Injecting Hope as an Immoral Act

The rationality of hopefulness depends on many factors. Factors such as the object of hope—that which we place our hope in—; the degree of hopefulness, the circumstances, the goal and the person hoping; the probability of the positive outcomes of that hope coming to fruition, and so on. Essentially, rational hope is hope for a positive outcome which, despite lacking certainty of its occurrence, we deem probable. Now, the higher the probability of occurrence, the more rational that hope is.

If hope is illusory, it may bring harms that, under certain conditions, may even be impossible to remedy. In my opinion, the condition for the rationality of hope is not that the individual must hope solely and exclusively in themselves or their own abilities; nor is the mere fact that we have placed our hope in someone other than ourselves a sign that our hope is illusory. The condition for the rationality of hope is the existence of a relative knowledge of the factors mentioned at the outset; that is, the reasonable possibility of the realization of that which we have placed our hope in. It seems that personal characteristics, circumstances, and the goals of each individual are, to a large extent, involved in the reasonableness of hope, and one cannot prescribe a single formula for everyone and incite all toward a single hope.

Consider a hopeful person whose object of hope is a kind father, physical ability, their current thought, social institutions, or even God's grace. How much guarantee and assurance is there that such things are worth placing hope in, for every person, with any goal, under any circumstances, and to any degree? How much assurance is there that my kind father will always support me? That my hands will always be capable? That my current thought will remain warming and illuminating? That the social institution will fulfill its duties and that God's grace will align with my desire?

The death of a father, a sudden accident, reading a book I had not yet read, a deceitful politician, or a divine wisdom misaligned with my goals, might turn all my hopes into despair. These were all hopes that had eliminated the possibility of other hopes emerging. Perhaps if I had not placed my hope in these (or at least not with such intensity), I would have thought differently, made a different decision, chosen a different way of living to find new resources and capital for hope. Hopes that are more reasonable and more reliable.

Based on these reflections and considerations, it seems to me that injecting a single hope into different human beings, without sufficient knowledge of their differences, their goals, their circumstances, and most importantly, the probability of their hope being fruitful, cannot be a moral and considered act.

Hope, on the one hand, brings peace of mind, and on the other hand, narrows the space for thinking about other ways of solving the problem. A look at the current situation of Middle Eastern countries and their abundant underground reserves can lead us to the conclusion that if we have an immediate solution or hope for solving our problems, we will probably no longer think about solving issues through other methods. The continuation of this process reaches a point where, although oil still exists in the Middle East, problems there increase day by day.

I suspect that hope—independent of its rationality—can close the path to new perspectives on solving problems. Perhaps this is why Stoic philosophers, besides considering anger as resulting from illusory hope and the encounter with reality, also consider great despair to be the result of great hope and the failure to achieve goals. Therefore, it is better to utilize even rational hope appropriately, in moderation, and consciously…

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Injecting Hope as an Immoral Act

The Rationality of Hopefulness, Rational Hope

Author: Reza Iranmanesh

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