How Far Into Nature?

Life on planet Earth has always been accompanied by challenges for us. We want to live a comfortable life, free from danger and suffering, on this planet, and to this end we sometimes make changes to our environment. Given the increase in human population and the consequent rise in construction, one of the problems that has arisen is the destruction or alteration of the environment. For example, a forest may be destroyed to make way for a residential complex. This issue can be approached from both an "ethical" and an "aesthetic" perspective, and in this article we will try to elucidate both subjects.

One of the important questions in environmental ethics is whether we are permitted to alter other planets in a way that makes them suitable for human life (this phenomenon is technically called terraforming). For instance, to change Mars or the Moon enough to make them habitable. In the changes we make to our own environment, is there an ethical consideration? Are we allowed to alter natural phenomena such as forests, seas, rivers, mountains, and so on, so that we can live a suitable life there? What about from an aesthetic point of view? To answer the ethical issue of making changes to the environment, we must examine the "value of nature." Does nature have merely "instrumental" value for humans, or does it have "intrinsic" and independent value?

The Value of Nature; Instrumental or Intrinsic

Broadly speaking, our attitude toward the environment can be divided into two main categories. One attitude holds that everything in nature and the environment exists for our benefit, and if a phenomenon in nature, or nature as a whole, has no use or meaning for us, then it has no value either. In effect, this type of attitude makes the value of nature and the environment dependent on human desires and needs. Opposing this is a second attitude, which considers the environment, nature, and what exists within nature—such as living beings and even inanimate objects (like a stone)—to possess value, a value that is not solely dependent on human needs and desires. This attitude does not value nature or animals merely for their instrumental function for humans, but accords them independent value in their own right. For example, animals have value in themselves, and if they are of no use or benefit to us, that does not justify doing whatever we please with them. Naturally, depending on which of these two attitudes we adopt toward nature or the environment, the changes we are morally permitted to make will differ. An attitude that takes an “instrumental view” of nature makes its value contingent on human desires and needs, while granting independent, intrinsic value to humans. Consequently, anything other than humans that exists in nature, such as forests or animals, acquires instrumental value if it is useful to humans, and whatever is not useful or significant will have no value. For instance, in this type of attitude, burning a forest can only be condemned on instrumental grounds. We might say, for example, that if we burn the forests, future generations will not be able to use this forest, or other people will be deprived of enjoying this beauty; or, regarding the killing of animals, we might condemn it solely because butchers suffer psychological disorders from killing animals or because their sensibilities are impaired. Thus, in this type of attitude, the value we accord to non-humans is purely “instrumental value.” The second attitude grants nature “independent value.” Keekok Lee, among the proponents of this view, reminds us, in order to show that nature has independent value, that nature does not exist for our sake; nature’s existence does not depend on us, and it is in fact our existence that depends on nature. In other words, if we humans were to become extinct, nature would still exist. On this basis, Keekok Lee argues that we should treat nature with humility and respect, because it is we who depend on nature, and nature does not depend on us. No matter how much we destroy nature or make changes to it, even if it leads to our own demise, something called nature and the environment will still exist. The environment may not be as verdant as it once was, there may be no sea, or drought may occur, but nature will still exist, whether we are here or not. This argument can be considered both for changes that can be made on planet Earth and for changes that might be made on other planets in the solar system to make them habitable. On this basis, one can conclude that the changes we wish to make in nature must take into account the fact that we depend on nature, and nature does not belong to us such that we can do whatever we please with it. Consequently, the changes we make in nature must be undertaken with caution and precise calculation so as not to have destructive effects on nature.

The Last Man

For many, it is difficult to conceive that we have a moral responsibility toward nature. Especially since the prevailing moral consideration at present is that “any action is permissible unless it harms other human beings”! To understand why we have a “moral responsibility” toward nature, we can consider Richard Sylvan’s “last man” thought experiment. Suppose all human beings on Earth have died and only one person remains. Under these conditions, if that person, using the technology at their disposal, were to destroy the Earth, would their action be wrong or right? From any ethical perspective, it is very difficult to accept that this act would not be wrong. With this challenge, Richard Sylvan seeks to show that nature does not merely have “instrumental value,” for if we accept that the destruction of the world by the last man on Earth is a wrong act, we consequently ascribe to nature and the environment a kind of value independent of humans, or a non-instrumental, intrinsic value.

Aesthetic Examination

Beyond ethical examination, we can also consider the changes we make to our environment from an aesthetic perspective. Suppose someone goes mountaineering in winter and sees icicles on the mountain. If they destroy them, nothing particularly significant happens, because these icicles will form again depending on the weather conditions, and given the altitude and the secluded nature of the place, it is unlikely that another person will pass by and wish to enjoy the beauty of the icicles. But if someone destroys them and eliminates their beauty simply because destroying these icicles has no consequences, it indicates a kind of "aesthetic blindness"; that is, the person lacks the necessary sensitivity to beauty. Or suppose that wild tulips grow in nature, and if we pick a number of them, nothing will happen and they will grow back on their own. If someone picks these flowers or tramples them, they suffer from "aesthetic blindness." On this basis, the beauty of nature should not merely have "utility" or "instrumental benefit" for us in order for us to respect it. The environment and wild nature, which have formed without human intervention, are fundamentally different from what we humans create artificially. Therefore, destroying a forest to build a road, with the excuse that we will later create a similar forest nearby, cannot be justified. "Robert Elliot" likens untouched nature, which has grown without human intervention, to a work of art. Compare an original work of art with its copy to grasp the difference between nature as it is and what we want to replace it with after its destruction. Suppose someone tells you they want to give you a Rembrandt painting as a gift. Then, using advanced technology, they reproduce this painting on a canvas and give it to you. These two paintings might be visually indistinguishable, but what makes the Rembrandt painting valuable is its "authenticity." The authenticity of the Rembrandt work is partly dependent on the "history" it possesses. This artwork emerged in a historical era in response to a specific event, and in this sense, it has meaning, and through the memories it has created for humans or the significance it has held for human society, it has attained such a historical status. But the painting printed onto canvas by a computer lacks such a history. In fact, this work feigns historicity. Similarly, Elliot considers pristine and untouched natural landscapes as akin to an "original work of art" and assigns less value to their replacements. The value of an untouched natural environment also lies in the fact that its beauty came into being without human intervention, and this beauty is linked to the history of that environment. Our encounter with nature sometimes occurs without examining its complex dimensions. Even if accepting intrinsic value for nature is difficult for some of us, and we ascribe merely instrumental value to nature, we can still pay attention to the point that all the changes we make in our environment are for the purpose of providing better living conditions within it. If the changes we make in our environment disrupt comfortable living in the long term or endanger human life in general, it is not defensible from the perspective of "instrumental ethics" either. When we say nature is for humans, we should not forget that "humans" does not refer only to the humans currently living on planet Earth. If necessary, nature must be altered in such a way that the humans of the coming centuries can also benefit from this nature.

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References:

Elliot, R. (1982). Faking nature. Inquiry, 25(1), 81-93. Lee, K. (1994). Awe and humility: Intrinsic value in nature. Beyond an earthbound environmental ethics. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement,36, 89-101. Sparrow, R. (1999). The ethics of terraforming. Environmental Ethics, 21(3), 227-245. Sylvan, R. (1973). Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic. InProceedings of the XV World congress of philosophy (Vol. 1, pp. 205-210).

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How Far Into Nature?

Zohair Bagheri No’parast

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