The Relationship Between Islamic Ethics and Liberal Ethics, in an Interview with Arash Naraghi

* As a first question, please explain what differences exist between Islamic ethics and liberal ethics at the various levels of applied ethics, normative ethics, and meta-ethics, and to which level do the differences in the moral principles of these two primarily pertain?

ـ In my view, ethics is fundamentally and inherently independent of religions and ideologies, and is not essentially bound by qualifiers such as “Islamic” or “liberal.” In other words, the validity or invalidity of moral judgments must be determined on a basis independent of religions and ideologies, that is, on a rational basis. Therefore, in this sense, there is no such thing as “Islamic ethics” or “liberal ethics.” However, of course, within the realm of independent ethics and permissible moralities, individuals may, according to their specific needs and goals (which may well align with their religious or ideological beliefs), make selections, grant special precedence and priority to certain values, and thereby organize different moral systems within the realm of permissible ethics. In this respect, one might possibly speak of something called “Islamic ethics” or “liberal ethics.”

* I mean more the ethics nurtured in Islamic culture or the ethics nurtured in liberal culture.

ـ Therefore, what is meant here by “Islamic ethics” is the ethics nurtured within the Islamic tradition and based on authentic Islamic sources, namely the Quran and the Sunnah. And presumably, what is meant by “liberal ethics” is an ethics that is compatible and consistent with the beliefs and priorities of liberal ideology. The truth, of course, is that it is difficult to find a single moral system under the title “Islamic” or “liberal.” But perhaps, based on a kind of family resemblance, one could call a constellation of moral systems more or less “Islamic” and a constellation of moral systems more or less “liberal.”

Given these premises, as a first step, it is good to distinguish between two types of values within the realm of what is called Islamic ethics: The first type or level can be called “transcendent values,” meaning values that are fundamental in this moral system and take precedence and priority over other values in that system. From a religious perspective, commitment to them is a necessary condition for being moral, and hence a condition for the Muslim individual’s nearness to God. In my opinion, in Quranic ethics, the virtues of justice and benevolence (ihsan) stand at the forefront of these transcendent values.

Justice and benevolence are absolute values and the guiding principles of the Islamic moral system. However, these transcendent values must be realized in the real world in accordance with the specific historical and social context of the moral agents. In other words, the external realization of justice within a primitive society may well have forms and requirements that are not valid or relevant in the context of a post-industrial society. The supreme value of justice or benevolence is, in one sense, universal, but the manner and mode of their realization can differ according to historical and social situations. Therefore, the second category of values are those arising from and suited to specific historical, cultural, and social situations.

Thus, the Quranic value-moral system is a synthesis of transcendent and supreme values, and values suited to the Arab society at the time of the revelation. For example, the ethics of the pre-Islamic Arabs was an ethics based on the concept of “muruwwa.” “Muruwwa” derives from the root “mar’” meaning “manliness.” And this ethics, which was largely based on “masculine” values necessary for survival in the harsh conditions of desert life, was, in a way, reflected in the text of Quranic ethics—with some important modifications. For example, the five fundamental values of pre-Islamic Arab ethics, namely generosity, loyalty, truthfulness, patience, and courage, also continued in Quranic ethics. Of course, the Quranic conception of these virtues differs from the pre-Islamic conception. For instance, generosity in pre-Islamic Arab culture was mostly motivated by a desire for a good reputation, and in most cases was extravagant and placed the generous person’s family in hardship. But in Quranic ethics, the motivation for generosity became seeking God’s pleasure instead of seeking fame, and a limit was set for it.

*: You believe that the moral principles traceable in Islamic culture have two levels: one is the general and transcendent level, and the other is its descended and concretized level, which, when it seeks to become concrete, is compelled to adapt to and utilize the culture of its time?

—Yes, that is correct. A substantial part of what we call Islamic ethics is, in fact, a moderated form of the ethics current among the people. If this is the case, it is natural that changes in the conditions of human life necessitate, in turn, the alteration and moderation of the ethical system at the second level. But the guiding principle in these changes consists of those sublime and transcendental principles. For example, a Muslim in today's society, while obliged to adhere to the original principle of justice and benevolence, must also know that the realization of those principles within the context of contemporary society has requirements that must be properly recognized and pursued. We are still duty-bound to realize the ideal of justice (for instance) in our society, but we must find the instances of justness, and the appropriate methods for realizing those instances, within the context of our contemporary society, and commit ourselves to them. Those instances and methods may well differ from the second level of ethics that has traditionally been considered “Islamic.”

* Right here, if you agree, make a comparison between the concept of “justice” as the most important transcendent value of Islamic ethics and “freedom and the individual's right to choose” as the most important value of liberalism, and what relationship these focal values of these two ethical systems have with one another.

—Before answering this question, I would like to add a supplement to my previous explanations about Islamic ethics. Religious ethics is a subset of ethics in the general sense. In this case, the question arises: what makes that ethics “religious”? The principle of justice and compassion is not exclusive to Islam. Any acceptable ethical system must respect these values—even if the arrangement and ranking of values in those systems are not identical. In my view, what makes a permissible ethical system religious is that observing and acting upon it provides the possibility of religious and spiritual experiences for its agents in a more effective way. That is, the religious person chooses from among the permissible ethical systems the one that is more commensurate with the flourishing of their spiritual life, and more effectively brings them closer to God. In Islamic ethics, the rule is not the performance of a “good deed,” but the performance of a “righteous deed.” A “righteous deed” is a good deed performed with the intention of seeking nearness to God. Every righteous deed is necessarily good, but not every good deed is necessarily an instance of a righteous deed. Therefore, when one speaks of “Islamic ethics,” this ethics must be bound by two constraints: first, that it falls within the realm of permissible ethics, meaning the validity of its ethical principles can be independently investigated and verified. But in addition to that, it must also be performed with the intention of seeking nearness to God. It is in this case that your good deeds are transformed into righteous deeds, and acquire value from a religious (and not merely ethical) perspective.

Thus, the Islamic ethical system should be considered an ethical system centered on justice and benevolence, whose most important ultimate goal is the intention of seeking nearness and drawing closer to God.

On the other hand, however, what is called “liberal ethics” is also a constellation of ethical systems that are related to one another through a kind of family resemblance and certain fundamental assumptions and values. But before I offer explanations about these characteristics, I would like to point out a distinction that is important in our discussion. In my view, we must distinguish between “liberalism” (Liberalism), the liberal polity (Liberal Polity), and liberal ethics (Liberal Ethics). Liberalism is a political theory that considers the most important duty of the state to be securing and guaranteeing the fundamental political and civil rights of the individuals in society, including individual and social freedoms (such as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of conscience and religion, and the like). The liberal polity, however, is in fact a kind of arrangement in the political institutions of society that protects and guarantees some of the fundamental freedoms of society. An individual may not believe in the theory of liberalism, but for certain considerations (including pragmatic considerations) may find the liberal polity defensible. And finally, liberal ethics is a type of ethics in which the ultimate and primary unit of ethical action and judgment is the human individual and their rights. That is, in this ethics, the concept of “right” (especially autonomy and the right to choose) as well as the concept of the “individual” play an important role.

These three categories (i.e., liberalism, the liberal socio-political structure, and liberal ethics) are interrelated, but it does not seem that any one necessarily entails the other. That is, an individual can consistently affirm one without the other. However, under normal circumstances, it appears that those who believe in liberalism inevitably strive to realize a liberal political structure in order to secure and guarantee the rights of the members of society, especially the rights that express and guarantee human autonomy and the right to choose.

On this basis, in my view, the cornerstone of liberal ethics can be considered the recognition of the human being's "right to be wrong." The liberal political structure is a kind of socio-political order within whose framework every sane, adult human being possesses the freedom to choose their own desired broad and comprehensive views about God and the good, and also to be able to organize their life based on their own conception.

Of course, it seems that in religious and Islamic ethics, the most important end is nearness to God. This is probably the most important difference between Islamic ethics and liberal ethics.

Of course, you can find common elements between so-called Islamic ethics and so-called liberal ethics. For example, in the value system of the Quran, the concept of the "individual" holds a distinguished place. You know that in the moral system of the pre-Islamic Arabs, tribalism held a distinguished place, and individuals, rather than being subject to moral judgment by virtue of their individual character, were identified and judged as members of a tribe. The individual was dissolved and absorbed into the tribe. If an individual from a tribe committed a wrongdoing, all members of the tribe were considered responsible in some way, and each of them could be considered a legitimate target for revenge. But in Quranic ethics, this tribalism was strongly negated, and the individual, by virtue of their individual character, was considered responsible for their actions. In Quranic ethics, it is the individual who must stand alone before God and be answerable for their deeds. Therefore, you can observe in the Quran the birth of a kind of ethical individualism in contrast to the pre-Islamic tribalistic ethics. Of course, this does not mean that Quranic individualism is identical to liberal individualism. For example, in liberal ethics, the human individual is considered autonomous and in their essence, and the main goal is to guarantee their right to choose. But in Quranic ethics, although the individual is important, that individual must always view themselves in relation to God (and not as autonomous and self-subsisting), and the most important goal of their moral-religious life is to attain greater nearness to God…

* I think it wouldn't be bad to also point out the difference between the two focal principles of justice and freedom, where justice is the focal principle of Islamic ethics and freedom is the focal principle of liberalism, and whether in Islamic ethics freedom is defined under justice or not?

— In my opinion, today in the field of religious ethics, we must answer this important question: whether, as a Muslim, we can recognize a political structure in which the right to choose and the free will of human beings is respected or not. In other words, a Muslim individual may not be reconciled with philosophical liberalism, and may consider it incorrect or incomplete based on rational and faith-based reasons. But this individual can still (and in my view, should) independently think about and judge the necessity and desirability of the liberal political structure. Therefore, the main question for them will not be whether religion is compatible with liberalism or not. The main question for them becomes: can a Muslim individual, as a Muslim, defend a social and political structure in which the individual is respected, and can freely organize their life based on their own conception of goodness and happiness, and the role of the state is to secure and guarantee the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, or not? Can a Muslim, by virtue of being a Muslim, consistently defend the liberal political structure (and not necessarily the political theory of liberalism)?

My answer to this question is affirmative. That is, in my view, a Muslim, by virtue of being a Muslim, can (and I believe should) accept this type of political structure – that is, a political structure in which the "right to be wrong" of citizens is recognized.

اما پیش از آنکه دلایل این مدعا را بیان کنم، مایلم به این نکته اشاره کنم که ما دو نوع گرایش به لیبرالیسم و ساخت سیاسی لیبرال داریم: یک نوع آن را می توان گرایش عمل گرایانه نامید، که به نظرم در میان پاره ای از متفکران و مصلحان معاصر ما، از جمله مرحوم مهندس مهدی بازرگان، دیده می شود. این نوع گرایش را می توان نوعی لیبرالیسم منفی یا “لیبرالیسم ترس” نامید. لیبرالیسم ترس عمیقاً نگران “قساوت” است، و مهمترین دغدغه آن پیشگیری از وقوع و شیوع آن است. قساوت شنیع ترین رذیلتی است که جامعه و خصوصاً جامعه دینی باید در دفع آن بکوشد. منظور من از “قساوت” عبارت است از هرگونه فشار فیزیکی و روانی که بر افراد ضعیف وارد می شود تا آنها را مرعوب، مغلوب، مضطرب، و پریشان سازد. از نظر مرحوم بازرگان چهره زشت استبداد را می توان در وجه قساوت آمیز آن، و لگدکوب کردن حرّیت و کرامت ذاتی انسانها دید. مهمترین تجلّی این قساوت سلب امکان مختارانه زیستن است. مهمترین خشونتی که نسبت به یک انسان ورزیده می شود آن است که به او اجازه ندهند خود مصالح زندگی اش را تشخیص دهد، و زندگی خویش را آنچنان که شایسته می داند سامان دهد. در هر حال، هراس از قساوت، و تلاش برای زدودن آن مهمترین انگیزه ای است که افراد را به سوی تأسیس ساخت سیاسی لیبرالی می راند.

بر یک مسلمان هم فرض است که در مقابله با قساوت بکوشد، و از جمله تلاش کند تا شرایطی را در جامعه تحقق بخشد که شهروندان از آفت این رذیلت عظیم ایمن بمانند.

اما در نسلهای بعدی روشنفکران دینی (مثلاً در آرای عبدالکریم سروش) ما با نوع دیگری از تمایل به لیبرالیسم و ساخت سیاسی لیبرال روبرو هستیم، این نوع لیبرالیسم را می توان “لیبرالیسم نظری” دانست. این لیبرالیسم را می توان نوعی لیبرالیسم مثبت یا به تعبیر دقیقتر “لیبرالیسم حقوق” نامید. در اینجا دفاع از ساخت سیاسی لیبرالیسم صرفاً ناشی از هراس از قساوت نیست، یعنی ارزش ابزاری این ساخت سیاسی در دفاع از قساوت تنها یا مهمترین عامل مطلوبیت آن ساخت سیاسی تلقی نمی شود. بلکه علاوه بر آن اعتقاد بر این است که ساخت سیاسی لیبرال حافظ حقوق انسانها است، و رعایت حقوق انسانها به ذات خود محترم و ارزشمند است، و البته مهمترین مصداق این حقوق هم “حقّ انتخاب آزاد” یا به تعبیر دقیقتر “حقّ ناحقّ بودن” است.

اما یک فرد مسلمان چگونه می تواند در چارچوب سنت اسلامی “حقّ ناحقّ بودن” را برسمیت بشناسد؟

همانطور که می دانیم غالب حکیمان اعتزالی و اشعری (هر دو گروه) معتقد بودند که تصدیق اسلام در گرو آن است که فرد با پای عقل خود صدق و اعتبار اسلام را دریابد. یعنی اسلام آوردن باید بر مبنایی عقلانی و مقدم بر دین صورت پذیرد. در این صورت شرط لازم مسلمانی آن است که فضای تحقیق و گزینش عقلانی و آزاد در جامعه مسلمین گشوده باشد. به بیان دیگر، شرط لازم دین باوری و دین ورزی آن است که شرایط لازم برای تعقل مستقل و آزاد در جامعه تأمین و تضمین شود. از جمله اقتضائات این امر آن است که نهادهای سیاسی و اجتماعی در جامعه چنان سامان یابد که امکان تحقیق، مطالعه و تعقل آزاد و مستقل در جامعه فراهم باشد، و افراد جامعه بتوانند آزادانه خرد بورزند. اما به محض آنکه شما امکان خردورزی و امکان تحقیق آزاد و مستقل را در جامعه برسمیت بشناسید، لاجرم امکان خطا کردن و ناحق بودن را هم باید برسمیت بشناسید. به این معناست که به نظر من مسلمانان می باید از ساختار سیاسی ای که فضای خردورزی مستقل و به تبع امکان خطاکردن و ناحقّ بودن را تضمین می کند حمایت نمایند. و این به معنای پذیرش و دفاع از نوعی ساخت سیاسی لیبرال (و نه لزوماً نظریه لیبرالیسم) است.

* از سخنان شما اين‌گونه برمي‌آيد كه معتقديد نسل اول روشنفکران دینی مثل مهندس بازرگان ، چندان توجهي به «حق ناحق بودن» نداشتند. آيا به نظرتان روشنفکران ديني بعد از انقلاب این «حق ناحق بودن» را به رسمیت شناخته‌اند و آیا از نظر آن‌ها دگرباشان و دگراندیشان می‌توانند از «حق ناحق ناحق» بودن استفاده کنند؟

ـ In my view, the general atmosphere prevailing over religious intellectualism after the revolution has placed greater emphasis on the “right to be wrong,” and the effort to recognize it in both theory and practice. Pre-revolution religious intellectualism, influenced by Quranic literature and leftist political literature, had a justice-oriented discourse, but in my opinion, after the Islamic Revolution, religious intellectuals’ understanding of the category of justice gained greater depth and precision. Among other things, our intellectuals, including religious intellectuals, realized that justice is not achieved in society unless the fundamental rights of human beings, including their right to choose and their right to be wrong, are recognized. It is in this sense that I believe religious intellectuals after the revolution arrived at a deeper understanding of the necessity of seeking freedom and realized that the realization of the Quranic ideal of justice depends on recognizing the rights of human beings. Respecting human rights is a condition for the realization of a just society. It is for this reason that in almost all the important branches of the religious intellectual movement in post-revolution Iran, the issue of human rights has become a central and important issue.

But in addition to what I have said, I would also like to add that the late Ayatollah Mehdi Haeri Yazdi, in his book *Hekmat va Hokumat* (Wisdom and Governance), developed a noteworthy argument that, in my view, a reading of it can be employed as an independent argument in support of the right to be wrong at the political and social level. The gist of his argument is that the public sphere of society is the joint property of all citizens, and all partners have an equal share in it. And the requirement of the principle of justice is that the affairs of this joint property be managed in such a way that the rights of all partners are observed fairly. In my view, the implication of this argument is that binding policies and laws in the public sphere must be formulated and managed in such a way that the rights of all partners in this joint property are preserved, and those laws should not be based solely on foundations that are only verifiable and justifiable for a specific group of those partners. In other words, the majority must not behave and make decisions in a way that tramples upon the rights of the minority. Of course, he employed the concept of joint property to defend the moral and religious necessity of democracy, but in my view, his argument necessarily entails the recognition of the “right to be wrong” as well.

* You identified the ultimate goal of Islamic ethics as nearness to God. On this basis, opponents of the “right to be wrong” could argue that the right to be wrong and the pluralism resulting from liberalism might steer the atmosphere of society in a direction that distances Muslims from nearness to God, and from this perspective, they could oppose liberalism. What is your response to them?

ـ I certainly understand the concern of this group of believers. However, in my view, this argument has at least two fundamental flaws:

The first flaw is that it seems to prefer imitative religiosity and faith over investigative religiosity and faith. If we accept that nearness to God depends on accepting the true religion, and if we accept that a precondition for accepting the true religion is the openness of the possibility for free and independent reasoning, then we must also accept that the openness of a space for free and independent reasoning in society is also a precondition for nearness to God. Proponents of a political structure that closes off the space of freedom and reasoning to citizens are, in fact, preferring imitative religiosity and faith over investigative religiosity and faith. In reality, these individuals, out of fear of deviation in religion, are cutting the roots of religion itself.

On the other hand, as we have seen, a political structure in which the right to be wrong is respected is a condition for justice and fairness, and a political structure that does not recognize the right to be wrong for citizens and tries to build a uniform society in accordance with what it itself considers right, is in fact trampling upon the rights of other citizens who live in that society. Do these individuals believe that the path to nearness to God passes through trampling upon the rights and dignity of other human beings? In my view, the liberal political structure both keeps open the possibility for investigative religiosity and faith, and because of the respect it holds for the rights and dignity of all citizens (solely by virtue of their citizenship), it is in a superior position from a moral perspective. And in my view, our path to God passes through respect for creation and reverence for morality.

Let me also add that those who believe that by negating freedom and the right to choose, and by suppressing and violating citizens' rights, they must prevent "deviation" in religion, in fact harbor doubts about the truth of religion, or at least about reason's ability to defend the sanctity of faith. It is as if these individuals, in their heart of hearts, believe that religion cannot emerge from the clash and arena of opinions with its head held high and its honor intact. As if, from their perspective, belief in God and religious teachings is ultimately something unreasonable and even contrary to reason, and therefore opening up the space for reasoning and free choice will ultimately be to the detriment of religion and religiosity. These individuals also consider human reason, in the final analysis, to be weak and unreliable.

In my view, all of these presuppositions are incorrect: religion can perfectly well emerge from the arena of opinions with its honor intact and its head held high, and reason can perfectly well, through free inquiry, affirm the eternal values of religious thought and life, and accept them as a rational and ethical basis for a noble life. The condition for the flourishing of religious thought and life is absolutely not the suppression of reason and the humiliation of human beings. In my opinion, rational inquiry and freedom can more effectively lead to the flourishing of religion and its positive impact on human life.

* Another point is that a segment of religious intellectuals, such as Engineer Bazargan, believe in the intrinsic goodness and badness of actions and thoughts. While holding a belief in the intrinsic goodness and badness of actions, can one still subscribe to and accept ethical liberalism and liberal pluralism?

— I believe the answer is yes. My assumption is that what you mean by believing in intrinsic or rational goodness and badness is a commitment to a kind of realism in the realm of meta-ethics. In this case, ethical liberalism, at least for many moral philosophers such as Locke, Kant, or Mill, has been based on a kind of moral realism. The realist believes in an objective distinction between right and wrong, but at the same time, believes that the right to be wrong is also among the objective rights of human beings—that is, they recognize the right to be wrong based on objective reasons. In any case, I believe that a commitment to moral realism is in no way incompatible with ethical liberalism. Ethical liberalism is based on the centrality of the individual and their rights and freedoms, and there is nothing in moral realism that contradicts these fundamental presuppositions.

* In your opinion, can a religious person and a Muslim act more ethically and be more devout in a democratic society than in a non-democratic one?

— I think it is entirely possible for an individual to draw closer to God even in a non-democratic society. For example, many of the great figures in the history of our religious culture lived and were nurtured in non-democratic societies, and in that world found their own path to God.

However, in my view, in today's world, the most ethical political and social structure is that political structure in which the rights and dignity of human beings are better preserved and respected, and their existence and identity are not trampled by oppression and cruelty. As far as I can judge, within the context of an ethical society, the possibility of practicing religion is far more readily available. Ethics is a precondition for scholarly, investigative, and humane religious practice. That is, if corruption rains down from every wall and door of a society, and cruelty, heartlessness, and lack of compassion are the common currency, the human spirit becomes darkened and withered. We are deeply affected by the world in which we live. A sick society sickens and withers the souls of its inhabitants as well. And a darkened and withered soul has less aptitude and possibility for perceiving spiritual subtleties and experiencing flashes of the sacred. Therefore, I believe that societies with religious and spiritual concerns should strive to create an atmosphere where being ethical and living ethically is the rule, not the exception. In a society where living ethically is only possible for heroes and saints, religion and spirituality also suffer from deficiency and crisis.

Moreover, in my view, the most important pillar of spiritual life consists of relationships of the kind (in Martin Buber's terms) "I-Thou," or, in the terms of our mystics, relationships of a loving nature—that is, a relationship that takes shape between two dignified beings, freely and on the basis of mutual respect. But in societies where human beings fall victim to violence, these "I"s and "Thou"s are transformed from persons into objects, and thus the delicate human relationships of the "I-Thou" kind are transformed into relationships of the "I-It" or even "It-It" kind, meaning a relationship between "person-object" or "object-object." And the closing of the door to "I-Thou" human relationships plunges spiritual experiences into crisis as well. Therefore, observing the rights and dignity of human beings, and opening up the space for rational inquiry and free choice, is to open the doors of spirituality and the paths of nearness to God. In my opinion, religion is for the flourishing of the human personality and psyche, and this flourishing takes shape within the context of a creative, aesthetic, and freely chosen relationship with God. And it is within this space that religion can serve the transcendence of humankind. But if religion itself is to become a factor for the humiliation and repression of human beings, then it acts against faith and will not open a path to God, even though it may be a commodity for traffickers. Therefore, a religion that guides us toward God is one that respects the rights and dignity of human beings. And for this reason, even if Muslims do not favor the theory of liberalism in theoretical terms, it is incumbent upon them to strive to establish a political and social order in which the fundamental rights of human beings are respected, and the dignity of the individual human being is safe from the blade of violence and cruelty.

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[1] This interview was conducted by Mr. Bijan Momivand. The text of the interview, titled "The Liberalism of Fear or Negative Liberalism in Bazargan's Views: The Relationship Between Islamic Ethics and Liberal Ethics," was published in the monthly Mehrnameh, Year 2, Issue 18, January 2012.

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PDF file of the interview on The Relationship Between Islamic Ethics and Liberal Ethics

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Interview: The Relationship Between Islamic Ethics and Liberal Ethics

Published on the personal website of Dr. Arash Naraghi | August 2013

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