introduced the four elements. In one sense, this historical background is correct, but the new meaning of naturalism pertains to the time when we have empirical science in the modern sense of the word. Before that, many in Greece, in the Middle Ages, and even in the modern period—thinkers who had materialistic and mechanistic thoughts—had spoken about everything being natural, but the idea that empirical and natural science is successful enough to serve as a model is a twentieth-century idea. That is, it is said that in the first half of the twentieth century in America, pragmatist thinkers like John Dewey and those who were not pragmatists but had gone to America, like Nagel, proposed the idea that reality is nature itself, that everything must have a natural explanation, and that the methods of the empirical sciences must be applied in the humanities and philosophy. I think this dating is more precise. Naturalists are not identical to materialists, because naturalists say that if science shows that something non-material exists, it must be accepted; we have no commitment to matter, but rather must see what empirical science says. Therefore, naturalism is an umbrella under which many tendencies are placed.

What is the importance of this approach or naturalistic view?

Ali Hossein Khani: Today, naturalism is one of the principal approaches or methods for addressing philosophical problems in all, or at least a major part of, the various domains of philosophy. Thus, naturalism is a very strong perspective within the discipline of philosophy itself. However, there is much disagreement about its results or consequences, especially when this attitude is applied in areas such as religion and ethics. A group of philosophers is concerned that adopting a naturalistic view might lead to the loss of the ethical and the religious. In these domains, it is debated, for instance, whether naturalism amounts to materialism and atheism or not. Naturalism is neither of these tendencies, although according to some readings it could be. Moreover, calling some ancient Greek philosophers and those after them naturalists is a late, modern reading of them. They did not consider themselves naturalists. For example, at the conference

Hassan Amiriara: This is a very difficult question, and I will try to answer it in a more indirect way. One account of naturalism, as Dr. Hossein Khani pointed out, is influenced by Quine's views. Quine's thought is, in turn, a reaction both to positivist currents, particularly Carnap's views, and to foundationalist epistemology, and in a sense, a reaction to

Amiriara: Let us consider metaphysics, for example. From an ontological perspective, the traditional question in metaphysics is: what does the world consist of? When we look at the works of philosophers, both those who favor traditional metaphysics and those who oppose it, they agree that the subject of traditional metaphysics, in addition to answering the question of what the world consists of, is to find the general features of reality or the fundamental nature of things—that is, the nature or essence of things. This is, in a way, the very same fundamental question of science. Here, a kind of parallelism apparently emerges between science and traditional philosophy. One traditional solution to resolve this overlap is to say, for instance, that science and metaphysics share a subject matter but differ in their method. The metaphysician's method is a priori and based on intuition, but the naturalist precisely criticizes this. For example, in the field of metaphysics, a naturalistic critique is that the method of metaphysics is not "natural." Philosophy has no special access to the world that science does not have. Therefore, if philosophy is to become naturalized and we do not wish to adopt an eliminativist view of metaphysics, we must make metaphysics at least collaborate and share in the project of understanding ultimate reality or ultimate nature with science. That is, metaphysics must be sensitive to science and empirical data. This is what someone who wants to naturalize metaphysics must do. They must show how metaphysics can be sensitive to empirical data and science and collaborate with science in a project. This collaboration and sensitivity, of course, have various degrees. The same issue exists similarly in other areas of philosophy.

My impression from what Dr. Hossein Khani and Dr. Amiriara said is that, in the naturalistic approach, the distinction between science and philosophy is seemingly removed. Is that not so?

Sheykh Rezaee: This is one of the topics that is a matter of disagreement. At the conference, various speakers also had different positions on this. For example, one of our speakers was Mr. Timothy Williamson, who is a critic of naturalism. Some of his books have also been translated into Persian. His idea in that lecture was that restricting the natural sciences to physics, chemistry, and biology faces the problem that there are some things in these sciences that are not natural. For instance, it is not clear whether mathematics, history, sociology, and political science are natural. In short, it is a difficult project. Therefore, if you define the natural sciences strongly, many sciences and matters are left out of it; if you define science in a broad sense, that is, calling any systematic and methodical inquiry about the world "science," then, according to Williamson, this would be a trivial theory or view, because mathematics, ethics, and so on have been and are systematic inquiries. So, this subject is a matter of dispute. However, it is true that in naturalism, the boundary between science and philosophy becomes blurred. In the definition I gave at the beginning of the discussion, when I spoke of metaphysical naturalism, this point is explicitly stated. That is, it says the world has a kind of homogeneity and unity, and nothing in it is beyond the scope of natural explanation. Therefore, philosophy is either absorbed into the natural sciences, follows them, or, in a minimal sense, is sensitive to them. Incidentally, this point also relates to another of your concerns, namely, what results naturalism will have in society. One of its most important results is precisely this. We traditionally have Islamic philosophy or wisdom, which is the heritage of medieval philosophy and is a kind of "speculative" philosophy that, in the form it is presented today—for example, in the texts of Avicenna and Mulla Sadra—either has its connection with modern sciences completely severed, or if it has a connection with science, it is with the science of its own time, that is, for example, with Aristotelian physics. Incidentally, this very point can be one of the results of naturalism in our current circumstances, because naturalism says that if a philosophical system, completely independent of the natural sciences of its time such as cognitive science, neuroscience, brain science, and so on, makes claims about the mind and consciousness, it is not philosophy at all; it is storytelling, it is a dream. This view has a fundamental difference from our way of doing philosophy and can therefore be quite challenging.

It seems this point does not apply solely to Islamic philosophy. It would not have been amiss to have a specialist and researcher in so-called continental philosophy present here as well, for instance someone who is a specialist in Hegel or Heidegger. Because it seems many of these philosophies also have similar characteristics.

Sheykh Rezaee: Of course, I must first emphasize that within the broad field of analytic philosophy itself, arguments opposing naturalism have also been presented, and as it happens, there were people with this stance at our conference, one example of which I mentioned. Williamson believes naturalism is not a defensible thesis. Or, for example, Alvin Plantinga, the American analytic philosopher, has a famous argument that two people discussed at the conference. He says that if you accept naturalism and Darwin's theory of evolution, the probability that our cognitive faculties, which are products of natural selection, would lead us to truth is very low. Therefore, by accepting these two assumptions, our cognitive faculties are unreliable, which would be a strange conclusion. There are other arguments against naturalism as well. So, although naturalism carries a positive valence within the field of analytic philosophy, it also has its opponents. But regarding continental philosophy, as far as I know, some researchers consider their own work, and sometimes the work of the great figures of continental philosophy, to be consistent with naturalism, though some are opposed to this idea. For instance, one of the speakers described Wittgenstein's work as a kind of naturalism. This type of naturalism is such that it is not very sensitive to, or a follower of, "science," but it still defends a kind of naturalism.

Many continental philosophers and thinkers, like Nietzsche or Freud, were, in their own time, sensitive to the science of the day and tried to ensure their ideas and thoughts, even if not entirely consistent with the science of the time, were not in serious opposition to it.

Sheykh Rezaee: But Nietzsche certainly does not grant science that unique status, as if it were a thing apart that delivers truth to us as it is. Science is also very human, in the sense that it is a human construct and artifact. But he is a naturalist in the sense that he tries to offer a natural account or explanation of, say, ethics, metaphysics, transcendental matters, or history. In any case, on both sides of the analytic-continental divide, there are those who think naturalism is open to critique. There are also those who see their program as consistent with it. For example, interpreters of Kant say that although Kant speaks of transcendental ideas, he presents ideas that are naturalistic. Another example is Hume. Meanwhile, among the rationalists, there are also those whom they themselves or their commentators considered naturalists. Therefore, the analytic-continental distinction does not map onto the defenders and opponents of naturalism.

But it can be said that most continental thinkers are not naturalists in the specific sense.

Sheykh Rezaee: I cannot comment with certainty about continental philosophers and philosophy, but in analytic philosophy, I can say there is a dominant naturalistic tendency.

Hossein Khani: Regarding the point Dr. Sheykh Rezaee mentioned, the later Wittgenstein, in the book On Certainty, says that part of philosophical problems and mistakes arise from applying scientific methods that function elsewhere (or in other language games), for example, to the concept of meaning and the question of its metaphysical possibility; on this basis, you encounter a series of complex philosophical problems and try to theorize about them. As a result, you distance yourself from the actions of everyday life and fall into the trap of philosophizing whose results are accompanied by many contradictions and paradoxes. He believes that the game of science must be in its proper place, and the discussion of meaning and language also has its own place.

Amiriara: My guess is that in the field of analytic philosophy, there is a very positive view of the institution of science, but in continental philosophy, it seems there is generally a critical view of it.

Overall, in this discussion it seems that naturalists, firstly, accord a very special status to science, and secondly, act as if everyone knows what science is and a specific, definite meaning of it is intended, whereas I think in science studies there have been developments regarding both issues. Moreover, that former positive view of science, its status, and its achievements no longer exists.

Sheykh Rezaee: That is a precise point. One of the main critiques of naturalism is that the naturalist imagines science to be a neat, well-defined phenomenon, institution, or entity, and that we know its boundaries and can say this is science and this is not. Secondly, it speaks of science as if it were a unified and homogeneous thing, as if we have a totality called science. All of these assumptions have been called into question in the last half-century. The distinction between science and non-science has become blurred. There are subjects that fall entirely on the borderline. Also, there has been much discussion about what the scientific method is, and they have apparently concluded that we do not have a single, unique scientific method that applies in all sciences. Moreover, instead of "science," we should speak of "sciences," which are diverse and plural. Also, in many so-called interdisciplinary discussions, speculation plays a role, and entities are recognized that are not physical at all, such as the concept of information, which is very important and runs our entire world, but it is not clear whether this concept is physical or natural, or likewise the concept of "data," which is not clear whether it is physical or not. Furthermore, there are presuppositions in science, and we are influenced by external factors. All of these make defining the concept of natural science increasingly difficult. But on the other hand, it can be said that there is still a hard core in the empirical and natural sciences. That is, after all, what is called empirical science is sensitive to experience, and whatever happens externally, science cannot fail to change its position and show no reaction. Perhaps someone might claim that this hard core is, in a sense, sufficient to define naturalism based on it. Here, I would also like to point out the consequence of this issue for our own society. The issue of trust in science or lack thereof is a social issue. Some claim that naturalism in its minimal sense, meaning the sensitivity of ideas to the sciences, is a kind of democratizing process, in the sense that evidence should be accessible to everyone and everyone should be able to examine it, and it should not be monopolized by a specific person or institution. In this sense, empirical science can be said to be democratic. Of course, in practice, not everyone may do this, but ultimately, in the public sphere, this possibility exists. Whereas some methods are not like this. For example, someone who speaks of inspirations and illuminations—these are not public matters. Therefore, the scientific method or naturalism in its minimal sense derives its value from being democratic, meaning you say that if someone theorizes, we demand testable evidence from them. This is one of the things that can be said to give naturalism social value.

Wouldn't reducing or confining the whole of philosophy to the naturalistic approach harm philosophy and some of its sub-branches, such as moral philosophy, political philosophy, social philosophy, etc.? Even those parts of philosophy whose function is to promote a kind of rationalism, reasonableness, and rational dialogue in everyday life—in other words, doesn't naturalism make discussions overly specialized and complex, distancing them from everyday life?

Amiriara: It is not necessarily so. I am not a specialist in moral philosophy, but it seems that if you are a moral philosopher, you cannot be indifferent to scientific and biological research. Indeed, it would be strange for a moral philosopher to engage in purely speculative work without any regard for the sciences that conduct empirical research on morality.

But it seems that if this interaction is necessary or essential, philosophical discussions become overly specialized and distant from everyday issues.

Sheykh Rezaee: I don’t much agree with this view. Of course, any discussion that becomes philosophical acquires a specialized philosophical language and is debated in philosophy departments in a way that probably seems incomprehensible and unnecessary to an outside observer. Every discussion is like this. This holds true for any specialized philosophical discussion; for instance, if you want to discuss Heidegger, the discussion inevitably becomes specialized. But if these topics enter the public sphere through others who are not necessarily academics but serve as intermediaries between academia and society, naturalistic approaches can actually be effective for society. For example, in recent years in Iran there has been a group that, especially in the fields of individual and collective psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience, presents the issues raised in science to the general public in an accessible and understandable way. It is as if the view is gradually spreading that the human being and the hardware of their brain are products of the evolutionary process, and that this is implicated in many things philosophers previously talked about, such as ethics, religious beliefs, revelation, dreams, and so on. Also spreading is the view that we, as human agents, enter into collective relations and exhibit behaviors that are entirely emergent and cannot be recognized at the individual level. The writers who promote these views are researchers who read specialized discussions and talk about them in the public sphere. These writers operate entirely within a naturalistic framework and, for example, explain in simple, accessible language how all moral precepts are products of evolutionary processes or why the system we have, which we think is unique and sacred, is not so. These are discussions that take place under the naturalistic approach. In fact, these discussions connect the general public with philosophical debates, and specialization does not necessarily mean that people understand nothing of them. Rather, it gives the audience a perspective that what was imagined in the realm of rationality to be something separate from matter is very much connected to material things. In other words, for many issues of everyday life, they offer biological-evolutionary explanations that are very interesting and represent a kind of link between philosophical discussions and the general public, giving the public a perspective for analyzing issues.

Hossein Khani: This specialization exists in almost all sciences. For example, in physics departments, various complex and abstract models are developed. But many top-level specialists and researchers give major public lectures, where great physicists like Hawking, Tyson, and others explain specialized topics in simple, accessible language for the people.

It seems these discussions receive even more attention, especially due to the general public’s acceptance of science.

Hossein Khani: Yes, exactly. In these discussions, the technical and specialized details are set aside. Sometimes these discussions also take the form of debates and dialogues, which become very engaging.

When we talk about naturalism, at first glance it seems as if religion and religious topics are set aside. Our common and widespread understanding of religion involves supernatural matters. Of course, some religions are themselves naturalistic, but at least in the common reading of the Abrahamic religions, it seems we are dealing with supernatural or non-natural matters. Can’t it be said that naturalistic approaches come with non-religious implications?

Hossein Khani: In fact, at our conference, two people spoke on a similar topic. When I said that naturalism is not materialism or physicalism, I was referring to this very issue. These are clichés that are constantly and carelessly repeated, for example, that naturalism is equivalent to atheism or agnosticism. For instance, Stephen Law, a prominent philosopher at Oxford University, discussed at the conference how one can be an atheist but not a naturalist, or conversely, one can be a naturalist and also a theist. In other words, atheism does not result from naturalism, and vice versa. Or Mohammad Legenhausen spoke about how Islam does not have a serious conflict with many naturalistic teachings.

Believers in religions usually claim that the common understanding of their religion was compatible with the understanding of science in past times, whereas religious texts and scriptures also allowed for other interpretations, and therefore today we can read religious texts with contemporary understandings of science or a naturalistic outlook—that is, today one can be a naturalist while still believing in a religion or theism.

Hossein Khani: Yes, these discussions have always surrounded our understanding of religious texts, and there has been a great deal of debate in hermeneutics and textual interpretation on this matter. Our view today of science, or of what is material or not, natural or not, and the like, has changed considerably. Likewise, our theories of hermeneutics and textual understanding have also evolved. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that a rigid opposition arises between religion and naturalism. Even naturalism itself is subject to various conceptions and conceptual formulations, each with different strengths and weaknesses.

Amiriara: In my view, a meticulous analysis does not necessarily yield an incompatibility between religious beliefs and naturalism as a definitive conclusion, and the research conducted in this area demonstrates this point.

So one can be both religious and a naturalist?

Amiriara: In any case, a narrative of science has taken shape in the public mind that is perceived as a reaction to religious beliefs, and a kind of opposition between the two is prominent in the general imagination. Many historical events may have fueled this opposition, such as the conflicts that have existed throughout history between the institution of science and the institution of religion (for example, the Church). But an analysis can show that these oppositions are not necessarily linked to logical consequences; rather, these oppositions may be social reactions—for instance, reactions aimed at social and political power—and have nothing to do with the content of these two institutions. But in any case, it is a complex discussion.

Hossein Khani: Another important point is that an individual's everyday life is not necessarily the logical consequence of their specialized philosophical thoughts. One famous contemporary philosopher, Hilary Putnam, stated in a well-known interview that while engaging in specialized discussions in the philosophy of mathematics, logic, language, metaphysics, and so on, in his daily life he is a believer and performs his religious rituals. He says he sees no direct connection between his everyday life and his philosophical discussions, and that performing these rituals actually brings him great peace of mind. But there are also many who argue that there must be a direct connection and a deep bond between philosophical thoughts and everyday life. A great many issues and debates are involved in this subject.

Sheykh Rezaee: This point is one of the challenging and debated cases. On one side of the debate are those who imagine that accepting naturalism means abandoning religious beliefs. Incidentally, they also promote this, saying that the further we advance in science, the less we see any trace of religious claims. They say that these two (science and religion) have a unity of subject matter, and when they reach opposition and contradiction, one is inevitably invalid. But this is not the only option. Other options have been historically proposed and have become stronger now. For example, those who try to offer non-literal interpretations and readings of religion and sacred texts and deny the unity of subject matter altogether. That is, they claim that science and religion do not speak about a single content, and the material in sacred texts should be understood metaphorically and consequently do not conflict with scientific results. Both in the Islamic world and in Christianity, there are theologies based on a metaphorical and fictional view of texts. But the interesting point is that the situation of theology or kalam in the Islamic world differs from Christianity. In the sense that philosophers and famous schools in Islamic philosophy, since they are rooted in the Aristotelian-Greek tradition, have fundamentally not held a negative position regarding empirical science and, in fact, have always tried, using philosophical methods and frameworks, to offer a formulation of things like miracles that does not create obvious interference with scientific findings. Therefore, as many have said, the challenge of science and religion that exists in Christianity does not exist in the Islamic world and has no parallel. That is, there has been no obvious conflict. The interesting point is that among those who even have theological approaches, there are those who believe that matters like the spirit and soul are also material, and the only thing that is immaterial is God. Of course, they differentiate between types of matter and speak of matters of a more subtle kind. This is an interpretation that has existed since ancient times, and it was, in fact, the philosophers who insisted that matters like the soul are immaterial. The view of this group of theologians also has supporters today. Therefore, even if you accept this line of thought, you still do not find much difficulty with naturalism.

One interpretation could also be the pantheistic view that sees the whole universe as one.

Sheykh Rezaee: Yes, that view, which sees everything as being of one kind and essence, is compatible with naturalism. Some who are proponents of naturalism and want to preserve supernatural beliefs, identities, or entities have conceptually formulated the matter in another way. They say that if you assume a supernatural entity exists, if you provide an acceptable explanation of how it affects natural affairs, accepting it is unproblematic, provided it is not mysterious; that is, you can accept that a supernatural entity exists, but there are mechanisms of intervention that are explainable. Some understand God in this way and imagine it does not conflict with naturalism. In summary, as Mr. Hossein Khani said, the matter is not black and white, and one should not say that naturalism is in opposition and contradiction with religious belief. In closing, it is not bad to add a few sentences about the conference. This conference was important in several respects, first because the number of prominent, top-tier philosophers who were invited and gave lectures was exceptional. Also, the conference was a good opportunity for specialists from diverse fields to become acquainted. It was also interesting for these philosophers that, despite all the difficulties, there is an active philosophical community in Iran that organizes programs and raises valuable discussions. This conference was also appealing for students and researchers. This program was a kind of confidence-building in the field of philosophy within the country, both for domestic and foreign participants. This point, regardless of what the conference topic was, is considered a turning point. Also, sometimes important discussions would arise among these philosophers that were very fascinating, which itself is a sign of success. That is, a philosophical interaction in the true sense of the word occurred at this conference.

Did Iranian researchers also contribute to this conference, and are the interactions set to continue?

Sheykh Rezaee: Yes, the first day of the conference featured Persian presentations, where domestic specialists spoke. On the final day, which had English presentations, some Iranian individuals were present. One day of the conference was in Persian and four days were in English. Those interested can view all the audio and video files of the lectures on the Instagram page of the Iranian Institute of Philosophy. But as for the continuation of these interactions, it depends on the conditions of the institute, the department, and the budgets. We are inclined to maintain our relations with the international scientific community. Now, due to virtual conferences, these interactions have become easier and there is no necessity for physical presence; moreover, holding this conference has helped build trust, making continued collaboration easier.

Hossein Khani: Of course, planning and coordinating conferences with this number of researchers from various universities and countries is very difficult work.

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