Lack of Hijab or Lack of Chastity: Which Is Immoral? | Soroush Dabbagh

Note: Some time ago, my article entitled “Hijab in the Scales of Ethics”[1] was published and met with several reactions. Some branded me an “anti-religion” activist and a promoter of the Reza Shah-era anti-hijab culture;[2] others, out of kindness, looked upon that brief piece and set out to explicate and critique it, honestly sharing their questions and ambiguities with me.[3] I have nothing to do with the first group, and I pray for fairness, self-restraint, and tolerance for them. In this writing, I will set forth a number of points in order to clarify the claims and arguments of that article and to respond to the questions and criticisms that have arisen for the second group. .

In the article “Hijab in the Scales of Ethics,” I was not in the position of issuing a jurisprudential ruling on the issue of hijab, for issuing fatwas is not my field of work or expertise; rather, I sought to analyze the issue of covering the neck and hair from an ethical perspective and, by considering the “Minimalist Theory of Divine Command,”[4] I explored its relation and connection to the jurisprudential ruling on covering the neck and hair. The main claim of the article was that livelihood-minded believers, who are solely concerned with jurisprudential rulings regarding the limits and boundaries of hijab, must also consider this issue from an ethical perspective and acknowledge that not covering the neck and hair is, in principle, not an immoral act, and those who do not cover their neck and hair do not commit a moral error; at the same time, it is good for them to know that a minority of jurists believe that not covering the neck and hair does not carry religious prohibition. Furthermore, knowledge-minded believers, who value rational ethical reasons and think about establishing a balance between jurisprudence and ethics and weighing jurisprudential rulings in the scales of ethics, can acknowledge that not covering the hair and neck is, in principle, not morally reprehensible. They can also, by considering the “Minimalist Theory of Divine Command” and looking with kindness upon the diversity of opinions among jurists, Quranic scholars, and Islamologists regarding the jurisprudential ruling on hijab, conclude that God’s command concerning the necessity of covering the neck and hair does not have definitive indication in the sacred text.[5] It seems that the ruling on hijab in the Islamic tradition is primarily and essentially identity-based and jurisprudential in nature, not ethical. In other words, if there were an ethical consideration at play here, and not covering the neck and hair provided the means for the inevitable sexual arousal of men and laid the groundwork for corruption in society, one could ask why this ruling has not been applied absolutely to all Muslim women, and why slave women have been exempted from covering their hair and neck. As the late Qabel has stated: “The non-obligation of covering the head and neck for Muslim slave women (which is necessitated by reliable transmitted evidence and a consensus-oriented tendency) indicates this very important matter: ‘It is not forbidden for the head and neck of any Muslim woman to be visible.’ In other words, ‘neither being a woman nor being a Muslim woman’ is the reason for the obligation of covering the head and neck. Because ‘Muslim slave women’ were both ‘women’ and ‘Muslims,’ and covering the head and neck (and even some other parts of the body, according to the explicit statements of some jurists) was not obligatory for them.”[6] According to the late Qabel’s analysis, neither being a woman nor being a Muslim is the reason for the obligation of covering the head and neck. It appears that the identity-based aspect of hijab and the differentiation made between free women and non-free women was the main reason for covering the head and neck in the era of the Prophet. Some Arab Muslim intellectuals, such as Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, also have such a conception of the philosophy of hijab:

“In the past, some alleys were roofed, and men would sit on both sides of the alley and converse with one another… When free women, accompanied by their slave girls, would leave the house to relieve themselves, men sitting by the alley… would harass and molest them with particular gestures… The reason for the ruling on hijab is so that young men and men could distinguish free women from slave girls, and thus not harass or molest them, nor cast impure glances at them.” [7] From Jaberi’s perspective, the causes that constituted the issuance of the jurisprudential ruling on hijab have now vanished, and the distinction between free women and slave girls has no relevance in the present day; on this basis, he explains that today, covering the neck and hair of the head for women is not among the religious rulings and is not necessary. Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, a contemporary Quranic scholar, also considers the primary reason for the issuance of the hijab ruling to be distinguishing between slave girls and free women, and since the system of slavery has been abolished in the present era, he concludes:

“Therefore, hijab is not obligatory in the modern age, because the ruling revolves around the cause; it comes with the presence of the cause and disappears with the disappearance of the cause.” [8] The modernist Sunni jurist, Counselor Mohamed Said al-Ashmawy, in his book The Truth of Hijab and the Authority of Hadith, has also stated that the verse of the khimar commands the covering of the bosom; regarding the verse of the hijab, he believes that its address is to the wives of the Prophet, and the meaning of hijab is not wearing clothes but rather a screen that serves as a barrier between the Prophet’s wives and those who ask something of them, such that the two parties do not see each other. Al-Ashmawy also agrees with al-Jaberi and Abu Zayd on the story of the jilbab and says that its purpose was to distinguish between free women and slaves, and he says this cause is negated today because there are no longer any slave girls or slaves, and according to the principle of jurisprudence, the ruling is contingent upon the presence or absence of the cause; if the cause is found, the ruling is also found. [9]

Ahmad Subhi Mansour, a contemporary Egyptian Islamic scholar, also believes that the meaning of “drawing their khimars over their bosoms” is covering the bosom [10], and also that the meaning of “drawing their jilbabs close” mentioned in verse 59 of Surah al-Ahzab is covering the two shins. [11]

Furthermore, as Amir Torkashvand has noted, our modern understanding of words like maghna’eh (headscarf) and rusari (scarf) differs from the function of these concepts in the Prophet’s era; because in the Prophet’s era, maghna’eh and rusari consisted of a turban, a sash, and a picheh, which did not cover the neck and most of the hair of the head; not our modern conception of a maghna’eh and rusari that covers the entire neck and hair of the head:

“Today, when we encounter the words maghna’eh and rusari in religious texts, we consider it a head covering that at least covers all the hair and the neck; but it is not clear whether this word had the above function in the Prophet’s era and encompassed the neck and all the hair. According to the evidence available to us, the maghna’eh can be considered equivalent to the men’s turban, which is wrapped around the forehead and head. On this basis, after the revelation of the verse of the jilbab or khimar, believing women began using a turban, which was also called miqta’ah, qina’, or even khimar… Therefore, the maghna’eh and rusari in that era can be considered as a turban, sash, and picheh (which naturally, firstly, is for adornment, beautification, and distinction, and secondly, does not cover the neck and most of the hair) and not the current scarves that encompass all the hair and neck.” [12] Mohsen Kadivar has also recently said in response to a question about the limits and boundaries of women’s covering:

“The limits of religiously prescribed covering for women outside the home: women’s bodies from below the neck to below the knees and the upper arms must be covered with clothing that is not tight, clinging, or thin. Covering the rest of the body parts is not intrinsically and primarily obligatory and depends on the conditions and customs of time and place… In societies where this level of covering is not customary and no corrupt consequence results from not covering [the head, neck, and hair…], covering them is not mandatory, and these parts of the body are considered ‘apparent adornment’ which are exempted from covering in verse 31 of Surah al-Nur: ‘and not display their adornment except what is apparent thereof.’ [13]

If the philosophy of hijab were that the entire neck and hair of Muslim women must be covered in all places and societies, then this ruling would not have achieved its purpose, because the headscarves women used during the Prophet's era did not cover their necks and all of their hair. In other words, covering the neck and hair is not obligatory in itself and as a primary ruling; whereas if the main intent were to quell men's lust upon seeing women's necks and hair, then a headscarf that covered the neck and all of the hair would logically have been used. With these explanations, one can better grasp the meaning of the claim that hijab rulings have a strong identity-based and jurisprudential dimension (and not an ethical one). Likewise, the fact that in Christianity, covering the neck and hair is not obligatory supports the point that covering the neck and hair is not a legal ruling in all Abrahamic religions, and not all Christian women—whether those with a traditional understanding of Christianity or those with a non-traditional religiosity—cover their necks and hair, and by this act they do not commit a sin and remain guided by God's guidance. It is apt, in accordance with the principle of "things are known by their opposites," to consider the issue of shortchanging and fraud in transactions. According to Quranic teachings, one who shortchanges must answer for their conduct on the Day of Judgment: "Woe to the defrauders. Who, when they take measure from people, take in full. But when they give by measure or weight to them, they cause loss. Do they not think that they will be resurrected?"[14]. According to the fatwas of the majority of Muslim jurists, shortchanging and acquiring illicit wealth is forbidden, and the perpetrator is sinful and far from God's mercy. At the same time, it seems this jurisprudential ruling has an "ethical connection"[15], and while it entails God's prohibition against shortchanging and acquiring illicit wealth, the ethical wrongness of this act has been involved and considered in its being deemed forbidden.

2. Hijab, Chastity, and the Ethical Matter

As we have seen, the identity-based (not ethical) character of issuing rulings related to hijab has been prominent, meaning the intent was to distinguish between free and slave women through the former wearing hijab and the latter not; so that free women would not be mistaken for slave women and no one would harass them. However, the implication of this understanding of the philosophy of hijab in Islamic law is not that one cannot think independently and from an ethical perspective about the issue of hijab. In other words, one can and "must" weigh this jurisprudential ruling on the scales of ethics and explore its limits and boundaries. The question may arise in some minds that the issue of hijab has a jurisprudential dimension and therefore one cannot and should not speak about it from an ethical perspective.

In response to this claim and its critique, I draw on the distinction made by Bernard Williams, the contemporary moral philosopher, between “thick moral concepts” [16] and “thin moral concepts” [17]. [18] In everyday life, most people perform various actions: eating, lying down, laughing, reading a book, crying, getting angry, running, slipping, arguing... We call these “natural actions”; actions that issue spontaneously from human beings in various contexts. One can discuss human actions from various biological, historical, sociological, psychological... perspectives; just as biologists, historians, sociologists, and psychologists do. These natural actions enter the domain of moral discussion when they are subsumed under moral headings such as “justice,” “oppression,” “kindness,” “harming others,” “loyalty,” and so on. [19] Williams calls these moral headings “thick moral concepts”; in contrast, he calls concepts like “goodness,” “badness,” “ought,” “ought not”... “thin moral concepts.” Suppose a father is beating his child. The act of “beating” is a natural act, like the natural acts of eating, pushing, and yawning. One can discuss the father’s act of beating from various sociological, psychological... angles; but when it is subsumed under the moral heading of “harming others,” this act acquires “moral relevance,” and one can inquire into its moral rightness or wrongness. In fact, natural actions that have moral relevance are first subsumed under one of the thick moral concepts, then qualified by one of the thin moral concepts such as good, bad, ought, ought not..., and together they form a moral proposition like “harming others is bad.” At the same time, our “moral intuitions” [20] tell us that within this very moral context under discussion, one can find certain characteristics that are “morally irrelevant” [21] and could, in principle, be otherwise without affecting our moral judgment. [22] By moral intuitions, I mean the moral intuitions of the “ideal observer” [23]; an observer who possesses knowledge in the area in which they are making moral judgments, and whose human feelings and emotions do not, as far as is humanly possible, seep into their judgments. In the same vein, wearing a headscarf and chador and “covering the hair and neck” is also a natural act, like other natural acts. According to what has been said, one can speak of this natural act within the domain of morality only when it is subsumed under moral categories. This natural act can be subsumed under the thick moral concept of “chastity” and a moral judgment can be made about it. Our moral intuitions tell us that the very act of covering the male and female body, or at least parts of it, has moral relevance; although there is disagreement about the limits, boundaries, and extent of covering, and cultural, climatic, educational, psychological... factors play a role in it. A great many people believe that covering the private parts and concealing the sexual organs is necessary and essential. The implication of this statement is that someone who does not cover their sexual organs has, from a moral perspective, committed a reprehensible act.

توجه داشته باشیم که بحث اینجا صبغه اخلاقی دارد و نه حقوقی. مطابق با قوانین کثیری از کشورها، برهنه ظاهر شدن در سپهر عمومی غیر قانونی است و شخص خاطی مجازات می شود. در عین حال، فارغ از سویه حقوقی مسئله، می توان مسئله را از منظر اخلاقی نیزصورتبندی کرد و چراییِ ناروایی اخلاقیِ نپوشاندن اندام‌های جنسی را تبیین کرد. لازمۀ این سخن این است که پوشیده بودنِ بدنِ زن و مرد علی الاصول «ربط اخلاقی» دارد و ذیل عنوان اخلاقی « عفت» قرار می گیرد؛ چرا که شهودهای اخلاقی ما می گوید کسیکه ستر عورت نمی کند و برهنه در ملأ عام ظاهر می شود، مرتکب عمل غیر عفیفانه شده است. در واقع، آن فعل طبیعی ذیل مفهوم اخلاقیِ ستبرِ«عفت» گنجانده و متصف به وصف بدی می شود و گزاره‌ای اخلاقی را سامان می بخشد. علاوه بر بایسته و ضروری بودنِ پوششِ حداقلی بدن زن و مرد، رواییِ میزان پوششِ دیگر بخش‌های بدنِ زن و مرد مقوله‌ای است که ارتباط وثیقی با فرهنگ و عرف دارد و می تواند از سیاق و فرهنگ و جامعه‌ای به فرهنگ و سیاق و جامعه دیگری تفاوت یابد. آنچه در اینجا محوریت دارد و «اخلاقا مربوط» است، عفت است و کنش عفیفانه؛ کنشی که اعم از پوشش و رفتار عفیفانه ی مرد و زن در سیاق‌های گوناگون است. اگرمیزان پوشش و رفتار زن و مرد در سیاق‌ها و فرهنگ های مختلف، قوام بخشِ رفتار عفیفانه باشد؛ آنوقت می توان پوشش‌ها و رفتارهای گوناگون را در زمرۀ رفتارهای عفیفانه به حساب آورد و کثرتی غیر قابل تحویل به وحدت را در این میان به رسمیت شناخت و پذیرفت. به تعبیر دیگر، در حالیکه « عفت»، مفهوم اخلاقیِ ستبری است و روایی و بایستگی جهانشمول دارد؛ مصادیقِ کنش عفیفانۀ زنان و مردان می تواند در سیاق‌های گوناگون تغییر کند. در زمان قاجار، این سخن که «کمال زن به این است که که مردِ نامحرمی را نبیند و مرد نامحرمی نیز او را نبیند» نزد کثیری به سمع قبول شنیده می شد و بسیاری از زنان در جلوت ظاهر نمی شدند، چرا که آنرا مصداقی از رفتار غیر عفیفانه می انگاشتند. با شروع مبارزات زنان در عصر مشروطه ، پس از آن تأسیس دانشگاه تهران در دوران رضا شاه و رونق گرفتن کارخانه ها، وزارتخانه ها، روزنامه‌ها ، ادارات و شرکت‌های غیر دولتی، رفته رفته زنان نیز به عرصۀ عمومی وارد شدند؛ چنانکه در تظاهرات‌های منتهی به انقلاب بهمن۵۷ ، کثیری از زنان پا به پای مردان در تظاهرات شرکت می کردند و آیت الله خمینی و دیگران این کنش ایشان را غیر عفیفانه و غیر اخلاقی قلمداد نکردند.[۲۴] پس از انقلاب اسلامی نیز حضور اجتماعی زنان رو به فزونی بوده و کثیری از زنان در دانشگاه‌ها و مراکز آموزشی، اداری، درمانی و تجاری مشغول به کار بوده ؛ تا جاییکه زنی بیش از سه سال بر مسند وزارت بهداشت، درمان و آموزش پزشکی کشور تکیه می زند و مسائل درمانی و پزشکی کشور را در سطح کلان مدیریت می کند. پس با ایجاد تغییراتی در فرهنگ و عرف جامعه، مصادیق رفتار عفیفانه و غیر عفیفانه در جامعه ما در صد و پنجاه سال گذشته تحول چشمگیری پیدا کرده ؛ کما اینکه در دیگر جوامع نیز تغییر کرده است. از ابتدای قرن بیستم بدین سو، در کثیری از کشورهای اروپایی، آمریکای شمالی، آمریکای لاتین و شرق آسیا... نپوشاندن گردن و موی سر رفتاری غیر عفیفانه و غیر اخلاقی قلمداد نمی شود. مطابق با شهودهای اخلاقیِ عرفیِ عموم کسانی که در این کشورها زندگی می کنند، زنان می توانند مناسبات و روابط عفیفانه ای با جنس مخالف داشته باشند، در حالیکه گردن و موی سر پوشیده ای ندارند. زیستن اخلاقی اقتضا می کند این تدقیق‌ها و تفکیک‌ها را پیش چشم قرار داده، دایره رفتار عفیفانه را در روزگار کنونی نه محدودتر و نه فراختر از آنچه باید باشد، قلمداد کنیم. نقل قول زیر از مرحوم مطهری را در نظر آوریم:

«...they say that among some peoples, hijab is good and lack of hijab is bad, and among other peoples, lack of hijab is good and hijab is bad, so it becomes clear that these goods and bads are not a fixed matter. In response, it must be said that the issue should not be framed in terms of hijab and lack of hijab. What is inherent in human nature is the matter of chastity, meaning God created humans, and especially women, in such a way that they respect family rights... What exists in the conscience of every man and woman is the matter of chastity, but there are things that are its prelude and means. That is, does the one who says hijab is good mean that hijab itself, insofar as it is hijab, is good, regardless of chastity? And that if a woman wears hijab, it is good, even if that woman is a hundred times less chaste than when she was without hijab?»[۲۵] According to Mutahhari's view, what is primarily and essentially central and ethically relevant is "chastity" and chaste behavior; chaste behavior that has various manifestations in different times.[۲۶] The extent of covering and hijab for women and men is a component of chastity, not the other way around. In other words, hijab and the extent of covering for women and men are defined under the concept of chastity and constitute chaste action; chastity is not defined under hijab. Mutahhari rightly emphasizes the ethical importance and centrality of chastity and chaste behavior; chaste behavior that is weighed on the scale of ethics and is characterized by the attributes of goodness and obligatoriness, and constitutes justified ethical conduct. The implication of this statement is that someone can have a covered neck and hair and exhibit dignified and chaste behavior. It is also conceivable that someone does not have a covered neck and hair, yet still practices chaste and ethical behavior. Therefore, there is no necessary concomitance between "having the neck and hair covered" and "chaste behavior," and multiple possibilities are conceivable in this regard.[۲۷] Furthermore, as stated in the article "Hijab on the Scales of Ethics," "compulsory hijab" is an unethical and reprehensible matter and leads nowhere, just as it has not succeeded in our society to date. The majority of scholars of ethics have said that a coerced and involuntary act carries no weight on the scales of ethics. Safeguarding fundamental ethical principles is the duty of governments and nothing more; meanwhile, discussion and dialogue about the limits and boundaries of hijab and its ethical validity can take place in civil society and the public sphere without the interference of governmental institutions. At the same time, just as "compulsory hijab" is unethical, "compulsory lack of hijab" is also unjustified and unethical. It should also be remembered that according to religious and ethical standards, practicing self-restraint, self-control, and chaste behavior is the duty of both women and men; this ruling applies to both sexes, not just to women. To place the finger of emphasis on one group and insistently demand self-restraint from them, while ignoring and overlooking the unethical action of the other group, is an unjust, unjustified, and unwarranted judgment and action. If the sole consideration is the state of men, and we ask women to cover themselves more and more day by day so that men are not tempted, one can assume that the process of the extent of a woman's covering will have no stopping point, and a day may come when some men are tempted even by seeing the faces of veiled women. The implication of this statement is that, to accommodate the state of such men with such an attitude, women should completely cover their faces and, in the next stage, not leave the house and not appear or be visible in the sight of non-mahram men; which, of course, is incompatible with our current ethical intuitions and seems unjustified. In this formulation, a kind of "slippery slope argument"[۲۸] is seen, according to which, to keep men safe, the extent of women's covering must be increased step by step and their social appearance and presence reduced, until, as Abu Hamid al-Ghazali says in Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din, it is better for women to remain in the inner quarters of the house and be occupied with spinning:

"The comprehensive saying on the etiquettes of women, without elaboration, is that she should be seated in the depths of her house, adhering to her spindle"[۲۹] He also emphasizes in Kimiya-yi Sa'adat:

« و حق مرد بر زن آن است که در خانه بنشیند ، و بی‌دستوریِ وی بیرون نشود، و فرا در و بام نشود، و با همسایگان مخالطت و حدیث بسیار نکند، و بی‌ضرورتی به نزدیک ایشان نشود، و از شوهر خویش جز نیکویی نگوید...و چون دوستِ شوهرِ وی در بکوبد، چنان پاسخ دهد که وی را نشناسد، و از جمله آشنایانِ شوهر، خویشتن را پوشیده دارد تا وی را بازندانند».[۳۰] باید تصویر و تلقی از رابطۀ با زنان را در روزگار کنونی عوض کرد تا چنان نتایجی بر آن مترتب نشود. به نظر می رسد مردان و زنان می توانند در حین حفظ حریم، رابطۀ انسانیِ عفیفانه‌ای را با یکدیگر سامان بخشند. مردان نباید زنان را به ابژۀ جنسی فروکاهند و کرامت انسانی ایشان را نادیده گیرند، که خود خطایی اخلاقی و درکی ناصواب است، بلکه باید با ممارست مداوم، نگاه جنسی به زنان را فرو نهاده و به جای آن نگاه انسانی و نوع دوستانه[۳۱] به زنان پیرامونی را در خویش نهادینه و درونی کنند: «خویش را تأویل کن نی ذکر را». اخیراً یکی از اهالی رسانه نوشته بود که علت اصلی حادثه تلخ اخیرِ تجاوز به یک دختر جوان در کشور هند، پوشش نامناسب او بوده است. فارغ از تحلیل بسیط ایشان از پدیدۀ تجاوز جنسی که از ناهنجاری‌های اجتماعیِ عموم جوامع است و علل و عوامل معیشتی، روانشناختی، جامعه شناختی... در آن مدخلیت تام دارد و تحلیل تک عاملی آن از بن باطل است؛ این نگرش، محدود و محدودتر شدن زنان را چاره کار می بیند و قوام بخش رفتارِ اخلاقی عفیفانه می انگارد؛ حال آنکه چارۀ کار شستن چشم‌ها و جور دیگر دیدن است و تغییر دادن نگرش خویش نسبت به زنان توأم با حفظ حریم اخلاقی و انسانی : « بهترین چیز رسیدن به نگاهی است که از حادثه عشق تر است».[۳۲] چنانکه آمد، آنچه در این میان محوریت دارد و قوام بخش کنش اخلاقی موجه است، اولاً و بالذات رفتار عفیفانه است؛ نه پوشش گردن و موی سر. ثانیاً «عفت» در زمره مفاهیم اخلاقی ستبراست و بایسته و برگرفتنی و روایی جهانشمول دارد، نظیر مفاهیم «عدالت» و « مهربانی» ؛ در عین حال مصادیق کنش عفیفانه می تواند از فرهنگی و دورانی به فرهنگ و دورانی دیگر تغییر کند. در روزگار کنونی، کثیری از انسانهای بالغ و عاقلی که در کشورهای گوناگون با پیشینه‌های معرفتی و تربیتی مختلف زندگی می کنند، بر این باورند که نپوشاندن گردن و موی سر قبح اخلاقی ندارد و علی الاصول مصداقِ رفتار غیر عفیفانه نیست. ثالثاً، خویشتن داری و رفتار عفیفانه پیشه کردن هم وظیفۀ اخلاقی مردان است، هم وظیفۀ اخلاقی زنان؛ در این میان نباید تنها از زنان انتظار داشت که خود را بپوشانند و روابط انسانیِ عفیفانه پیشه کنند.

۳.نظریۀ حداقلی فرمان الهی

Regarding the relationship between religion and morality, I believe in the "minimalist theory of divine command." According to this reading, morality is semantically and ontologically independent of religion. In other words, ascertaining the meanings of thick and thin moral concepts such as "chastity," "fidelity," "kindness," "goodness," "badness"... does not depend on reference to religious texts. Furthermore, the determination of moral attributes and principles in the surrounding world is not dependent on the will of God the Lawgiver. Moreover, epistemologically and methodologically, by borrowing Robert Audi's theory of "moderate foundationalism-coherentism" [33] and John Rawls's method of "reflective equilibrium" [34], I hold that arriving at justified normative judgments requires dialogue and interplay between moral intuitions and religious intuitions or normative rulings derived and adapted from the religious tradition. The implication of this statement is that neither religion and jurisprudence should replace morality, nor morality replace jurisprudence; rather, the interaction and harmony between jurisprudential and religious intuitions on the one hand, and conventional moral intuitions on the other, is illuminating and adoptable in this regard, and yields justified normative (jurisprudential and moral) judgments for us. Thus, the discussion is neither about the primacy of religion over morality, nor the substantive primacy of morality over religion; rather, it concerns the epistemological interrelation between these two types of intuition in order to reach justified normative judgments.[35] As mentioned, jurists such as Qabel believe that not covering the neck and hair of the head does not carry religious prohibition; scholars of Islam such as al-Jabri, Abu Zayd, and Subhi Mansour also believe that in the present day, covering the hair of the head and neck is not a religious necessity. At the same time, through his historical and jurisprudential investigations, Torkashvand has delineated the limits and boundaries of covering in the era of the Prophet and believes that covering the neck and hair of the head was not necessary in the Prophet's time and the Lawgiver's decree did not pertain to this matter; although the overwhelming majority of Muslim jurists believe that not covering the neck and hair of the head carries religious prohibition. As I understand it, the implication of the fact that all jurists and scholars of Islam are not unanimous and do not have a consensus regarding the limits and boundaries of women's covering is that the verses related to hijab are not explicit (in the sense of the principles of jurisprudence); the implication of this statement is that, unlike explicit verses which have definitive signification, multiple interpretations and readings of the hijab verses are possible and conceivable. Many jurists believe that God's will pertains to the necessity of covering the neck and hair of the head,[36] while a minority of jurists believe that God's will does not pertain to the necessity of covering the neck and hair of the head; unlike an issue such as "incest," where the majority of jurists from both Sunni and Shia schools believe that this act has moral ugliness and committing it is religiously forbidden and entails disobedience to God's commands. On the other hand, as we have seen, according to the moral intuitions of most people, not covering the neck and hair of the head in the present day does not have moral ugliness. Formulating its moral permissibility under the apparatus of David Ross's "ethics of prima facie duties" [37] and considering "chaste behavior" as one of the "prima facie moral duties" in the article "Hijab in the Scales of Ethics" is merely one of the conceivable ways to explain the moral permissibility of not covering the neck and hair of the head. By borrowing teachings from other schools in the realm of "normative ethics" [38], such as "utilitarianism" [39], one can demonstrate the moral permissibility of not covering the neck and hair of the head. Now, taking the "minimalist theory of divine command" into consideration, one can suppose that in cases where, on the one hand, God's command in the sacred text lacks explicitness and scholars of Islam, Quranic researchers, and jurists do not have a consensus on ascertaining God's intention (such as the issue of hijab, unlike issues such as incest and shortchanging), and on the other hand, conventional moral intuitions decree the normative permissibility of an action, one can accept the judgment of moral intuitions and suppose that God's intention in this matter is not explicit in the sacred text, no explicitness is seen in those verses, and more than one reading of it is possible and conceivable. In fact, the presupposition of the "minimalist theory of divine command" is that both a coherent and methodical reading of the religious tradition for ascertaining God's intention and command is epistemically valuable, as are conventional moral intuitions. Therefore, seeking harmony and interaction between these two matters to arrive at justified normative rulings is a moral and rational duty. Let us note that this claim does not entail issuing a jurisprudential fatwa; rather, it is a kind of reading of the sacred text to ascertain God's intention in light of accepting the "minimalist theory of divine command" and adhering to the logical implications of the doctrines of "reflective equilibrium" and "moderate foundationalism-coherentism."

در عین حال سراغ گرفتن از توازن و تعامل میان احکام فقهی و شهودهای اخلاقی علی الاصول ناظر به احکام فقهیِ اجتماعی نظیر حجاب، سنگسار، ارتداد... است، نه احکام فردی؛ چرا که احکام فردی نظیر روزه، نماز.... غالباً « ربط اخلاقی» ندارند و نمی توان آنها را در ترازوی اخلاق توزین کرد.

4. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that the rulings on hijab in Islamic law are, first and foremost, identity-based in nature, not moral; therefore, covering the neck and hair has not been necessary for all Muslim women. Secondly, the category of covering the body of men and women is a natural act, among other natural acts, which falls under the category of "chastity" and acquires a "moral relevance"; although the limits and boundaries of covering can vary from one culture to another. In the present day, many cultures and customs do not consider not covering the neck and hair as an instance of unchaste and immoral action; we too can reconsider this matter and not deem the behavior of many who do not cover their neck and hair as immoral.

Furthermore, by taking into account the "Weak Divine Command Theory" and accepting, on the one hand, that a minority of jurists and some contemporary Islamic scholars believe that the Quranic verses do not provide a definitive indication (nass) of the necessity of covering the neck and hair, and, on the other hand, that the permissibility of not covering the neck and hair aligns with conventional moral intuitions, it can be concluded that not covering the neck and hair in the present day is, in principle, not morally reprehensible, while at the same time it does not entail violating God's command and intention or disregarding the explicit text of the Quran.

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. *In finalizing this article, I benefited from the helpful observations and suggestions of dear friends and colleagues: Mouloud Bahramian Nejad, Mohammad Tavakoli-Targhi, Forough Jahanbakhsh, Farshad Habibi, Hossein Dabbagh, Saharnaz Samaei Nejad, Hossein Kaji, Philip Clark, Hossein Kamali, Yaser Mirdamadi, and Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari. I sincerely thank them. At the same time, the responsibility for the article rests with the author.

[1] 3danet.ir/soroush-dabbagh-hejab-1

[2] For example, see:

http://www.bultannews.com/fa/mobile/116992

[3] For example, see the articles by Farshad Habibi and Majid Iranshahi under the titles "A Look at Hijab on the Scales of Ethics" and "A Critique of the Article Hijab on the Scales of Ethics" at the following links:

http://zananpress.com/archives/28925

http://www.rahesabz.net/story/64359/

[4] Weak Divine Command Theory

[5] For more on the components of livelihood-oriented and knowledge-oriented religiosity, see:

Abdolkarim Soroush, "Types of Religiosity", The Ethics of the Gods, Tehran, Tarh-e No, 2001; idem, "Religion and the New World", Tradition and Secularism, Tehran, Serat, 2002. Also see Soroush Dabbagh, The Faith in the Mirror: A Review of the Religious Views of Abdolkarim Soroush, Tehran, Serat, 2008; Entry 5.

[6] Ahmad Qabel, Rational Sharia website, article "Regarding the Covering of Hijab 1"

http://ghabel.blogspot.ca/

Also see Ahmad Qabel's interview with the Jaras website under the title: Hijab and Political Islam from the Perspective of Rational Sharia:

http://www.rahesabz.net/story/54225/

[7] Mohammad Bahrami, "New Readings of the Verses on Hijab", Quranic Research Quarterly:

http://www.maarefquran.org/index.php/page,viewArticle/LinkID,262

In this article, the views of other Arab intellectuals on hijab are discussed. The majority of these Muslim neo-thinkers believe that covering the hair and neck for women in the present day is not among the religious rulings.

[8] Ibid.

[9] - For Counselor Muhammad Said al-Ashmawy, The Truth of Hijab and the Authority of Hadith, Cairo, Madbouly Library, 2nd ed. 1995, pp. 15-17

[10] - http://www.ahl-alquran.com/arabic/show_news.php?main_id=814

[11] - http://www.ahl-alquran.com/arabic/show_fatwa.php?main_id=191

[12] Amir Torkashvand, Legal Hijab in the Age of the Prophet, PDF electronic version, pages 684, 721

[13] http://kadivar.com/?page_id=8218

[14] Surah al-Mutaffifin, verses 1-4: Woe to those who give short measure! Those who, when they take a measure from people, take it in full; but when they measure or weigh for them, they cause loss. Do they not think that they will be resurrected?

[15] moral relevance

[16] thick moral concepts

[17] thin moral concepts

[18] For further acquaintance with Williams's view, see:

Bernard Williams (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

David McNaughton and Peter Rawling( 2000) ‘ Unprincipled Ethics’ in Hooker, B. and Little, M. (eds.) Moral Particularism(Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 256-275.

[19] Abdolkarim Soroush, in his fine essay "The Ethics of the Gods," has proposed the distinction between "natural acts" and "moral acts"; see: Abdolkarim Soroush, "The Ethics of the Gods: There Is No Higher Morality," The Ethics of the Gods, Tarh-e No, Tehran, pages 11-40.

[20] moral intuitions

[21] morally irrelevant

[22] For example, "the father's trousers being blue" and the fact that the beating occurred on a Tuesday have no bearing on our moral judgment. In other words, our moral intuitions tell us that if the father beat his child on Monday or wore brown trousers, his action would still be morally reprehensible and wrongful.

[23] Ideal observer

[24] For an acquaintance with women's struggles in the Constitutional era, see: Janet Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, translated by Reza Rezaei, Bistoon, Tehran, chapters 2 and 7.

[25] Morteza Motahhari, Islam and the Requirements of the Time, Sadra, Tehran, first volume, pages 403-405.

[26] In the article "Hijab on the Scales of Ethics," citing the book The Problem of Hijab, I explained the late Motahhari's view on the category of hijab. According to his position, apart from the face and hands, the rest of a Muslim woman's body must be covered. In this article, regardless of Motahhari's position in The Problem of Hijab, I have brought a quotation from him about the concept of chastity and the boundaries of chaste conduct from the book Islam and the Requirements of the Time and explored its implications.

[27] If, in a moral context, a more important moral consideration is at stake—for example, if by covering her hair and neck, a person loses her job and suffers financial hardship, such that the well-being of her family, who are economically dependent on her, is severely disrupted—she morally ought not to cover her neck and hair until she possibly finds another job. Ross's ethical system, as explained in the article "Hijab on the Scales of Ethics," well explains the "context-dependence" of moral judgments.

[28] slippery slope argument

[29] Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din, "The Etiquette of Marriage"

[30] Abu Hamid Imam Muhammad al-Ghazali al-Tusi, The Alchemy of Happiness, Quarter on Acts of Worship and Quarter on Transactions, edited by Hossein Khadiv Jam, Tehran, 1380, vol. 1, “The Etiquette of Marriage,” p. 323.

[31] altruistic

[32] Sohrab Sepehri, Eight Books, “The Green Volume” notebook, poem “The Night of Good Solitude.”

[33] modest-foundationalism-coherentism

[34] reflective equilibrium

[35] For a more detailed discussion, see: Soroush Dabbagh, “Religion in the Mirror of Ethics,” interview with the Imam Sadiq University Society and University Journal at the following link:

http://www.begin.soroushdabagh.com/pdf/87.pdf

[36] As an example, see the interview of Mohammad Javad Fazel Lankarani with the Jahan News website titled “The Condition of Faith is Hijab”:

http://jahannews.com/vdchwqnix23nx-d.tft2.html

[37] The Ethics of Prima Facie Duties

[38] normative ethics

[39] Utilitarianism

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