The Book “Legal Veiling in the Prophet’s Era” by Amirhossein Torkashvand

In the solar year 1390 (2011–2012), a book was released in online media under the title: Legal Veiling in the Prophet’s Era, authored by Amirhossein Torkashvand. The book quickly drew attention and was welcomed by Muslim researchers, and later by a number of non-religious researchers as well, soon finding a large readership. I received the book by email right at the outset, but after a while I realized that it had been distributed and read on an extensive, almost unprecedented scale via email and through publication in online media. A reception that continues to this day. At that time I did not know the author and had not even heard his name. Although I still do not know him personally and have not had the honor of a direct acquaintance.

Given the importance of this significant work, which in my view is epoch-making in contemporary Islamic studies, I will endeavor in this article to introduce it in two parts: the first part introduces the book’s particulars and a summary of its content, and the second part provides an account of the work’s scholarly and research significance and the author-researcher’s fresh perspective on Islamic texts and sources, specifically his radically critical interpretive and jurisprudential approach to the veiling of the Muslim woman. In a third part, I will also touch upon a few necessary points.

A. The Book’s Particulars and Content Introduction

According to the introduction on the book’s first page, the book was submitted to the Ministry of Islamic Guidance in 1389 (2010–2011) for a publication license and even reached the pre-publication cataloging stage (FIPA), but it met with opposition from the censorship officials of the said ministry, and therefore, at least until now, the book has not been officially published in print in Iran. The author, however, was compelled to first make the book available to certain individuals via email and possibly by hand and in person, and then published it on his blog[1] and thereafter it was published on several other blogs as well. The author has provided a report on the fate of his book on that same personal blog (including posts 13 and 22). The reason for this initial limited distribution is also stated on the book’s first page: “This book has been provided solely for the use and examination of you, the religious researcher. Refrain from reflecting its contents and publishing news about it, except in research books and dissertations.” However, due to the public reception of the book, the book and news related to it soon far exceeded the limited scope the author had anticipated and became widely renowned. The reason for this initial avoidance of public distribution and even the publication of news about it was likely twofold: one, the unofficial publication of the book within the country and its specific constraints, and the other, the author’s wish to avoid the book becoming politicized and consequently sensationalized. It is clear that the author did not produce this book out of material motivation or personal whim and as a pastime; the main concern of the non-clerical, middle-aged author (born 1343/1964), who also has a background of activity in military institutions of the Islamic Republic, is to exert influence within the realm of thought of the proponents and bearers of traditional Islamic teachings (mainly mujtahids and jurists), and it goes without saying that such a goal is incompatible with the book becoming sensationalized and possibly subject to political exploitation in the politicized and securitized atmosphere prevailing in the country. What is important is that this book be taken seriously and read, above all and before anything else, in the Islamic seminaries, and be critiqued and examined by scholars and jurists. As far as I know, this has been the case so far, and positive and constructive reactions have been seen, and of course, significant oral and written critiques have also been presented (according to my information, one of the more or less modernist marja‘s of taqlid in Qom has privately declared that he is sympathetic to and in agreement with the thesis of Torkashvand’s book on legal veiling).

This voluminous work, in its first version (the version in my possession), is exactly 1017 pages. According to what appears at the beginning of the book, in a broad outline, the book is organized into three parts:

Part One: Veiling before Islam and the Muslims’ Reaction

Part Two: In the Shadow of the Quran

Part Three: Jurisprudential Discussions (Examining the Conformity of Jurisprudential Opinions with the Extent of Legal Veiling in the Prophet’s Era).

However, since the patient and persevering researcher has investigated and reflected upon almost every topic, large and small (even topics that are usually not considered in jurisprudential ijtihad or do not ordinarily come to mind), related to the issue of women’s covering, the book has a detailed and extensive table of contents, and this table of contents, in terms of page count, occupies exactly twenty pages of the book. Although reviewing this table of contents aids in understanding the book’s subjects, grasping the author’s perspective, and ultimately appreciating the importance of this work, and from this standpoint, perusing them would certainly be beneficial, such a task is not possible in this space and would probably also be tedious. Nevertheless, I present a selection of the book’s central topics and headings solely for the information of the readers of this introduction.

As the three parts of the book show, the discussion begins with the nature and reasons for covering in the pre-Islamic era (mainly in Arabia and the Hejaz), and then this same subject is critically examined within the text of the Quran (as the holy book and authoritative religious document of Muslims). Numerous verses related to covering in general, and women’s covering in particular, and more specifically, the several verses related to “hijab” in its conventional meaning, are examined in detail and with exegetical and linguistic meticulousness. In the third part, the subject of women’s covering, that is, (legal hijab), in Islamic jurisprudence and ijtihad, mainly Shiite, and the opinions of jurists from the past to the present, becomes the specific and scholarly focus of research, critique, and analysis. Perhaps the following headings can be listed in slightly more detail as follows:

The concept of covering and its nature, reasons, and types in the pre-Islamic era among the so-called Jahili Arabs; the architectural situation and the concept of the house and the houses of the Arabs, and specifically the people of the two cities of Mecca and Medina on the eve of Islam’s emergence; the clothing and garments of the Arabs before Islam and after it during the Prophet’s time (which were mostly unstitched, and this is, of course, an important point); the state of temples, including the Kaaba, and the performance of traditional Hajj rituals and the religious presence of women and men in the pre-Islamic era (where, in some cases, they performed circumambulation completely naked as a sacred religious act); covering during Hajj (ihram) in the Arab tradition and covering during individual or congregational prayer in Friday prayers and congregations in the Islamic tradition; an examination of various types of male-female association and various types of sexual relations and formal and informal marriages in the Jahili era and thereafter during the era of the Prophet of Islam and its developments in later times; an examination of the issue of women and men looking at each other in the pre-Islamic era and its legal specifications in the post-Islamic period; the state of hygiene, water, and washing (bathing and relieving oneself, or as the author puts it, sanitary facilities, etc.) in the pre-Islamic era; the seclusion of women in the Islamic tradition from the beginning to later centuries; the connection of the Arabs’ environment, such as climate, heat, soil, type of livelihood, and the people’s poverty and hunger, with the types of covering for women and men in the Arabia of that time; the manner of entering houses in the Jahili era and thereafter in early Islam; the effect of prayer in strengthening covering and legal hijab; an exegetical and jurisprudential examination of verses related to women’s covering and legal hijab (including verses 33-34, 53, 59 of Surah Al-Ahzab and 30-31 of Surah An-Nur); an examination of the special status and dignity of the Prophet’s wives; an examination of the concept of “women being awrah,” which is apparently derived from a prophetic hadith (which, of course, the author considers fabricated); and so on. In this series of research discourses, all topics and issues related to the female sex, including the subject of covering and not covering the woman’s body (from the tip of the toe to the crown of the head and the hair of the tresses), have been researched and scrutinized one by one, with the necessary details mentioned, and even the Quranic account of the covering of Adam and Eve, which apparently has no connection to the issue of legal hijab, has not been overlooked. Traditional interpretations of concepts such as chador, maqna’eh, khimar, jilbab, and the like have been challenged. Ultimately, the author’s view is that covering the lower half of the hands and feet, as well as the hair of the head and neck, was definitely not obligatory, but covering the rest of the body, including the torso, thighs, and upper arms, is deducible, although, except for the area of the lap, it can be a matter of discussion and doubt.

In this extensive study, the factors that, from the beginning to later periods, led to the emergence of various forms of strict veiling and ultimately the seclusion of women in Islamic societies have been examined (including the negative and strict thought and policy of the second caliph, Umar, regarding women). Among other things, he correctly considers the seclusion of women in early Islam, especially the wives of the Prophet and his daughter, a

In this context, the issue of women’s hijab and covering is one that, following Muslims’ encounter with the Western world and European modernity over the past one hundred and fifty years, has emerged as a serious “problem” and a major challenge more than any other subject. The great challenge has arisen because the modern world, founded on humanism, has made the inherent and natural equality of human beings the standard for regulating civil relations, securing freedoms, and guaranteeing civil rights; indeed, the various forms of freedom, democracy, human rights, and civil rights are fruits of this towering tree, and this causal link is clearly reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In contrast, however, in the pre-modern world, including the tradition of jurisprudential Islam, which historically belongs to this period, the regulation of social and civil relations is based on legal inequality in various forms. Now, in relation to the subject of gender, in this era, the fundamental question is: what answer do Muslims, purely from a religious perspective, have to this great and profound challenge? Do they accept equality and its logical and practical requirements, including regarding gender, or do they still define and base the system of civility on various forms of discrimination within the framework of the traditional, pre-modern outlook and with intra-religious arguments? For instance, does the concept of women’s hijab fall under the category of Muslim women’s discretionary rights, or is it entirely coercive, such that no woman (whether believer or non-believer) has the right to appear in the sight of non-mahram men without the conventional religious hijab (full body covering), and especially that the political and governmental system claiming to implement Sharia has the right to compel women by force and even punish violators? (As is currently prevalent and dominant in the Islamic Republic).

Over this past century and more, Muslim thinkers (both religious scholars and academic Muslim intellectuals) have, each to the best of their ability, striven extensively to answer this great challenge. Although novel and tradition-breaking theories have been put forward on this matter so far, and some Muslim women (especially in the free and secular world) practically enjoy the right to exercise their egalitarian will, freedom, and choice, the story remains the same across the Islamic world and in traditional religious societies, and the observance of religious hijab by religious custodians or religious governments is still enforced as a binding religious matter, a divine decree, or a governmental command (it goes without saying, of course, that observing the principle of hijab as a personal choice and as a governmental, compulsory matter are two separate categories).

The historical trajectory of the discussion on women, including the issue of hijab, from one hundred and fifty years ago to the present shows that the subject of gender, and specifically women’s hijab, has always been and remains tense. Figures such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan in India, Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani throughout the Islamic world, Muhammad Abduh and later Qasim Amin in Egypt, Tahar Haddad in Tunisia, and others have, on the whole, defended the legal freedom and equality of men and women, and specifically the freedom of women’s covering. In 1913, an Egyptian Muslim student named Mansour Fahmy wrote his doctoral thesis on the condition of women at the Sorbonne in Paris, in which he scholarly, and befitting an academic thesis, critically examined the condition of women in Islam and, citing historical data, enumerated the positive and negative conditions of Muslim women (this book was later translated from French into Arabic and recently into Persian through the efforts of Torab Haqshenas and Habib Saei under the title “The Condition of Women in Tradition and in the Evolution of Islam” and published in Cologne, Germany, in 2007). In recent years, Fatema Mernissi in Morocco wrote a singular book on this very subject, and in her research, she explored fragments of Islamic history and jurisprudence, demonstrating that all this strictness regarding women’s hijab is contrary to Quranic thought and the earliest tradition of the Prophet of Islam, and at least contrary to the Prophet’s fundamental idea and thought; her illuminations found a positive and creative resonance among Muslims and even in Western societies[2] .

In Iran, too, the situation has been more or less the same, and more or less similar views have been expressed. In the 1960s, a scholar like Morteza Motahhari, although he did not believe in or advocate for complete, modern legal equality between men and women, nor for religious freedom of dress, nevertheless tried in his two books, The Rights of Women in Islam and The Issue of Hijab, firstly to somewhat reduce the restrictions imposed on Muslim women, and secondly to offer a reasonable, or in today's parlance, a modern defense of those very legal and jurisprudential discriminations between men and women; a defense which, I believe, was and is not, on the whole, successful. In the 1960s, he took a small step: in his book The Issue of Hijab, contrary to the belief of the majority of jurists (including Ayatollah Khomeini at that time), who held that covering the face and hands (wajh wa kaffayn) was a religious obligation for women, he defended the freedom of women to leave their face and hands uncovered. It is noteworthy that even this small step was met with a sharp reaction from the traditional and dogmatic scholars of the time.

After the revolution, however, the situation changed entirely. On the one hand, from the very first months of the Islamic Republic's establishment, hijab, meaning the full covering of women (both Muslim and non-Muslim), became mandatory and compulsory, first in government offices and shortly thereafter absolutely outside the home. On the other hand, such a closed and suffocating atmosphere prevailed that even the possibility of scholarly discussion and the presentation of theoretical issues (even by Muslim scholars and intellectuals) was practically forbidden and made impossible. During these more or less long years, almost no clear, expert, religious, or even jurisprudential word has been, or can be, spoken on this matter in public circles. Things have now reached a point where the term 'bad-hijab' in the political-religious literature of official state authorities, and especially in government media, is equivalent to being unveiled and is therefore considered an insult and an accusation; an accusation that is even legally punishable. This punishment, assuming hijab is deemed a necessity according to traditional jurisprudence, begins with ta'zir and ultimately, upon the third or maximum fourth offense, ends in execution (not to mention that these continuous punishments and penalties have not only been ineffective so far, but according to the latest research report by the 'Research Center of the Islamic Consultative Assembly' in August 2015, all governmental, disciplinary, and punitive regulations regarding hijab and chastity have not only failed but have practically led to reverse results).

Nevertheless, in recent years (for various reasons, including the active and dynamic movement of religious and non-religious women), the problem of hijab in Iranian society has received increasing attention. Some religious scholars (including Ayatollahs Montazeri and Sanei) and some Muslim neo-thinkers have addressed this issue to some extent from various aspects (jurisprudential, ethical, historical, social, etc.)[3]. For, in any case, without resolving the issue of equal gender rights, including women's hijab (especially compulsory hijab, which is considered a symbol of patriarchal domination and state domination over women), speaking of freedom, democracy, and human rights is an incomplete, and one might even say, a futile discourse. The least that can be said is that opposition to compulsory hijab is today agreed upon by the overwhelming majority of Muslim neo-thinkers in Iran and the Islamic world. Even a neo-thinker scholar like Seyyed Mohammad Ali Ayazi has recently, in Qom, opposed compulsory hijab, especially when enforced by the government, by publishing several articles and interviews in various media. He has refuted the religious proofs of the defenders of compulsory hijab with reasoned arguments and has defended freedom of dress from a religious and jurisprudential perspective, which is itself an important step forward (these talks and writings can be seen on the 'Information Base of Seyyed Mohammad Ali Ayazi').

But the initiator of the radical critique of the issue of religiously mandated hijab in Iran was the late Ahmad Qabel. A graduate of the Qom Seminary and a student of the late Ayatollah Montazeri, he possessed the traditional qualification of ijtihad (although he was religiously opposed to the special clerical garb and did not wear it himself). In the early 2000s, through a series of talks and writings, he began an expert discussion on women's covering and advanced it through several stages. Through scholarly critique and examination of the opinions of jurists and analysis of the verses and narrations related to religious hijab, he concluded that not only is covering the hair, head, and neck not a religious obligation, but even covering the body, except for the private parts during prayer, is not obligatory. In fact, he considered only "satr-e salati" (the covering required during prayer) to be obligatory, which in practice is the covering of the private parts (Qabel's views on this matter are accessible on his website, Shariat-e Aqlani). At that time, his astonishing ideas received widespread reflection inside and even outside the country, creating a strange uproar in seminary and traditional circles and within the judicial system of the Islamic Republic, and even provoked reactions and opposition from some of his seminary-academic friends. Nevertheless, his innovative thoughts on this subject were influential and opened a new path. In recent years (after the publication of Mr. Torkashvand's book), another seminary-academic graduate, Mr. Mohsen Kadivar, who is one of the figures of religious intellectualism in contemporary Iran, has also trodden this same path. However, his view on the non-obligation of covering the head, neck, elbows, and below the knees is closer to Torkashvand's theory than to Qabel's[4]. Another notable work in this field is the book by Ms. Sedigheh Vasmaghi titled "Woman, Jurisprudence, Islam," which addresses the position of women in Islamic jurisprudence and tradition and, with a critical approach, has challenged the traditional jurisprudential views of the jurists. She has mainly defended equal rights for women, including the freedom of covering for Muslim women, from a legal perspective. She also does not believe in the religious obligation of hijab as an eternal and transhistorical ruling of Islam[5].

However, in this context, Mr. Torkashvand's research is a monumental work, novel in various respects, and in its subject matter, it adopts a critical and radical approach. It can be said that from a jurisprudential perspective, Torkashvand's views are a continuation of the thoughts and opinions of Ahmad Qabel, but in other respects, it is a completely fresh and newly arrived work. This research and the author's jurisprudential and religious deductions are of such importance that they can be considered epoch-making, possessing the potential to become the source of significant intellectual and jurisprudential transformations in the near and distant future, not only on subjects such as women and hijab. The acceptability of the author's research method could also be applied to the foundations and methods of traditional ijtihad in various jurisprudential chapters, creating epoch-making changes and transformations in the religious rulings on important subjects such as politics, economics, the family system, penal regulations, ethical preferences, and many cultural-religious aspects among Muslims[6].

The most important method employed in the book Legal Veiling in the Prophet’s Era (and also in the book The Abrogation of Stoning) is the method of historical criticism; a method that is fundamentally absent from the principles and methods of deriving legal rulings in our Islamic seminaries, and there are few jurists who have paid attention to it or are aware of its importance. The principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh), as the method and methodology of ijtihād, have long been used by uṣūlī jurists, and this science (or, more accurately, this art), although in the early centuries of its establishment and during the periods of flourishing and advancement of ijtihād (3rd to 8th centuries AH) possessed the necessary capacity and capability and aided the development and deepening of ijtihād, thereafter, with the spread of the process of decline, this art, like other fields of knowledge and sciences, went into decline, and today it is in no way suited to serious and effective ijtihād. Among other things, historical perspective and the historical criticism of the proofs of ijtihād have no place in the domain of ijtihād.

What is meant by historical perspective is that the proofs of Shi‘i ijtihād—namely the Book (the Qur’an), the Sunnah and Sirah of the Prophet and the Twelve Imams, reason and rationality, and finally the concept of consensus—are removed from the realm of metaphysical and sacred and uncriticizable matters and, like other human and earthly texts and sources, are subjected to understanding, interpretation, criticism, and examination within the context of the ongoing events and developments of the time and the backgrounds of specific periods. It is clear, of course, that the rules of historical criticism and its criteria are constantly changing and evolving, and they undergo transformation in accordance with the requirements of the advancement of sciences, experiences, and the rationality of the time. If the rules of the principles of jurisprudence codified in the medieval Islamic centuries were suited to the knowledge, experiences, and rationality of that era, today this is certainly not the case, and for this reason, for centuries, not only has the methodology of ijtihād been in need of revision and recodification, but, in accordance with the times, ijtihād is in need of a “philosophy of ijtihād” (and, prior to that, a “philosophy of religion”), and this is a necessary and essential task that has scarcely even crossed the minds of our traditionally-minded jurists.

In any case, Mr. Torkashvand has endeavored (continuing the work of figures like Mansour Fahmy and Mernissi), contrary to the common tradition among jurists who derive rulings and issue fatwas from above the minute and major developments of successive centuries, relying at most on a few Qur’anic verses and a multitude of hadiths on each jurisprudential topic or issue, to delve into the history and time of events related to various issues concerning women, centered around the main axis of the research, namely covering, and through critical examinations of the existing Islamic texts and sources in the realm of hadith, exegesis, and jurisprudence, to open a new path toward reconstructing the highly contentious subject of legal veiling and ultimately arrive at entirely novel ijtihādī conclusions in our time.

It can be said that in this process, he has accomplished four important tasks:

First. In the initial stage, with a historical-critical perspective, the logical and historical sequence has been observed, and the subject of women’s covering has been examined and researched, starting from an investigation of the state of garments and the reasons for various types of covering among the Arabs in the pre-Islamic era as a cultural phenomenon and the reaction of the first Muslims to it. Then, within the context of such a historical background, the verses of the Qur’an regarding garments, including legal veiling, have been examined. It goes without saying that without scrutinizing the historical contexts and backgrounds of the traditional and common coverings among the Arabs of the seventh century CE, a hermeneutic understanding and interpretation of the numerous verses of the Qur’an—verses that either generally refer to types of coverings (even the covering of Adam and Eve in Torkashvand’s research) or specifically refer to the preferred and prescriptive (ethical or legal) coverings of women or men—is impossible. Such a perspective is absent in the common types of jurisprudential ijtihād. Of course, after traversing such a logical sequence, it is time to examine the opinions of jurists in different periods, and in this position, the esteemed researcher has also examined and criticized the opinions of these jurists to some extent, considering the historical contexts of the emergence of such opinions.

I should add that in this part of the research, a kind of anthropology or historical sociology of the people of the Hejaz has also taken shape, which is independently noteworthy and thought-provoking and can be useful and illuminating for historians of the early Islamic period.

Second. Another important point in Torkashvand’s work is the optimal use of linguistics. I do not know to what extent the author is familiar with linguistics, modern linguistics in general, and specifically with modern hermeneutics (including philosophical hermeneutics); but whatever the case, in his research—a thoroughly intra-religious and even traditional inquiry—he has utilized language and a probing of the subtleties of words and meanings, ultimately arriving at conclusions contrary to conventional traditional fatwas. This is a highly significant and almost novel undertaking in mainstream jurisprudential and religious research. Torkashvand meticulously excavates Qur’anic and narrational words and terms, and by drawing on the vast capacity of words in the Arabic language, arrives at often fresh and problem-solving inferences. He does this, for instance, regarding concepts such as khimār, jilbāb, satr, and so on. Today, the use of modern linguistics is one of the important criteria for the critique of history and historical events; to the extent that a sound, or near-sound, understanding and analysis of historical events seems impossible solely by relying on written and common narrations, without utilizing the immense capacity of linguistics.

Third. Another important task of the researcher is a systemic and systematic view of the entire set of Qur’anic and narrational words, terms, concepts, and terminologies concerning covering and, specifically, legal veiling (ḥijāb-i sharʿī); a view that is almost absent among the community of those engaged in ijtihād. Of course, a systematic and holistic view of Islam as a religion or creed (and, in a sense, a worldview or ideology) is not a new idea. In the last half-century in Iran, some modernist Muslim thinkers have paid attention to it and have themselves endeavored, with such a view, to reinterpret Islam in general and its components (monotheism, prophethood, resurrection, prayer, fasting, Hajj, zakāt, jihad, ethics, politics, economics, the individual, society, this world, the hereafter, etc.). In this regard, Ali Shariati is undoubtedly the pioneering and renowned figure. Torkashvand also strives to interconnect all Qur’anic, narrational, and jurisprudential words and concepts related to women’s covering as a cultural phenomenon within a macro-level view, and to present a coherent and balanced interpretation from their totality; in such a way that it is both rationally acceptable and, at the same time, does not depart from the framework of the core beliefs of the faith and the conventional, and indeed definitive, Islamic and even jurisprudential criteria.

Fourth. Another innovation in this book is the extraction of the profile of revelation (the context of issuance and the occasion of revelation) from within the verses of the Qur’an themselves, whereby the cause of issuance and the historical background of the Qur’an’s directives, at least regarding veiling, can be obtained from the heart of the verses themselves (see, for instance, the heading “Contextualizing Revelation with the Aid of the Qur’an Itself” on pages 274-315 and also 396). Setting aside the four points mentioned, Torkashvand’s work appears highly significant from another perspective as well, and that is that he has advanced his research within a completely intra-religious framework and with conventional Islamic criteria (lexicography, the Arabic language, hadith, exegesis, principles of jurisprudence, jurisprudence, etc.) and has ultimately arrived at new and fresh religious and jurisprudential data. This demonstrates that, setting aside modernist extra-religious and new hermeneutical perspectives—which begin religious modernism and reform by refining the basis of epistemological presuppositions and fundamentally transforming the rules of understanding, and which endeavor to produce intra-religious interpretations according to conventional Islamic documentation—modernism and thoroughly intra-religious rethinking within the framework of conventional and traditional religious rules are also possible, at least within certain limits. Even without revising theological and philosophical foundations, and largely within the framework of transmitted and common documentation, one can present radical and impactful interpretations and ijtihāds on some fundamental jurisprudential issues and the rigid seminary-based Sharia, thereby bringing about transformation in legal and jurisprudential opinions and thoughts, and ultimately affecting the lives of believers.

Until now, I have cited the monumental work of Nāʾīnī and his book Tanbīh al-Umma wa Tanzīh al-Milla as an example to prove the possibility of effective rethinking within the Islamic-Shiʿi-jurisprudential tradition, and now I have a new piece of evidence: this very enduring and impactful work by Amirhossein Torkashvand on the subject of “Legal Veiling in the Prophet’s Era.” The difference is that Nāʾīnī wrote Tanbīh al-Umma during the Constitutional era, amidst the heated and tense disputes between proponents of mashrūʿa (religious legality) like Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri and the three scholars of Najaf (Khurasani, Tehrani, and Mazandarani), along with others such as Tabatabai and Behbahani in Iran, over the religious legitimacy or illegitimacy of constitutionalist thought. Without stepping outside the framework of traditional theology and jurisprudence, he skillfully and delicately both reconciled constitutionalism with Shiʿi doctrinal and jurisprudential foundations, granting it religious legitimacy, and, within the core and text of his entirely novel and innovative theorizations, brought about a fundamental transformation in the tradition of Shiʿi political thought. Torkashvand, however, with this book of his, has acted in the same manner on one of the most contentious contemporary Islamic-jurisprudential issues, namely the question of gender (a crucial subject that is now the focus of feminism and women’s studies in universities worldwide, including in Iran); a work that possesses a significant capacity for transformation in jurisprudential ijtihād and a fundamental change in the outlook of uṣūlīs and mujtahids (both Shiʿi and Sunni).

Although Nāʾīnī’s work was not taken very seriously (otherwise, either the Islamic Revolution of ’79 would not have occurred, or at least at the time of the revolution, the revolutionaries would not have been captivated by the image of Ayatollah Khomeini and later his flawed theory of wilāyat-i faqīh, and consequently, the fate of the system born from the revolution might have been different), I hope that Torkashvand’s example will be taken seriously, and that both seminary scholars will read and reflect upon it, and also, of course, Muslim academic new thinkers, who will learn a great deal from this type of research and scholarly work. Especially in the field of women’s studies, such an approach and such Islamic and jurisprudential research will be highly effective and impactful (particularly if one believes in so-called “Islamic feminism”). Religious intellectualism and new thinking are not merely titles, propaganda, and claims; serious and practical rethinking is also necessary. This is an important understanding: that veiling was a cultural and customary matter that, for historical reasons, became a religious matter, and this proposition completely distorts and renders moot a significant part of traditional jurisprudence concerning gender, women, and legal veiling. It is worth noting, of course, that such an understanding has precedents in contemporary Islamic rethinking, but the importance of Torkashvand’s work lies in the fact that, within a documented, intra-religious research project, he has made this understanding more substantiated and robust than ever before. He has been able, on the one hand, to present sufficient and adequate documentation for his interpretations, and on the other hand, to seriously challenge the documentation and interpretations common among traditionally-minded jurists.

With all this, let me add that in the real world, any serious rethinking within the tradition of Islamic thought, and especially within traditional ijtihād and jurisprudential understanding, is impossible without a refinement of the basis (tanqīḥ-i manāṭ) in doctrinal principles and without a transformation in epistemological presuppositions and the rules of understanding. Even figures like Nāʾīnī, Qābil, and Torkashvand, who have opened new horizons and created transformation within traditional thought, have undoubtedly been and are influenced by modern ideas and new interpretive foundations; otherwise, they would not have been able, theoretically or practically, to take a step forward. These individuals first came to believe in the matter of freedom (especially freedom of faith), the novel phenomenon of the precedence of right over duty and at least their equivalence (the right to choose, the right to elect, the right to self-determination, etc.), and the provision of human dignity and responsibility (even if through religious justifications), and then, with a historical approach and reasonable distancing, undertook the critique of parts of the Islamic tradition. It is fundamentally a rule that one cannot critique tradition without distancing oneself from it, and undoubtedly, this distancing has been made possible in the light of the philosophical ideas and epistemological foundations of the modern world. It must be particularly emphasized that a historical approach to religion and religious teachings is either impossible or truncated and will not reach its logical conclusion without a belief in the historicity of revelation (the Quran), prophethood, and the opinions of the Companions, jurists, and Imams. This is precisely what Iqbal Lahori said eighty years ago: “The time has now come to reconsider the entire apparatus of our Muslimness,” and this is the very claim that contemporary non-seminary new thinkers (from Iqbal to Shariati and contemporaries) refer to under the title “first ijtihād in principles, then ijtihād in derivatives.”

C. Final Word and a Few Points

First. The first point is that although Torkashvand’s important book Legal Veiling is a scholarly and meticulous work, full of precise points and, in particular, containing significant conclusions (which, at least in my view, are correct and defensible), this does not mean that all of its claims are correct and defensible. Therefore, it can be subject to critique and examination from various perspectives (narratological and hadith-scientific, or linguistic and lexical, etc.). Fortunately, many critiques have been written about it so far, or have been raised in debates with the book’s author, an occurrence that signals the serious consideration and impact of this work. Of course, the few critiques I have seen and read have not been very justified or robust, and the critics have resorted to unwarranted, often marginal and insignificant objections; in any case, such fault-finding, which more closely resembles caviling, does not create a fundamental breach in the pillars of the author’s viewpoint. It goes without saying that these so-called critiques are aimed more at overshadowing the radical and deconstructive thoughts and opinions of the author of Legal Veiling in the Prophet’s Era than at being serious, corrective critiques of a theory.

The only point I can make here is that, despite the correctness of the claim that women were not secluded during the Prophet’s time and even in the first half-century, there are nonetheless numerous reports and narrations in current sources that speak of a kind of seclusion of Muslim women and even the Prophet’s wives (such as what occurred regarding Aisha and her riding in a howdah during the Battle of the Camel). Although I suspect that such narrations cannot stand in opposition to the transmitted and rational evidence for the non-seclusion of Muslim women, it is nevertheless necessary to examine the conflicting narrations on this matter, and of course on other matters, with greater care. Mr. Torkashvand knows well that conflicting narrations are very important in the science of hadith and in ijtihad, to the extent that sometimes both sides of a conflict lose their authoritativeness and credibility. It seems that in this research, not much attention has been paid to the conflicting narrations, or at least the status of the rule of “mutual cancellation” (tasāqut) is not clear. Merely citing conflicting narrations is not sufficient. Ultimately, based on the principle of “equivalence and preponderance” (ta‘ādul wa tarājīḥ), it must be clarified what the researcher’s chosen option is.

Another noteworthy point in this same context is paying greater attention to the authenticity and credibility of narrations. In this extensive research, numerous narrations and hadiths have been used in favor of its chosen theory or to refute the views of others, which is, of course, a necessary and unavoidable task. However, it should be noted that in the process of ijtihad, the first step is a precise examination of the degree of credibility and reliability of the narrations transmitted in existing sources. We know that fabricated and false narrations and reports are so abundant in our narrative sources that it is not an exaggeration to say that the principle and rule is their unreliability, unless the contrary is proven. It is clear that in the process of hadith criticism and refinement, even with the criteria of traditional hadith science, such as biographical evaluation (rijāl) and dirāya, the trusted and accepted hadiths for proving or refuting a theory will be so few that citing them will practically not be very effective or problem-solving.

Second. In terms of writing and editing, considerable flaws are observed in the book (at least in the first edition, which is the one I have), which require revision. While the prose is understandable everywhere, it does not possess the necessary uniformity and fluency. In particular, some Arabic texts have been left either entirely without translation, or sometimes an incomplete and inaccurate translation has been deemed sufficient. This was probably done to save on the book’s volume, but in any case, a complete translation is necessary and essential, especially for those who do not know Arabic.

Third. I also have an important suggestion. Given the exigencies of our time, people of the book and study have neither much time to study nor the necessary patience for reading lengthy texts. Although the voluminousness of such an important book is not a fundamental flaw (since, on the one hand, it is to some extent required by such discussions, and on the other, it has its specific enthusiasts who will read it anyway), the principle of "concise and useful" is nonetheless a fundamental one, and observing it as much as possible is necessary and requisite. I suggest that a second edition of the book be prepared and presented by the author (or done by another and approved by the author) that reduces the book's volume to one-third or at most one-half. I think if the book's structure were arranged differently and special attention were paid to conciseness, the book could have been completed with a smaller volume. In any case, one can assume that the large work is for specialists and the small, concise work is for general and non-specialist audiences. In such a way that general audiences, by spending less time and even with a quick skim, can become aware of the author's main thoughts and views. In the new edition of the book, the Arabic texts (except in rare and necessary cases) can be entirely removed or limited to translation (and in the case of long texts, summarized). If a summary is also included at the end of both editions of the book, it would be very appropriate and useful.

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[1] Revisiting Religious Texts baznegri.persanblog.ir

[2] This book was translated into Persian by Maliheh Maghazei under the title "Veiled Women and Armor-Clad Men" and published in Iran in 2001.

[3] Several articles on the lack of moral reprehensibility of women not covering their head and neck by Soroush Dabbagh, published in various media and also viewable on his personal website, are examples of this type of writing.

[4] His views on this matter were published on the Jaras website and are now accessible on his website.

[5] The mentioned book was published in Iran in 2007 and also published in English in Germany in 2014.

[6] It is worth mentioning that the author has written another important book titled "The Abrogation of Stoning by Islam," which was published virtually in 2012. In this research, Torkashvand, contrary to the thinking of the majority of jurists, claims that the punishment of Rajm (stoning) was not only not endorsed in Islam but, quite the opposite, this extremely violent ruling, a remnant from ancient eras, was abrogated in Islam.

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Download PDF of the book Legal Veiling in the Prophet's Era

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Book author: Amirhossein Torkashvand

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Book introduction text by Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari

Source: Azadi-e Andisheh Electronic Journal

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Related content:

Hossein Soozanchi’s Critique of the Book “Legal Veiling in the Prophet’s Era”

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