Islam, Ethics, and Homosexuality: A Critique of Arash Naraghi

Today, the wave of homosexuality and the promotion of sodomy in the West has also tainted the skirts of some who call themselves religious intellectuals. Mr. Arash Naraghi has defended homosexuality in several articles, and believes that not only is permitting the spread of homosexual behaviors morally justified, but any interpretation of the Quran that does not tolerate such a thing is unjust, and a Muslim must necessarily strive to shape their understanding of the Quran in a way that is compatible with the permissibility of homosexual behaviors!

He has written three articles on this subject:

The first article, titled "On Sexual Minorities," was written on November 25, 2004 (5 Azar 1383), in which he claimed to want to "evaluate the most important rational reasons that have been the basis for the moral condemnation of such behaviors."

The second article, titled "The Quran and the Issue of the Rights of Sexual Minorities," was written on December 28, 2010 (7 Dey 1389), and in it, relying on what he presented in the first article, he attempts to question the matter that the Holy Quran, in the story of Prophet Lot, rejects homosexual relations; and on this basis, he claims that: "Any interpretation of the Quran that tolerates discrimination based on sexual identity and orientation is morally unjust" and "a rational Muslim must necessarily strive to find an understanding of the Quranic verses that is compatible with the negation of discrimination based on sexual identity and orientation."

And the third article, titled "The Issue of Homosexuality in Contemporary Iranian Shiite Thought," was published in Iran Namag Quarterly (Year 3, No. 1, Spring 1397, pp. 87-119); and it is a review of the two aforementioned claims, with a glance at the positions of some contemporary Iranian clerics and intellectuals. [1]

His discussions can be considered in two phases: The first phase is where he tries, from an extra-religious perspective, to portray the defense of homosexuality as an instance of seeking justice and living ethically; and the second phase is where he tries to instill in his audience that a person can be a Muslim but still respect homosexual behaviors! And the present article is a critique of his views in both phases.

Before beginning the critique, it is appropriate to mention a point that Mr. Peter Sprigg[2], Senior Fellow at the Family Research Council in Washington, D.C.[3], points out in his article titled "The Controversy over Homosexuality; A Comparison of Two Views."[4] At the beginning of his article, he tries to show how advocates of homosexuality, through irrational atmospherics, incite people against opponents of the spread of "abnormal sexual behaviors" and portray them as proponents of discrimination and opponents of justice. He explains that movements defending homosexuality introduce the issue of "homosexuality" in such a way as if:

"• Sexual orientation is an innate personal characteristic, like race;

Some individuals are born homosexual from the start.

Homosexual individuals can never be heterosexual.

Being homosexual is fundamentally no different from being normal, except in the gender to which the person is attracted.

Being homosexual causes no harm.

And based on these presuppositions, they pretend that opposition to homosexual relations is similar to racial discrimination and is like considering one race inferior and another superior."

In order to expose the media tricks of the proponents of homosexuality, he invites people to carefully examine the keyword "sexual orientation" and says:

"As numerous studies in understanding human sexuality have shown, the term 'sexual orientation' is an umbrella that casts a shadow over three different concepts. In reality, we are dealing with three concepts that are conflated:

(1) "Sexual orientation"[5] (that is, to which sex—the same or the opposite—a person is inclined and oriented),

(2) "Sexual act and behavior"[6] (the behavior a person engages in during sexual relations and with whom they engage in it);

and (3) "Sexual identity"[7] (how a person sexually identifies themselves: heterosexual or homosexual).

According to Mr. Sprigg's explanations, advocates of homosexuality pretend that these are always concomitant; that is, as if someone who has same-sex inclinations necessarily also engages in homosexual acts and, in society, recognizes their identity as homosexual. But by referring to some field studies, he shows that such a necessary connection does not exist; that is, there are many who engage in homosexual behavior but do not consider their personality homosexual; or those who find same-sex inclinations within themselves, but neither engage in this act nor necessarily consider themselves as having a homosexual identity and personality; and so on.

Then, while pointing out that despite extensive research conducted, no justifiable reason for the existence of such an innate orientation has yet been found; and that "homosexual identity" is more of a social construct than a natural and objective matter, he specifies that the compassionate opposition of opponents is neither to homosexual identity nor to the internal inclination that may exist in some individuals; rather, their main issue is opposition to the spread and normalization of "homosexual behaviors," and in more precise terms, opposition to "sodomy" under the pretext of "homosexuality"; and if research proves that these are three independent categories, one should not conflate them.

Mr. Naraghi's literature is such that one feels he has used the very method Mr. Sprigg complains about to advance his own argument; that is, he has framed the problem in such a way as if the opponents' discussion and conflict is with individuals' internal orientation and their identity.

At the beginning of the second article, he formulates his argument for the extra-religious claim as follows:

"1. All human beings are equal, meaning they enjoy equal human rights and dignity, and any discrimination among them is unjust unless there is a morally justified reason for it. (Principle of Justice)

2. Ethics (i.e., moral foundations, principles, and reasons) in terms of existence and proof is entirely rational and, in principle, independent of and prior to religion.

3. There is no rational/ethical justified reason for condemning the identity and orientations of homosexuality (insofar as it is homosexual).

4. Therefore, discrimination based on homosexual identity and orientations (insofar as it is homosexual) is contrary to the principle of justice and morally impermissible." (The Quran and the Issue of Sexual Minorities' Rights, p. 1)

Whereas, both in the reasons he cites from opponents in the first article and in the phrases he mentions from the Holy Quran and commentators in the second article, it is solely and exclusively the behavior of homosexuals that is condemned.

In fact, what opponents of sodomy and the promotion of homosexuality say is that "engaging in sexual behavior with a person of the same sex" is impermissible; but what he—and most defenders of homosexuality—defend is that we should recognize an inner orientation (sexual orientation toward the same sex) or an identity (considering oneself as having such an orientation); whereas there is no necessary connection between the two: acknowledging the existence or absence of an inner "orientation" in a human being is a matter that must be left to the sciences concerned with anthropology and has nothing to do with the pursuit of justice or ethics; and making a person's sexual status the criterion for determining their "identity"—as Mr. Sprigg has also pointed out—is to reduce human worth to the level of an instinctual and animalistic matter; and an ethically-minded, justice-seeking person does not consider the identity of human beings to be based solely on their sexual status, such that they would want to recognize such an identity or not; and the issue for opponents of homosexuality is neither of these two; their issue is whether the freedom of homosexual acts and their promotion in the public sphere is something required by ethical rules or contrary to human morality?

Now let us read the rest of Mr. Naraghi's statements and see if, without such a conflation, his subsequent conclusion about understanding the Quran becomes necessary. He continues the matter as follows:

"5. A group believes that some Quranic verses discriminate among human beings based on their type of sexual identity and orientations (especially homosexual identity and orientations).

6. If this group's claim is correct, then the Quran would contain verses contrary to justice and ethically impermissible.

7. But (according to the belief of Muslims) the Divine Word is free from injustice and immorality.

8. Therefore, Muslims:

(a) must either show that at least one of premises 1-3 is false, and therefore, the Quranic verses that discriminate among human beings based on their homosexual identity and orientation are not unjust and ethically unjustified;

(b) or must accept that premises 1-3 are true, but show that the interpretation of those Quranic verses that permits sexual discrimination is incorrect, and that an interpretation of those verses can (and must) be provided that does not entail such a discriminatory and unjust conception.

The author considers premises 1-3 to be true, and as a Muslim believes in premise 7. In this case, he necessarily rejects from an ethical perspective any interpretation of the Quranic verses that allows for discrimination based on homosexual identity and orientation."

And if the aforementioned distinction between orientation and identity on the one hand, and behavior on the other, is carefully considered, it becomes clear that even if premises 1-3 were correct, his advocacy for homosexual behaviors and questioning the explicit opposition of the Holy Quran to the act of Lot's people has no justification, and what has been stated so far is sufficient to set aside his views.

Nevertheless, it seems that when writing the third article, he realized this mistake of his—without explicitly stating it; because in this article, instead of using the terms "identity" and "orientation," he uses the term "homosexual relations"; and tries to present the same claims of the first two articles, this time in a new vocabulary. Hence, by focusing on the third article, we will examine the discussion in the two sections he raised.

First Section: Moral Judgment about Homosexual Behaviors

Introduction

As mentioned, in the first article, Mr. Naraghi tries to conclude that "the claim that homosexual behaviors are ethically impermissible and worthy of condemnation has no firm rational foundation" (On Sexual Minorities, p. 22) and thus tries to defend what he calls the "moral and sexual rights of sexual minorities" and encourage others to "recognize these rights" (On Sexual Minorities, p. 22).

First, let us see what is meant by these rights?

Nowhere does he explicitly state what he precisely means by the “moral rights” and “sexual rights” of these individuals that he wishes to be respected; however, by scrutinizing his statements, one can understand his intent. At the very beginning of this same article, he clarifies that:

“By ‘sexual minorities’ I mean human groups whose sexual behavior differs from the pattern of sexual behaviors prevalent among the majority. Of course, precisely defining the dominant sexual pattern among the ‘majority’ is not an easy task. But probably the following two characteristics can be considered the main elements of that pattern: first, sexual relations are established between (one) woman and (one) man; second, these relations ultimately lead to the penetration of the male and female reproductive organs …

Sexual minorities include groups with a very diverse spectrum of sexual behaviors, but in order to make the discussion more precise, I will limit my focus to ‘homosexual’ sexual minorities, that is, those who show sexual desire towards individuals of the same sex, and establish sexual relations with them.” (On Sexual Minorities, p. 3)

With this explanation, since relations with the same sex are sexual relations between man and man (or woman and woman), and he has considered his meaning to be relations that ultimately lead to the penetration of reproductive organs, then according to the above explanations, the meaning of “sexual rights” is, as a rule, the right to freely engage in “sodomy” (or “tribadism”)! [8]

But what are the “moral rights” of such individuals? We saw that he believes that men and women, sexually, have the right to commit sodomy and tribadism with their own sex; then, presumably, his meaning of “moral right” is that this act of theirs is morally permissible; and therefore, they are worthy of respect! Or at least, no one can prevent them from doing this act. [9]

But has he provided any reason to prove the existence of such a “sexual right” and “moral right” for men and women?

The truth is that the only thing he has done to make this claim acceptable in the first article, and to which he has referred in the two subsequent articles, is merely to dispute some of the opponents’ arguments. In the first article, he considers the most important reason of the opponents to be the “unnatural act argument” (the argument based on considering homosexual behavior unnatural) and has tried to review various interpretations of this argument from Plato, Aristotle, and others, and to dispute all of them; then he turns to Roger Scruton, quotes two arguments from him, and names them, respectively, the “argument based on the superficiality of human relations” and the “argument based on sexual promiscuity”; and he has tried to cast doubt on these as well. He has stated that the main factor for such opposition in society is considering these behaviors “disgusting,” “revolting,” and “abhorrent”; and has claimed that these descriptions are at most aesthetic feelings and have nothing to do with ethics! Finally, he asks religious people to reconsider “traditional religious views about sexual minorities.”

One can dispute his disputes, as someone has done so, and Mr. Naraghi himself has responded to him, and that person has again shown the inadequacy of his responses. [10] But more importantly, in that article, he has merely enumerated some of the opponents’ arguments (and not all of them) and disputed them. The question is whether disputing a claim logically means that the rival claim is correct? This type of reasoning can be considered one of the forms of the “argument from fallacy” fallacy (which has also been interpreted as the fallacy of “refuting the reason instead of refuting the claim”). [11] That is, in the best-case scenario, and if he had enumerated and criticized all the opponents’ arguments against homosexual behaviors, the most that would be proven is that their claim lacks sufficient reason; but from the fact that someone’s reason for their claim is incorrect, one can logically only conclude that they have not yet provided sufficient reason for their claim, not that it proves that “the opposing group’s claim is correct”! For example, suppose some people believe that “thieves, by virtue of being thieves, have the right to steal and are worthy of respect.” And suppose Hossein, in opposition to this proposition, provides a reason, and Arash demonstrates the flaw in Hossein’s reason. Does the mere fact that Hossein’s reason was flawed lead to the conclusion that “thieves, by virtue of being thieves, have the right to steal and are worthy of respect”?

In other words, to prove a “sexual right” and a “moral right” for those who engage in sodomy and lesbianism, he would have to both provide arguments showing that human beings have a right to perform sodomy and lesbianism, and demonstrate the incorrectness of the opponents' reasons; merely disputing the opponents' reasons cannot prove the existence of such a right.

Nevertheless, what follows will first attempt to reconstruct the positive arguments implicitly present in his words, and assess whether a reason can actually be found for justifying homosexual behaviors. Then, we will turn to the opponents' arguments to see whether, as Mr. Naraghi claims, they have truly failed to provide sufficient reasons for their opposition?!

A. Examining the Positive Arguments in Defense of Homosexual Behaviors

As noted, in none of these articles has he directly presented a reason to prove such a right. However, considering the common literature among advocates of homosexuality, some of the sentences he wrote in response to the critique of the article “On Religious Minorities,” as well as some sentences in the third article, might perhaps be considered his reasons for this matter:

Reason 1. The Existence of a Sexual Minority in Every Society

In the note “About a Critique,” he writes:

“The issue of the rights of sexual minorities is among the issues related to human rights. ... According to statistics, about seven percent of the individuals in a society constitute sexual minorities, meaning in a country with a population of about seventy million, the number of sexual minorities should be estimated at around five million people. On this account, sexual minorities must be considered among the most numerous human minorities.” (Islam and the Issue of Homosexuality, p. 24)

The formulation of this statement as a reason is that:

Some human beings are truly [and in the fabric of nature] sexually different from the majority of society, and therefore they are considered a “minority”; and their number is such that mentioning them as a “minority” is justified; thus, like others, they have the right to live according to their nature.

Critique and Examination

In this statement, not only is a completely unrealistic statistic presented[12], but this argument is a naturalistic argument that makes the existence of a specific nature in some people the criterion for recognizing a right; whereas: neither is such a nature provable in human beings, nor, even assuming that nature is proven, does the mere existence of a nature logically create a right.

And now, the explanation of these two points:

1.1. Does Such a “Sexual Minority” Exist?

It was previously mentioned that in this discussion, one must distinguish between “behavior,” “orientation,” and “identity,” and note that the subject of discussion regarding “minorities” is the existence of a “deep-seated orientation” or an “identity,” not the mere occurrence of a “behavior” by a group. In fact, the existence of a group that performs a specific behavior, as long as this behavior does not trace back to an internal, natural matter or a realm of identity, in no way warrants the application of the term “minority” with its legal weight to them. For example, in every society, some people are engaged in theft or are professional killers who take money to kill people. But the existence of such behaviors in some individuals—even though individuals who perform such behaviors are found all over the world—never justifies anyone speaking of a “minority” of thieves or murderers, or discussing the rights of this minority, insofar as they are thieves or murderers. However, the discussion regarding racial minorities (which trace back to an internal matter) or religious minorities (which trace back to a matter of identity) is open.[13]

Therefore, to speak of “sexual minorities,” one must consider them not merely as performers of a behavior or act, but as possessing an inner natural condition, or an “identity.” It is for this reason that advocates of homosexuality have made great efforts to defend the existence of a natural orientation or an identity, so that the use of the term “minority” might be deemed permissible. However, if we consider the numerous studies of the past three or four decades on “sexual minorities” in general, and the “homosexual minority” in particular, we clearly find that this concept is one of the new Western constructs that is highly contestable.

If by “sexual minority” is meant those who are born with such an “orientation” from birth, Mr. Peter Sprigg, in the article mentioned, shows with sufficient evidence that despite the many efforts since the 1990s to prove this claim genetically, the latest articles that claim the existence of such a gene ultimately specify that this is still at the level of an estimate, not proof; and there is still no solid evidence for such an orientation being innate;[14] and if we set aside media propaganda and turn to objective evidence, the discourse of psychology before 1974[15]—which is still emphasized by some psychologists today—held the most empirical evidence, considering the emergence of such an orientation in some individuals to be the result of sexual disturbances and adversities in childhood, largely under the influence of cultural factors (neutral), rather than something entirely natural (natural).

But if we turn to “sexual minority” as an “identity,” the simplest reason for demonstrating the inauthenticity and constructedness of these identities is the statistics from those very countries: among the evidence showing that these identities are largely media constructs is a study published in 2007 by Savin-Williams [16] and Ream G.L. [17], whose statistical population consisted of individuals aged 16 to 24. They observed that within the target population, among those who identified themselves as “homosexual” at age 16, when questioned at age 17, 81% of the girls and 67% of the boys identified themselves as “heterosexual.”[18]

Or Ms. Nancy Pearcey, in her book Love Thy Body: Answering Hard Questions about Life and Sexuality[19] published recently (January 2, 2018), has raised interesting discussions, with irony directed at homosexual and transgender currents,[20] about whether we should truly consider the “I” identity as something entirely constructed, such that by decision I can deem it contrary to my biology and believe any sexual orientation for myself?! She notes in her book that “advocates of homosexuality separate a person’s gender from their biological male or female status; is this truly liberating, or does it merely distance us from who we really are?!” She clearly demonstrates how important the biological issue is for the humanity of the human being, and if we set this aside, no criterion for being human remains; and if we define sexual orientation solely based on desire, how have we denied the humanity of the human being (which grants them dignity and special rights in the world)? Among the interesting points she highlights in her book is that, in total, 80% of those who once considered themselves homosexual have changed their minds at least once in their lifetime!

A pause on concrete examples occurring in the world today can better reveal the depth of the catastrophe. In a letter that a mother wrote about a month ago (December 4, 2018, equivalent to 13/9/1397) to psychology advisors at the New York Times, seeking their intellectual help, she expressed concern that her daughter, who at age 11 considered herself “pansexual,”[21] and is now 15 years old, has so far repeatedly experienced sexual relations with the opposite sex and sexual relations with young girls, and now wants to have a relationship with a “transgender” boy[22] (a boy who considers himself a girl)! And the experts, in response, emphasizing why she doesn’t discard her traditional beliefs, insist that she recognize her identity as she likes and not hinder her happiness![23]

Has a young girl who recognizes herself in this way and engages in such behaviors in childhood truly arrived at this identity on her own, or has this identity been imposed upon her by the media and those around her? Does the requirement of justice and the avoidance of discrimination truly demand that space be given to these constructed identities?

1.2. Even if such an orientation were natural, does it logically create a right?

Even if, hypothetically, they could prove such a nature in some human beings, Mr. Naraghi, who in his first article had extensively attempted, on the one hand, to deny the existence of any inherent nature in humans, and on the other hand, claimed that even assuming such a nature existed, one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is"; how then can he accept the existence of a nature called a homosexual nature in a number of individuals? And from this natural fact, how can he build a bridge to the realm of "ought" and speak of the necessity of rights for these people?

In fact, based on the foundation he has adopted, one cannot defend the existence of a group with a different nature as a "sexual minority," neither in terms of the minor premise (the existence of this nature in some humans) nor in terms of the major premise (if a nature exists, a right must exist); and this alone is sufficient to show that he has provided no reason for what he calls a "sexual right" and a "moral right."

However, since this notion (that such a nature exists, and from this nature such a right can be deduced) is highly prevalent among advocates of homosexuality, it is appropriate to reflect a little more on this claim.

If there are objections to the naturalness of same-sex orientation—and there are—no one has doubted the naturalness of opposite-sex relations. Nevertheless, is the mere "naturalness of a relation" sufficient for it to be "morally permissible"?! Has there not been an illogical leap from "is" to "ought" in this statement?!

In fact, the issue comes back to this: if the mere naturalness of a relation provides sufficient license to establish that relation, then sexual anarchy would also become morally acceptable in relations with the opposite sex!

Of course, in the West, much effort has been made, under the pretext of freedom, to treat sexual relations outside the family with tolerance. But if we disregard the propaganda clamor, does a human being who has a natural desire for the opposite sex morally have the right to establish a sexual relationship with anyone of the opposite sex—let alone the same sex—simply because they have the desire? Or is a sexual relationship with the opposite sex also considered a moral relationship only within the framework of marriage, and outside the bounds of marriage, this relationship is immoral? This issue has put so much pressure on Western minds that today they are desperately trying, by emptying the word marriage of its content through the construction of terms such as "white marriage," "same-sex marriage," and "marriage to animals," etc., to create a moral weight for these immoral relations! Furthermore, today, the very same people who champion freedom in sexual relations condemn polygamy for men. Why?[24] What space has given them the ground to justify their opposition? Are all these not good evidence that behind every human being's moral intuitions lies the fact that "sexual relations" have a sanctity, and the mere existence of a desire and orientation is not sufficient to grant a right to any sexual relationship to which both parties consent?

Reason 2. Recognizing the right to be wrong and/or the right to freedom

Perhaps the most important argument of homosexuals, to which Mr. Naraghi has also implicitly alluded, is resorting to the "right to freedom." In his recent article, he writes:

“The essence of liberalism is the recognition of the right to be wrong. That is, members of society recognize the fact that others do not necessarily and always hold values and beliefs similar to ours, and as long as their commitment to those ways and beliefs does not violate the fundamental rights of others, individuals have the right to organize their lives according to what, from the perspective of others’ beliefs, appears wrong. Recognizing this right is a moral matter. That is, by the rule of morality, and not in spite of it, we recognize the right of others to live according to their values and beliefs. This recognition of a moral right can in no way be considered something contrary to morality or a sign of the decline or deficiency of a society.” (Arash Naraghi, “The Issue of Homosexuality in Contemporary Iranian Shiite Thought,” Iran Namag, Spring 1397, p. 97)

Critique and Examination

This claim is unacceptable in several respects: the “right to be wrong” is itself a paradoxical and self-negating claim; it goes astray in categorizing “rights” as matters of taste; and it is based on an unwarranted confusion of “is” and “ought.” Furthermore, it relies on an incorrect understanding of the “right to liberty” and a confusion between the two concepts of “mistake” and “sin”; and also on an incorrect understanding of the concept of “the fundamental rights of others.” But to elaborate on these points:

2.1. The Paradoxical Nature of the “Right to Be Wrong”

The first issue is whether “being wrong” can logically be a “right.”

Mr. Naraghi himself has noticed the paradoxical nature of this expression and, in the article “The Paradox of Tolerance,” tries to demonstrate and resolve the paradox latent in this phrase; however, as I have shown in the article “An Unsuccessful Attempt to Defend the Paradox of the Right to Be Wrong,” while his formulation of the paradoxical nature of the “right to be wrong” is to a large extent appropriate, his solution for escaping this paradox is not acceptable; and he has not been able to avoid deeming this combination unreasonable.

In addition to those objections (the repetition of which is omitted here), in the above passage, he has also unconsciously added a new paradox:

To justify the “rightness” of this matter, he has considered “right” to be something entirely “dependent on the perspective of this or that person”; with this statement:

Since something that person A considers “wrong,” person B considers “right”; therefore person B, from their own perspective, has the right to enjoy something that, from person A’s perspective, is wrong (which he has named the “right to be wrong”).

Whereas, if we do not have a “universal” right (beyond dependence on the perspective of this or that person), then considering this very “right to be wrong” as right is also dependent on Mr. Naraghi’s perspective; and not only can he not expect others to recognize this right (for him or for anyone else), but fundamentally, the implication of accepting this right is the invalidity of (= permission not to recognize) this very right itself!

The matter can be formulated in the form of a reductio ad absurdum argument as follows:

(1) Arash considers the “right to be wrong” to be correct (= right). (The rightness of the “right to be wrong”)

Therefore[25],

(2) (From Arash’s perspective) everyone has the right to enjoy the “right to be wrong”; (Having the right to enjoy the right to be wrong)

And as he himself has shown in the same article[26], the semantic entailment of any right is “the duty of others not to interfere”;

Therefore:

(3) (From Arash’s perspective) everyone (at least, Arash himself) is obligated to recognize the “wrongness” of others and not prevent others from adhering to what he considers wrong.

Now:

(4) Hossein considers the “right to be wrong” to be incorrect (= wrong);

From propositions (3) and (4) it follows that:

(4) (From Arash’s perspective) Hossein has the right to be wrong in this regard;

which reduces to the following two propositions:

(5) (From Arash’s perspective) Hossein has the right not to be committed to the “right to be wrong” (i.e., not to recognize the wrongness of others and to prevent Arash’s adherence to what Hossein deems wrong), and

(6) Arash is obliged not to prevent Hossein from adhering to this belief that Arash considers wrong (i.e., not to prevent Hossein from not recognizing Arash’s wrongness, and from preventing Arash’s adherence to what Hossein does not consider right);

In simpler terms:

(6) Arash is obliged to leave Hossein free in his desire to prevent Arash’s belief in the “right to be wrong.” (That is, Arash is obliged to allow Hossein to prevent Arash’s belief regarding the “right to be wrong.”)

Thus, the implication of believing in the “right to be wrong” is that we recognize this right for someone who is not committed to this right; meaning the implication of accepting this right is the permission to not recognize this very right!

Perhaps to escape this problem, he has, in this very statement of his, indirectly introduced a criterion called “not violating the fundamental rights of others” as a “right beyond any perspective”! But if one can have a “right beyond any perspective,” then this right is superior to “wrong” and “wrong” should not be given free rein or recognized.[27]

2.2. Considering “Human Rights” as a Matter of Taste

Now that the unresolved nature of the aforementioned paradox is clear, we add: the root of the “right to be wrong” paradox lies in the fact that in this phrase, “right” (which is a matter beyond tastes and which everyone is obliged to observe) is presented as belonging to the category of “matters of taste” (in which right and wrong have no meaning). And we know that matters of taste are matters that have no moral ruling (i.e., they are neither good nor bad in themselves); and it is for this reason that compelling others to a matter of taste has no moral justification;

That is, moral intuition dictates that:

“Unjustified interference in the lives of others is morally impermissible”;

and the conclusion drawn from this is merely that:

“Forcing individuals to something that is merely our taste is morally impermissible.”

But “right” (including this very moral ruling: “Unjustified interference …”) is by no means among matters of taste such that compelling human beings to it would be morally impermissible.

In other words, the root of this confusion is that one of the domains where we have a “right” is the domain of tastes; but the right in question in the domain of tastes is precisely that “unjustified interference in the lives of others is morally impermissible”; not that rights themselves are fundamentally matters of taste.

2.3 Unwarranted Transition from “Is” to “Ought”

Regarding the right to be wrong, and indeed regarding the liberalism that considers the “right to liberty” as the most important human right, one of the significant mistakes is the confusion between “free will” (which is an “existential” matter and belongs to the category of “is”) and “right” (which is a conventional matter and pertains to “oughts”):

The fact that humans can (= have the free will to) behave in different ways does not logically entail that they also have the right to engage in such behavior; just as anyone can (= has the free will to) slap another person on the ear for fun, but certainly does not have such a “right”![28]

In fact, the important question is: on what basis do those who deny the relation between is and ought defend the “right to liberty”? Assuming humans “are” free in the context of nature, why do they have a “right” to this freedom; that is, why “should” no one interfere with this freedom of theirs? This point brings us to a more fundamental problem:

2.4. A Misguided Understanding of the “Right to Freedom” (Conflating Sin and Mistake)

As is clear from the claim cited, the author relies on liberalism, and liberalism considers the most important human right to be the “right to freedom”; and it holds that freedom is limited only by the freedoms of others; and since humans have the right to freedom, no one should hinder their freedom; that is, no one has the right to prevent others from doing something that, in their view, is improper.

In fact, the claim is that “perhaps in your view, homosexual relations are reprehensible, but that is your opinion; and if two people themselves consent to such an act, it is none of your business; and they have the right to live as they themselves see fit; and you have no right to prevent them.”[29]

But the important question that challenges liberalism (and, consequently, the above claim) is this: fundamentally, why should we grant the “right to freedom” to “humans”?[30] If merely being a living creature brings such a right, why do we not accept this right for animals and plants, and easily grant “ourselves” the “right” not only to limit their freedom, but also to disrupt the natural course of their lives and raise them entirely according to our taste and for consumption!

When we speak of “human rights,” our speech is reasonable only when we believe in a certain kind of dignity and special nobility for humans, so that this dignity and nobility, and not merely this biological condition, creates a value and a “right” for them that others (e.g., animals) do not have. Then, based on the belief in such dignity for “humans,” we “must” respect the rights of other humans.

If this is so, we must see what that characteristic is; and then, only that which arises from and is in line with that characteristic can be respected as a “human right”; or at least, it must not be contrary to that characteristic; and that dignity is not mere “being free” (in the sense of doing whatever one desires, if one has the ability to do it); because animals also have this; and in this respect, there is no difference between the two.

Perhaps they might say it is “free will” that brings about such dignity. This can be a correct statement, provided that we consider “free will” to be beyond the “desire” found in animals. The “free will” that makes humans superior to animals, and indeed superior to angels, is that the path is open before them to perform deeds whose goodness and badness their intellect can, in principle, discern; and with their intellect, they can act upon what they have discerned as good, even if it is contrary to their desire or contrary to the demands of the environment.

In other words, free will takes on a hue and character beyond animal desire when it is somehow tied to human transcendence and conscious discernment, and then, the choice of this transcendence: that is, there is a transcendence for humans (unlike animals), and there is the possibility of discerning and yet not acting according to the dictates of that transcendence (unlike angels), and then they prefer the transcendence they have discerned, even if it is contrary to their desire.

Hence, if a human misuses this free will, they become lower than animals (Qur’an 7:179 and 25:44), and this is not merely an intra-religious claim; everyone understands that a human like Saddam, who for his own pleasure and ambition readily tortures or massacres thousands of innocents, is lower than an animal.

Thus, it becomes clear that the highest human right is not the “right to freedom,” but the “right to growth”; and since true growth is often achieved where a person makes a choice consciously and freely, the “right to freedom” is also raised; but this “right to freedom” is justified only in the shadow of the meaning of “growth”; therefore, this “right to freedom” itself does not mean the “right to have” and “being in the right” in doing whatever one desires (even if it is contrary to their transcendence), so that one could derive matters such as the “right to sodomy” from it; rather:

The “right to freedom,” if it is based on human dignity, merely means “being permitted” to commit a mistake;

That is:

If one makes a mistake in their choice, they are not taken to task for this mistake;

But this does not mean that the fruit of his mistake should be deemed right and permissible; and that this mistake creates a special right for him!

Nor does it mean that he is permitted to commit a "crime" or "sin" (that is, an act he knows is impermissible and about which he was not ignorant, so that his action would be considered a "mistake")!

And not even that if his mistake had adverse consequences in practice, he bears no responsibility for those adverse consequences! (Similar to a case where someone has a car accident without violating any laws and purely due to a mistake, causing damage to another person; he has not sinned and has not committed a crime, but he is obligated to compensate for the damage caused.)

In other words, it can be seen that Mr. Naraghi (and, in fact, the followers of liberalism) has deduced the "right to sin" from the "permission to commit a mistake"; or has equated the two. But if we disregard the realm of matters of taste (where right and wrong have no meaning), and turn to areas where performing this or that action is seriously and truly impactful in life and where worthy and unworthy actions have meaning (and this is one of the most important areas of right), there is no doubt that human beings also have free will in these areas. The requisite of having free will is that when performing an action, two paths are often open to them, one of which yields a desirable effect and the other an undesirable one; at the same time, valuing a person's reason and free will depends on allowing them to "discern" for themselves and choose the "better path." In fact, the very moment we speak of "discernment," we have entered the realm of "rational decision-making based on perception," not "emotional decision-making" or merely based on taste; in other words, if the justified reason for granting individuals free will in decision-making is their intellectual advancement and the strengthening of their ability to discern (so that through these decisions they reach "better discernment"), then fundamentally, there are "better" and "worse" options ahead; and the purpose of giving scope to free will is for the person to gradually attain intellectual advancement and choose the "better." Accordingly, when we grant someone free will in a matter, we also accept the possibility of them making a "mistake" and do not blame the person for the mistake they made; but this statement does not mean that we deem their "mistake" to be "correct"; nor even that we do not inform them that their action is a "mistake."

In summary, if individuals are to be allowed to make mistakes so that they may grow, growth only has meaning when they understand that their action was a mistake and, after understanding, this time make the "right decision."

In other words, in this discussion, there is a confusion between "right" in the general sense (which is merely the permission to do something and stands in opposition to prohibition) and "right" in the specific sense (which means being in the right and enjoying a specific entitlement). The "right to freedom" merely signifies being permitted to make mistakes, not being in the right to do whatever one desires.[31]

2.5. Incorrect Understanding of "the Fundamental Rights of Others"

Mr. Naraghi's statement, quoted above – and fundamentally the basis of the liberals – is such that it seems matters like homosexual behaviors, if they lack an aggressive nature and the non-consent of one of the parties, do not harm the "fundamental rights of others"; and this stems from the basis they have for the concept of "the rights of others." In fact, because they consider the most fundamental human right to be the "right to freedom," their presupposition is that something only falls within the category of a person's rights if it is desired by them; hence, if someone consents to an action being done, performing that action does not constitute harming their rights.

But this presupposition can easily be questioned. For example, is giving a certain food to a patient who is unaware of their illness and does not know that food is like poison to them not an instance of harming their fundamental rights (the right to life)?! Truly, have you ever asked yourself why suicide is prohibited and individuals are not left free in this personal decision of theirs?!

As will be shown in section B, engaging in homosexual behaviors has numerous physical, psychological, and sociological harms; and all of this is apart from the spiritual harms that are considered in the divine religions.

And in the second part of the discussion, it will be shown that one of the fundamental reasons a rational person turns to religion is precisely the existence of these basic human rights, or in other words, the existence of such adverse consequences for matters that may not be apparent to them at first glance and that they might even consider gratifying.

If a person pays attention to this Quranic principle—which is not a matter of blind obedience but a reference to a reality that all of humanity has experienced—they will quickly acknowledge that a person's own "right" and "optimal state" cannot be measured solely based on their "desired state." That principle is:

«وَ عَسى‏ أَنْ تَکْرَهُوا شَیئاً وَ هُوَ خَیرٌ لَکُمْ وَ عَسى‏ أَنْ تُحِبُّوا شَیئاً وَ هُوَ شَرٌّ لَکُمْ: It may be that you dislike a thing while it is good for you, and it may be that you love a thing while it is bad for you» (Al-Baqarah/216)

We have all experienced instances in our lives where we liked something and pursued it, and sometimes even attained it, only to later realize it was bad for us; or vice versa. And often, after the regret that grips us, we have said to ourselves: If only someone had warned us of these consequences before we acted. As it happens, in many cases, someone did warn us, but we did not take their words seriously at the time because we did not accept that they knew better than us. But a believer knows that there is a God who certainly knows everything better than we do; it is for this reason that immediately following this verse, He says: «وَ اللَّهُ یعْلَمُ وَ أَنْتُمْ لا تَعْلَمُون‏», meaning it is true that you sometimes like something that is to your detriment, and vice versa; but do not worry, for there is an All-Knowing and Merciful God who, if you do not know, knows all things; so trust in Him. And if He prevents you from an act you desire, the benefit of this returns solely to you, not to Him, for He is the Absolutely Self-Sufficient.

B. Some Arguments of Opponents of Homosexual Behaviors in the West

So far, we have seen that Mr. Naraghi has not provided any positive reason for the existence of such a sexual right and moral right. But are the non-scriptural arguments of opponents of homosexual behaviors, which he has set out to critique—regardless of the fact that he has apparently been unable to offer a successful response to the objections others have raised against his critique—truly limited to those he enumerated?

As we said, in his first article, he refers to only three arguments from Westerners. In his recent article, he also tries to present the first argument (the argument based on the unnaturalness of homosexual behavior) as the same argument used by figures like Allameh Tabatabai; whereas the cornerstone of the first argument is the concept of the "natural," but the cornerstone of Allameh Tabatabai's argument is the concept of the "innate" (fitri). And although the word "natural" also appears in the text quoted from Allameh, and assistance is drawn from the aforementioned argument, the neglect of the crucial difference between the keywords "innate nature" (fitrat) and "nature" (tabi'at) in the literature of Allameh Tabatabai has led to the decisive difference between these two arguments being overlooked, and Allameh's proof is effectively not considered at all, let alone critiqued![32]

اما حق این است که پس از شروع جنبش ترویج رفتارهای ‌هم‌جنس‌گرایانه در ۱۹۷۰، بسیاری از اندیشمندان غربی، استدلالهای متنوعی در مخالفت با رواج «رفتارهای ‌هم‌جنس‌گرایی» ارائه کرده‌اند متفاوت با استدلالهایی که به نحو سنتی و در فضای فلسفیِ صرف مطرح می‌شد؛ که وی در مقالات خود کمترین اشاره‌ای بدانها نکرده است. مثلا از آقای پیتر اسپریجگ – که از فعالان ضد‌هم‌جنس‌گرایی در آمریکاست، و اتفاقا آقای نراقی نیز تمام این مقالات را در آمریکا نگاشته – در ژولای سال ۲۰۰۴ (یعنی ۵ ماه پیش از نگارش اولین مقاله آقای نراقی) کتابی منتشر شد با عنوان «فاجعه: چگونه فعالان ‌هم‌جنس‌گرا و قضات لیبرال با دستکاری در تعریف ازدواج، دموکراسی را به زباله‌دان می‌اندازند».[۳۳] در همان سال، کتاب دیگری به سرویراستاری وی و تیموثی دیلی[۳۴] منتشر شد با عنوان «معمولی باشید: آنچه تحقیقات درباره ‌هم‌جنس‌گرایی نشان می‌دهد»[۳۵] که در آن تلاش می‌شود، به قول خودشان، شش افسانه[۳۶] مهم ‌هم‌جنس‌گرایان مورد تأمل قرار گیرد[۳۷]؛ که در اینها ادله کاملا متفاوتی در نقد ‌هم‌جنس‌گرایی یافت می‌شود.

آقای اسپریجگ مجددا در سال ۲۰۱۱ مقاله‌ای نوشت با عنوان «مناقشه در ‌هم‌جنس‌گرایی؛ مقایسه دو دیدگاه».[۳۸] و در آنجا به سه دسته دلیل برای اینکه نباید به «رفتارهای ‌هم‌جنس‌گرایانه» میدان داده شود، ارائه می‌کند که می‌توانیم به ترتیب آنها را ادله سلامت جسمی (ناظر به آسیب‌های جسمانی و بهداشتی‌ای که این رفتارها برای خود این افراد، و به تَبَع برای کل جامعه، به همراه دارد)، ادله روان‌شناختی (ناظر به آسیب‌های روان‌شناختی‌ای که این رفتارها برای خود این افراد، و به تَبَع برای کل جامعه، به همراه دارد)، و ادله جامعه‌شناختی (اینکه این رفتارها بستر مناسبی برای ترویج سوءاستفاده جنسی از کودکان فراهم می‌کند) بنامیم؛ که به طور مختصر در اینجا اشاره می‌شود:

۱٫ آسیب‌های سلامت جسمی

آقای اسپریجگ ابتدا با برشمردن تحقیقات میدانی متعدد نشان می‌دهد که نه‌تنها آمار ابتلا به ایدز در افراد ‌هم‌جنس‌گرا به نحو چشمگیری بیش از افراد دگرجنس‌گرا می‌باشد (احتمال ابتلا به ایدز در میان ‌هم‌جنس‌گراها ۵۰ برابر بیشتر افرادی است که دگرجنس‌خواه هستند!)، بلکه شیوع بسیاری از بیماری‌های کشنده‌ مانند هپاتیتA ، هپاتیتB ، سوزاک، سیفلیس و کلامیدیا، در میان افراد ‌هم‌جنس‌گرا تفاوت چشمگیری در مقایسه با افراد عادی دارد. همچنین تحقیقات دیگری را برمی‌شمرد که نشان می‌دهند آمارهای بیماری‌های خاص زنانه (بویژه بیماریهای مربوط به عفونتهای واژنی، و خصوصا سرطان زنان[۳۹]) در جمعیت زنان ‌هم‌جنس‌گرا نیز بمراتب بیشتر از زنانی است که با جنس مخالف رابطه برقرار می‌کنند.

۲٫ آسیب های روان‌شناختی

وی سپس به سراغ پژوهش‌هایی می‌رود که نشان می‌دهد آمارهای مربوط به بیمارهای روانی مانند اضطراب و استرس، افسردگی، خودکشی و… ویا مصرف الکل و مواد مخدر نیز در این افراد بسیار بالاتر از افراد معمولی است.

پاسخی که مدافعان ‌هم‌جنس‌گرایی برای این مدعا دارند این است که تبعیض بین ‌هم‌جنس‌گرایان و افراد عادی در جوامع، عامل پدید آمدن این مشکلات روانی برای این افراد بوده است.

But Mr. Sprigg shows that this claim has no external evidence, and in fact the empirical evidence contradicts it. If this claim were true, now that these relationships have been legal for years in many countries and there is serious social support for these individuals in some countries, the rate of mental illness among homosexuals in these countries should be lower than in countries without such freedoms; or within these same countries, their rates should have decreased compared to ordinary people; but this has not happened; and for example, the suicide rate of homosexuals in the Netherlands, which is presented as a paradise for homosexuals and has been their most important advocate, is 5 times the suicide rate of non-homosexuals in that country!

3. Sociological Harms

Mr. Sprigg next turns to statistics on child sexual abuse and, citing field research, shows that homosexual men engaging in sexual relations with children is significantly higher than among ordinary men.

He explains that advocates of homosexuality, in order to distort these statistics, use the word pedophilia[40] (sexual desire for children) for these relationships and try to present the statistics of pedophilia as distinct from the statistics of adult homosexual relationships! But what neutralizes their trick is that, in fact, most of the individuals who, in their words, engage in pedophilia also engage in sexual relations with adults.

To escape this scandal, advocates of homosexuality, although in other cases they often conflated the three concepts of "homosexual act," "homosexual orientation," and "homosexual identity" (so that anyone possessing one of these was introduced as a homosexual individual), in these statistics have tried to accept only those individuals with pedophilia as homosexual who possess all three characteristics together! But this trick is also of no use, as he finally points to statements by some famous homosexuals that clearly show that among homosexual men, sexual relations with children are presented as a source of pride and an advantage in a homosexual relationship!

4. Other Moral Consequences of This Act

If one pays attention, all three categories of reasons above are evidence showing that homosexual behaviors cause such immense harm, primarily to the individuals themselves and secondarily to the whole of society, that morally permitting it—which amounts to giving it free rein—is not permissible. We repeat Mr. Sprigg's emphasis that the discussion is about the public permissibility or impermissibility of "sodomy" and "homosexual behaviors," not about individuals' internal orientation; nor about the personality and identity of homosexual individuals.

And the truth is that if one considers the consequences of homosexual behaviors and their legalization in society, the evidence for their immorality is not limited to these cases. For example, enumerating the adverse effects of recognizing same-sex marriage in countries that have recognized this behavior has confronted advocates of homosexuality with a volume of new ethical challenges. For instance, "Millie Fontana"[41] the daughter of a homosexual couple, points out how this couple lied to her for years about her real, genetic father (whom they later referred to as the "sperm donor") and how she is forced to always bear the stigma of a fatherless life in her heart.[42]

***

Enumerating these cases was only to point out that, contrary to what Mr. Naraghi has claimed, opponents of homosexual behaviors have presented abundant non-scriptural evidence for the immorality of these behaviors.

Section Two: The Position of Islam Regarding Homosexual Behaviors

So far we have seen that Mr. Naraghi’s premises can in no way justify, from an ethical and justice-seeking perspective, the necessity of abandoning the common interpretation of the Quranic verses. Nevertheless, he attempts to cast doubt on the common Muslim understanding that sodomy is shameless and immoral, in order to pave the way for the acceptance of homosexual acts and respect for homosexual behaviors among Muslims; and we shall now examine to what extent he has proceeded justifiably in casting this doubt, and how much he has adhered to rationality in his understanding of this sacred text.

In the introduction, it was quoted from him that

“5. A group believes that some Quranic verses discriminate among human beings based on the type of their sexual identity and orientation (especially homosexual identity and orientation).

6. If this group’s claim is correct, then the Quran would contain verses contrary to justice and ethically improper.”

And he ultimately concluded

“The author … deems any interpretation of the Quranic verses that leads to discrimination based on homosexual identity and orientation as ethically unacceptable.”

As was pointed out in the same place, in these statements there is a clear conflation between “homosexual act” (which is the subject of criticism by Muslim exegetes) and “sexual identity and orientation” (which is a completely different discussion). Among Muslim thinkers, whether Shia or Sunni, traditional or modern, etc., we have not found anyone who believes that any verse of the Quran discriminates among human beings based on the type of “sexual identity” and “sexual orientation”; and if such a person were to be found, they must show from which part of the Quran they have derived such an understanding.

But if the intention is the homosexual act (sodomy); the discussion is not about “discrimination” among human beings; rather, it is about “crime” and “sin” and holding individuals accountable for their sin; and holding individuals accountable for committing a sin is different from their inner inclination or accepting a specific identity for them; and not only a constructed identity, but even the existence of an inner inclination cannot be a cause for overlooking a crime and sin. If a person who is medically a sadist harms others, is their action not considered a crime and sin?

Incidentally, one of the sublime points of the story of the people of Lot is that Prophet Lot (PBUH) distinguished between their behavior and their character. When this Prophet of God wants to reproach them, he does not direct his expression of displeasure at their “person” or “identity” at all, but explicitly states that I certainly and definitely detest only your “action,” meaning not yourselves.[43] That is, the reproach of the people of Lot, and the punishment that was sent down upon them, has nothing to do with discriminating or not discriminating among human beings based on their identity; rather, it was specifically because of their action. And if punishing someone for a crime they have committed means discrimination and is contrary to justice, then all the courts of the world are fundamentally proceeding contrary to justice!

In terms of inclination, there is also no doubt that Muslims do not consider the mere existence of an inclination as warranting the condemnation of a person; rather, they consider someone who has a strong inner inclination towards a sin, but can restrain themselves from committing that sin and does not commit it, to be far more valuable than someone in whom that inclination has never found the possibility to arise, and they acknowledge that the believer who sees beautiful, delicate-faced individuals and does not stumble is superior to the worshipper who has contented himself with the world from a cave, and because he has not seen a beautiful face, has not stumbled.[44]

A. The Relationship Between Sharia Rulings and Ethical Propositions

Now let us assume that he – as appears from his third article – has noticed this mistake, and we try to rewrite his intention with phrases referring to “behavior.” In this case, he should have said:

“A group believes that some Quranic verses condemn homosexual acts and behaviors (sodomy); if this group’s claim is correct, then the Quran would contain verses contrary to justice and ethically improper.”

When the phrases are rewritten as “behavior” (i.e., what the Quranic commentators actually say), it is clear that no such entailment exists. That is, even if we assume that we do not accept the arguments of opponents of homosexuality and have no independent rational reason for condemning homosexual action and behavior (sodomy), can it be proven that such an entailment holds?!

For example, we know that we have no independent moral reason for the obligation of prayer (note that prayer is a specific action distinct from absolute supplication) or the obligation of fasting in the month of Ramadan, and on the other hand, we know that the Quran has severely condemned those who do not perform prayer or do not fast; would any sane Muslim accept that, for this reason, “the Quran contains verses contrary to justice and morally unjustifiable”?!

Note that I said “sane Muslim” because our assumption here is that we are speaking with a Muslim; in fact, the root of this statement goes back to the second proposition quoted from him in the introduction. There he said:

“2. Ethics (i.e., moral foundations, principles, and reasons) in terms of subsistence and proof is entirely rational and, in principle, independent of religion and prior to it.”

Mr. Naraghi has referred the proof of this claim to the article “Does Ethics Depend on Religion?”; and when we read that article, we see that his main claim there is that the proposition “ethics depends on religion” is not a defensible proposition; and for this purpose, he has raised three aspects of the dependence of ethics on religion—ontological, epistemological, and psychological—and has disputed all three aspects.

But even if his disputes are appropriate disputes, does his claim: “Ethics in no way depends on religion” get proven? Again, here we witness that he commits the fallacy of “refuting the argument” (which was previously mentioned). That is, in the best case, he has disputed the arguments of those who have said “ethics depends on religion”; but logically, from the fact that someone’s reason for their claim is incorrect, the most one can conclude is that they have not yet provided sufficient reason for their claim, not that it proves that “the contradictory of that claim is true”!

Moreover, if we study his discussion carefully, we find that the very disputes he has raised are also very weak. A critique of each of those disputes requires another occasion, but among the claims made there, what is necessary for the present discussion is the claim raised under the title “the minimal reading of the epistemological dependence doctrine.” This doctrine, in his words, is as follows:

“Whenever reason finds no reason for condemning a particular behavior, but that behavior is condemned in the religious text, we must assume that there is a reason for the ugliness of that behavior, but we are incapable of perceiving it, and perhaps we will discover that reason later.” (Baztab-e Andisheh Monthly, No. 73, Ordibehesht 1385, p. 165)

And the critique he offers of this reason is expressed as follows:

“But the logic of ‘perhaps a reason will be found later that…’ is a problematic logic. If we accept this logic, we have no reason to confine it solely to the claimed domain. For example, why, in cases where reason has a clear and firm reason for condemning act A, can we not resort to this logic and claim that perhaps a reason will be found later showing that our rational judgment in this matter was incorrect? The possibility that such reasons will be found is by no means ruled out. As it happens, throughout history we have repeatedly witnessed that people once considered act A to be ‘clearly and firmly’ wrong based on rational reasons (in their own view)[45], but later found better reasons indicating the wrongness of that act. Therefore, if we take the logic of ‘perhaps a reason will be found later that…’ seriously, then whenever reason issues a judgment contrary to the decree of religion or the (apparent) meaning of the sacred text, we can say that perhaps a reason will be found later that supports our current understanding of religion and the sacred text, and therefore it is better not to change our current understanding of religion and instead suspend the judgment of reason. In other words, if reason judges that act A is morally good/bad, and the sacred text rules otherwise, then the decree of religion still takes precedence and authority, not the judgment of reason. That is, the minimalist reading ultimately leads to a form of the divine command theory as well. The common feature of the minimalist and maximalist readings is distrust of reason. But a religion that distrusts reason is sitting on a branch and sawing it off.” (ibid., pp. 165-166)

Is this really a critique of the aforementioned claim? If we were to formulate his statement as an argument, its content would be as follows:

“If we acknowledge the limitations of reason in some areas, it follows that no rational judgment, including the judgment to refer to religion, can be trusted; therefore, we accept no limitations on reason’s discernment!”

But is this truly an acceptable statement?!

(1) Does ordinary, common human reason always make the correct discernment in every area it enters? Does he take as evidence for his claim something that is a refutation of his claim?! The fact that there have been numerous areas where individuals considered a judgment to be their firm rational discernment and later its erroneousness became clear to everyone—does this lead to the conclusion that “the logic of ‘perhaps a reason will be found later that…’ is a problematic logic”?! That is, does the existence of this clear historical fact support his view or negate it?! In reality, contrary to his view, acknowledging certain limitations for reason (that reason may err in some of its intellectual movements) is not a claim that can be denied.

(2) Why should there be such a necessary connection that if reason discovers its error in some areas, all areas of reason are erroneous and one can no longer trust reason for religiosity? Yes, a rational human being is fundamentally one who logically considers the occurrence of error possible for all acquired knowledge not based on their immediate knowledge, and it is for this reason that a rational human being becomes open to criticism. But the very fact that they hear criticism and accept their error shows that there are areas of knowledge upon which they can rely and understand their error.

(3) What has been presented as evidence for this claim is the very evidence that believers use for turning to religion, not evidence for turning away from it! That is, reason understands its own limitations, and based on those limitations, understands the need for “God’s help in grasping the areas where it is limited.”[46] Hence, not only in areas where reason has no actual ruling and the Sharia has a ruling, but also in areas where the ruling of reason has not been a completely evident ruling (a certain ruling with epistemological certainty), it takes seriously the possibility that the Lawgiver has taken certain dimensions into account; and this is a logic that the Holy Quran itself emphasizes when stating some divine prohibitions. When God wants to state the prohibition of drinking wine and gambling, He does not say that these two actions are entirely ugly and vile and have no goodness or benefit in them; rather, He says that, indeed, there are benefits in them, but they have an evil that outweighs their good; which, if one were to realize it, one would understand that finding various benefits for these two does not compensate for that evil: “They ask you about wine and gambling. Say, ‘In them is great sin and [yet, some] benefit for people. But their sin is greater than their benefit.’” (Al-Baqarah/219)[47]

Thus, a “wise Muslim” is someone who believes in the limitations of reason in the discernments needed in their life; that is, someone who believes there is a God who knows things we do not know, and if He commands something, He is not pursuing His own interests, but rather wants our good.[48]

B. The Quran’s View on Sodomy and Homosexual Acts

He has summarized his work at this stage as follows:

“First, it seems that the Quranic verses do not appear to be in the position of condemning ‘homosexual’ relations, and even assuming such an appearance, the way is open for their esoteric interpretation.

Second, even if the alleged appearance of those verses were not open to interpretation, Muslims could consider the content of those verses as a reflection of the culture of the people at the time of the revelation, and on this basis, without stepping outside the circle of Islam, deem the applicability of those verses to the modern era questionable.

Third, even those who consider homosexual behaviors a definite sin are obliged, like Abraham, to exercise patience and compassion towards sinners, especially when their sin does not harm others, and to refrain from humiliating and using violence against them.” (The Quran and the Issue of Sexual Minorities’ Rights, p. 18)

Before examining what argumentative support these claims have, it must be noted that, contrary to his assumption, the story of the people of Lot is not the only instance in the Holy Quran where the act of sodomy is condemned.

Everyone knows that regarding the severe punishment for “adultery” (which is a relationship with the opposite sex outside the framework of formal marriage), the Quranic verses are so explicit that they leave no room for doubt: “The [unmarried] woman or [unmarried] man found guilty of sexual intercourse – lash each one of them with a hundred lashes, and do not be taken by pity for them in the religion of Allah, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. And let a group of the believers witness their punishment.” (An-Nur/2)

And the very non-discrimination intended by Mr. Naraghi (which was in claims 5 and 6 in the material quoted from him in the introduction) is sufficient to conclude the necessity of severe punishment for two people who engage in sexual relations with the same sex!

But there is no need for this; because in the opening verses of Surah An-Nisa, it emphasizes the punishment of those who engage in same-sex relations – provided, of course, it is proven by four just witnesses – and, of course, declares that if such individuals truly repent and desist from their actions, no one has the right to molest them:

«وَ اللاَّتی‏ یأْتینَ الْفاحِشَهَ مِنْ نِسائِکُمْ فَاسْتَشْهِدُوا عَلَیهِنَّ أَرْبَعَهً مِنْکُمْ فَإِنْ شَهِدُوا فَأَمْسِکُوهُنَّ فِی الْبُیوتِ حَتَّى یتَوَفَّاهُنَّ الْمَوْتُ أَوْ یجْعَلَ اللَّهُ لَهُنَّ سَبیلا؛ وَ الَّذانِ یأْتِیانِها مِنْکُمْ فَآذُوهُما فَإِنْ تابا وَ أَصْلَحا فَأَعْرِضُوا عَنْهُما إِنَّ اللَّهَ کانَ تَوَّاباً رَحیما: And those of your women who commit an indecency, call four witnesses from among you against them; and if they testify, confine them to the houses until death takes them or God makes a way for them. And the two men among you who commit it, punish them both; but if they repent and reform, turn away from them. Indeed, God is ever Accepting of repentance, Merciful» (Nisa/15-16).

The phrase "اللذان" means "the two men"; thus, it refers to sexual relations between two men; and this indication is so strong that some have concluded that the phrase in the previous verse, which concerns women, also indicates sexual relations between women (musahiqa); because, on the one hand, we know that according to verse 2 of Surah al-Nur, the punishment for an adulterous man is the same as for an adulterous woman; and if we take the meaning of indecency to be adultery, what justification is there that, in the discussion of adultery where both a man and a woman are present, this verse only mentions the punishment of women? So, verse 15 is probably about the punishment of homosexual women, in contrast to verse 16, which is about the punishment of homosexual men.

Thus, even if the story of the people of Lot did not exist, the verses of the Holy Quran would still have a clear indication of the prohibition and necessity of punishing homosexual behaviors. Now, let us examine his claims one by one:

1. The Indication of Quranic Verses in Condemning Homosexual Relations

Mr. Naraghi has approached casting doubt on the indication of the verses in several ways:

(1) Doubt about the reason for the punishment of the people of Lot!

He says:

"The primary sin of the people of Lot that led to their punishment is not confined to the 'homosexual' act of the men of the tribe... At the forefront of the sins of the people of Lot was disbelief and the denial of the prophethood of Lot and other divine prophets:... and of course, the people of Lot, in addition to the great sin of disbelief and denying the prophets, also committed other indecent behaviors."[49]

And he has devoted a large volume of his second article to proving these statements.

Critique and Review

Firstly, let us assume his statements are correct. The maximum conclusion is that their punishment was not solely for "sodomy." But what relevance does this have to his claim that: "The Quranic verses do not indicate the condemnation of 'homosexual' relations"?! That is, even assuming his disputes were correct, the maximum conclusion would be that the people of Lot were not punished solely for this act; but must they necessarily be "punished only for this act" for it to become clear that such relations are condemned from the Quran's perspective? Does the fact that in the Quranic stories we do not see any people punished for adultery mean that the act of adultery has no reprehensibility from the Holy Quran's point of view?! He himself mentions verses containing the explicit words of Prophet Lot (AS), who rebukes his people for "approaching men instead of women" (which is the meaning of 'homosexual act'), and then tries to say that their punishment was related to other factors as well. Fine, so be it! Is the message and explicit words of Prophet Lot (AS) himself, as a prophet of God who is in the process of conveying God's message, not a condemnation of this act?!

Secondly, does his evidence really show that the punishment of the people of Lot was not for their homosexual act? His most important reason for this claim is that another factor mentioned in the verses for the punishment of this people is that, in some verses, disbelieving and denying the prophet of God (Prophet Lot) is introduced as the cause of the punishment's descent.

Here, we must see what is truly meant by the disbelief of the people of Lot and their denial of their prophet?

The story of Prophet Lot appears in 14 surahs of the Holy Quran; and despite the fact that the call to monotheism (worship of the One God) has been the refrain of the call of all divine prophets (Nahl/36), nevertheless the Holy Quran makes not the slightest reference to the idolatry of Lot’s people, nor is it ever observed that he called his people to (monotheism and the worship of Allah), and his words are solely concerned with warning them against that abominable act[50], and in many narrations, it is mentioned that they—before engaging in this abominable act—were among the best of people[51]; which confirms that they were not idolaters, since polytheism and idolatry in the logic of the Quran is a tremendous injustice (Indeed, polytheism is a great injustice; Luqman/13), and is the only sin that—if a person dies without repenting—is never forgiven. (Indeed, Allah does not forgive that partners be associated with Him, but He forgives what is less than that for whom He wills; Nisa/48 and 116). If we add to this that they were contemporaries of Prophet Abraham (PBUH) and the people to whom Prophet Abraham (PBUH) was sent were entirely idolaters, and from those people, none believed in him except “Lot”; and then Lot enters another people whom he does not even once warn against idolatry, this greatly strengthens the point that these people, although they were God-worshipping people, turned to this abominable act; and perhaps this is why Prophet Lot was only engaged with this act of theirs[52]. So their disbelief and denial of him means they disbelieved in the content of his call (that sodomy is a great sin) and denied it; thus it was because of this act of theirs that they were punished.[53]

(2) The Difference Between “Sodomy” and “Homosexual Act”!

Mr. Naraghi claims:

“What is meant by ‘sodomy’ which was prevalent among the people of Lot is not merely the homosexual act, but performing this act in a specific manner.”

He provides several reasons for this claim:

2.1. The Prevalence of the “Homosexual Act” Before the People of Lot

His most important reason is that the Holy Quran considers the performance of this act to be unprecedented by the people of Lot (Such immorality as no one has preceded you with from among the worlds; A'raf/80 and Ankabut/28), and Mr. Naraghi takes it as historically certain that this act was prevalent before them as well. His reason is that, according to Old Testament experts, this act was also found among the Canaanites, Babylonians, and other idolatrous peoples. He then concludes that what caused the punishment to descend was “not the sexual relations between two men per se, but rather that specific method or type of relations that was prevalent among the people.” Then, since in his view, the Quran does not provide an explanation about this specific method of the people of Lot, he turns to some narrations (most of which do not even have strong chains of transmission) and tries to introduce specific dimensions as components of the specific method of the people of Lot’s act, in order to thereby differentiate between the act of the people of Lot and the common meaning of sodomy.

Critique and Examination

In response, it must be said:

Firstly, were the Canaanites and Babylonians before the people of Lot? A simple reference to historical books shows that the Canaanites were the very people among whom Prophet Abraham (PBUH) was sent and they existed for centuries after him, and the Babylonians were also contemporaries of the Canaanites, as they had battles with them. And we know that Prophet Lot (PBUH) was also a relative and contemporary of Prophet Abraham (PBUH); so these were contemporaries, and it is not clear that the act attributed to them pertains to the period before the people of Lot.

Secondly, even if we assume that Mr. Naraghi's historical interpretation is correct, the Qur'an itself states what could have made their actions specific and different; we do not need to resolve the matter through speculation. What has been reported among other peoples is the performance of this act as a very limited behavior; but the deed of the people of Lot was very widespread and public; and their main problem was that this “abomination” had become “well-known” in society; as the Holy Qur'an describes their coming to the guests of Prophet Lot thus: “And his people came rushing toward him, and before this they had been doing evil deeds” (Hud/78). And after Prophet Lot, to dissuade them, proposes marriage to his daughters, they say with utter impudence and insolence, “You certainly know that we have no claim to your daughters, and indeed, you surely know what we want!” (Hud/79)

That is, if it is proven that this behavior existed before the people of Lot, then God's meaning in considering them the first people would be that even if earlier peoples did such a thing, they were not so shameless as to vie so openly with one another to commit this act, and to so readily approach men and consider such an act their right!

So, if the aforementioned historical assumption is correct, then, contrary to Mr. Naraghi's claim, the likelihood that the prevalence of homosexuality in the contemporary era—where many countries even recognize their marriage and hold Muslim countries accountable for prohibiting this act—is precisely an instance of the deed of the people of Lot is, in fact, much greater!

2.2. The Accompaniment of This Act with Other Components

In Mr. Naraghi's view,

“The specific type of sexual relations among the people of Lot was a kind of political tool that the people of Lot used particularly to humiliate Lot and deny his status as a divine prophet;… [or] the specific type of sexual relations in question was a violent behavior whose perpetrators imposed themselves by force and against the will of the victims, and was a clear instance of rape;… [and/or] since, according to traditions, the angels entered in the form of youths whose faces had not yet grown hair, the specific type of sexual relations in question was probably, in most cases, directed at children and young adolescents, and should be considered an instance of assaulting children and underage adolescents and sexually abusing them.”

Critique and Examination

These are some of the possibilities that have occurred to Mr. Naraghi, and other possibilities could be added to this list; let alone that some of these possibilities, if correct, refute others (for example, if it was a political tool, it makes no sense for it to be mostly directed at children and adolescents, etc.). Indeed, it is not impossible that such motives or other matters were present in their behaviors; but when the Holy Qur'an explicitly quotes Prophet Lot (AS) as saying in his reproach of them, “Indeed, you approach men with desire instead of women” (A'raf/81 and Naml/55), it shows that the main focus of Prophet Lot's (AS) objection is not the probable motives of these people, nor other matters that accompanied their act, but the act of “sexual relations with the same sex” itself. Yes, homosexual behaviors, not only at that time but—as discussed in previous sections—even at this time, are heavily directed toward the predatory relationship of adults with adolescents and younger individuals and matters of this kind; and this, incidentally, is itself one of the things that even today intensifies the condemnation of such relations, even among societies that have recognized it.

2.3. Dimensions of Orientation and Identity in Contemporary Homosexuality

In Mr. Naraghi's view, the homosexuality that is discussed today is a passionate inclination arising from deep emotions toward the same sex and a kind of identity that may not even lead to sexual relations with a person of the same sex! He says:

“The 'act of sodomy' is very different from the concept of 'homosexuality' in its modern sense. 'Sodomy' is nothing more than a mere sexual act and is often devoid of deep human emotional attachments… and the individual who engages in this act does not see a significant difference between their personal and social identity and life and that of other men in society, although their sexual or aesthetic taste may, under certain conditions, diverge from the dominant taste among their peers… But 'homosexuality' in its modern sense goes far beyond a mere sexual act between two people of the same sex and becomes intertwined with their personal and social 'identity'…. Women emphasize a 'feminine' identity, Black people a 'Black' identity, and homosexuals a 'homosexual' identity… It is in this context that the homosexual individual incorporates their sexual identity into the definition of their human identity, and asks others to respect that identity, and to recognize their right to organize their personal and social life honestly and in accordance with their true self, and to strive for their flourishing as a noble and dignified human being. In this context, homosexuality is not merely a sexual act, but a kind of 'being' and, consequently, a kind of 'living' suited to that being—a living filled with deep human emotions…. Merely having a sexual relationship with someone of the same sex does not make a person 'homosexual'; it is quite possible for someone to have a sexual relationship with a person of the same sex but not be 'homosexual,' meaning they do not consider their identity to be 'homosexual.' On the other hand, a person may consider themselves 'homosexual' without necessarily having a sexual relationship with someone of the same sex. Logically speaking, the relationship between the concept of 'homosexuality' and the concept of 'sexual relations with the same sex' is one of generality and specificity in some respects.”

Critique and Analysis

This statement of his is the same point raised at the beginning of the article, quoting Mr. Sprigg, that defenders of homosexuality conflate three areas: 'sexual action and behavior' (the behavior an individual engages in during sexual relations and with whom they engage in this behavior); 'sexual orientation' (meaning to which sex—same or opposite—the individual is inclined and oriented), and 'sexual identity' (how the individual identifies themselves sexually, whether they consider themselves heterosexual or homosexual).

The response to this objection was elaborated in detail in the first part of the article:

Firstly, the notion of sexual orientation as a natural, innate matter is merely a claim that, despite extensive research, has not yet been proven; and consequently, 'homosexual identity' is, more than anything else, a social construct rather than a real matter rooted in human existence and personality;

Secondly, even assuming such an inclination exists in some individuals, Muslims have never held, and do not hold, an individual accountable or deserving of punishment merely for their inner inclination.

Thirdly, if the discussion is about 'deep human emotions' that are not necessarily related to sexual relations, does Islam oppose such a thing in the slightest?! Are the Islamic verses and narrations not full of verses asking men to deeply love divine men? And indeed, in Shiism, the concept of 'Wilayah' means a deep emotional relationship that humans (both men and women) establish with divine saints (both men and women). Is this truly the situation that homosexuals are seeking?!

2.4. The Issue of Female Homosexuality

In Mr. Naraghi's view,

” To all of this it must be added that the Quran makes no mention whatsoever of female “homosexuality.” Some exegetes have, of course, suggested that the following verse may refer to homosexual relations among women: “And those of your women who commit an indecency—call four witnesses from among you against them; if they testify, then confine them to their houses until death takes them or God makes a way for them” (Nisa/15). According to some traditions, the story of the People of al-Rass and their fate (Furqan/38 and Qaf/12) was also connected with the act of “musāḥaqa” (lesbianism). However, the overwhelming majority of exegetes have considered the first verse to refer to the act of zinā (fornication) and not musāḥaqa, and there is also no indication anywhere in the Quran that links the story of the People of al-Rass with the act of musāḥaqa or female “homosexuality.” If homosexuality, qua homosexuality, were an illegitimate phenomenon, then homosexuality among women would have to be considered just as reprehensible as homosexuality among men. Yet in the Quranic narrative, “homosexual” relations among women and men are by no means treated as equivalent: the Quranic narrative decisively condemns the sexual behavior prevalent among the men of Lot’s people, but makes absolutely no reference to sexual relations among women.”

Critique and Examination

It is strange that he himself mentions the verses that, in exegetical works and interpretive traditions, have been considered indicative of punishment for homosexual women, and then, because they lack complete clarity in his own view, claims that “the Quranic narrative … makes absolutely no reference to sexual relations among women”! Even if we assume that a sentence from which many people have inferred “sexual relations among women” is not “explicit” on this claim, does it constitute “absolutely no reference” to it either?!

Moreover, the implication of this very reference is far more than a mere allusion; and at the beginning of the second section of critiques, this verse was discussed, and it was explained that given the verse speaks only of the punishment of women (even though adulterous men also deserve punishment), and the subsequent verse, due to the word “al-ladhān,” has a strong prima facie indication of punishment related to sexual relations between two men (liwāṭ), the likelihood that the verse in question concerns the punishment of homosexual women is far greater than it referring to the punishment of adulterous women.

Beyond all this, even if the Quran made no reference to the issue of “female homosexuality,” it would still not follow that “homosexuality, qua homosexuality, is not an illegitimate phenomenon.” A simple proof of this is that even today, as the wave of homosexuality has swept through the Western world, the majority of discussions, debates, and articles by its proponents and opponents concern sexual relations between men; while both sides repeatedly remind us during these discussions that they do not mean only liwāṭ! This greater sensitivity seems to stem from certain undeniable differences between men and women, differences that everyone acknowledges in the depths of their being, even though, for fear of being accused of discrimination between men and women, they constantly try to deny them; a detailed discussion of this matter requires another occasion.

2. The Eternality or Temporality of the Quranic Ruling on the Prohibition of Liwāṭ

Mr. Naraghi says:

“But let us suppose that the Qur’anic verses unequivocally and uninterpretably condemn homosexual behaviors, and the alleged apparent meaning of these verses absolutely admits no interpretation. In that case, is another path open for reconciling those teachings with the requirements arising from gender justice? In my view, the answer is still yes. In recent decades, a number of Muslim neo-thinkers have employed a method in understanding the Qur’an that can be considered a kind of sympathetic historical critique of the sacred text…. This method of interpretation proceeds in two steps: in the first step, the interpreter seeks to understand the revelatory text or discourse by referring it to its historical, social, and cultural context in the age of revelation, and in the second step, seeks to refine the essence of the text’s message from the historical contingencies of the age of revelation and bring it into the semantic horizon of the contemporary audience… The result is that, if Muslims reach the conclusion that discrimination based on sexual orientation and identity is unjust, and the Qur’anic rulings regarding homosexual behaviors have an uninterpretable apparent meaning[۵۴], then they can consider these rulings, like the rulings concerning women and slaves, as a reflection of the culture of the Arabs in the age of revelation and part of the first world of the sacred text.”

Critique and Review

It seems that such statements stem from a misunderstanding that our intellectual current has suffered from since the time of Iqbal Lahori regarding the issue of the “Seal of Prophethood”; as if, in their subconscious, they imagine that God—who had previously sent down other laws suited to earlier times—was, God forbid, unaware of the subsequent changes and developments in the world, and did not know that the conditions of human life would change, and made a mistake in declaring the Seal of Prophethood! And that another prophet should have been sent to abrogate the Islamic Sharia! And since God made such a mistake, they see themselves as tasked with bringing new rulings!

If belief in God’s justice is among the certain beliefs of every Muslim, the incompatibility of the above view with the fundamentals of being a Muslim is beyond discussion, and since I have dealt with it in detail elsewhere[۵۵], I will suffice with this brief mention here.

۳. Emulating Prophet Abraham (PBUH)

Mr. Naraghi says at the end of his article:

“But suppose that some do not consider the apparent meaning of the Qur’anic verses in condemning homosexual behaviors to be interpretable, and earnestly believe that the content of those verses belongs to the second world of the sacred text and is intrinsic to the Qur’anic message. From the perspective of these individuals, homosexual behaviors are considered an indisputable sin, and a Muslim, insofar as they are a Muslim, must, by God’s definitive decree, refrain from establishing such relations. But in this case, is the scroll of discussion regarding the rights of sexual minorities rolled up, at least from a religious perspective? As far as I can tell, the answer is no. I believe the Qur’anic account of Abraham’s reaction to the fate of Lot’s people is highly instructive…. The thought-provoking point in the Qur’anic account is that Abraham, in the face of a people who were polluted with all kinds of sins and toward whom God’s inevitable punishment was heading, showed patience and compassion, and argued with God on their behalf. And more importantly, God did not find him blameworthy for that earnest defense, but rather praised his patience and compassion toward the sinners. Abraham’s way teaches the teachers of religion and ethics that in confronting sin, especially a sin whose harm does not extend to others, they should show patience and compassion, and not be impatient, like a muhtasib, to punish the sinner. Aversion to sin should not prevent a religious person from showing compassion to the sinner.”

Critique and Review

That a Muslim has no right to assault another human being on the slightest pretext is a matter beyond dispute. In the present subject, too, according to the narrations, the fatwa of the generality of jurists is that proving sodomy, like proving adultery, requires the testimony of four just witnesses who have directly observed the very act of sodomy. Moreover, the punishment for sodomy, like the punishment for adultery, is counted among the “ḥudūd”; that is, only and exclusively the religious judge has the right to carry it out. In other words, even if four people witness the incident with their own eyes, if the “religious judge” (a pious jurist and mujtahid possessing the relevant qualifications) is not present, no one is permitted to punish that person arbitrarily.

If one reflects a little, one easily understands that, given these constraints, the purpose of prescribing such severe punishments was neither to humiliate human beings, nor irrational violence, nor to hold individuals accountable for an inner inclination, nor to act as a self-appointed censor impatient to punish a sinner, nor … . Rather, the primary purpose was to preserve the ugliness of this shameless act in society so that people would not turn toward it, and so that society, and indeed the individuals themselves, would remain safe from its personal and social harms. Consider once more the condition that Islam has set: “the testimony of four just witnesses who have directly observed the occurrence of the act itself”! Is such a thing even possible, except in a society where vulgarity and shamelessness have pervaded it from head to toe? Of course, another way to prove this matter is for the perpetrator himself to confess to having done this deed four times, that is, in four separate sessions (in which case, only he is punished, and not the person with whom he had relations); which itself is another confirmation of the aforementioned purpose.

Yes, Prophet Abraham (AS) is our exemplar, but if you wish to take his being an exemplar seriously, God says that he is your exemplar in that instance when he dissociated himself from his people who had fallen into such misguidance: “There is for you an excellent example in Abraham and those with him, when they said to their people, ‘We are disassociated from you and from whatever you worship besides Allah. We have denied you, and there has appeared between us and you animosity and hatred forever until you believe in Allah alone’” (Al-Mumtahanah/4). According to many narrations, the sending of Prophet Lot (AS) to guide the people of Lot was through a revelation that was conveyed to Prophet Lot by this very Prophet Abraham (AS). Does Abraham’s (AS) being an exemplar mean that Lot should not have gone to those people to counsel and deter them? Fundamentally, was Prophet Abraham’s (AS) argument a defense of their action, or was it showing mercy and giving them an opportunity to repent?! Defending their action is so repugnant in the logic of the Quran that God counted the wife of Prophet Lot among them and afflicted her with punishment along with them, even though we know that this woman never engaged in homosexual behavior. (This is emphasized in many narrations: that no prophet’s wife ever had illicit sexual relations; and the reason for counting her among that people was that she was in league with them, meaning that if Prophet Lot (AS) brought someone to his house, she would inform them, just as she did in the case of the divine angels who visited them. And these narrations are entirely in line with this noble verse that God never permits the marriage of a wicked woman or man to a chaste man or woman: “Wicked women are for wicked men, and wicked men are for wicked women; and good women are for good men, and good men are for good women” (An-Nur/26). Does this not show that one who defends homosexuals is, in the sight of God, like them, and if a punishment descends, they will be punished along with them?[56]

Yes, as mentioned, one of the striking passages in the Quranic story of the people of Lot is the saying of Prophet Lot (AS) to them: "Indeed, I am, toward your deed, of those who detest [it]" (Ash-Shu'ara/168) — "your deed," not yourselves. As Mr. Sprigg puts it, truly religious people consider human beings far too exalted to reduce their identity to sexual matters and label them "homosexual" and the like: from a religious person's perspective, the primary identity of everyone, even a dissolute individual, is being a "servant of God" and a "creation of God"; and it is with this eye that a believer looks upon all human beings, even sinful ones, while at the same time not wishing for sinners to ruin their own lives and the lives of others with their sin.

Does taking the divine prophets as role models mean that we should consign to oblivion the action of Prophet Lot (AS), whom God sent to guide that people and whose story He mentioned to us 14 times in the Holy Quran, and use the compassion of Prophet Abraham (AS) — a compassion that was certainly meant to grant them more time for repentance, not to justify their vile act or to forgo guiding them — as an excuse to abandon guiding the homosexuals of the world and, by distorting the purposes of the Quran, effectively encourage people to promote homosexuality?

Yes, one should not hasten in punishing homosexual individuals; rather, in Islam, people are not encouraged to testify against ordinary individuals in sexual matters; and the door of repentance is always open for those who return to the path of God; even more than this, Islam has not permitted us to pry into the private lives of individuals, and the very fact that it stipulates the existence of four just witnesses to prove this sin practically restrains us from intruding upon people's privacy. In the logic of Islam, even confessing before others has no place, and if someone wishes to repent, they are not asked to confess their sin before a human being or in public for their repentance to be accepted; rather, the emphasis is that they repent in their own privacy. Yet all of this has been set forth in a way that strongly preserves the ugliness of this act; and thus, it has rolled up not the scroll of human beings, but the scroll of the prevalence of these shameless behaviors.

This is how, if we reflect a little on the ruling of the prohibition of sodomy and its severe punishment on one hand, and the difficulty of its legal proof on the other, not only is its fruit not the promotion of violence in society, as modern homosexuals insinuate, but it could perhaps be said that this Quranic ruling, more than being concerned with a legal aspect, particularly criminal law, has had its cultural function and fruit in view; and its main goal has perhaps been to keep the ugliness and abhorrence of this matter high in the public sphere; so that if anyone should ever wish to engage in this shameless act in their privacy, they would be warned against expressing it in the presence of others, and this act would not become normalized in society; and the individual, families, and society would, as much as possible, remain safe from the physical, psychological, spiritual, and social harms, a few of which were mentioned.

With this description, is it not probable that the sin and immorality of one who strives to promote and normalize this act is even greater than that of those who commit the act itself?

.

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.

[۱] . Of course, in addition to these three articles, he wrote a piece titled "About a Critique" on February 28, 2006 (9 Esfand 1384) (which will be explained in footnote 10), as well as a Q&A on November 10, 2010 (19 Aban 1389) with readers of the Radio Farda website, which was given the title "Interview about Islam and the Rights of Sexual Minorities," and he has placed these two pieces, together with the first two articles, in a single PDF file titled "Islam and the Issue of Homosexuality" on his website.

Since his article "On Sexual Minorities" was not found independently on the mentioned site, references to this article are made according to this version; but references to his other two articles are directly to the pages of the articles themselves, the PDF versions of which he has placed on his site.

[۲]. peter sprigg

[۳].Family Research Council in Washington, D.C.

[4]. Sprig, Peter. Debating Homosexuality: Understanding Two Views. Family research council. printed in the united states, 2011.

A report on this article in Persian can be read at the following address:

http://www.souzanchi.ir/debating-homosexuality-a-report/

[5]. sexual attraction

[6].sexual conduct

[7]..sexual self-identification

[8] . Of course, in all three of his articles, he attempts to draw a distinction between "sodomy" and "homosexual behavior," by adding components such as that the act of Lot's people was probably accompanied by other components in addition to this behavior; or that contemporary homosexual behavior is also accompanied by deep emotional and passionate dimensions; in the second section of the present writing, we will examine whether a justifiable reason has been presented for these claims, or whether these claims contradict what he himself has practically acknowledged in the background of the above statements?

[9] . In the article "The Paradox of Tolerance," he first explains that in the common view, the concept of "moral right" includes the two concepts of "permission of the act" and "the duty of others not to interfere"; then, to escape the intended paradox, he tries to retain only the second concept. Of course, in the article "An Unsuccessful Attempt to Defend the Paradox of the Right to be Unjust," I have shown that this move of his is not defensible. Nevertheless, it can be conjectured that, considering that article, here too, by "sexual right" he means the positive dimension of this issue (its permissibility for the homosexual individual), and by "moral right," he means "the duty of others not to interfere" and the necessity of respecting their beliefs.

[10] . Mr. Mostafa Hosseini Tabatabai wrote a critique of Mr. Naraghi's first article in 2005 titled "In Condemnation of Homosexuality"; and Mr. Naraghi responded on February 28, 2006, with a piece titled "About a Critique" (which was mentioned in footnote 1); and again Mr. Tabatabai responded on April 1, 2006, with a piece titled "Unsuccessful Considerations on Homosexuality"; and he points out Mr. Naraghi's errors in his latter response, to which there is no further reply from Mr. Naraghi.

[11]. An example given on Wikipedia for this fallacy is:

Kourosh: I speak Persian this fluently; so there is no doubt that I am from Iran.

Soroush: Your reasoning is incorrect. Afghans also speak Persian fluently; therefore, you are not Iranian.

[12] . Mr. Naraghi wrote the mentioned article in 2006 and provided no evidence for such a claim. This is while this action had not yet been legalized in many countries to be able to extract such statistics. Even in America, after the legalization of this act in 2013, the statistics presented by advocates of homosexuality for these individuals were slightly more than one and a half percent (1.8 percent among men, and 1.5 percent among women), and about 98 percent of men and women considered their "sexual status as 'straight' (meaning free from any deviant tendencies towards the same sex or bisexuality, etc.)

https://www.statista.com/statistics/248822/american-adults-who-identify-as-lesbian-gay-or-bisexual-by-gender/

which, as will become clear later in the text, this very statistic also lacks proper validity and is based on surveys conducted on the individuals themselves, and interestingly, 80% of these apparently homosexual individuals changed their opinion about themselves after a while; that is, in American society and according to statistics from proponents of homosexuality, only about three-tenths of a percent of individuals continued to identify as homosexual. Even more interesting is that according to Gallup Institute statistics, two years after this situation was formalized, i.e., in 2015, and despite the removal of legal barriers and the creation of facilitating laws for homosexuals, only 2.10 percent (i.e., one-tenth) of those who identified as homosexual entered into a same-sex marriage;

https://news.gallup.com/poll/212702/lgbt-adults-married-sex-spouse.aspx

All these statistics exist in an environment where there is intense media propaganda in favor of homosexuals, and they have managed to raise the percentage of those who advocate for the legalization of this practice from about 27 percent to 64 percent over the past 20 years:

https://www.statista.com/statistics/217962/opinion-of-legalization-of-same-sex-marriages-in-the-us/

Then, what justification is there for applying that unrealistic statistic to the 70-million-strong country of Iran, with its immense civilizational history where the public sphere of society has always been opposed to such behaviors, and declaring five million people from this population to be homosexual?

[۱۳] . Of course, even in these cases, merely being a minority is not a reason for being entitled to engage in their behavior. For example, there are individuals who are considered "insane" due to their internal natural system; but simply because their insanity is an internal matter does not grant them license to be left free to do anything.

[۱۴] . He wrote his article in 2011. Someone might think that a new result has been obtained in the past few years; but this is not the case. As an example, you can refer to the article (Genome-Wide Association Study of Male Sexual Orientation) presented in a 2017 article on the Nature website by a group who are advocates of homosexuality, where, despite their great effort to claim that DNA in a homosexual person differs from a normal person, they ultimately acknowledge that this matter is currently, at best, only at the level of an estimate and probability (though these potential connections are best characterized as speculative).

[۱۵] . Until 1973, reference books in psychology recognized "homosexuality," or more precisely "homosexual acts" (homosexuality), as a psychological disorder; as Freud believed paranoia and homosexuality were inseparable. From 1970, homosexuals held several large-scale marches in America, and through social pressure from advocates of these behaviors, the APA (American Psychiatric Association), which was responsible for compiling the DSM classification (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, a reference for psychiatrists and psychologists in America and some other countries), removed "homosexuality" from the category of mental disorders without any scientific evidence and with a research project, solely by a vote, and under conditions where, out of 15 members, two were absent, and its removal from the list of mental disorders was approved by a margin of one vote among those present! And hence, in 1974, the name homosexuality was no longer mentioned in the DSM! (As quoted from the American psychologist, Phil Hickey, in the article Homosexuality: The Mental Illness That Went Away)

[۱۶]. Savin-Williams

[۱۷]. Ream GL.

[18]. Entitled “Prevalence and Stability of Dimensions of Sexual Orientation During Adolescence and Young Adulthood”

Prevalence and stability of sexual orientation components during adolescence and young adulthood.

And a brief report of this research appears in the article “Is Sexual Orientation Change Possible?”

[19]. Love Thy Body: Answering Hard Questions about Life and Sexuality

[20] . transsexual

[21]. pansexual

[22]. transsexual

[23] . The text of her letter and the experts’ responses to her

[24] . Of course, if one is profound, one understands that their work is merely out of anti-Islamism, but for now we are not in the position of judging whether this opposition is warranted or not; rather, we have brought it up merely for the sake of argument and as evidence that they themselves also feel that not every sexual relationship should be legalized merely by the consent of the parties.

[25] . In the same article, “The Paradox of Tolerance,” he distinguishes between “being right” and “having a right” and claims there is no logical entailment between the two; and if we accept this statement, this very proposition (2), which was his goal, cannot be derived from proposition (1). And essentially, his critique ends right here; that is, based on his own words, even if the “right to be wrong” is correct, one cannot conclude that individuals have such a right!

But for now, we set aside this objection; because it seems that although in that article he correctly states that logically, “being right” and “having a right” are two different concepts, under normal conditions (that is, if there is no situation of conflict), the moral intuition of human beings indicates that the “rightness” of a belief or action entails “having a right” to believe in that belief or perform that action by a human; and of course, this moral intuition apparently proves this relationship in a one-way manner; meaning “having a right” does not necessarily entail “being right.”

In that article, he merely pointed to the conceptual difference between these two, but from this difference, he concluded a two-way lack of logical entailment; for such a deduction, he logically should have provided a reason. His phrasing – which, because he has presented both the antecedent and the consequent with a disjunctive composition, has practically created an ambiguity so that the audience does not precisely notice this conflation – is as follows:

“‘Being right’ is an attribute of a belief or action, and ‘having a right’ is an attribute of the holder of the belief or the agent of the action. A belief or action can be right or wrong, but it is only the individual holding the belief or the agent of the action who can be a right-holder or not.”

[26]. In that article, he first says that “moral right” is composed of the two concepts of “permissibility of the action” and “the duty of others not to interfere”; then he tries to exclude the first concept from the meaning of “moral right.” In the critique referred to in the text, it has been shown that he has not really succeeded in this claim; but here, the fact that he accepts that “the duty of others not to interfere” is a logical requisite of a moral right is sufficient for our current discussion.

[27] . In other words, the very existence of this condition can expose the paradoxical nature of the original claim. Mr. Naraghi considers adherence to the rule of “not violating the fundamental rights of others” to be a “right”; but another person may not accept this right and may wish, from Mr. Naraghi’s perspective, to “be in the wrong”; therefore, the requirement of the “right to be in the wrong” is that the right to violate this rule be preserved for that individual, meaning, for example, if someone felt like slapping another person in the ear (which, from Mr. Naraghi’s perspective, is “wrong” because it violates the fundamental rights of others), then his “right to be in the wrong” for this act must be recognized; and not only should he not be prevented, but he should be respected for having acted according to his own view!

[28] . The above statement does not mean that, in the author’s view, no logical relationship whatsoever exists between “is” and “ought,” and that any epistemic movement from “is” to “ought” is impossible. Rather, the author believes that, contrary to the claims of Hume’s followers, one can defend the relationship between “is” and “ought” in certain specific domains; but whatever the case, those domains have particular requirements, and homosexual behaviors are not an instance of those domains. The connection between “is” and “ought” by reference to the audience’s intuitive understanding is utilized in the next paragraph; and of course, a logical analysis of that intuitive understanding requires another occasion.

[29] . It seems that the people of Lot also held such a position; for on the one hand, they insisted on homosexual relations, and on the other hand, they spoke of having no right in other matters: “They said, ‘You certainly know that we have no right to your daughters, and indeed, you well know what we want!’” (Hud/79)

[30] . This critique can also be leveled against liberalism from another angle: If you consider freedom to be the most important human right, why have you limited it to this domain (non-aggression against others)?

If they answer that it is because the other party is also a “human being,” the question is: What is the criterion for being human that limits “my freedom to aggress against him”?

If the criterion for being human is merely this skin and flesh, this body, or its possession of life, what advantage does this living body have over, for example, the living body of a sheep or a living carrot plant?!

And if this right stems from his “humanity,” meaning there is a unique characteristic in humans that is not present in other living beings (animals and plants), then only and solely that which aligns with that unique characteristic can be considered a “right.”

[31] . Another critique can be made of the aforementioned argument, which is “the lack of logical entailment between ‘believing something to be right’ and ‘acting upon that thing.’”

In fact, the “right to be in the wrong” relies on the presupposition that any act a person commits, that person necessarily believes in its “rightness” and “worthiness”; whereas, both in the realm of social life and in the realm of ethical behaviors, the contrary of this claim can clearly be demonstrated; that is, a person undertakes something while acknowledging its wrongfulness.

Examples such as a doctor who smokes while accepting the harms of smoking; or many sinners suffering from a guilty conscience; or individuals’ regret over an action they performed in a state of anger, easily show that a person may, in the depths of their being, consider an act wrongful and unjust, but due to the dominance of non-cognitive elements such as lust, anger, and so on, in a situation, and even for many years, undertake that act and even become notorious for it.

So it is not the case that those who engage in this behavior necessarily consider it right, so that it could be said, “Everyone has the right to act as they deem permissible.”

(Of course, this critique applies to the generality and inclusiveness of his argument for defending homosexuality as the “right of homosexuals”; and it shows that this argument practically ignores the many individuals who know this act is bad and yet commit it, and indeed tries to suggest to them that just because you perform this act, do not feel distressed!)

[32]. Elaborating on this point requires another occasion. It is only noted that the argument based on fitrah (innate nature) rests on a particular analysis of “human dignity” that considers humans fundamentally different from animals, granting dignity to the former—and not to animals. In this argument, fitrah is not merely a natural, animalistic matter such that the presence or absence of such an inclination in animals could serve as evidence for or against this claim; and fundamentally, because humans possess a specific meaning of dignity, “human rights” become an ethical category. The significance of taking the concept of fitrah seriously can be discerned in section 2.3, which addressed the “incorrect understanding of the right to freedom.”

[33] . Outrage: How Gay Activists and Liberal Judges are Trashing Democracy to Redefine Marriage

[34] . Timothy Dailey

[35] . Getting it Straight: What the Research Shows about Homosexuality

[36] . Myths

[37]. These myths, which the authors attempt to expose as false, are as follows:

That some people are born homosexual; that 10 percent of people are homosexual; that homosexuals are socially disadvantaged and have a history of discrimination and persecution; that homosexuality does not pose significant health and medical risks; that homosexual parents do not pose a threat to their children; and that there is no serious link between homosexuality and child sexual abuse.

You can read a brief report on that book here.

[38] . Debating Homosexuality, Understanding Two Views.

In footnote 4, it was noted that a Persian report of this article is available.

[39] . gynecologic cancers

[40] . pedophilia

[41] . mili fontana

[42]. She presented these points in a speech against the legalization of homosexuality, the file of which is easily accessible online. You can find small parts of it with Persian subtitles on “Aparat.”

[43]. “He said, ‘Indeed, I am, toward your practice, of the detesters’” (Qur’an 26:168). Note that the particle “inna” and the particle “la-” are both for emphasis (hence, in translation, the words “indeed” and “certainly” were used), and because the phrase “li-‘amalikum” is a prepositional phrase dependent on “al-qalin” and is placed before it, based on the grammatical rule “bringing forward what is due to be delayed indicates exclusivity,” it conveys the meaning of exclusivity and “only”; and it is for this reason that it was translated as “only from your practice, and not from yourselves.”

[44] . Martyr Motahhari refers to these two with the terms “piety of strength” and “piety of weakness.” Piety of strength is when one is in the arena, an inclination arises within them, and they restrain themselves; but piety of weakness is when one essentially removes themselves from the arena of social life. (Motahhari, Ten Discourses, pp. 21-23) Of course, in the view of believers, piety of weakness is better than impiety; but its rank is certainly far lower than piety of strength.

[45]. Apparently, he meant “correct,” and a slip of the pen occurred in his writing of the article.

[46] . This matter was explained to some extent in section 2.5, in the context of explaining “the fundamental rights of others.”

[47]. I have elaborated on the critique of this simplistic view regarding the relationship between Sharia rulings and ethics in the article “A Philosophical Reflection on the Relationship between Jurisprudence and Ethics.”

[48] . The core claim of Mr. Naraghi in the article “Is Ethics Dependent on Religion?” is the primacy of secular ethics over religious beliefs and legal rulings. This claim stems from an incorrect understanding of “moral intuitions” and “legal rulings,” which I have explained in detail in the article “A Philosophical Reflection on the Relationship Between Jurisprudence and Ethics” (Āyīn-i Ḥikmat Quarterly, no. 39) (you can download the full file from the website “http://www.souzanchi.ir/”).

[49]. Mr. Naraghi quotes a passage from Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusī, who is among the forefathers of the contemporary Takfīrī movement, which any reader who reads Ibn Ḥazm’s original text in full would easily realize the flimsiness of his disputes; interestingly, Mr. Naraghi, even in translating his phrases and in order to show him as fully in agreement with himself, does not observe fidelity in quotation and translates the sentence “أَن الرجْمَ الذِی أَصَابَهُمْ لَمْ یکُنْ لِلْفَاحِشَهِ وَحْدَهَا، لَکِنْ لِلْکُفْرِ وَلَهَا” (Al-Muḥallā bi-l-Āthār, vol. 12, p. 394) as “that rain of stones that came upon them as their punishment was not for that specific vile act, but rather because of their disbelief,” and in the translation ignores the word “و لها” (which indicates that, in Ibn Ḥazm’s view, both disbelief and sodomy were the cause of their punishment). Interestingly, Ibn Ḥazm himself begins this discussion by stating the vileness and reprehensibility of sodomy, and at the end of the discussion also explicitly states that, although due to the disputes he has raised he opposes the death penalty for the sodomite, he emphasizes the necessity of punishment and discretionary chastisement for such a person.

[50]. From him in the Noble Qur’an, apart from directly warning against that heinous act, the expression “أَ لا تَتَّقُونَ… فَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ وَ أَطیعُونِ” (Al-Shu‘arā’/161-163) appears only once, and immediately in the following verses it becomes clear that the referent of his call to piety was also abstention from that same act; and in that very place he also explicitly states that I have a problem with this act of yours: “قالَ إِنِّی لِعَمَلِکُمْ مِنَ الْقالین” (Al-Shu‘arā’/168).

[51] . The people of Lot were among the most excellent people God created, and Iblīs pursued them with intense pursuit … (Al-Maḥāsin, vol. 1, pp. 110–111; Al-Kāfī, vol. 5, pp. 544–546; Thawāb al-A‘māl wa ‘Iqāb al-A‘māl, pp. 264–266)

[52]. Prophet Lot referred to what his people were doing with the expression “al-fāḥishah”: “وَ لُوطاً إِذْ قالَ لِقَوْمِهِ أَ تَأْتُونَ الْفاحِشَهَ…” (Al-A‘rāf/80) “وَ لُوطاً إِذْ قالَ لِقَوْمِهِ أَ تَأْتُونَ الْفاحِشَهَ…” (Al-Naml/54) “وَ لُوطاً إِذْ قالَ لِقَوْمِهِ إِنَّکُمْ لَتَأْتُونَ الْفاحِشَهَ…” (Al-‘Ankabūt/28)

“Fāḥishah” refers to an act whose ugliness and repulsiveness is extremely severe and manifest (literary points), such that no moral human being would deem it permissible, and it is an act whose commission is at the command of Satan and an instance of following him: “الشَّیطانُ… یأْمُرُکُمْ بِالْفَحْشاءِ” (Al-Baqarah/248). And the fact that Prophet Lot, when referring to this act, added the definite article “al-” to “fāḥishah” intensifies this ugliness further, because either the “al-” is for definition, intending to say that it is the “fāḥishah” whose being a “fāḥishah” is so evident to human intellects that it is completely well-known and recognized; or it is the generic “al-” which in such cases is used for hyperbole in a matter, as if due to the intensity of its being a “fāḥishah” it is the epitome of all fawāḥish, unlike “zinā” (adultery), for which, although its ugliness is very manifest, the Noble Qur’an, when prohibiting it, mentions it without the “al-”; meaning it is one fāḥishah among fawāḥish: “وَ لا تَقْرَبُوا الزِّنی‏ إِنَّهُ کانَ فاحِشَهً” (Al-Isrā’/32) (Al-Baḥr al-Muḥīṭ, vol. 5, p. 99). So the act of homosexuals is one whose ugliness and repulsiveness is extremely severe and manifest, an act far more vile than adultery (for which the Qur’an has repeatedly insisted on severe punishment for its perpetrators; e.g., Al-Nūr/1); and it is a clear instance of following Satan.

[53] One might ask why, despite being God-worshippers and apparently having a good record, they were punished. Does not faith ultimately save a person? Perhaps the answer to this question can be found in the hadiths that introduce modesty (ḥayāʾ) and faith as inseparable companions, such that if one departs, the other does not remain (الْحَیَاءُ وَ الْإِیمَانُ مَقْرُونَانِ فِی قَرَنٍ فَإِذَا ذَهَبَ أَحَدُهُمَا تَبِعَهُ صَاحِبُهُ. al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 106); and since modesty had departed from among them, no faith remained in that society.

[54]. Apparently it should have been written "ندارد" [does not have]; a slip of the pen likely occurred.

[55]. In the book The Meaning, Possibility, and Strategies for Realizing Religious Science, pp. 180-182

[56] As the Commander of the Faithful, peace be upon him, said: «الرَّاضِی بِفِعْلِ قَوْمٍ کَالدَّاخِلِ فِیهِ مَعَهُم: One who is pleased with the action of a people is like one who enters into it with them.» (Nahj al-Balāgha, Wisdom 154)

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PDF file of this article

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Islam, Ethics, and Homosexuality: A Critique of Arash Naraghi

Author: Hossein Souzanchi / Qom, Baqir al-Olum University, peace be upon him / 15 Dey 1397

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