The Place of Hijab in Jurisprudence and Ethics: A Critique of Dr. Soroush Dabbagh's Views, Hossein Souzanchi

Some time ago, Dr. Soroush Dabbagh (son of Dr. Abdolkarim Soroush) wrote an article entitled “Hijab in the Scales of Ethics,” the gist of whose claim was that not wearing hijab is neither ethically problematic nor an instance of violating a divine command. This article provoked criticisms, and some time later he wrote a second article further explaining his claim, entitled “Not Wearing Hijab or Lack of Chastity: Which Is Unethical?” Around that time, a friend sent me these two articles and asked me to express my analysis of them. Since perhaps the most important arguments of the opponents of the hijab debate can be found in these two articles, it occurred to me that a critique and examination of them could serve as a pretext for responding to many of the criticisms in the hijab debate; therefore, I have written a critique of these two articles, within which I have explained many of the discussions surrounding hijab and its relation to ethics.

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«It can thus be concluded that the rulings on hijab in Islamic law are, first and foremost, identity-based in nature, not ethical; therefore, covering the neck and hair has not been necessary for all Muslim women. Secondly, the matter of covering the body of men and women is a natural act, among other natural acts, which falls under the category of 'chastity' and acquires an 'ethical relevance'; although the limits and boundaries of covering can change from one culture to another. In the present day, many cultures and customs do not consider not covering the neck and hair to be an instance of unchaste or unethical conduct; we too can reconsider this matter and not deem the behavior of many who do not cover their neck and hair as unethical. Furthermore, by taking into account the 'minimalist theory of divine command' and accepting, on the one hand, that a few jurists and some contemporary Islamic scholars believe that the Quranic verses do not have definitive indication (nass) on the necessity of covering the neck and hair, and, on the other hand, the permissibility of not covering the neck and hair in accordance with conventional moral intuitions, it can be concluded that not covering the neck and hair in the present day is, in principle, not morally reprehensible, and at the same time does not entail violating God's command and intent or disregarding the explicit text of the Quran.»

To prove the above claim, numerous premises have been presented in these two articles, and the present writing attempts to examine the validity of these premises and the conclusion drawn from them. But before entering into a detailed discussion of these articles, it may be necessary to mention two points:

The first point is a scholarly one, concerning the necessity of avoiding ambiguity and imprecision in the use of words and terms, as well as not clarifying one's intent, one of the undesirable consequences of which is falling into the trap of the fallacy of equivocation. It would have been better if the esteemed author had been more careful in this regard, lest a phrase be used with one meaning in the 'premise' and with another meaning in the 'conclusion.' For example, the most important concept under discussion is the concept of 'ethics,' where in the two articles in question, the term 'unethical' is sometimes used in the sense of 'the realm outside of ethics' (something about which ethics has no ruling), sometimes in the sense of 'ethically permissible' (something about which ethics has no negative ruling), and sometimes in the sense of 'anti-ethical' (something that is ethically reprehensible); likewise, 'secular ethics' is sometimes used in the sense of 'pre-religious ethics' (which is a kind of universal ethics), and sometimes in the sense of 'ethics accepted in secular societies' (which is not necessarily universal); and such imprecisions are not befitting a scholarly discussion.

The second point is a reminder about research ethics: if research enters a field of science and inquiry in which the researcher is not an expert and wishes to quote a point from the experts of that field, attribute it to that field, and advance their own discussion based on that quotation, one of the ethical conditions of research is to consult specialists whose expertise is considered valid by the relevant scholarly community. Mere personal interest in the existence of that statement in that field should not become a pretext for imposing that point on the field at any cost. Let us suppose that Mr. A, who has no expertise in biology, opposes the theory of evolution due to certain concerns outside this discipline. If he wants to show that this theory also has opponents in the field of biology, citing the words of someone like Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr is unacceptable and could even be considered deceiving the audience; because although Dr. Nasr is truly an expert in some fields, and although he has statements against the theory of evolution that non-specialists might consider a biological analysis, he is, after all, neither a theorist in the field of biology, nor are his arguments of a kind that would be considered valid based on the accepted methods in the discipline of biology. Even if he and some others consider him an expert in biology (which, of course, in this example, he does not claim), as long as the community of biologists does not attribute biological value to his theory, such a citation to him is unjustified. Unfortunately, something similar to this is observed in the articles under discussion. To demonstrate the existence of a jurisprudential opponent in the discussion of the obligation to cover the hair and neck, the esteemed author has cited individuals whom either the relevant scholarly community (i.e., the jurists) does not consider experts in this field, or does not attribute jurisprudential validity to this specific view of theirs; and then basing one's discussion on such a point as the opinion of some jurists is incompatible with research ethics.

In any case, in the present writing, the points of Dr. Soroush Dabbagh will be examined in several chapters: "The Relations between Religion and Ethics," "The Nature of Jurisprudential Rulings and Their Relation to Ethical Rulings," "The Relation between Hijab and Morality," "The Relationship between Coercion and Ethics," "The Existence or Non-existence of a Rival Jurisprudential View on the Obligation of Covering Hair and Neck," and "The Indication of the Holy Quran on the Hijab of the Muslim Woman." In each case, his views will first be briefly stated, then questions will be raised about them, and finally, a summary of the entire discussion will be presented. To simplify the reader's study of the critiques, in each chapter, a list of questions that can be raised on that axis will first be mentioned, and then the details of each will be presented.

1) The Relations between Religion and Ethics

A Discussion on the Minimalist Divine Command Theory and Its Scope

In the aforementioned articles, an attempt has been made to examine the relations between religion and ethics from four perspectives: semantic, ontological, epistemological, and psychological. The esteemed author accepts the dependence of ethics on religion from a psychological perspective, but by presenting an explanation of the "Minimalist Divine Command Theory" and rejecting the "Maximalist Divine Command Theory," they reject the dependence of ethics on religion in the other three areas.

From the semantic and ontological perspectives, by resorting to the "Use Theory of Meaning," they have claimed the complete independence of ethics from religion:

"Ascertaining the meanings of ethical terms does not depend on referring to religion" (ethics' lack of need for religion from a semantic perspective); and

"The determination of ethical attributes in the external world also does not depend on God's will being attached to them; rather, they exist independently of religion" (ethics' lack of need for religion from an ontological perspective);

However, regarding the epistemological perspective of ethics, their statement is ambiguous. They state that:

«Most proponents of the 'minimalist theory of divine command' believe that although ethics does not need religion in the two aforementioned domains, the attainment of justified moral knowledge depends on reference to religion and cannot be obtained independently. At the same time, some proponents of the 'minimalist theory of divine command' emphasize that our reason can discover justified moral knowledge. According to this view, human reason in the realm of ethics discovers, confirms, and deems justified precisely that which is God's will. In fact, in this view, reason does not follow the sacred text; rather, it independently discovers moral rightness and wrongness; a discovery that is congruent and harmonious with God's will and command.»

He contrasts this theory with the 'maximalist theory of divine command,' which holds that in all three domains of semantics, ontology, and epistemology, one must refer to religious texts, and by rejecting this view, he concludes the validity of the minimalist theory.

In the next stage, noting that a conflict sometimes arises between the moral judgment understood by reason and the jurisprudential ruling found in religious texts, he emphasizes the necessity for a person to have a coherent epistemic system. To resolve this conflict, which in his view has arisen between the jurisprudential ruling on hijab and its corresponding moral judgment, he proposes the method of 'reflective equilibrium,' 'an equilibrium that is two-sided, in which a back-and-forth movement between the two sides of the balance is necessary.' This serves as a prelude for the next chapter, where he will compare the discussion of hijab in the two domains of ethics and jurisprudence.

Critique and Review:

Regarding this analysis, several questions arise:

1) Concerning the relationship between religion and ethics in the aforementioned domains, are only these two theories—the minimalist and maximalist divine command (and with the formulation presented in the mentioned articles)—tenable, such that by refuting one, the other is proven?

2) Can his arguments from each of the three perspectives of semantics, ontology, and epistemology prove the independence of ethics from religion in that perspective?

3) Is the explanation he presents as a more justified interpretation of the 'minimalist theory of divine command' truly a minimalist theory or a negationist one; in other words, is his actual view the 'minimalist theory of divine command,' or the theory of 'absolute independence from divine command,' which stands in opposition to both minimalist and maximalist theories, and thus opposes the very principle of religiosity?

4) Given his interpretation of this theory, is there any need at all for reflective equilibrium and the resolution of the alleged conflict?

The Details of These Issues:

1) The ambiguities in his exposition of the two theories of minimalist and maximalist divine command are such that many of his arguments have become instances of 'begging the question.' Are these two theories opposed to each other in all four perspectives of semantics, ontology, epistemology, and psychology, or only in the epistemological perspective? Of course, since he accepts the influence of religion on ethics in the psychological dimension, it can be said that the opposition between the minimalist and maximalist theories is not necessarily in all four perspectives; but the context of the esteemed author's discourse is such that it seems as if accepting the maximalist theory of divine command necessitates that in the three other dimensions (semantics, ontology, and epistemology), one must only refer to religious texts, that is, for understanding the meaning of moral terms, for determining moral attributes and principles, and for attaining justified moral knowledge; and conversely, the minimalist theory says there is no need to refer to religious texts in any of these, and reason is independent in all three. Then, by rejecting the maximalist theory, he concludes the validity of the minimalist theory.

Regardless of the validity of his arguments in rejecting the maximalist theory, is this kind of reasoning logically justified? That is, are other possibilities not conceivable? Is it not possible for someone to accept, from the perspective of semantics, the independence of the meanings of moral terms, but not accept it from the other two perspectives? Is it not possible for someone to accept the independence of reason in the two perspectives of semantics and ontology of ethics, but not accept its independence in the epistemological perspective? (Interestingly, he himself explicitly accepted the possibility of this last case in his first article.) Or is it not conceivable that someone accepts the minimalist view in the two perspectives of semantics and epistemology, but accepts the maximalist view in the ontological perspective? And so on... If these possibilities are conceivable, does rejecting the first view (which considers humans in need of referring to religious texts in all three areas) necessarily prove the minimalist view (which leaves no room for referring to religious texts in any area)? It appears that using the terms minimalist and maximalist in a situation where there are three components for judgment, each of which must be examined independently (meaning there are logically eight opinions [8 = 2³]), serves no purpose other than adding to the ambiguity of the discussion; and by rejecting one view, which lies at one end of the spectrum, one cannot necessarily accept the content of the view that lies at the other end of the spectrum.

2) Are the arguments presented in each of these three perspectives acceptable or not?

a) From the Semantic Perspective

He first proposes that "moral terms have a meaning of their own, independent of religious texts," but a few lines later, to prove this claim, he resorts to the "use theory of meaning," according to which "the semantic breadth and narrowness of terms in a linguistic community, and consequently the application of terms in various contexts, emerges through the users of the language." If the all-or-nothing view, which is highly misleading in the analysis of social realities, is set aside, the theory he cites not only does not yield his claim, but, considering discussions related to discourse analysis, the opposite of his claim is proven: In the rules pertaining to discourse analysis, it is stated that with the shifting of signifiers within a discourse, society's understanding of words changes, to the extent that today, some views in the field of discourse analysis are more concerned with presenting theories for "discourse creation" than with the "analysis" of discourse (such as the Laclau-Mouffe view). The Sharia, especially if it is text-centered like Islam (as opposed to Christianity, which is person-centered rather than text-centered), is itself an important and influential language user that, by employing terms in various contexts (according to the use theory of meaning), creates semantic breadth and narrowness, and indeed change in meaning, and shapes a new discourse. This phenomenon has been of particular interest to Shiite jurists and scholars of legal theory (usuliyyun), leading to the opening of a discussion in the science of usul al-fiqh under the titles "Shar'i reality" (haqiqat shar'iyya) and "Religious community reality" (haqiqat mutasharri'a).[1] The first term applies where the intended word is used in a new meaning in the language of the Lawgiver Himself, and the second applies where the said word is used in a new meaning not in the language of the Lawgiver Himself, but in the culture of the Islamic community. Whether all words are capable of such a change can be a subject of debate, but there is no doubt about the general change in some words, and Mr. Toshihiko Izutsu has demonstrated this claim not only regarding ethical concepts[2] but also regarding concrete concepts such as "human being"[3]. Therefore, even if many moral terms had a specific signification before the establishment of the Sharia in society (which they did), it is entirely possible that after the advent and establishment of the Sharia, a change occurred in the semantic load of at least some of them, and indeed new terms were added to the realm of society's moral concepts; and at least regarding the signification of these terms, we are not independent of referring to religious texts. Thus, speaking of the complete independence of reason in the semantic realm is invalid. He states:

"The semantic dependence of ethics on religion is unjustified; for one must at least know the meaning of some moral terms before referring to religious texts."

Considering the esteemed author's other explanations, his intention in deeming this reliance unjustified is the complete lack of any need for the semantics of ethics to refer to religion; and here one can discern his entrapment in the fallacy of all or nothing. That is, one can agree with him regarding "some" of these, but does "some" mean "all"? Our discussion concerns the rest of the ethical vocabulary; if the rest, in their meaning, require reference to religious texts, then speaking of the independence of the semantics of ethics from religion is unacceptable.

b) From an Ontological Perspective

The above argument applies, a fortiori, to the ontology of ethical vocabulary; and it is interesting here that the esteemed author himself, in his second article, points to an instance of this state; that is, a case where the atmosphere of religious knowledge and teachings has caused an act to be characterized as good or evil. His sentence is as follows: "… an issue such as incest, which the majority of jurists of both sects believe possesses moral evil and its commission is religiously forbidden." The question is, can the moral evil of incest or sodomy not be considered, from an ontological perspective, as originating from religion? Meanwhile, scrutiny of the reason presented for rejecting the ontological dependence of ethics on religion also shows that the all-or-nothing view again governs his statements; he states: "If God commanded that an innocent child must be tortured, our moral intuitions tell us that performing this act is wrong." Regardless of the fact that the example itself is debatable (which will be addressed in Chapter 2, Section 4), but supposing the example is correct and our moral intuitions independently make judgments about the goodness and evil of some actions; does this mean they make judgments about all actions and that it is no longer possible for religious teachings to establish the moral goodness or evil of an act (such as incest or sodomy) in the realm of our perception?

c) From an Epistemological Perspective

In his statements, two interpretations of the minimalist theory in the field of epistemology have been proposed, and he has chosen the second interpretation; wherein it seems he has again fallen into the pitfall of the all-or-nothing fallacy: From the premise that "in some cases, reason finds the appropriate justification for a moral act without referring to religious texts" (which is, of course, a defensible statement), can one logically conclude that "reason has no need whatsoever to refer to religious texts in this domain"? In other words, in all the arguments in favor of the minimalist theory, only instances of reason's independence have been presented, and then it has been concluded that in no case does reason need to refer to religion, and in all cases reason is sufficient and independent; whereas a third view is conceivable, in which, in the justification of moral propositions, a portion belongs to independent reason, a portion independently belongs to religion, and a domain exists where both offer their opinions. This view is not only conceivable but also has precedent in history: this is the very common discourse among Shia scholars who, while accepting rational good and evil in the generalities of ethics, simultaneously considered reason incapable of identifying most particulars and in need of the assistance of Sharia (reference to religious texts), and of course, they believed that some of Sharia's recommendations are "advisory rulings," meaning that although Sharia has presented them, reason can also independently grasp them. The existence of such a view renders the esteemed author's evidence ineffective, because this view lies between his two all-or-nothing views and, while recognizing a domain for reason (which are the very instances he enumerates), does not consider this as negating the necessity of referring to religious texts.

3) As can be seen by scrutinizing the passages quoted from him, under the name of the “minimalist theory of divine command,” and on the pretext that some proponents of this theory have a different interpretation, he is in fact proposing the “theory of absolute independence from divine command.” That is, even if we accept the degree of latitude to say that the “minimalist theory of divine command” means that ascertaining the meanings of moral terms and the determination of moral attributes in the external world are also not dependent on God’s will being attached to them (= ethics’ lack of need for religion in the two domains of semantics and ontology), and only the attainment of justified moral knowledge depends on recourse to religion; then, by setting aside this very last domain (the second conception in the domain of epistemology), what place (even to the minimum extent possible) remains for divine command that we might call it the “minimalist theory of divine command”? If, as he explains, “in this conception, reason does not follow the sacred text; rather, it independently discovers moral rightness and wrongness, a discovery that is proportionate and consonant with God’s will and command,” then with such independence, what place remains for divine command to be said that we accept it as the “minimal” domain?

In other words, a minimalist theory leaves a minimal degree of validity for its subject (here: divine command); but in his interpretation, no validity remains for divine command at all.[4] It is clear that “independence” is different from “minimal need”; granting our reason a complete role in discovering moral rightness and wrongness means that there is absolutely no need for revelation in this domain, because reason, firstly, has a complete role, and secondly, it possesses this complete role not only in discovering the rulings themselves, but, more than that, in discovering the rightness and wrongness of the rulings that revelation presents. In other words, according to this statement, it is not even possible for revelation to say something about which reason is silent (technically: reason-evasive, as opposed to reason-opposing and reason-accepting); and this claim amounts to an absolute negation of the value of revelation, and no religious person can subscribe to it.

Therefore, even if proving the “minimalist theory of divine command” were possible through disputing the “maximalist theory of divine command,” the theory of “absolute independence” still cannot be proven by the above dispute; for this view is fundamentally opposed to both the minimalist and maximalist views, because its presupposition is complete epistemic independence from religion, whereas both of the aforementioned theories accept the principle of epistemic need for religion and debate the scope and domain of this need.

It seems the source of this error in the esteemed author’s words is the conflation of the station of divine will and the station of divine command; when he wants to state that “reason independently discovers moral rightness and wrongness,” he adds this explanation: “a discovery that is proportionate and consonant with God’s will and command.” Anyone familiar with the analyses of scholars of the principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) will notice how the error occurs in this phrase: the station of God’s will is different from the station of divine commands; that is, it is possible that God has willed something (in the sense of legislative will), but no command or order concerning it has yet come from God.[5] The simplest instance of this issue can be found in the case of rulings that were revealed gradually; for example, regarding the prohibition of drinking wine, although God’s will had attached to making it forbidden, God’s command concerning it was not revealed on the very first day of the proclamation of Islam; and, as it happens, the issue of hijab, which is the subject of his discussion, is of this same type of ruling. If the difference between divine will and divine command is taken seriously, then it becomes clear that the “theory of independence from divine command,” which the esteemed author has mistakenly called the “minimalist theory of divine command,” can in no way be acceptable, at least from the perspective of a religious person.

4) Given that Shia jurists recognize “reason” that provides certainty as one of the sources of religious knowledge, on a par with Quranic verses and narrations, performing a reflective balancing is an action carried out within the very process of jurisprudence, and there is no need for someone to want to perform this balancing between jurisprudence and ethics. However, more importantly: if someone subscribes to the “theory of absolute independence from divine command,” they have then blocked the path of “reflective balancing,” because they will reject in advance anything for which they do not find a proof in conventional reason; and this is the logic that governs the esteemed author’s discussion, and hence his statement:

“According to a version of the ‘minimalist theory of divine command’ which the author considers justified, weighing jurisprudential rulings in the scales of ethics and seeking assistance from reason and rational, conventional moral intuitions is a necessary condition for considering jurisprudential rulings justified and for discovering God’s intent in the present day.”

This, which indicates a one-sided, rather than two-sided, balance (the latter being a requisite of reflective equilibrium), is only acceptable according to his own version, which is in fact the “theory of independence from divine command”; and it is evident that someone who denies the human need for religion and divine command does not accept any jurisprudential or religious proposition insofar as it is religious. In other words, this view is defensible for an irreligious person, but the question is why he expects religious people to accept this view? This is a point that will be further explained in the subsequent discussion.

2) The Nature of Jurisprudential Rulings and Their Relation to Ethical Rulings

As mentioned, one of the significant problems with the present text is the ambiguities arising from its affliction with equivocation, which becomes particularly apparent in this discussion. For instance, what is meant by the normative teachings of religion, and does religion have ethical teachings and commands, or only jurisprudential teachings? In one place, he explicitly states regarding the normative teachings of religion:

“What is meant by religion in this context is the jurisprudential rulings of religion, which may conflict with ethical teachings.”

But elsewhere, he says:

“The ethical commands present in religion overlap considerably with the rulings of secular ethics; however, jurisprudential rulings sometimes conflict with conventional and secular ethical rulings.”

Setting aside such ambiguities, another important ambiguity observed in his words, which has perhaps inadvertently laid the groundwork for certain fallacies, is the manner of determining the relationship between jurisprudence and ethics. He expresses that:

“A person who seeks a coherent epistemic system must, when a conflict arises, seek a balance and equilibrium between jurisprudential rulings and ethical rulings by examining ethical rulings and assessing the relationship between them.”

Based on this, he proceeds to weigh jurisprudential rulings in the scales of ethics and claims to use Rawls’s method of “reflective equilibrium” in this endeavor; an equilibrium that is “two-sided, in which a back-and-forth movement between the two sides of the balance is necessary.” At this stage, since he intends to judge between the ethical ruling on hijab and its jurisprudential ruling, he turns to Ross’s ethical system to arrive at an ethical ruling on hijab. According to this system, humans in the realm of ethics possess multiple “prima facie duties”; but in practice, two or more “prima facie duties” generally conflict with one another. To ascertain the “actual duty” that leads to action and constitutes justified ethical conduct, the moral agent must obtain their ethical duty by using their “moral intuitions” and “moral perceptions.” Of course, Ross distinguishes between “fundamental prima facie duties” and “derivative prima facie duties,” the latter being composed of two or more fundamental prima facie duties. The author then states that hijab falls into neither of the two aforementioned categories; therefore, it is not in itself an ethical act; rather, it is a natural act, and one can only speak of it in the realm of ethics if it finds an “ethical connection” with one of the two categories of fundamental or derivative prima facie duties; and in his view, such an ethical connection does not exist—the latter part of his statement will be examined in the next chapter.

Critique and Examination:

Up to this point in the discussion, several important questions can be raised about his view:

1) He believes that reflective equilibrium must be two-sided, but is his statement not a one-sided weighing of rulings in the scales of ethics?

2) Is there really a distinction between ethical teachings and jurisprudential teachings? If there is a distinction, what reason is there for the necessity, or even the usefulness, of measuring the latter against the former? Are not his own arguments for distinguishing natural acts from ethical acts a justified reason for refuting his own claim (that an ethical examination of hijab is necessary and that he has issued an ethical ruling on hijab and the lack thereof)?

3) If jurisprudential teachings are to be measured against ethical teachings, will a fair judgment be issued in the court of non-religious, secular ethics regarding religious behaviors? In any court, is one of the parties to the dispute ever made the judge? If the measure is ethical propositions that precede specific cultures (so-called universal ethics), it might be defensible; but why has secular ethics—that is, the ethics prevalent in non-religious or anti-religious cultures, which logically have no ethical priority over religious culture—been made the criterion for validating religious teachings?

4) Is not the presupposition of the possibility of measuring a jurisprudential ruling in the scales of ethics—whether in universal ethics or in his own ethical system, which considers secular common reason as the standard of ethics—a denial of prophethood? In other words, can one, with a presupposition based on the denial of prophethood, offer a recommendation to the religious (whether knowledge-oriented or livelihood-oriented)?

But the details of these issues:

1) Two claims have been made here, one of which is correct but yields no fruit in his conclusions, and the other is incorrect and has served as a premise for his conclusion. What is correct and defensible is that:

"A person who wants to have a coherent epistemic system cannot suffer from conflict in the various areas of their knowledge and beliefs. Such a person, if they encounter a conflict in the realm of jurisprudential rulings and ethical rulings in their life, must, by examining ethical rulings and assessing the relationship between jurisprudential rulings and ethical rulings, seek a balance and equilibrium between the two."

But it is strange that while he explicitly states that "this reflective equilibrium is two-sided and in it, the back-and-forth between the two sides of the balance is necessary," he subsequently states that:

"The implication of this statement is that jurisprudential rulings must be weighed in the scales of ethics, and rulings that are bound by ethical constraints and do not constitute an instance of violating justice and human dignity in the present day should be considered justified."

No matter how much one reflects, one cannot understand how the necessity of a one-sided examination can be deduced from the necessity of a two-sided back-and-forth; and strangely, from the title of the first article to the end of the second article, this entirely one-sided weighing continues! What, indeed, is the relationship between his one-sided weighing and Rawls's reflective equilibrium, and the school of "moderate foundationalist-coherentism," both of which emphasize the two-sidedness of the examination? And fundamentally, what purpose does the reference to reflective equilibrium and the aforementioned school serve in his article?

2) Let us suppose that the author does not intend to use the aforementioned school or Rawls's two-sided method at all, but rather intends to place rulings entirely one-sidedly in the scales of ethics. The first question that arises is what necessity, or at least what benefit, does this weighing have? Rawls's point is quite clear: someone who has experienced a conflict among their various beliefs must establish a balance between them; but regarding someone for whom such a conflict has not arisen, what insistence is there that we must take a set of their teachings to a court where the judge is the other party to the dispute, and it is clear what the ruling will be in advance?![6]

That is, two conflations of the discussion have occurred here: first, is there logically a distinction between ethical teachings and jurisprudential teachings or not? If there is a distinction, what insistence is there that the latter must be measured against the former? Secondly, if it is to be measured, why with secular ethics? Apparently, the esteemed author has noticed the first problem, because in the second article, after emphasizing that "this jurisprudential ruling [on hijab] can and must be weighed in the scales of ethics," he has said:

«ممکن است‌ این پرسش به‌ذهن‌ برخی متبادرشودکه مسئله حجاب، سویه فقهی دارد و ازاینرو نمی‌توان ونباید ازمنظر اخلاقی درباره آن سخن گفت»

اما به نظر می‌رسد که در پاسخ به این اشکال، توضیحی داده‌اند، که کاملا اشکال را تثبیت، و موضع ایشان را رد می‌کند. توضیح مطلب اینکه: ایشان پس از اشاره به تفاوت «مفاهیم اخلاقی ستبر» (مانند عدالت، ظلم، مهربانی، وفاداری) و «مفاهیم اخلاقی سبک» (مانند خوبی، بدی، باید، نباید) و تفاوت این دو با «فعل طبیعی» (مانند خوردن، آشامیدن، خندیدن)، «حجاب» [به عنوان یک مفهوم فقهی] را یک فعل طبیعی دانسته، اظهار داشته‌اند که:

«هرجا افعال طبیعی، ربط اخلاقی داشته باشند، ابتدا ذیل یکی از مفاهیم اخلاقی ستبر قرار می‌گیرند، سپس متصف به یکی از مفاهیم اخلاقی سبک نظیر خوبی، بدی، باید، نباید… می‌شوند»؛ و «وقتی می‌توان از این فعل طبیعی در قلمرو اخلاق سخن به میان آورد که ذیل مقولات اخلاقی قرار گیرد.»

جمله اخیر ایشان (وقتی می‌توان از این فعل طبیعی…) نشان می‌دهد حتی اگر ما با ایشان همراه شویم و حجاب (به عنوان یک حکم فقهی) را در ردیف افعال طبیعی قرار دهیم، نه‌تنها جمله ابتدایی ایشان (می‌توان و «باید» این حکم فقهی [حجاب] را در ترازوی اخلاق سنجید) نارواست و بررسی حجاب در ترازوی اخلاق «باید» و «ضرورت»ی ندارد، بلکه تنها در صورتی این بررسی «مجاز» می‌شود که حجاب ذیل یک عنوان اخلاقی قرار گیرد.

دقت کنید: سخن از اخلاقی بودن یا نبودن یک فعل طبیعی، طبق توضیح ایشان، زمانی مجاز است که ربط اخلاقی پیدا کند؛ و تمام همّ و غمّ ایشان در ادامه بحث نشان دادن این است که حجاب با هیچ عنوان اخلاقی (مثلا عفت) ربط پیدا نمی‌کند. اگر این ادعای ایشان درست باشد (که حجاب هیچ ربط اخلاقی ندارد)، لازمه این سخن، درست خلاف مقصود ایشان و درواقع، رد مدعای اصلی ایشان (ضرورت بحث از حجاب از زاویه اخلاق) است. ایشان تمام همت‌شان در این دو مقاله این بوده که ضرورت پرداختن به مساله حجاب را از زاویه اخلاق نشان دهند، و حکمی اخلاقی صادر کنند با این مضمون که: «بی‌حجابی اخلاقا روا و بی‌اشکال است»؛ اما طبق بیان فوق، اگر حجاب با هیچ عنوان اخلاقی ربط پیدا نکند، لازمه‌اش این است که اصلا نتوان هیچ حکم اخلاقی (روا بودن یا نبودن) درباره حجاب صادر کرد؛ و اگر نمی‌توان چنین حکم اخلاقی‌ای درباره حجاب صادر کرد، نوشتن مقاله‌ای با عنوان «حجاب در ترازوی اخلاق» و سپس توجیه اخلاقی بی‌حجابی چه معنایی دارد؟

شاید ایشان پاسخ دهند که مقصود من از بیان «بی‌حجابی بدون اشکال است»، همان عدم حکم اخلاقی برای حجاب است؛ نه اینکه این جمله به عنوان یک حکم اخلاقی قلمداد شود. اگر چنین چیزی مدنظر ایشان بوده، باید گفت که اتفاقا این باز هم یکی از مواردی است که در بحث ایشان تعبیر «غیراخلاقی» به صورت مشترک لفظی به کار رفته است. دو معنایی که در اینجا به صورت اشتراک لفظی به کار رفته، معنای «بی‌ارتباط با اخلاق» و «به لحاظ اخلاقی، مجاز» است. معنای اول، مصداق مورد بحث را خارج از عرصه اظهارنظر اخلاقی معرفی می‌کند ولی معنای دوم، آن را قابل اظهارنظر اخلاقی، و البته فتوای اخلاقی مربوط به آن را «جواز» و «روا بودن» اعلام می‌نماید؛ و واضح است که حکم به «جواز اخلاقی» و «روایی اخلاقی» حکمی است برای چیزی که قابلیت اظهارنظر اخلاقی را دارد.[۷] اگر واقعا مقصود ایشان، همان عدم هرگونه حکم اخلاقی برای بی‌حجابی است، و نه ارائه این حکم اخلاقی که «بی‌حجابی اخلاقا بدون اشکال است»؛ آنگاه لازمه این سخن آن است که خود مساله حجاب و بی‌حجابی به لحاظ اخلاقی، قابلیت اظهارنظر نداشته باشند و اخلاقا مسکوت بمانند؛ درحالی که تمام کوشش ایشان در این دو مقاله این است که، نه‌تنها امکان، بلکه ضرورت اظهارنظر اخلاقی درباره حجاب و بی‌حجابی را مطرح کند و مخاطب را قانع سازد که بی‌حجابی، اخلاقا روا و بدون اشکال است و زن مسلمان بی‌حجاب اخلاقا نباید مذمت شود.[۸]

3) Although the above objection alone is sufficient to dismiss the claim of this article, let us assume that the author has stepped back from his position and accepted my view—as will be shown in the continuation of the discussion—that hijab itself is subject to moral judgment. Yet another objection remains against him: why has he reduced "universal ethics" to the level of "secular ethics"? If one wishes to judge moral behaviors in a particular society, one must either appeal to the norms of that society itself, or to universal norms (i.e., moral norms transcending specific cultures). It is clear that using non-universal norms specific to one society as a criterion for judging the behavior of another society is unjustified; and this is, unfortunately, what has occurred in this article. In numerous instances, he judges jurisprudential rulings by secular ethics (neither religious ethics nor universal ethics). Pay attention to his statements:

"Some jurisprudential rulings, such as 'stoning' and 'apostasy,' are incompatible with the achievements of secular ethics."

This statement is like saying, "Some civil laws of Indian society are incompatible with some norms of Spanish society." Are the norms of Spanish society necessarily superior to the norms of Indian society that produced those civil laws?! In other words, if it is shown that the civil laws of Indian society are incompatible with some universal norms or some norms of that very society, this is a weakness and should be rectified through a reflective equilibrium approach; but not that the laws of one society should be measured against the specific norms of another society.

Two responses might be given by the author. One is to say that by secular ethics, I do not mean the prevalent and accepted ethics of secular societies (i.e., societies that currently exist and have a specific cultural determination), but rather the very universal ethics that, prior to any specific cultural determination, is relevant to the human being qua human (in his terms: the ideal observer). This claim is fine, but it strips him of all his examples, including his claims regarding the non-immorality of not wearing hijab; and in fact, it turns his claims into claims without evidence. In other words, it drags him once again into the pitfall of equivocation, because he initially intended "universal ethics" by the term "secular ethics," but then cited instances of the "specific ethics of non-religious societies."

His second response could be that since religion brings specific norms, the norms of a secular (irreligious) society are the very universal norms. This response faces two challenges: one is an empirical challenge, meaning historical experience has shown that the opposite of all the instances he enumerated has been prevalent as an accepted norm in many other societies, and therefore many of the norms of today's secular ethics are not universal. Secondly, it assumes that human beings behave solely based on reason and that the only thing standing against rational norms is religion, and that if a society were secular and irreligious, its norms would certainly be the pure rational ethics. The incorrectness of this notion is also quite evident, and everyone knows that human norms are influenced by dozens of factors, from lust to power and affection for ancestors, and so on. In summary, it is accepted that "when a conflict arises, a person who wishes to maintain a coherent epistemic system must, by examining moral judgments and weighing the relationship between jurisprudential rulings and moral judgments, seek a balance and equilibrium between the two." But on the condition that a conflict occurs within a single culture, or at least a conflict between the rulings within a culture and universal rulings; and that we, by taking foreign cultures as the principle, induce in our own society that you are in conflict, and then, under the pretext of resolving the conflict, give precedence to the specific rulings of that culture over the rulings of our own society's culture, is indefensible.

4) More important than all the above objections is that the presupposition of the entire foregoing discussion is the denial of prophethood; that is, fundamentally, measuring jurisprudential teachings on the scale of secular ethics (and even universal ethics) stems from a conception that, at its core, denies prophethood. The explanation of the matter is that the basis of religiosity lies in the human being's acceptance that, in addition to rationally acceptable propositions (which his reason is capable of examining and accepting) and rationally repugnant ones (which his reason denies), there also exists a realm of the rationally elusive; that is, there is an area in our lives regarding which reason, at least at the outset of its inquiry,[9] is silent and uninformed; and it may initially make some conjectures, but it possesses no assured knowledge of those conjectures. It seems that the Holy Qur'an, in verse 216 of Surah Al-Baqarah,[10] points to this truth (which constitutes an empirical, objective, and accessible proof for everyone regarding the necessity of prophethood) with a simple statement: it has often happened to each of us that we sometimes loved something and considered attaining it good, or vice versa, but after experiencing it, we realized that we did not know the truth in that matter and were mistaken. On the other hand, everyone finds within themselves a desire to know the answer to such matters before experiencing them; and if there is a God—and there is—He knows what we do not know; and prophethood means that this Merciful God informs us of these matters; and religiosity means having greater confidence in God's word than in one's personal conjectures. If one looks closely, the examples raised in the aforementioned articles for the non-necessity of submitting to all divine commands are either so clearly contrary to human innate nature that it is obvious such a command is not found among divine commands (such as

Secondly, the list that Ross provides of “prima facie duties” is entirely the list of the moral system of a particular secular society (not universal ethics); in it, purely religious duties (such as worship) have no moral aspect whatsoever and cannot have one. This list differs from the list of “prima facie duties” that can be presented in the discourse of a religious society. The question is, why should we, as a religious society, be bound by this list of “prima facie duties”? Even if we accept the basis of that system (i.e., the idea of prima facie duties), why would our view necessarily be incorrect if we do not accept Ross’s list of “prima facie duties” in that form and, based on an analysis that does not wish to take secular society as its criterion, subtract from or add to that list? For instance, if we wish to speak based on the literature of “prima facie duties,” there seems to be considerable evidence that in religious discourse, and indeed in universal ethics, the concept of “modesty” (ḥayā) (which is very close to the concept of “chastity” but, unlike chastity, is not confined to the realm of sexual matters) falls under “prima facie duties,” not “derivative prima facie duties.” Therefore, it is not defensible for us to fully accept Ross’s system, even in its secular details, and measure religious rulings within that framework.

He might say, “I am speaking to you from a position outside of religion, a position that does not believe in prophethood.” In that case, it must be said that, firstly, it is necessary to examine to what extent that list is defensible from the perspective of an ideal observer (not an observer who has taken the ethics of secular societies as the principle); and secondly, in this case, your audience is inevitably secular and irreligious people[۱۲], not knowledge-oriented or livelihood-oriented religious people (however much these two terms are also very vague and, of course, biased).

۳) The Philosophy of Hijab and Explaining the Relationship of the Ruling on Hijab with Ethics

As mentioned, after issuing a fatwa on the necessity of weighing jurisprudential rulings on the scales of ethics, the esteemed author has used “Ross’s ethical system” for this weighing. Although the preceding discussions showed that both the principle of said weighing is problematic and Ross’s ethical system lacks the capacity for such weighing, it can be shown that even using said system not only does not support the esteemed author’s view but works against it. Therefore, first, his argument will be reported, and then its critique and analysis will be presented:

To ethically weigh the ruling on hijab, the author proceeds to prove that “not covering the hair and neck” entails the violation of none of the “prima facie duties” and “derivative prima facie duties.” To this end, he introduces the nature of hijab as a jurisprudential and identity-based issue (and not a moral duty); and presents it as belonging to the category of natural acts (like eating and drinking) that are not inherently subject to any moral judgment, and for a moral judgment to be made about it, it must find a moral connection; that is, it must be linked to other moral titles. Among moral titles, in his view, the only title that can be related to hijab is the title of “chastity.” He introduces “chastity” as a “derivative prima facie duty” derived from the combination of three duties: “fidelity,” “self-improvement,” and “not harming others.” He then states that observing conventional hijab, which, in addition to conventional covering, includes employing appropriate, dignified, and humane speech and behavior in regulating relations with the opposite sex, is morally necessary, and deviating from it is an immoral act; but there is a difference of opinion regarding the limits, boundaries, and extent of covering, and cultural, climatic, educational, psychological, etc., factors play a role in it; and since, in today’s custom, not covering the hair and neck is not considered contrary to chastity, this act is therefore not immoral behavior and has no moral ugliness.

In addition to the above statement, he also provides evidence for the lack of a necessary connection between chastity and covering the neck and hair of the head, namely that it is conceivable that someone covers their neck and hair but behaves unchastely in regulating their relations with the opposite sex; or that someone does not cover their neck and hair and behaves chastely.

From the discussions in his second article, a second explanation can also be implicitly extracted, namely that

To clarify the matter: the word "hijab," which is the subject of debate today, is fundamentally a discussion about "external covering," referred to in jurisprudential literature by the term "satr";[13] and this term is essentially concerned with the concept of covering the parts of the body, and has nothing to do with "speech" or "behaviors unrelated to covering." Therefore, the expression "employing appropriate, dignified, and humane speech and behavior in regulating relations with the opposite sex" (which the esteemed author has used to explain hijab) is fundamentally an explanation of the concept of chastity, not the concept of hijab. For example, someone might completely cover all parts of their body (even their face), yet, for instance, not have dignified speech. In this case, one could say, "At present, her covering and hijab are complete, but her speech is not chaste."

Now, if this semantic difference between chastity and hijab is taken seriously, by carefully examining the implications of his statements, it can be shown that the discussion of "covering" itself can also be considered under an ethical title (of course, within the limits of what he calls "thick ethical concepts"). Pay attention to his phrasing:

"Our moral intuitions tell us that the very act of covering the body of men and women, at least parts of it, has moral relevance."

He then points to the necessity of "covering the private parts and concealing the sexual organs," which is, of course, related to chastity. There is no dispute that this amount of covering is related to chastity; but is what results from our moral intuitions regarding "the very act of covering" limited to this extent? According to our moral intuitions, if someone had covering only to the extent of concealing the private parts (and not a bit more), would they not have committed a reprehensible act?! Even if we, like him, wish to make custom the criterion, it still seems clear that the amount of covering that custom accepts for an individual's act to be ethical is more than this limit. For example, in explaining the act of a man who leaves the house in minimal underwear, common custom does not necessarily point to his lack of chastity, but rather uses expressions like "impolite" and "uncultured" (with a semantic load of moral condemnation).

2) Continuing the above discussion, he says: "There is a difference of opinion regarding the limits, boundaries, and extent of covering, and cultural, climatic, educational, psychological... components play a role in it." The question is whether he has remained committed to the implications of his own statement (the role of the aforementioned components in the extent of covering). If the audience of our discussion is Muslims (in his terms, knowledge-oriented and livelihood-oriented believers), the custom of which culture and climate should determine the limits and boundaries of covering in their society (i.e., Islamic society)? The custom of Islamic societies or the custom of non-Islamic societies? He simply claims that in today's custom, not covering the neck and hair has no moral reprehensibility; but whose custom is this? If cultural, climatic, educational, and psychological components are involved in customs, can one speak generally and universally of "today's custom"? It is true that such a custom exists in Western societies and among some Muslims who do not have serious commitment and attachment to the teachings of Islam; but why should we prescribe this custom for Muslims who truly want to remain Muslims, and then place them, under the title of livelihood-oriented believers, one step below knowledge-oriented believers? Would it not be better, instead of the term knowledge-oriented believers, to use the term believers indifferent to genuine religious knowledge for those who disregard jurisprudential rulings?[14] If someone has a concern for knowledge, they remain committed to the requirements of that knowledge. If I am a believer rationally and based on knowledge, (even assuming a minimal religion) I have accepted the rules proposed by religion for my life and remain committed to them; then, is it reasonable, under the pretext that only religious knowledge matters to me, to ignore the behaviors that are a requirement of this knowledge and make the custom of those who are not bound by these behaviors the basis of my decision-making?!

He will probably respond by saying: Since I have demonstrated the lack of consensus among jurists and religious scholars on the well-known limit of hijab in Islamic societies, therefore Muslims who do not adhere to this hijab can follow this interpretation of religion, and consequently, their custom can also be considered a Muslim custom, and as a result, their action is not necessarily contrary to the custom of Muslims. Although this claim of a lack of consensus will be challenged in the fifth chapter of the discussion, even assuming that challenge does not hold, this response will still not be acceptable because, firstly, many Muslims who do not observe the covering of hair and neck are completely unaware of the existence of the individuals he cites and their views, and it is not the case that they have resorted to this action by consulting an Islamic scholar—even individuals whose expertise is doubted by specialists in Islamic studies—so that their custom could be considered a Muslim custom; secondly, does the custom of a society mean the one hundred percent acceptance of all its individuals? To show that covering the private parts is a moral act accepted by custom, the respected author uses the expression that “a great many human beings believe that covering the private parts and concealing the sexual organs is necessary and essential.” The use of the expression “a great many” means that he accepts that there are also those who do not consider this action necessary and essential, but at the same time, the existence of these individuals, due to their being in the minority, does not harm the declaration that the necessity of covering the private parts is accepted by custom. With this description, even if we assume that the small number of Islamic scholars intended by the author are truly Islamic scholars, and their words are truly based on Islam, does their scarcity compared to the incomparable multitude of Shiite and Sunni Islamic scholars throughout the history of Islam disrupt the “custom” of Islamic scholars, and consequently, the custom of Muslims? Is the multitude of Islamic scholars who believe in the necessity of covering the hair and neck, compared to his alleged Islamic scholars, less than the multitude of individuals who believe in the necessity of covering the private parts, compared to those who deny its necessity? If custom is achieved with such a population ratio, and bringing a few exceptions does not disrupt this custom, the very same statement applies to religious custom as well. Therefore, at least for Muslims, not wearing hijab to the extent of the neck and hair, according to his basis, is contrary to chastity because it is contrary to the custom of an Islamic society that is committed to its Islamic identity[۱۵].

۳) Let us assume that the moral neutrality of the concept of covering is accepted, and that for covering to be considered moral, its connection to a moral concept is necessary, but is “chastity” the only moral title related to hijab? It is interesting that the same book by Martyr Motahhari, which he cites in the discussion of chastity, has also considered the necessity of hijab from at least two other angles (“psychological tranquility” and “the value and respect of women”)[۱۶], all of which are titles with moral implications that are unrelated to chastity, and he has also considered the two cases that are related to chastity (the strengthening of the family bond, the stability of society) from a non-individualistic angle; if he wants to demonstrate the unrelatedness of hijab to morality, he should have questioned both those first two dimensions and this non-individualistic angle of chastity; a further explanation of these dimensions and their role in considering the concept of covering as moral will come in the next paragraph.

۴) He has considered the prevention of men’s lustfulness as one of the mentalities of the religious about the philosophy of hijab and, to deem it unjustified, has offered two reasons: one is that “if not covering the neck and hair causes the arousal of men and lays the groundwork for corruption in society, why were slave women exempted from covering the hair and neck?” and secondly, this rule is a kind of undue imposition on women, asking women to cover themselves so that men are not tempted.

The error in this analysis is the one-dimensional view of the issue, or in other words, seeing this religious norm as monocausal. In analyzing customary and social norms, one should never examine the issue one-dimensionally, let alone religious norms, which we consider to be from God. Those who raise "preventing male lust" as part of the philosophy of hijab, firstly, present it as one of the effective components in the necessity of hijab, not as the sole component; secondly, and conversely, they also present hijab as only one of the necessary factors for preventing lust, not the only factor; and thirdly, they discuss chastity in its social dimensions, not just from an individual perspective: The Holy Qur'an raises the issue of the necessity of guarding one's gaze before (and of course, alongside) the necessity of women's hijab (verse 31 of Surah An-Nur); and in the culture of the devout, the recommendation for women's hijab is always accompanied by an emphasis on men refraining from ogling; and these two together, and of course alongside dozens of other teachings, become a factor in preventing lust in society. To consider only one of the effective factors in the social analysis of an event, and that too with an individualistic view, and then, citing that sometimes that factor is present but the result is not, and sometimes the result is present but that factor is not, to deny any connection between that factor and the result, is a kind of monocausal view of social events that is in no way defensible. Just as with a monocausal analysis, one cannot question a social law[17] like the effect of supply and demand on the high cost of goods (because sometimes supply increases, but cheapness does not ensue), here too we should not analyze the role of hijab in preventing lust monocausally.

"Preventing lust" could be one of the concerns considered by the Lawgiver when establishing the law of hijab, but it is not necessarily the only concern. Multiple considerations were at play in establishing the law of hijab, and for instance, in cases where the issue of lust lost its relevance, concessions were made in hijab. Paying attention to this point can largely explain the exception made for slave women and elderly women. The irrelevance of the issue of lust in the case of elderly women is clear; regarding slave women, one must also consider the societal custom concerning them. He quotes the late Ahmad Qabel as saying:

"What difference is there in the provocativeness between enslaved and free Muslim women that covering the head and neck is not obligatory for the former but is obligatory for free women?"

His detailed response will come in the final stage of the discussion; for now, it is briefly pointed out that at least one important difference is that slave women were considered among the lower strata of society, such that they were generally not desired, and therefore, in terms of provocativeness, they truly did not have the same status; otherwise, regarding the prohibition of adornment in front of non-mahrams, which can provide grounds for provocativeness, there is no difference between them, elderly women, and free women.

Another point in this regard is that the expression "the obligation of hijab for women in order to prevent male lust" is an expression that carries an individualistic, patriarchal, and insulting weight towards women; and although the esteemed author has denied this in this article, considering that some sometimes use such an expression, perhaps further explanation of this expression is necessary. It seems the correct expression to use in this regard are expressions like those of Martyr Motahhari in his book The Issue of Hijab; that is, the role of hijab in the "stability of society" and the "strengthening of family bonds." In other words, it can be argued that women's hijab plays an important role (though not the only factor) in preventing an atmosphere of lust in society (not just male lust), and when the atmosphere of lust in society diminishes, family bonds become stronger and the general condition of society becomes more stable for wholesome work. In other words, one of the problems that unfortunately exists in common both in the expression of the speakers of the aforementioned insulting phrase and in Dr. Soroush Dabbagh's analysis is the individualistic view of the category of ethics. Should moral duties be considered only with individual criteria (in the aforementioned expression: only the man, and in Dr. Dabbagh's expression: only the man himself and the woman herself), or do components such as preserving the general condition of society and helping to strengthen family bonds in society sometimes lead to the formation of a moral duty for individuals?

The conclusion of this discussion is that when the issue of hijab is approached from the perspective of preventing lustfulness (which is, of course, only one factor in the necessity of discussing hijab), it must be said that it is not the case that women wear the hijab for the sake of men; rather, they observe the hijab for the sake of the overall moral safeguarding of society and the strengthening of family bonds within the entirety of society. Such a recommendation to women has nothing to do with a patriarchal perspective. In other words, although it appears on the surface that women observe the hijab for the sake of men, in reality, they undertake this action for the sake of elevating morality within their own society, not for the sake of men. It is like someone who stops at a red light; a simplistic view is that they stopped for the cars coming from other directions, but in truth, they stopped for the sake of promoting order in their society, the benefit of which ultimately returns to them.

If one pays attention to the point that "one of the philosophies behind the obligation of hijab for women in religious literature is that Islam accords a special dignity and respect to the Muslim woman," it becomes clearer that attributing a patriarchal perspective to Islam is a double injustice. To understand how hijab exemplifies special respect for the Muslim woman, one can consider this point: regarding a person who holds respect and sanctity in our eyes, what kind of clothing do we expect them to leave the house in, and to what extent do we look at their body? For example, if a prominent scholar for whom we hold special respect, for any reason (such as a specific illness requiring immediate transfer to the hospital), leaves the house in minimal undergarments, do we not try, in addition to not staring at them, to create a barrier before others to prevent them from being seen in that state? Both our not looking at them and the necessity for them to wear more than undergarments indicate respect for them, not that we are superior to them, and matters of this sort.[18]

The final point that must be considered in order to avoid a single-factor analysis of hijab is that avoiding lustfulness is one element among various elements of life, not the only element. Therefore, when an issue like hijab is raised from this angle, it must simultaneously be in a way that takes other components of life into account. That is, one issue in social life is preventing lustfulness; but another issue is the reasonable possibility of women's presence in society. Many Muslim thinkers have believed that the permission for a woman not to cover her face and hands (up to the wrists) is because Islam does not take a single-factor view and does not want to consider only and solely the component of preventing an atmosphere of lustfulness in society when legislating the ruling of hijab; rather, it also considers the issue that a woman can enter the arena of social life chastely. Since covering the face and hands would practically entail the impossibility of women's presence in society and the necessity of their staying at home and seclusion, it has therefore not made it obligatory.[19]

If this point is taken into consideration, then it becomes clear that the objection the esteemed author quotes from the late Ahmad Qabel regarding the necessity of covering a woman's hair and neck is an inappropriate objection. The late Qabel said:

"Considering that the essence of beauty in the area of the head and neck comes down to the beauty of 'the eyes, eyebrows, mouth, lips, teeth, chin, and their combination,' and Islam has not made covering them obligatory, what attractive characteristic is there in a woman's hair and neck that the necessity of covering them has been emphasized in this way?"

The answer is that the permission not to cover the face has a different philosophy than the philosophy of the necessity of hijab; and the determination of this limit for hijab is the resultant of several components, not just the consideration of the component of attractiveness.

5) One of the points repeatedly mentioned in the esteemed author's phrasing is that hijab is merely a jurisprudential and identity-based issue, and not observing it has nothing to do with ethics. It seems that the ambiguity existing in the two terms "jurisprudential" and "identity-based" has led to a fallacy; if this ambiguity is removed, it becomes clear that fundamentally, this very being jurisprudential or identity-based entails an ethical relation and proportion, and for someone who lives within that jurisprudential or identity-based sphere, transgressing a jurisprudential or identity-based conduct is an unethical act.

I will begin with the concept of "jurisprudential." What is meant by a "jurisprudential" ruling? As a rule, it refers to a ruling that a jurist has deduced from religious texts; in other words, a jurisprudential ruling is one that can be attributed to religion based on valid methods of deduction from religious texts. As noted in paragraph 4 of Chapter 2, the basis of reasonable and epistemically-oriented religiosity[20] is that a person accepts that there are areas of life where reason alone is insufficient for identifying the requisite duty, and for this reason, one needs additional guidance to recognize the correct path in life. If we wish to speak specifically about the religion of Islam (which, unlike most world religions, bases its acceptance on submission to the truth, and not on mere obedience to a person)[21], a true Muslim is a person who, through their own epistemic inquiry, has arrived at the truth that there is a God who created them and, by virtue of His mercy and kindness, has provided a plan for their life in which He has considered only their best interest, and not any benefit for Himself. He may have set forth certain matters as their duty, the necessity of which they may not initially understand; but if God is truly God, then God's judgment is certainly correct. These matters have been made available to us through texts, the understanding of which is methodical, and this method is technically called jurisprudence (fiqh); and a jurisprudential ruling is the articulation of these duties. If this matter were to be expressed within Ross's ethical framework, which Dr. Soroush Dabbagh favors, it should be said: both the requirement of gratitude and the requirement of self-improvement dictate that a Muslim who holds these beliefs, as a "prima facie derivative moral duty," should act upon each and every jurisprudential ruling. Therefore, if hijab is a jurisprudential ruling, acting upon it is a moral duty for a Muslim.

Now let us turn to the concept of "identity." In his articles, he has used the identity-based nature of hijab in two senses. One meaning is that hijab signifies a person's Muslim identity. He says:

"These rulings are bound by time and place and have a jurisprudential and identity-based character, not a moral one. In fact, just as a Greek, Australian, Lebanese, or Iranian person is preoccupied with their identity and loves the flag and the cultural and scientific glories of their country, taking pride and delight in them; for a Muslim woman, the ruling of hijab has more of an identity-based and jurisprudential character."

Here the question arises: what is the moral status of being committed to one's identity and defending it? Even if we refer to the same Rossian ethical framework he cites, it can be shown that such a duty is at least a "prima facie derivative duty"; because it leads to "self-improvement." If we also carefully examine our moral intuitions, we find that insisting on one's own identity and not being assimilated into foreign identities—provided it does not reach the level of racism, which would violate certain moral laws—is a commendable and desirable thing. For example, an Iranian who disregards their Iranianness and for whom Iran's cultural glories hold no special value or respect is worthy of reproach. Similarly, if hijab has an identity dimension for a Muslim woman, adherence to it is a moral commitment, and indifference to it, for her as a Muslim, constitutes a moral weakness. A simple piece of evidence for the moral nature of the issue of hijab as an identity matter is that people, even many non-Muslims, consider a veiled Muslim girl who, for the sake of preserving her hijab (which has indeed taken on an identity dimension for her), is willing to endure certain deprivations, to be worthy of admiration, and they praise her steadfastness in preserving her identity and beliefs.

The weaker and more indefensible meaning regarding the jurisprudential and identity-based nature of the hijab issue, which the esteemed author brings up only in the second article, and even then merely by way of an attribution to the late Qabel, is that "it distinguishes the identity of free women from slave women." He says:

"According to the late Qabel's analysis, neither being a woman nor being a Muslim is the reason for the obligation to cover the head and neck [since this level of covering is not obligatory for a Muslim slave woman]. It seems that the identity dimension of hijab and the differentiation between free women and non-free women was the main reason for covering the head and neck in the Prophet's era."

As previously noted, the late Qabel's argument stems from viewing the law of hijab as a single-factor phenomenon; that is, he assumed that the philosophy of hijab is solely to prevent male lust, and by citing that hijab was not obligatory for slave women, or for the face, which holds great attraction, he negates this factor; and from negating this factor, he concludes the non-necessity of covering the hair and neck. However, hijab is a multidimensional norm, and preventing lust is one factor, while other factors have also been involved in designing the form of hijab. Incidentally, it seems that this very distinction between free and slave women is one of the identity-giving elements of hijab, but not as the cause of hijab, rather as a facilitator for promoting hijab; and a lack of attention to these various aspects leads to such an error in analysis.

To avoid this error, the issue of preserving respect and elevating the value of women, which, according to previous discussions, has been one of the philosophies of hijab, must be reconsidered. For a better understanding, attention to this legal example is helpful: sometimes, to encourage a group to comply with a law, the legislator exempts another group; this exemption, more than having a legal weight, carries the weight of conferring value upon that primary law and prepares the ground for its implementation. For instance, in an institution (e.g., the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), a rule might be established that all male employees must come to the ministry wearing a suit and tie. Then, to enhance the enforcement guarantee of this law, individuals with a sub-bachelor's degree are exempted, allowing them not to observe this rule. In fact, although the apparent ruling is a reduction and facilitation for sub-bachelor's employees, considering that in this ministry, most highly educated individuals come and go in suits, after the enactment of this law, if an employee comes and goes without a suit, in the eyes of people, they are considered a sub-bachelor's degree holder, even if they hold a doctorate; and since many people do not wish to be known by this title, they observe that law more seriously; especially since the legislator is aware that according to the institution's plans, in a few years, there will be no sub-bachelor's employees; and this law will automatically apply to everyone.

Islam, with the law of hijab, also seeks a special respect for the Muslim woman, and by exempting those who, in the public eye, are considered among the lower strata of society and enjoy less respect,[22] perhaps intended to create an enforcement guarantee for this duty. Evidence for this analysis is that Islam did not forbid slave women from wearing hijab; whereas if the identity concept of hijab meant a distinguishing factor for recognizing free and slave women, then hijab, besides being obligatory for free women, should have been forbidden for slave women; and we know that throughout history, many slave women were also veiled, and they too tried to elevate their social rank by wearing hijab.

In fact, the analysis of those who present hijab solely for distinguishing free women from slave women is based on a view that is certainly incompatible with other Islamic teachings, and no valid historical evidence has been provided for it. Those who propose hijab solely on the basis of the aforementioned distinction rely on an incorrect interpretation of the verse "That is more suitable that they should be known and not be abused" (Surah Al-Ahzab, Verse 59: That [=hijab] is better for them, so that they are recognized and not harassed), as if the verse means that free women, by wearing hijab and being recognized as free women, would not be subjected to the harassment of lustful men. The esteemed author, following al-Jabri, Ashmawi, and Abu Zayd, writes:

"As we have seen, the identity-based (not ethical) character of issuing rulings related to hijab has been prominent, meaning that the intention was to distinguish between free and slave women through the former wearing hijab and the latter not; so that free women would not be mistaken for slave women and no one would harass them."

This statement implies that if a slave woman is harassed and molested by lechers, it is of no consequence, and that Islam only sought to protect free women from such harassment?! It must be said that the phrase "that is more suitable that they should be known and not be harmed" has nothing to do with being recognized "as a free woman" or "as a slave woman," and there is absolutely no verse in the Holy Quran that generally exempts slave women from the ruling of hijab. What exists are certain narrations which, incidentally, have no connection to this verse. And if narrations are not valid for understanding the regulations and conditions of the divine command, then the permissibility of slave women not wearing hijab is also invalid; and if they are valid, their implication regarding the obligation of the conventional religious hijab for free women at all times cannot be denied. In summary, the intent of the noble verse is that hijab causes Muslim women to be recognized as "chaste women" so that they are not harassed.

6) From what has passed, it became clear that even based on Ross's ethical system, complete Islamic hijab is a moral duty for a Muslim, and violating it is like violating any moral duty. However, the corollary of this statement is not that "a Muslim woman who does not observe complete Islamic hijab is a completely immoral person; or that anyone who observes complete hijab is necessarily a perfectly virtuous person." Rather, according to the previous explanations, for hijab to be considered moral, there is no need for a comprehensive correlation between "morality" (and even "chastity") and "hijab." It is possible for a person to observe complete hijab yet exhibit some anti-moral (and even unchaste) behaviors, or to not observe complete hijab yet behave morally (and perhaps chastely) in some of her actions and speech. In fact, it should be noted that the morality or immorality (and also the chastity or lack of chastity) of a human being is not an all-or-nothing affair, such that one can judge a person as immoral (or unchaste) based on a single violation, or as virtuous (or chaste) based on a single moral act.

This statement holds true for each and every human behavior: judging a specific behavior as moral or immoral does not mean that the person committing it is completely virtuous or immoral. Consider this example from the realm of public ethics: "Breaking promises" is a moral vice, and "benefiting others" is a moral virtue. There may be a person who, when faced with the needy, is one who "benefits others"; but at the same time, when it comes to making promises, is a "promise-breaker." Is such a person virtuous? Or immoral? It is clear that they are neither this nor that; from one perspective they are virtuous, and from another, immoral. To judge them, one must look at the totality of their actions and consider the overall outcome. If we wish to speak using the terminology of Bernard Williams, which is favored by Dr. Soroush Dabbagh, it must be said that committing or not committing one of the "thick moral concepts" (such as loyalty, harming others, kindness) does not necessarily result in the person falling under one of the thin moral concepts (such as good, bad). This rule also applies to "hijab," which, according to the discussions above, is a "thick moral concept" (in Williams's terminology) and, of course, one of the "prima facie duties" (in Ross's terminology).

4) Does making an act compulsory necessarily lead to it becoming immoral?

Another point that has been raised, perhaps digressively (and indeed in both articles), is the discussion surrounding the compulsory nature of hijab. He has taken it for granted that compulsory hijab is immoral, and in the first article, he states:

«It should be noted that what I mean here is voluntary hijab, not compulsory hijab; for the unethical nature of compulsory hijab is clear and does not require much argument or explanation. The majority of scholars of ethics have said that choice and free will are among the constituents of a moral act; the implication of this statement is that a forced and involuntary act has no moral value; rather, insofar as it entails disregarding the right to choose and human dignity, it is an unethical act. If will and choice are among the constituents of authentic faith, and the believer is one who passionately and with contentment and desire undergoes the 'faith experience,' the implication of this statement is that compulsory faith is, in a sense, paradoxical and carries no weight on the scales of ethics. Hence, governments that seek to establish compulsory faith in society commit a moral error and do not succeed in practice either. Rulers should only think about policymaking aimed at meeting people's primary needs such as security, employment, health, clothing... and leave people's secondary needs such as art, love, religion... to the people, civil society, and the public sphere, and not interfere, manipulate, or exercise power in these domains. Therefore, establishing compulsory hijab in society is unethical and thus must be abandoned.»

And in the second article, he emphasizes that:

«Compulsory hijab is an unethical and reprehensible matter that leads nowhere, and the majority of scholars of ethics have said that a forced and involuntary act carries no weight on the scales of ethics. Safeguarding fundamental moral principles is the duty of governments, and nothing more.»

Critique and Examination

Several issues can be raised here:

1) Even if we accept that compulsory hijab is not a moral matter, does it have any bearing on whether an individual who has been forcibly veiled deserves reproach? And if the intention is to reproach those who compel, what relevance does that have to the subject of discussion (moral judgment about hijab itself)?

2) Is the 'choice and free will' that are among the constituents of a voluntary act, choice and free will in their ontological sense or in their legal concept? If what is meant is ontological free will, then in its domain, deprivation or imposition is meaningless; and if imposition is possible there and it is legal free will, then can it be said that if an act becomes compulsory, it is necessarily unethical and even reprehensible?

3) When analyzed from a social perspective, is compulsion still always contrary to ethics?

4) Do the majority of scholars of ethics really consider compulsion to negate the morality of an action?

5) Is the subject of discussion compulsory ethics or compulsory faith? And are these two exactly the same?

6) What is the scope of governments' duties? Should they only address primary needs (and with a list based on a materialistic view of human reality) or also engage with secondary needs? And if they do engage, is 'safeguarding fundamental moral principles' their only duty? And is this safeguarding an abstract matter, or does it require entering into the instances of moral action (not just remaining at the level of fundamental principles)?

7) Is enjoining good and forbidding evil not considered a moral act in an Islamic society? And more importantly, is the struggle against oppression (which is a form of compulsion against the oppressor to prevent their oppression) not a moral virtue according to the moral intuitions of all human beings?

And now, the elaboration of these issues:

1) As was also noted in the second chapter, one of the problems with the present text is the ambiguity and the occurrence of the fallacy of equivocation in the use of the phrase "unethical." There, a confusion occurred between the meaning of "unrelated to ethics" and "morally permissible"; and here, between "unrelated to ethics" (or in other words, outside the domain of moral judgment) and "morally reprehensible." In other words, even disregarding the subsequent discussions, the question is: what is the purport of "compulsory hijab is not an ethical matter"? If one pays close attention to the sentences quoted from him, he has taken the "non-ethical nature" of compulsory hijab to mean its "reprehensibility." If a person is forcibly obliged to perform a moral act (for example, others compel him to fulfill his promise), is he deserving of reproach? It is clear that in such cases, if we say this act of his is unethical, it at most means it carries no positive moral weight, not that it is worthy of reproach.

Perhaps he would respond by saying: "My intention regarding the reprehensibility of compulsory hijab is the reproach of those who enforce it"; which, from some ambiguities present in his text, such an intention can also be inferred in addition to the above meaning. But then, a more significant objection arises against him: what relevance does such a point have to the subject of the discussion (moral judgment about hijab itself) that he emphasizes it so much when defining his intent? Suppose I want to speak about the morality or immorality of a subject like "fulfilling a promise." Does addressing the reproach of those who compel others to "fulfill their promise" at the beginning of the discussion, under the pretext of defining intent, have any relevance to the goodness or badness of the subject of "fulfilling a promise" itself? Does this action of mine not suggest to the audience that I have a negative stance towards this moral act in advance, and therefore, even if I accept its goodness, I am preemptively condemning those who try to promote it under the pretext that compulsion is a bad thing? Whether compelling moral matters is morally permissible or not, and whether the government should intervene in it or not, is a subject that has no relevance whatsoever to the morality or immorality of that subject itself, such that the subject would be divided into voluntary and compulsory states, and its compulsory state would be declared self-evidently invalid in advance.

2) In his judgment, besides the previous ambiguity, there is another ambiguity, which is the confusion between the ontological concept and the legal concept of free will and volition. From the premise that "free will and volition are among the constituents of a moral act," he has concluded that:

"A forced and involuntary act has no moral value; rather, since it entails disregarding the right to choose and human dignity, it is an unethical act."

Whereas what constitutes a moral act is the ontological concept of free will; that is, fundamentally, a being can perform a moral act only if it possesses free will; and acts that fall outside the scope of our ontological volition (such as blood circulation in our body's vessels) are not subject to moral judgments. Incidentally, their being unethical also means this lack of inclusion under moral judgment, not the meaning of being reprehensible, which he has employed. This ontological compulsion is a compulsion in whose realm deprivation or imposition, and consequently good or bad, are meaningless; and it lies entirely outside the discussions of ethics. However, when speaking of a forced and involuntary act that entails disregarding the right to choose and human dignity, what is meant is legal compulsion, not ontological compulsion; wherein, firstly, one can dispute considering legal compulsion as unethical (let alone reprehensible), and secondly, depriving a person of the right to choose does not necessarily entail disregarding their human dignity; and this issue is debatable both from the perspective of the compelled and from the perspective of the compeller.

To better clarify the issue, a brief explanation of the difference between ontological compulsion and legal compulsion is necessary. Ontological compulsion occurs when an action is fundamentally beyond the sphere of human volition, such as when someone is pushed off a rooftop; they no longer have any choice or will regarding falling or not falling. Legal compulsion, however, occurs when the matter lies within the sphere of human volition, but an external factor acts in such a way that, in the external world, no choice remains for the volitional agent. The mode of the external factor's action in the realm of legal compulsion is of two kinds. Sometimes, the volitional agent is placed in a situation where, although the path of their ontological free will remains open, the possibility of their desired action no longer exists in the external world; like imprisoning a thief, who, because they are in prison, lacks the possibility of stealing. At other times, they are placed in a situation where, although the possibility of their desired action remains in the external world, under this new situation, their own reason no longer permits them that action; like holding a gun to someone and saying, 'Either give us the money you have on you, or we will kill you'; or, for example, informing a person that if they do not pay taxes, their economic activity will be blocked. In these cases, the situation is such that, ontologically, the possibility of not giving the money or not paying taxes exists, but their reason does not grant them such permission, and legally, it is interpreted that they have been compelled to perform that act. Furthermore, sometimes the situations of the latter category become so complex that, although legally the term 'compelled' is used, reason does not issue a definitive judgment, and despite considering the person legally compelled, it judges them to be guilty; although it may deem them deserving of a reduced sentence. This is like placing a person at the crossroads of: 'If you do not kill that (innocent) person, we will kill you.' Killing an innocent person, even under such circumstances, is a crime, but because they are legally compelled, their punishment is reduced.

Now, let us examine the situation of legal compulsion in the above examples, from an ethical standpoint, both from the side of the compeller and the compelled. Regarding the imprisoned thief, of course, their not stealing in prison is not considered a moral act for them; but the 'immorality' of their not stealing merely means it is unrelated to ethics, not that it is blameworthy. Regarding the aforementioned taxpayer, one might perhaps say something similar. However, regarding the person compelled to hand over their money, although the compellers' action is blameworthy, their own action is not only not blameworthy but is ethically praiseworthy; that is, ethics dictates that in such circumstances, a person should sacrifice their money for their life (note that the assumption of the problem is where there is no possibility of defense for them), and if they behave contrary to this, they are condemned with ethical labels such as miserly and stingy, and it is said they were so miserly that they sacrificed their life for their money. But in the example where a person is forced to kill another, the matter is reversed; that is, if they sacrifice their life, they are ethically praised, and if they kill the other, even if legally compelled, they are still deserving of blame.

But from the side of the compellers, their action is not always blameworthy. Of course, unjustly taking others' money, or compelling a human being to kill an innocent human being, is an unethical and blameworthy act. But is imprisoning a criminal, or compelling economic actors to pay taxes, ethically blameworthy? If we look at moral intuitions or even international norms, these two actions are not only not considered blameworthy, but can even be regarded, in some respects, as instances of ethical actions, the explanation of which will come in the next paragraph.

In summary, careful consideration of these examples shows that it is not the case that if an action becomes compulsory, it is necessarily unethical, let alone necessarily blameworthy, whether on the part of the compeller or the compelled.

3) It seems that the root of this judgment—that compulsion is necessarily contrary to ethics—is the dominance of a kind of one-dimensional analysis of ethics that considers ethics only from an individual perspective and is inattentive to the social dimensions of moral duty. If analyzed from a social perspective, is compulsion always contrary to ethics? There is no dispute that the ideal situation is one where an act is performed with the individual's will and choice, but if we do not view moral action as all-or-nothing, but rather take a spectrum-based view of performing moral acts, we find that, especially from a social perspective, some compulsions upon certain individuals are necessary for the moral development of society at large. Even if we disregard the simple examples from the previous discussion (such as imprisonment and tax law), one can cite many of the obligations that are prevalent in the Western world today and have gradually led to the formation of specific moralities in the general public culture. For instance, making the social cost of lying in society high (which is a kind of pushing this moral issue towards compulsion), is this not a morally desirable thing? In other words, it can be said that any activity that, from a social perspective, creates obligations and compulsions that, without ignoring human dignity, pave the way for the expansion of moralities, has moral desirability. In fact, as mentioned, the concomitance of "the act becoming compulsory" and "ignoring human dignity" only exists when the issue is considered solely from an individual perspective; otherwise, from a social perspective, numerous situations can be imagined where compulsion not only does not entail ignoring human dignity, but is for the sake of preserving it. Perhaps simple examples of this are the educational obligations of parents for the moral development of their child, which are precisely for the sake of preserving and enhancing the child's human dignity, not ignoring it. As a larger-scale example, do our moral intuitions not regard making literacy or hygiene compulsory as a good deed?

The issue can also be considered from another perspective. In fact, if, firstly, attention is paid to the point that "paving the way for the expansion of moralities in society" is itself an instance of a moral act, and secondly, attention is paid to the legal concept of compulsion (as opposed to its ontological concept), it becomes clear that fundamentally, one state of legal compulsion (where the situation is arranged in such a way that ontological violation is possible, but one's reason does not permit it) is a requisite for most moral groundwork; and if, in some cases, legal compulsion is deemed reprehensible, it is either of the type that ontologically blocks the possibility of violation, or what is being compelled is itself an instance of an immoral act (such as killing an innocent person or usurping property).

4) A point that can be added as a supplement to the previous paragraph is that in referring to scholars of ethics, they apparently do not consider the ancient scholars as ethicists at all; for if we only pay attention to the difference between the views of ancient scholars and Western scholars regarding the role of habit in human moral development, we find that it is not the case that the majority of ethicists consider compulsion as negating the morality of an action. In reality, there is a disagreement between ancient and contemporary scholars as to whether "habituating" individuals to good deeds is a moral act or not. Many contemporary Western scholars, citing that habituation causes an act to be performed involuntarily by a person, have deemed it impermissible; but the ancients, by distinguishing between active habits and passive habits, believed that active habits are a necessary matter for the moral development of humans, because for many moral acts, if their foundations are not formed within a person's being, the possibility of performing them practically does not exist; and therefore, they fundamentally considered education as the art of forming habits (=moral dispositions).^[23]

5) Another noteworthy point in their discussion is the conflation of the two terms faith and ethics, and the use of one in place of the other. They say:

"If will and choice are among the constituents of authentic faith, and the believer is one who passionately and with satisfaction and desire undergoes the 'faith experience'; the implication of this statement is that compulsory faith is a paradoxical expression and carries no weight on the scales of ethics."

The question is whether the subject of discussion is the enforcement of ethics or of faith? And are these two the same? And what does compulsory faith have to do with the subject at hand (compulsory hijab) anyway? Faith means a heartfelt belief and, in his words, a passionate one, but hijab is an external act and behavior, not a heartfelt belief. Those who compel others to wear hijab, do they want belief in hijab from them, or the covering of bodily parts? Is such phrasing anything more than entangling matters with emotional statements, and is such a thing permissible in an article that seeks to make moral judgments based on rational analyses?

6) From the above analyses, it becomes clear that ethics has social dimensions, and therefore governments must also enter into it. We now add that if the promotion and expansion of ethics is itself an instance of ethical action, the entry of governments into this matter, through legislation and even the use of punitive and incentive tools, is entirely permissible; and as long as they have not violated the general human dignity[24] of people in this process, no one considers them deserving of moral censure; and the simplest example of this is criminal laws and the use of imprisonment, which is accepted in the custom of human cultures, and our moral intuitions also accept the moral goodness of this action by governments.

The esteemed author declares in this regard in the first article that:

"Rulers should only be concerned with policymaking to meet the primary needs of the people, such as security, employment, health, clothing... and should leave the secondary needs of human beings, such as art, love, religion..., to the people, civil society, and the public sphere."

And in the second article, they emphasize that:

"Safeguarding fundamental moral principles is the duty of governments, and nothing more."

There are several problems in these statements:

a) There is a contradiction between these two formulations regarding the duty of governments. Ultimately, in their view, should the government only address primary needs, or should it also enter into secondary needs? In other words, according to their list, is "safeguarding fundamental moral principles" part of primary needs, on par with health, employment, and clothing, or is it part of secondary needs, on par with religion, art, and love?

b) Regarding the use of the terms "primary" and "secondary" for the aforementioned needs, it seems we have again fallen into the trap of the fallacy of equivocation. If the meaning of primary versus secondary needs is the temporal precedence and succession in the formation of needs, in the sense that primary needs are those from which the formation and emergence of society begins, and secondary needs arise at a later stage, this phrasing is acceptable, but what necessary connection does it have with the idea that the government should not address secondary needs? If, however, the meaning is the importance and priority of primary needs over secondary ones, what evidence has been presented that matters such as health and clothing are superior to matters such as love and religion; and is such a priority not based on considering the truth of the human being as material, which presents their material needs as primary and having priority, and their spiritual needs as secondary and of subsequent priority?

c) If the government is to enter to the extent of "safeguarding fundamental moral principles," is such safeguarding merely an abstract matter, or does it require entering into the instances and details of ethics? Is the very admiration that many members of our society have for the observance of ethics in Western society not due to the fact that the government has entered the realm of ethical instances and has done something so that ethics such as orderliness, truthfulness, work ethic, etc., have become widespread among the people, and through the policies and mechanisms it has adopted, it steers people toward these components? Ultimately, is this good or bad? And in summary, is safeguarding fundamental principles possible without entering into the details?

7) From a religious perspective, enjoining good and forbidding evil is a moral virtue; and according to the explanation provided in the previous chapter, acting upon any religious recommendation, in a society that believes in that religion, is an instance of a moral act. Moreover, if we disregard the excesses and deficiencies of some claimants of this religious duty (for which, as with any moral title, poor execution and excess and deficiency are conceivable), from the angle of moral intuitions as well, enjoining good and forbidding evil is a moral act; for promoting what is moral and good, and which leads to the moral elevation of society, is morally good; and that the general public should join hands and prevent the performance of vices by norm-breaking and immoral individuals is, in the moral intuition of every human being, a desirable matter, and therefore a moral act. It is clear that understanding the goodness and moral nature of enjoining good and forbidding evil is entirely dependent upon moving beyond a purely individual perspective and adopting a social view of moral action.

Even if enjoining good and forbidding evil is considered a specific act of a religious community, the pursuit of justice and the struggle against oppression are certainly among the highest instances of moral action. Is the struggle against oppression not a form of compelling others, and is the element of compulsion inherent in this action not sufficient evidence that the mere existence of compulsion cannot be a sufficient reason for deeming an act immoral and reprehensible?

5) Is there a jurist who holds a different view on hijab?

In the preceding discussions, his ethical arguments regarding the permissibility of not covering the neck and hair were examined. However, in order to demonstrate the non-necessity of this covering in Islam, and to bring religious people along with his purpose, he has ventured into a field outside his expertise (namely, the field of jurisprudence) and, by citing statements from some contemporaries[25], has attempted to present evidence of a difference of opinion regarding the necessity of covering the head and neck, so as to suggest that:

"By accepting that a minority of jurists and some contemporary Islamic scholars believe that the Quranic verses do not provide definitive indication (nass) of the necessity of covering the neck and hair […] one can conclude that not covering the neck and hair in the present day does not entail violating God's command and intent or disregarding the explicit text of the Quran."

Of course, he has emphasized that:

"I was not in the position of issuing a jurisprudential ruling on the issue of hijab, for issuing fatwas is not my field of work or expertise; rather, I have been seeking to analyze the issue of covering the neck and hair from an ethical perspective and have pursued its connection and relation to the jurisprudential ruling on covering the neck and hair."

But he expects from livelihood-minded and knowledge-minded religious people that:

"By taking into consideration the minimalist theory of divine command and regarding with care the diversity of opinions among jurists, Quranic researchers, and Islamic scholars concerning the jurisprudential ruling on hijab, they conclude that God's command and decree regarding the necessity of covering the neck and hair does not have definitive indication in the sacred text."

Critique and Examination

In his statements and citations, several points are worth examining:

1) Is the criterion for identifying God's command solely the Holy Quran, such that if a definitive indication from the Quran is not found on a matter, we cannot consider its violation as a violation of God's command?

2) To what extent are the statements of those he has cited reliable for substantiating a jurisprudential ruling, so that from the diversity of their opinions, we can conclude the lack of definitive indication of this matter in Islam? And has research ethics been observed in the manner of citing the material?

3) Apart from the speakers of those statements, are the arguments presented by those individuals regarding the non-obligation of covering the hair and neck in Islam acceptable?

But the details of these issues:

1) One of the points the esteemed author has alluded to in passing[26] is that “the verses of the Quran do not provide a definitive indication (naṣṣ) of the necessity of covering the neck and hair”; and therefore, “not covering the neck and hair in the present day does not entail violating God’s command and intention or disregarding the explicit text of the Quran.” His reason for this claim is quoting certain individuals.

Whether the claim itself is correct or not, and what the Quranic terms jilbāb and khimār indicate, will be examined in the next chapter. However, let us assume that from the Quranic verses, one cannot necessarily find an indication of the obligation to cover the neck and hair in the form of a “naṣṣ” (definitive indication); does it follow that God’s command in this regard is not definitive? The indication of most religious concepts is at the level of “ẓāhir” (apparent meaning), not “naṣṣ”[27]; and this in no way causes doubt in attributing them to Islam. Do we know of anything more certain in Islam than the obligation of prayer (ṣalāh)? Is the term “al-ṣalāh” mentioned in the Quranic verses a “naṣṣ” for prayer in its technical sense? We know it is not; rather, it is “ẓāhir.” Nevertheless, considering numerous other historical and narrational indications and evidence, we have no doubt that “ṣalāh” in its technical sense has been made obligatory in Islam, and one who does not perform the prayer has disregarded the divine command. The same applies to hijab. It is not a new point to say that the words jilbāb and khimār in the Quran are not a “naṣṣ” for hijab in its contemporary meaning (for, indeed, some exegetes have considered their meaning to exceed the conventional headscarf of today, to the extent of covering the face as well!), but this does not entail that the obligation of conventional hijab cannot be proven and shown that one who abandons it has disregarded one of the divine commands. A simple witness to this is that before the recent century, no one doubted this obligation; and as we shall see, the arguments of the mentioned individuals are not justified arguments either; and often, instead of deriving the meaning from the verse, they have resorted to personal interpretations influenced by their surrounding culture, which is not a valid method for understanding the signification of historical texts.

Furthermore, is the Holy Quran our only source for identifying God’s commands? Does the Quran itself not command: “Yā ayyuhā alladhīna āmanū aṭī‘ū Allāh wa aṭī‘ū al-rasūl” (Al-Nisā’/59; O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger[28])? Does it not state: “Wa mā ātākum al-rasūlu fa khudhūhu wa mā nahākum ‘anhu fa antahū” (Al-Ḥashr/8; And whatever the Messenger gives you, take it; and whatever he forbids you, abstain from it)? No Muslim (or Shia) doubts that the narrations of the Prophet, may God’s blessings and peace be upon him and his family (and the Pure Imams, peace be upon them), are also obligatory to follow, just like the verses of the Quran, and if the Noble Prophet (PBUH) stated something as a command from God, that matter is a command from God even if it is not mentioned in the Quran. And this point has abundant historical evidence; that is, one can point to numerous instances of definitive Islamic commands that are not mentioned in the Holy Quran but about which no Muslim has any doubt. A simple example is the number of rak‘ahs in the daily prayers, which is not mentioned anywhere in the Quran, yet no Muslim doubts that the morning prayer is two rak‘ahs and the noon prayer is four rak‘ahs.

2) In the introduction to the present article, it was mentioned that one of the ethical conditions of scholarly discussions is that if the discussion extends into a field of knowledge and research in which the author is not an expert and wishes to advance his discussion based on quotations from others, he must cite the words of someone whom the specialists of that scholarly field accept as an expert. Of course, in non-specialist discussions, it often happens that by appealing to the audience’s information, something contrary to reality is instilled in them; a simple example of which might be the story of the snake.[29]

With the specialization of knowledge and the increase in people's general information, unfortunately, the "snake" fallacy has become prevalent with greater complexity; that is, some individuals, by appealing to the general knowledge of non-specialist audiences, present a statement as specialized information. If a specialist were present, they would easily recognize the error, but sometimes, because a correct understanding of the issue requires extensive specialized knowledge that the audience lacks, they cannot be easily convinced. For example, those unaware of the emergence and development of non-Euclidean geometries think that the law "the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees" is an absolute law whose contrary cannot even be supposed; and they can easily inculcate in a high school audience that "someone who says they have drawn a triangle whose angles sum to 160 degrees is weak in geometry." Whereas, fundamentally, in non-Euclidean geometries (which, incidentally, according to Einstein's theory, is the type of geometry of our universe), the sum of the angles of a triangle is not 180 degrees; it is either more or less! Or when a person saw that someone had arrived at the number 10^-5.7 (ten to the power of negative five point seven) as the answer to a mathematical equation, they would assert with certainty, "You don't know mathematics; because, firstly, a negative exponent is meaningless, and secondly, a decimal exponent is meaningless!" And they would provide a reason: "An exponent means how many times a number is multiplied by itself, and multiplying by itself a negative or decimal number of times is meaningless!" Today, with a scientific calculator, one can easily show that not only is this value not at all meaningless, but it is completely calculable and its value is approximately 501178; but in the absence of such a calculator, how would one convey the meaning of that number (how we can have negative or decimal exponents) to an audience who has only learned simple exponents?

At the beginning of the present article, an example of commentary in the field of biology was presented, but now these two examples have been added to make it clear that merely because a person has some information in a field (in the present examples: geometry and arithmetic), information that is correct in its own right, does not mean they can easily question the statements of specialists in that field (in the present examples: mathematicians); and the lack of response from those specialists cannot be considered proof that the objection is valid; for sometimes the reality is like the tale of the "snake," where if one enters the relevant specialty (literacy in the snake example, or specialized arithmetic and geometry in the recent examples), the matter resolves itself for them, and if it does not, the point cannot be easily explained to them.

Unfortunately, a similar mistake is observed in the two articles under discussion. To demonstrate the existence of jurisprudential opposition in the discussion of the hijab of the hair and neck, the esteemed author has cited individuals whom the relevant academic community either does not consider authorities in this field, or whose opinions fall outside the methodological standards of the science of jurisprudence; and then presenting such material as the "opposing view of some jurists" as the basis for their discussion is incompatible with research ethics.

It should be noted that even based on the theory of the plurality of readings, not every reading, but only a methodical reading, should be accepted; and when someone steps outside the basic principles of research methodology in, for example, the field of jurisprudence, can their statement be accepted as a citable reading regarding a jurisprudential ruling? The fatwa-based consensus[30] of all specialists in the field of jurisprudence (i.e., Shia and Sunni jurists) over more than a thousand years regarding the extent of covering for women's heads and necks in front of non-mahrams has been that covering all of it except the face is necessary and obligatory, and if there has been any debate among them, it has been about whether covering a woman's face is also necessary or not; and this is a consensus that Dr. Kadivar (who is one of the individuals cited by the esteemed author) has explicitly affirmed.[31] In such a context, what is the meaning of citing the statements of a few individuals whose juristic authority is not accepted by anyone (not even by themselves), or whose jurisprudential weakness in their evidence on this subject is such that specialists (= jurists) do not even bother to respond to it? Is a person's personal desire for the audience to accept a point sufficient to present their statement as a scholarly statement by any means?

The esteemed author will probably respond: I accept that figures like al-Jabri, Ashmawi, Abu Zayd, Abdolali Bazargan, and Torkashvand are not jurists, and they themselves do not claim juristic authority, but what about Dr. Kadivar and the late Qabel? They have received permission for ijtihad from Ayatollah Montazeri.[32]

As to whether these two individuals possess such a license for ijtihad, since this claim has been made on their own website, we assume its validity [33] (although the very person who granted them the license for ijtihad also disagreed with them on this issue). However, what serves as the criterion for judging whether a person's opinion is based on ijtihad is, more than such licenses, their reasoning. Those who are specialized in the field of jurisprudence clearly know that the material quoted from these two individuals on this matter can, at most, amount to raising a possibility. The late Qabel explicitly considered his evidence as merely raising a noteworthy possibility, and Dr. Kadivar, firstly, in his own writing, qualified his opinion with conditions (such as: "in regions where covering the head, hair, and neck of women is customary and not covering these areas leads to corruption, women are obliged to cover these areas"), and secondly, in support of this opinion of his, he cited a verse, the continuation of which explicitly refutes his opinion; an opinion that, based on the methodology of common and conventional Shia jurisprudence, cannot be considered a valid jurisprudential argument. Where do such views stand, and where does the existence of a competing jurisprudential ruling stand?

***

Now it is time to examine the arguments that the esteemed author has presented, quoting the aforementioned individuals, regarding the non-obligation of covering the hair and neck in Islam.

5-1) The Views of Messrs. Turkashvand, Kadivar, and Bazargan

The esteemed author begins his citations with the material of Mr. Turkashvand, stating:

"Amir Turkashvand, through his extensive jurisprudential and historical research, has, contrary to the famous opinion, concluded that covering the neck and hair of the head is not obligatory. According to his view, the religious hijab in the era of the Prophet had different limits and boundaries and was far removed from what is current among us today."

The aforementioned research has been published in cyberspace in a book titled "Religious Hijab in the Era of the Prophet"; however, this book is not only unreliable in terms of its historical research method and has even distorted individuals' statements at times, but in numerous instances, it has also committed gross errors even in the translation of phrases and the explanation of the meaning of words; it is more indicative of the esteemed author's subjective notions than historical realities. Since this humble writer has demonstrated the severe scholarly weakness of this work elsewhere, that will suffice. [34]

Dr. Kadivar, in a statement quoted from him in the aforementioned articles, has cast doubt on the implication of jilbab and khimar as referring to covering the head, and in most of his comments on his website, he has relied on the phrase "except what is apparent thereof" in verse 31 of Surah An-Nur for not covering the head and neck. Of course, Dr. Kadivar, in the continuation of the same material cited by Dr. Soroush Dabbagh, has an important point that the latter has not mentioned at all. Dr. Kadivar explicitly states:

"Believing women in societies and conditions where covering the head, neck, hair, and generally the entire body except the face, hands up to the wrists, and feet is customary, such that not covering them leads to corruption, are obliged, by secondary ruling, to cover these areas as well." (Date of the post on Dr. Kadivar's website: January 19, 2013)

And in a more recent comment, he has emphasized:

"In regions where covering the head, hair, and neck of women is customary and not covering these areas leads to corruption, women are obliged to cover these areas. […] Believing women should not fall below the average covering in their region" (Date of the post on Dr. Kadivar's website: January 31, 2013)

Regarding the meaning of jilbab and khimar, some points will be made in the next chapter, and concerning his main argument (the phrase from verse 31 of Surah An-Nur), this humble writer has shown in detail in another article that, besides the incorrectness of his interpretation based on linguistic standards, the content of the continuation of the verse also explicitly refutes his opinion, and his understanding is contrary to the text of the verse itself, and he has not yet provided a valid reason for this understanding that contradicts the verse. [35]

Regarding Engineer Abdolali Bazargan, the only matter quoted from him is an opinion without evidence[36]; the discussion that will be presented about the verse at the end of the article (as well as referring to the critiques introduced concerning the views of Dr. Kadivar and Mr. Turkashvand) will suffice to reveal the incorrectness of his understanding.

5-2) Views of Some Arab Intellectuals (al-Jabri, Abu Zayd, and Ashmawi)

The argument that the esteemed author has quoted from some Arab intellectuals is that the obligation of covering the hair and neck was for the purpose of distinguishing free women from slave women. He quotes from Mohammed Abed al-Jabri that:

"In the past, some alleys were roofed, and men would sit on both sides of the alley and converse with one another... When free women, accompanied by their slave girls, would leave the house to relieve themselves, men sitting by the alley... would harass and bother them with particular gestures... The reason for the ruling of hijab is so that young men and men could distinguish free women from slave girls, and thus not harass or bother them, and not cast impure glances at them."

Then, quoting Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, he concludes the negation of the obligation of hijab in this manner: since the need to differentiate between slave girls and free women has been eliminated today, the aforementioned hijab is no longer necessary:

"Therefore, hijab is not obligatory in the modern era, because the ruling revolves around its cause; it comes with the presence of the cause and disappears with the disappearance of the cause."

And regarding Ashmawi, it is merely mentioned that he is in agreement with Abu Zayd and al-Jabri.[37]

Critique and Examination

As we explained in the third chapter, not only is there no justifiable reason that the philosophy behind the obligation of hijab is "distinguishing the free woman from the slave woman," but the atmosphere of Islamic texts is contrary to it. In fact, the issue is that:

1) Has this matter been presented in the Holy Quran in the above manner; or at least, has a noteworthy historical document been provided regarding the occasion of revelation of a verse with this theme?

2) Is such a philosophy compatible with other Islamic teachings, and considering the totality of Islamic teachings, can such a matter even be attributed to Islam?

3) This event, even if it were true, would at most be at the level of the occasion of revelation of the verse; can the philosophy of a ruling be derived from the occasion of revelation?

The details of these issues:

1) This matter, in the above form, has not come in the Holy Quran at all; rather, it has appeared in some commentaries regarding the occasion of revelation of the verse, and even then, without providing any reliable historical document. Upon investigation in Shia and Sunni commentaries (which is easily done today with available software), one finds no connected historical document for this claim (meaning someone who was present at the time of the Prophet or heard the matter from the Pure Imams and narrates the event). The only instance found as a historical document in the interpretation of this verse is a narration from Ali ibn Ibrahim al-Qummi, which, incidentally, is incompatible with the above analysis. This narration states:

"The occasion of revelation of the verse 'O Prophet, tell your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers to draw their cloaks over themselves' was that women would come to the mosque and pray behind the Messenger of God (peace and blessings of God be upon him and his family), and at night, when they would come for the Maghrib, Isha, and Fajr prayers, young men would sit in their path and harass them, accosting them. So God revealed this verse, up to where He says: 'That is more suitable that they should be known and not be harassed.' (meaning: This is more appropriate for them so that they be recognized in such a way that they are not harassed)."[38]

As can be seen, in this narration there is no reference whatsoever to slave women and free women; and some early Islamic exegetes have also noted that the meaning of “so that they may be recognized” is “so that they may be recognized as women of covering and righteousness [as opposed to adulteresses], so that a transgressor does not harass them, because if a woman is known for covering and righteousness, she will no longer be molested.”[39] In other words, the meaning of the phrase “yuʿrafna” (so that they may be recognized) is the recognition of chaste women from promiscuous women, so that transgressors do not dare to insult them; not the recognition of free women from slave women, so that transgressors recognize free women in order not to molest only free women! Of course, throughout history, given that the fatwa of some jurists permitted the non-use of the jilbab (and thus the permissibility of not covering the hair of the head) for female slaves, some have linked this jurisprudential ruling (without any historical evidence) to the above verse, and later scholars have merely repeated this.

2) The very basis of this claim is completely incompatible with other Islamic teachings; because the necessary implication of this ruling is that for dissolute individuals, harassing and creating sexual nuisance for slave women and looking at them with a lustful gaze is permissible; and that Islam, so that they do not mistakenly harass free women in this nuisance, has made hijab obligatory upon free women! And the invalidity of this statement is completely evident.[40]

3) The above argument has another flaw as well. Even if the mentioned incident were true, it was the occasion of revelation for this verse; and the occasion of revelation of a ruling is different from the philosophy and cause of that ruling. The occasion of revelation means under what circumstances and with what event the verse was revealed; and even if the unsupported statement of the mentioned exegetes were correct, it would at most express the occasion of revelation of the ruling, not the philosophy of the ruling; meaning that the necessity for legislating a ruling may have various roots in different psychological and social dimensions of human beings, which determines at the time of which event that ruling is expressed, but it has often happened that the event has been resolved, yet because those roots and primary philosophies of the ruling still persist, the ruling has remained. For example, the occasion of revelation for the verses that led to the change of the Muslims' Qibla from Al-Aqsa Mosque to Al-Masjid al-Haram was some of the taunts and problems directed at the Muslims by the Jews; but this does not mean that the real cause and the entire philosophy of the ruling of the new Qibla was solely this; hence, although the Muslims gradually gained superiority and the Jews no longer dared to taunt them, the Qibla still remained this same new Qibla. In summary, firstly, the basis of the story is incorrect; secondly, even if the basis of the story were correct, it would at most express the occasion of revelation of the verse, not the cause of the ruling.

Note: The exemption of female slaves is also a ruling that has not come in the Holy Quran; rather, its primary source is the famous fatwa of the jurists and some narrations. Mentioning this point was necessary to emphasize the matter discussed in the previous paragraph; that is, those who think that something must explicitly appear in the Quran to be considered a religious ruling; then how is it that they use this exemption of female slaves (which is the most important pretext for deniers of the contemporary obligation of hijab for the hair and neck) as a contextual indicator for what its ruling has explicitly come in the Quran? In other words, why is it that where they want to make an exception in a religious ruling and derive the philosophy of the ruling through this exception, the narrations and the common fatwa among jurists are accepted as a way to identify the divine command, but where understanding the scope of the ruling is concerned, only and exclusively the Quranic verse must be involved, and even authentic narrations and the consensus of jurists become worthless?

5-3) The View of Ahmad Qabel

What emerges from reading the late Mr. Qabel's article is that he was merely in the position of outlining a “noteworthy possibility” in brief, not expressing a “rival jurisprudential ruling” for which he had “sufficient evidence” to prove his claim[41]; and if someone familiar with the field of jurisprudence studies his text, they will find that his evidence is in no way at the level of presenting a valid jurisprudential argument to prove a new jurisprudential ruling; and if one were to look at that evidence with this title, it would be subject to numerous disputes. Here, by way of example, only that amount of his evidence which appears in Dr. Soroush Dabbagh's article will be pointed out.[42]

The reason cited from the late scholar for negating the obligation of covering the hair and neck goes back to the very issue of the difference between a Muslim woman and a slave woman; however, he appears to have used this matter in a way different from the aforementioned intellectuals, meaning he has paid attention to the principle of the ruling, not to its occasion of revelation. He uses this difference in the following way:

"The non-obligation of covering the head and neck for Muslim slave women indicates this very important point that: 'The head and neck of any Muslim woman being visible is not forbidden'; in other words: 'Neither being a woman nor being a Muslim' is the reason for the obligation of covering the head and neck. Because 'Muslim slave women' were both 'women' and 'Muslims,' and covering the head and neck was not obligatory for them."

Then, emphasizing that:

"What difference in provocativeness exists between Muslim slave women and non-slave women that covering the head and neck is not required for the former but is required for free women?"

He concludes that preventing provocativeness cannot be the philosophy of hijab either; especially:

"Considering that the essence of beauty in the area of the head and neck comes down to the beauty of the eyes, eyebrows, mouth, lips, teeth, and chin and their combination, and Islam has not made covering them obligatory, what attractive characteristic was there in a woman's hair and neck that the necessity of covering them has been so emphasized by Muslims?"

Critique and Analysis

If one carefully examines the text of his argument, it becomes clear that the late Qabel's analysis is a single-factor analysis, as if the only factor that could result in the permanent obligation of hijab is the prevention of male provocativeness; then, by negating this, the permanence of the hijab ruling is negated, and its philosophy is considered solely to be the distinction between free and slave women, which in his view is a temporary matter and has no necessity today. Regarding this argument, several questions can be raised:

1) Can such single-factor analyses be used to extract the philosophy of a religious ruling?

2) Does this same single-factor analysis have the capacity to prove his claim (the lack of connection between provocativeness and hijab)?

3) Does his basis not return to the same occasion of revelation claimed by the Arab intellectuals (whose problems were stated)?

4) Have the criteria of a valid jurisprudential argument been observed in his reasoning?

The Details of These Issues:

1) As was pointed out, "the permissibility of not covering the head and neck of Muslim slave women" is a jurisprudential ruling, which, of course, this exception is not mentioned in the Holy Quran (and contrary to what the late Qabel claimed in his article, not only is it not "the requirement of reliable transmitted evidence and a consensual tendency," but we neither have numerous narrations on it, nor, given the existence of opposing jurists, has it been a matter of consensus); although the well-known fatwa of the jurists has been given to it.[43] However, what deserves reflection here is the analytical model of the late Qabel, which is a kind of single-factor interpretation of this religious social duty. In other words, in the above argument, it has been supposed that the only factor that can be proposed as the philosophy of hijab is the prevention of men being provoked, then with the statement that "if this is the criterion for the obligation of covering the hair and neck, then slave women (and also women's faces) should not have been excepted," it is concluded that: "Now that slave women (and also women's 'faces') have been excepted, that criterion is incorrect; therefore, covering the hair and neck is not necessary."

But how has it been proven that the sole criterion that can be considered in the discussion of women's covering is exclusively and solely the prevention of provocation? In paragraphs 4 and 5 of Chapter 3, the weakness of this single-factor analysis regarding the philosophy of hijab was explained, and there is no need to repeat it. Just for a better understanding of the point that

3) Although the late Mr. Qabel did not state it explicitly, he has in practice considered the same basis as the Arab intellectuals (the distinction between free and slave women) as the philosophy of hijab; because he accepts the existence of a criterion for rulings and also accepts the necessity of covering the hair and neck of free Muslim women during the time of the Prophet and the Imams, and then, considering the exception made for slave women, he has claimed that its philosophy cannot be the prevention of male lust; thus, he has implicitly considered the criterion to be the very distinction between free and slave women. With this explanation, it becomes clear that the same critique applicable to the view of the Arab intellectuals applies to him as well: that is, the very claim that hijab was for distinguishing free women from slaves is a claim without evidence, and indeed contrary to many historical certainties; therefore, this cannot be the philosophy of the obligation of hijab, while he accepts the obligation of hijab for free women at that time; hence, when the criterion he has introduced for considering hijab temporary is incorrect, his conclusion that: since its criterion has passed, it is no longer necessary today, will also be incorrect.

4) Since the words of the late Mr. Qabel have been invoked as those of a mujtahid, it is not inappropriate to also point out how certain standards of jurisprudential reasoning have been overlooked in his argument; and therefore, it cannot be considered a methodical ijtihadi opinion. It seems the late Mr. Qabel sought to extract the scope of the ruling by entering into the criterion and basis of the ruling; but in determining the criterion, he relied on unreliable evidence; and in his intellectual process, on the one hand, he did not pay attention to the abundance of peripheral narrations about hijab, which is evidence of its definitiveness, and on the other hand, he ignored the requirements of absolute and conditional (or general and specific) expressions, and also confused between exigent permissible and non-exigent permissible.[44]

A brief explanation of the matter is that: in the discussion of hijab, in addition to the narrations that directly concern the limits of a woman's covering, there are numerous other narrations in response to the questions of inquirers which show that the principle of this limit was so clear to the general public that people asked so many questions about its peripherals and other exceptions.[45] In other words, in addition to the narrations that directly point to the obligatory limits of hijab, the abundance of questions in areas such as whether not covering the head is permissible specifically for elderly women, or slave women, or a sick person, or questions about the permissibility or impermissibility of looking at the hair and neck of women of the People of the Book, Bedouins, etc., shows that for the general public, the principle of hijab for a Muslim woman was considered definitive, and they wanted to see whether this ruling, which is obligatory for Muslims under normal conditions, is also obligatory for specific groups or for certain social conditions. This volume of narrations leaves no doubt for a jurist regarding the obligation of covering the neck and hair of the head for all Muslim women. In this context, one must act according to the requirements of absolute and conditional (or general and specific) expressions. If an absolute ruling is conditioned in one instance, does it mean that the principle of that ruling, in itself, was not necessary, or, on the contrary, does the very statement of the absolute, and then its conditioning, show that the principle of the ruling was necessary in itself, but under specific conditions and due to secondary considerations, this ruling is not implemented, and for instance, it is a matter whose primary exigency was obligation or prohibition, but due to a consideration such as hardship, it has become permissible under certain conditions (= exigent permissible)? The absoluteness of the narrations in the discussion of hijab is such that this condition considered by the late Mr. Qabel (that if a woman is a slave, hijab is not obligatory upon her) is not at all in a way that can yield the basis of hijab for him to say

A detailed discussion of the extent of hijab based on Quranic verses is beyond the scope of this article; however, given the objections raised in the aforementioned article, it is necessary to at least address whether the use of the terms jilbab and khimar in the Holy Quran actually indicates covering the neck and hair or not.

The general body of exegetes up to the present day have understood such an indication from the verse; and as we have shown, even Arab intellectuals and the late Qabel understood the same from the verse (they only said this pertains to the distinction between slave and free women, and is a temporary ruling, not an eternal one, the response to which has been given). The most prominent person who has claimed that jilbab and khimar do not indicate covering the neck and hair is Mr. Torkashvand; and then Dr. Kadivar; the invalidity and lack of evidence for their claim has been explained in the articles referenced (see footnotes 34 and 35).

As the general body of exegetes throughout history and the general body of lexicologists have explained: khimar and jilbab were pieces of cloth that women would freely drape over their heads; the khimar[46] was smaller in size (similar to today's headscarves), about which the Holy Quran says: "وَلْیَضْرِبْنَ بِخُمُرِهِنَّ عَلَى جُیُوبِهِنَّ"[47] meaning, with their khimars, they should also cover the "juyub" (the openings at the neckline)[48] (that is, now that the top and back of your head is covered, cover the front of your neck and chest as well); and the jilbab was larger in size[49] (apparently slightly smaller than today's chadors), about which the Holy Quran says: "یَا أَیُّهَا النَّبِیُّ قُل لِّأَزْوَاجِکَ وَبَنَاتِکَ وَنِسَاء الْمُؤْمِنِینَ یُدْنِینَ عَلَیْهِنَّ مِن جَلَابِیبِهِنَّ";[50] meaning, it is emphasized not to drape it loosely over your heads, but rather to draw it close to yourselves (in today's terms, to secure your hijab firmly, not loose and slack so that it constantly slips aside).

Furthermore, in linguistic discussions (the discussions of verbal forms in the principles of jurisprudence), it has been explained in detail that the imperative form indicates "obligation"[51]; that is, if a sentence is expressed in the imperative form, it prima facie signifies the meaning of obligation; and we know that in both verses in question, the words jilbab and khimar (Al-Ahzab/59; An-Nur/31) are expressed with an "imperative" phrase; that is, women are commanded that in the covering they place on their heads, they should not suffice with draping it loosely, which only covers the top and back of the head and sometimes slips aside with movement, but rather they should draw it close to themselves and, in particular, cover the opening at the neckline of the garment (the chest and neck), which remains exposed, with this same headscarf.

It may be necessary to reiterate that this interpretation is the "prima facie meaning" of the verse; and in recognizing divine commands, the Quran itself emphasizes that the words of the Prophet and the Uli al-Amr (who are the Purified Imams, peace be upon them) are on par with the word of God and, like the Quran itself, are obligatory to obey; that is, a Muslim, if they have any ambiguity regarding God's ruling, cannot ignore the words of the Prophet and the Imams and act solely based on their personal understanding. In fact, this recent Quranic discussion was only to show that what can be inferred from the apparent meaning of the Quran is this very well-known ruling of hijab, not a ruling permitting the lack of hijab; not that the apparent meaning of the Quran alone suffices for identifying the various dimensions of God's rulings.

In closing, it may be useful to recall a historical point, recorded not only in Shiite sources but also in the most important Sunni sources,[52] that two or three days before the passing of the Holy Prophet (PBUH), while he was confined to his sickbed, he requested:

In the third chapter, the relationship between the ruling on hijab and ethics was examined, which was essentially a discussion on the philosophy of hijab. It became clear that hijab is not a natural act that must necessarily be subsumed under other ethical categories for moral judgment. Even if we seek its ethical connection with other categories, those categories are not limited to the concept of chastity. Moreover, if hijab must be examined under chastity, and we accept, as he does, that cultural, climatic, educational, psychological, and other factors play a role in the limits, boundaries, and extent of covering, then the custom of an Islamic society should determine the limits and boundaries of covering for an Islamic society, not the custom of secular societies. Meanwhile, it became evident that the explanation of "preventing lust" in the philosophy of hijab, if presented with social considerations, not merely individual ones, will in no way be construed as an unjust imposition on women. Then, the relationship of hijab, as a jurisprudential and identity-based issue, with ethics was examined, and it became clear how presenting a correct image of this very jurisprudential or identity-based nature entails an ethical connection and relationship.

The fourth chapter addressed the judgment concerning the relationship between ethics and coercion: does the enforcement of an act necessarily lead to its becoming unethical or not? After noting the ambiguity in expressions and the fallacy of equivocation regarding the word "unethical," which in this part of the articles under review was used in two senses: "outside the domain of ethics" and "reprehensible" (and elsewhere in the same articles, in the sense of "morally permissible"!), a warning was issued that not only is the author's entry into the discussion of compulsory hijab irrelevant to the subject of the discussion (moral judgment about hijab itself), but also, in these articles, no justifiable reason has been provided that enforcement causes hijab (or any other act) to become unethical (whether in the sense of "deserving of reproach" or "irrelevant to ethics"). What has been presented as a reason either stems from a confusion between faith and ethics, or an equivocation and mistake has occurred between the ontological concept and the legal concept of free will and volition. Furthermore, considering any form of coercion as negating ethics is rooted in a one-dimensional analysis of ethics and a disregard for the social dimensions of moral duty. From a social perspective, coercion is not necessarily contrary to ethics; and if he considers "safeguarding fundamental ethical principles" a duty of governments, such safeguarding requires involvement in ethical instances and details. At the end of this chapter, two simple proofs were presented for the permissibility, and indeed the necessity, of coercion in the realm of ethics: the intra-religious proof is enjoining good and forbidding evil in an Islamic society; and the universal proof is the desirability of opposing oppression according to the moral intuitions of all human beings.

The fifth chapter was dedicated to examining the statements he cited regarding the permissibility of not covering the head and neck, to determine whether a view other than conventional hijab can be attributed to Islam. After stating that the criterion for recognizing God's command is not solely the definitive indication of the Holy Quran—rather, both apparent indication and authentic narrations can also inform us with a degree of certainty about the existence of a divine command—the point was addressed that the statements of those cited by the esteemed author are, methodologically, not reliable for attribution to Islam, such that their opposition would lead to the conclusion that this matter is not obligatory in Islam. This is because, on the one hand, the relevant scholarly community (jurists) does not consider many of the speakers of those statements to be specialists at all, so their opinions have no jurisprudential validity, and they themselves make no such claim. On the other hand, the arguments they have put forward regarding the non-obligation of covering the hair and neck in Islam are not acceptable according to the methodology of this specialized field.

And finally, in the last chapter, the point was addressed as to what limits the Quranic verses on hijab actually indicate, and how at least two verses of the Quran (using the terms jilbab and khimar) deem covering a woman's head and neck necessary.

The outcome of all these discussions was that, firstly, the limits of obligatory hijab for women, as all Shia and Sunni jurists have maintained for over a thousand years, include the neck and the hair of the head. Secondly, at least for a Muslim woman, failing to observe it is considered not only a jurisprudential violation but also a moral error. Nor is it the case that its being compulsory necessarily conflicts with its being ethical.

And peace be upon you and upon those who follow guidance

Hossein Souzanchi

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Endnotes