Lecture: “A Critique of Modern Science” by Dr. Mehdi Moinzadeh

What do “critique” and “modern science” mean? “Critique” means examination and the determination of limits, and differs from criticism, which has a more negative connotation. “Modern science” is the science that has made astonishing advances in the last four hundred years (since Descartes). Distinguishing modern science from pre-modern forms of knowledge means that this science possesses characteristics and features that ancient knowledge lacked. By “a critique of modern science” we mean understanding these differences, that is, understanding what distinguishes something like modern science from the science that preceded it. Three groups in the West have undertaken a critique of modern science. The first group of critiques relates to pure philosophy (Continental philosophy as opposed to analytic philosophy), especially German philosophy and the figure of Martin Heidegger, who expressed the sharpest critiques of modernity, and the other two critiques relate to Michel Foucault and the Frankfurt School, who have critiqued modern science within the philosophy of the social sciences. Heidegger’s (1889–1976) critique of modern science has three main axes: 1. Our primary opening onto the world is a practical, not a theoretical, opening, but because in modern science our opening onto the world has become theoretical, we see the world not as signs but as objects. 2. The Cartesian conception of the world (seeing the world mathematically). These two critiques appear in Being and Time and belong to the first period of Heidegger’s thought. 3. Technology (= the ambition to conquer nature instead of understanding truth) is ontologically prior to modern science. This critique was put forward in the essay “The Question Concerning Technology” (1936), belonging to the second period of Heidegger’s thought, which is the first serious philosophical treatment of the problem of technology, and one could loosely say that the philosophy of technology begins with this essay. In the essay “The Age of the World Picture” (1938), Heidegger also offers a critique of technology, presented as a gloss, namely that he believes in the history of Being and held that Being reveals itself to us in a particular way in every age, and this time it has shown itself to us in a technological form. The second critique of modern science is associated with the French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926–1984). In his view, knowledge and power are two sides of the same coin; there is no domain of knowledge that does not have a domain of power surrounding it, and no domain of power that does not create its own specific knowledge. Foucault conceives of an episteme for each age, which gives rise to power-knowledge regimes, and the power-knowledge regime from the mid-twentieth century onward is the power-knowledge regime of the human sciences. The third critique of modern science relates to the thinkers of the Frankfurt School. In their view, the social sciences describe the existing state of affairs and represent the will of the ruling class and the hegemony of the world of domination, justifying it, whereas they ought to outline the desirable state of affairs.

The subject of the discussion is the critique of modern science. Modern science is one of the pillars of our lifeworld; meaning that we live within it, we build our houses based on it, we treat our illnesses based on it, and we educate and raise our children based on principles derived from modern science. In other words, modern science has encompassed us; therefore, understanding our cultural situation seems impossible without understanding the characteristics of modern science.

At the outset, a distinction must be made between critique and criticism; although both share the same root, the negative connotation is more prominent in criticism, and it must be emphasized that what is meant by critique is examination and the determination of limits, not an emphasis on its negative connotation. By modern science is meant the science that has made astonishing advances in the last four centuries, since Descartes. And when we consider this science different from ancient science and ancient knowledge, it is because we are aware that this science has characteristics that ancient knowledge lacked. By a critique of modern science we mean understanding these differences, that is, understanding what distinguishes something like modern science from the science that preceded it. It is likely that modern science and ancient knowledge are so different that they share only a verbal commonality, and perhaps we are compelled to no longer apply the term science to ancient knowledge.

Modernity and its sharpest critiques from within itself

Three groups in the West have criticized modern science. The sharpest and most rigorous critiques of modern science have emerged from within modernity, or from modern science itself. One critique was voiced by pure philosophy, continental or Continental philosophy. Continental philosophy stands in contrast to Anglo-Saxon or Britannica philosophy. The philosophy of English-speaking countries is analytic philosophy; in other words, a philosophy that is coupled with logic, with logic serving as its corridor and introduction. This philosophy is called analytic, or Anglo-Saxon, because Britain, which is the symbol of the English language and English-language philosophy, is an island; any philosophy other than this has been termed continental or terrestrial (as opposed to maritime).

Continental philosophy largely encompasses German philosophy. The sharpest critiques of modernity have come from Germany, and this has a historical background. Germany's striving for independence from the rest of Europe can be observed at various points in history. The Germans were the last people to bow to the laws of the Roman Empire, which had been uniformly imposed across Europe. The Germans nurtured Luther in their bosom, who offered a German interpretation of Christianity and stood against the Roman Catholic Church. Just as Germany separated itself from the rest of Europe, the German university also separated itself from European universities. In Germany, the term "German university" is very well-known; if you speak of an "English university," it lacks meaning, because science is science, but the German university has its own specific characteristics. Great minds such as Kant, Fichte, Nietzsche, and Heidegger have discussed the German university, and all these discussions revolve around the point that the University must be a Uni-versity. "Versity" means divergence, dispersion, abyss, pure scattering; "Uni" means to unify the dispersion. The German university holds that the faculties are isolated, scattered fragments of knowledge that must be brought together under a unifying factor (philosophy).

Three Currents Critical of Modernity

We will refer, by way of example, to three intellectual positions critical of modern science: Continental philosophy, Michel Foucault, and the Frankfurt School.

In the critiques arising from Continental philosophy, the views of Martin Heidegger in particular will be examined. We have the most fundamental critiques, specifically of modern science and generally of the modern world and knowledge of the modern world, from Heidegger.

In the second current of critique of modern science, we must point to the French philosopher, Michel Foucault, and as the third current, we can point to the school of philosophy of social sciences, which is the Frankfurt School. Of these three currents, one pertains to pure philosophy and the other two pertain to the philosophy of social sciences.

Heidegger was born in 1889 and died in 1976, spending most of his life in the twentieth century. Heidegger's critique of modern science can be seen in three positions: first, the discussion of sign and reference; second, the Cartesian worldview—both drawn from the book Being and Time—and third, from an essay titled "The Question Concerning Technology." The first two pertain to the first period of Heidegger's thought, and the third to the second period of his thought.

Heidegger and the Critique of Modernity

Heidegger bases his critique not on modern science but on modern existence, because for Heidegger, existence is identical with understanding; however, since a significant part of understanding is scientific knowledge, Heidegger is inevitably drawn to science as well. Heidegger is not a philosopher of science; his primary concern is not science at all. Existence is the eternal question of the philosopher and philosophy, but Heidegger moves from existence into the domain of science.

Heidegger's First Critique: The Theoretical View of the World

He begins his critique of science with the theoretical approach to the world. In criticizing the theoretical approach to the world, he believes that our primary opening to the world is not a theoretical opening but a processing or circumspective (circumspection) opening. In other words, and loosely speaking, it can be said that our primary approach to the world is not a theoretical approach but a practical one.

Heidegger says that the Greeks called a thing pragmata. For Heidegger, Greece was the origin of authentic and pure thought, and what he meant by this statement was that the matter, in its originality and purity, was like this. Currently, pragmata refers to the utility of a thing. In the Greek language, a thing was identical to its utility, though it must be noted that this does not mean pragmatism or utilitarianism. Our primary approach to the world is an approach in which we order and arrange things according to our own intentions.

What does the proposition "our primary approach to the world is a processing-oriented approach" mean? I will try to explain this with an example. When we enter through this door, whether as a speaker or a listener, this room is not first understood theoretically; that is, the area of the room is not the point, because we have come to teach or to hear a lesson, the first appearance of the room for us is whether it is suitable for studying and listening or teaching, or not? After we see, for instance, that it is small for this purpose, we then inquire about its area. The example of the hammer is Heidegger's famous example in Being and Time; a carpenter, while working with his hammer, says to his apprentice, "this hammer is heavy." Assuming the carpenter and the apprentice are educated, do they mean density and volumetric mass by the heaviness of the hammer? No, the hammer is heavy in the world of the workshop, meaning "it is heavy for pounding." Our first authentic encounter with things is oriented towards our processing of the world. The reason for this is the specific mode of human existence.

Heidegger says that the human being, or in his own term, Dasein, is the only being whose essence and existence differ from one another; loosely speaking, this means there is a difference for the human being between what they are and what they ought to be.

Therefore, something like an end is conceivable for the human being; the end is precisely that from which the human being falls short; it is not a determinate, fixed thing. The human being lives by falling short of what they ought to be; if this is taken from the human being, everything has been taken from them, their existence has been taken. Heidegger says the future becomes possible because Dasein, or the specific existence of the human being, falls short of what it ought to be. The future is the temporal ecstasis of this essential shortcoming of the human being. Likewise, to explain the theoretical approach, Heidegger uses the example of the clock; he says we do not look at the clock out of curiosity or amusement to see what time it is; we look at the clock to know whether it is still early for a task, or late, or if it is time for a task. This is not theoretical; it is practical, accompanied by human action directed towards an end. The issue of time cannot be posed theoretically; our primary approach to time is a processing-oriented approach.

If I want to explain this issue in the form of another example, I must refer to the pen. The pen is first a tool for writing, and afterward, properties such as its length and material are raised; properties and essences are derivative. Our approach to things is organized according to our end, which itself is the result of our essential shortcoming from that which we ought to be.

If our first proposition is that our primary approach to the world is processing-oriented, then we arrive at the second proposition, which is that the world is not a collection of objects but a collection of equipment; the pen is writing-equipment, the room is dwelling-equipment, as Heidegger says, the wind is in the sail. For example, a person riding a boat or ship on a river or sea can only think of the wind speed in m/s in a derivative way; their initial approach is not the measurement of speed but whether the wind in the sails and the boats will bring them to the shore or not? But when this person withdraws from personal involvement with the matter and, for instance, reaches the shore, and no longer has a pulsating concern, then theory arises. Heidegger says the carpenter becomes aware of the theoretical properties of the hammer when they cannot perform their work with the hammer; it is here that the world shows itself theoretically, and it is evident that science is a theoretical encounter with the world.

The third proposition is that the foundation of being a tool lies in its "being a sign." This is where Heidegger's position diverges from pragmatism. For something to be a tool, it must first be a sign. Heidegger says you know things under the aspect of an end; indeed, cognition itself takes place under that end. For example, a hammer is for hammering, hammering is for building a chair, the hammer is for building a chair, the chair is for sitting, sitting is for studying, studying is for passing the university entrance exam, and ultimately for the passion for learning, or for earning a living, or for knowledge. All of these are defined under a project. Project means a throwing-forward; in other words, you have thrown forward an end for yourself, and things are known and understood under it. In fact, it must be said that the hammer is a sign of hammering, hammering is a sign of the chair, the chair is a sign of sitting, sitting is a sign of studying, and so on. The world is a totality of signs. Here I must emphasize that for Heidegger, the end is not something predetermined, and we expressed the matter in that way merely to make it comprehensible.

The Image of the World in Peripatetic Philosophy and Sadrian Wisdom

We believe there is a similarity between Heidegger's view that "the world is not a collection of objects but a totality of signs" and the image of the world of existence in Transcendent Wisdom.

From the Peripatetic perspective, the world consisted of the Necessary Being and contingent beings; contingent beings are those things that can exist and can not exist, but currently do. The Necessary Being is clear; that is, an existence whose existence is necessary. The relationship between these two is also one of cause and effect. The Necessary Being is the Cause of causes or the First Cause of contingent beings. In the Mulla Sadrian image, the world becomes God and God-manifestations (to show, to indicate), and the relationship between these is not causal, but rather one of origination and manifestation. God-manifestations are the theophanies and signs of God. The religious insight and outlook is, in principle, more compatible with this view, because the type of relationships is more that of signs than of cause and effect. When we say something is a sign of something else, instead of being its effect, it is very different from saying something is the effect of something else. Cause and effect create science; radiance and manifestation create something else. Modern science is founded upon seeing our approach to the world theoretically; therefore, science has considered the world a collection of objects, and based on that, causal relationships have been established, and science has become the study of causal relationships. The fact of the matter is that this is not the only possible insight; therefore, modern science was created by the transition from seeing the world as signs (ayat) to seeing the world as objects and entities.

The Difference Between the Scientific and Religious View of the World

To understand the sign, we are compelled to use some examples. Over the last 150 years, and especially in the last 50 years, a false image has dominated us: the idea that science can be built upon the verses of the Quran, and this was dealt with in a very superficial way; for example, matching 'alaqah' and 'mudghah' with embryology, or saying the Quran somehow refers to the laws of thermodynamics. This approach is a confusion between object and sign (ayah). If something is a sign, it can no longer be an object, and if it is an object, sign-ness can no longer be built upon it. The arrow is the representative of the sign. For example, on a traffic sign, an arrow reads Shahid Hemmat-East; the arrow expresses something: do not look at me, look at what I point to. The sign says, do not look at my quiddities and coordinates. In this example, if you pay attention to the quiddities of that sign, you lose your way. The sign must withdraw itself to draw attention to what it indicates. A sign realizes its sign-ness when it does not draw attention to its own coordinates. When the mass of a star is measured, that star is no longer the najm the Quran speaks of, and it never becomes that. When something goes under a microscope, it can no longer be a sign. Sign-ness cannot be built upon object-ness, or vice versa. Their origins are two different kinds of seeing. If we want to establish a harmony between science and religion (and this harmony exists), we must look more deeply and fundamentally.

Heidegger's Second Critique; The Cartesian Worldview and Seeing the World Mathematically

Heidegger’s critique of modern science stems from his belief that science adopts a theoretical rather than a sign-based approach; this was expressed through the three aforementioned propositions. Another aspect of Heidegger’s critique, found in Being and Time, rests on the idea that our worldview is built upon the Cartesian worldview, which itself was based on a presupposition that could have been otherwise; the world was looked at in a particular way, and the shadow of this outlook gave rise to something like modern science. At least on the level of a rational possibility, one could have looked at the world differently, and in that case, a different science, a different philosophy, a different world, and a different human being would have emerged. Do not imagine that truth, veracity, and proof are simply this; this is based on a path that has been taken and, incidentally, is not very authentic at all. Heidegger says this has been a “fallen” path. The authentic matter was that sign-based thinking which we have abandoned and has been lost to us.

The Cartesian worldview is another point of critique; Heidegger says Descartes looked at the world in a particular way, based on which the mathematical viewing of the world came into being. The present world is a physico-mathematical world. When we transformed sign-ness into measurable coordinates, for instance, we thought of a room not as a dwelling-place, but as the product of length, width, and height, and consequently area and volume—it became a number. In this worldview, qualities became dependent on measurement and number; death, being, and non-being became dependent on numbers; mathematics holds us in its sway. This kind of view did not exist from the beginning and belongs to the modern age; it belongs to a specific way of looking. How did Descartes look such that the world became mathematical? We imagined that if we know a set of numbers about something, we have come to know that thing, and another design can be cast.

How did Descartes look?

In the first stage, he fused the idea of the world with the idea of substance. What is substance in philosophy? (substance) meaning that which stands under (sub standing), something that stands beneath; meaning the superstructures change, but this substance remains constant. Substance means that which remains constant despite the change of other things. Descartes considered the world to have two substances: the knowing mind or ego cogito, and corporeality (corporea); and he made corporeality contingent upon substance; meaning one must everywhere seek that constant thing. Descartes said this body has a substance. What was new was that Descartes considered the substance of body to be extension. A body has numerous properties, including weight, color, and shape; if we take all of these away from a body, the body still remains. Only if we take one thing away from a body does it cease to be a body, and that is extension. For example, when you call something soft or hard, your world is sensory-poetic, but Descartes considered even softness and hardness to be dependent on extension. His view was that when we call something soft, it is because the extension of our hand opposes the extension of its particles; something is soft because it is dependent on an extension.

What is motion? In the Aristotelian interpretation, motion follows the inclinations of bodies, that is, the four elements of water, air, earth, and fire. In the Aristotelian interpretation, motion is the inclination toward one’s origin. The origin of stone was from earth; when released, it moved toward the earth. The origin of fire was from ether; when released, it moved toward the sky. The origin of water was from the sea; when released, it moved toward the sea. Inclination toward origin was transformed into attraction and force; the world changed. A body is nothing but an extended thing; because we were seeking substance/the constant matter, the body became an extended thing, and when we seek the constant substance within it, which science is more commensurate with this fixing? Mathematics. Of course, mathematics today differs in some ways from the Cartesian conception of mathematics. According to Heidegger, in our encounter with the world, we sought something constant and a secure possession. The secure possession, in the realm of nature and the study of bodies, created substance, and on this side, brought forth a science commensurate with itself: mathematics. The world became mathematical. This process was not necessary. When we fix something, it is as if we subjugate it and no longer lose it. It is as if, in our encounter with the world, we had a fear—a fear of encounter—and from this fear, we took refuge in a science that tells us: everything is okay. Mathematics provided this; in mathematics, one can solve a problem and be at ease, but in philosophy, one cannot, because life is constantly renewing itself; life is hermeneutical and renews itself with living.

Thus, according to Heidegger, our world became mathematical, and the knowledge of bodies—even the knowledge of the body and the human being's knowledge of its own states—came to be organized by number.

The human being came to know its fetus by number; the first question it asks is: how much does it weigh? How many weeks old is it? Food is no longer a matter of the lawful and the forbidden; rather, the calorie count is what matters. This process was not necessary; it has become necessary, and it could have been otherwise. This is the second part of Heidegger's critique of modern science.

Heidegger's Third Critique: The Ontological Priority of Technology over Science

Heidegger's third position is set forth in the essay "The Question Concerning Technology." This essay is the result of a lecture he delivered in 1936 and represents philosophy's first serious engagement with the problem of technology; one could loosely say that the philosophy of technology begins with this essay. In it, Heidegger makes a strange claim: that technology is prior to science, contrary to what most of us think.

Most of us believe that we first engage in science, and then, at the stage of application, this science becomes technology; engineering is the application of the basic sciences, and in medicine, the basic sciences are taught first, followed by clinical courses. We think that, temporally and ontologically, science is prior to technology. Heidegger does not emphasize temporal priority and posteriority (though some consider technology to be temporally prior to science as well), but rather emphasizes ontological priority and posteriority. What is the meaning of this proposition that technology is ontologically prior to science? It means that the desire to take possession of the world is prior to science; what has made science what it is, is the desire to take possession of the world. In other words, science is not the understanding of truth, but the conquest of nature. This does not mean that a deviation has occurred in science.

We sometimes think that science was put to a bad use and produced the atomic bomb. Heidegger says that when Descartes was laying the foundations of modern philosophy, the thing was annihilated right then and there, and its outward manifestation was merely the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan. Let us not think that a deviation occurred and that innocent science was used by charlatans for unknown ends and purposes, and that is how this science emerged; rather, this is inherent in the essence of modern science. The desire to take possession of the world existed before science, and this desire brought such a science into being.

What are the signs of this desire for possession? In response, one can say that the first task of science is the classification and ordering of things, and classification is nothing other than intervention and possession. It is in classification that one can say this group of people are sick (we will address this issue more in Foucault's views), and this group are natural and normal; hence, every individual measures themselves against the normal and the abnormal. Classification means possession. Heidegger points to Gestell (Ge-stell), which in German means enframing and framing; the human being has imagined the world within a frame and brought it under its control. Thus, the foundation of science rests on technology, and technology is the very possession of the world; it could have been otherwise, but with the emergence of humanism, it became this way. The human being saw the world in a humanistic way; in humanism, everything is organized around human desires, and naturally, the knowledge of the world also follows human desire. Within this framework, the human being is the axis. Truth is no longer pure truth; it is a truth that pleases the human palate and is in harmony with human desire.

This was Heidegger's critique of modern science, explained in summary; as mentioned earlier, it is not that Heidegger criticized modern science, but rather his concern is Being, and since Heidegger considers Being to be identical with understanding, in his critique of understanding, he also turns his attention to science. Heidegger's critique was examined around three main axes, and a note will also be added. First, the world was seen not as a sign but as objects; second, Descartes saw the world as extension; third, science was organized on the basis of technology, which in turn meant the desire for possession.

The History of Being in Heidegger's Thought

In another essay from 1938, “The Age of the World Picture,” Heidegger also turned his attention to science from a different angle. The term paradigm originates in Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science, and the term episteme from Foucault is roughly its equivalent. The source of both must be sought in a discussion by Heidegger, who believed in something called the history of Being. The main point is that in every epoch, Being reveals itself with coordinates that may differ from those of the previous epoch. Heidegger states that the human being plays no significant role in this; Being has revealed itself in this way. In this discussion, manifestation and disclosure are very prominent, as if the beloved Being has this time shown us the corner of its eyebrow, and we have pondered and grasped the corner of its eyebrow; tomorrow it shows a beauty mark. One must pay attention to the difference between these two perspectives. Being, or in Heidegger’s terms Dasein, according to its own will, reveals itself to the human being in a certain way; naturally, we will see a different picture of it, as if Being has this time revealed itself to us in a technological form.

Fardid, the first person to introduce Heidegger’s ideas to Iran’s scholarly community in a lecture in 1948 at the University of Tehran, has an interpretation of the history of Being. He puts forward a discussion under the title of the science of the Divine Names and holds the view that in every epoch we live within one of the Names of God. This epoch, God has revealed Himself with the attribute of the Subduer (Qahhar); there is a subduing force between heaven and earth.

In any case, the first three critiques were Heidegger’s main critiques, and this last critique has the aspect of a marginal note that is not heavily emphasized.

Michel Foucault and the Genealogy of Phenomena

Michel Foucault was born in 1926 and died in 1984. The foundation of Foucault’s views on science, and especially on the human sciences, is influenced by the ideas of Nietzsche and particularly his theory of the will to power. Foucault shows that science and power are two sides of the same coin; there is no domain of science that does not have a domain of power surrounding it, and no domain of power that does not create its own specific science. The method Foucault employs is known as genealogy or geonology; that is, he examines the lineage of a phenomenon.

Foucault uses the term episteme, which requires a little explanation. Episteme has been defined as the “configuration of knowledge of each age.” Knowledge is an indeterminate matter, but in each age it takes on a specific determination and form; for example, if we ask a shoemaker about the state of his business, he says God is the Provider (al-Razzaq). This is cognition and the very stuff of knowledge, but this individual cannot be considered a scientist, because he has not expressed his statement in the form of scientific terminology, and his statement was not uttered within a scientific institution, and in fact his statement lacks scientific method. It is as if knowledge cannot be without a mold; it must necessarily be presented to us in the form of a language, within an institution, in a specific place.

Foucault says that in different ages, knowledge takes on molded forms, and these molded forms are born of power. With the episteme thesis, Foucault turns to various branches of the human sciences and states that the human sciences are power-truth regimes; that is, power and truth are one and the same thing.

Foucault states that the dominant power-truth regime, at least in the second half of the twentieth century, has been the power-truth regime of the human sciences; meaning that the seizure of the world is exercised more by the human sciences. Foucault examines the phenomenon of madness in the book “History of Madness.” According to today’s scientific thinking, the insane or madman must possess scientific characteristics, including hallucinations, delirious speech, etc. We never think that power is being exercised here; the power Foucault has in mind is not the power of the ruling class, but a power that individuals and institutions invisibly exercise upon one another.

Foucault states that when the Hôpital Général of Paris was founded in 1656, very different and heterogeneous individuals were kept there, including the insane, the poor, orphans, the disabled, and so on. These undesirable elements were those who could not be in the service of production, could not produce anything; therefore, a center had to be established that, with meager food and through forced labor, would compel them to produce, however little. Such centers had the advantage that these undesirable elements were no longer in the sight of others. Then a science called psychiatry was created in accordance with this need. There is a very elaborate theory in psychiatry and psychology as if mental illnesses are diagnosed based on social function; that is, as if an individual is not stigmatized with mental illness as long as they perform their social function. In other words, we keep the class or group that cannot contribute to production occupied by establishing a science called psychiatry. The elderly can no longer produce, so we send them to nursing homes; we entrust children to daycare centers due to mothers' employment; the disabled are no longer kept within the family but are cared for by the welfare organization. There is a scientific justification for all of them, because it is tailored to the stature of that science. The phenomenon of psychiatry is linked to care, punishment, and the legal system. The outcasts in the judicial system have the same situation; a panoptic gaze keeps the outcasts under surveillance day and night.

Education is also like this. Foucault says we imagine we send our children to school for education, whereas the child learns a discipline there. In schools, when science is taught to children, the foundations of power are also transmitted within this science, albeit invisible power. This process is the same ordering and classification of things for the purpose of exercising ever more power.

Other arenas, such as scientific language, are also like this. Scientific terms create hegemony or, as Derrida says, jargon. Knowledge is episteme and must be cast in the mold determined by power, and that power is the power that brings a science into being, and vice versa, whoever knows is powerful; knowing means appropriation, and this is inherent in modern science, whereas this was not the case in ancient knowledge.

The Frankfurt School and the Critique of Modernity

The Frankfurt School is one of the schools of the philosophy of social sciences; in this school, the human and social sciences are subjected to critique. Figures such as Adorno, Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, Habermas, and Herbert Marcuse were followers of this school. These individuals stated that modern human and social sciences are founded upon the ruling power. In Foucault's theory, power is invisible and institutions exercise it upon one another, but the Frankfurt School thinkers, being Marxists and left-wing Neo-Hegelians, expressed power as a matter of the ruling class. They looked at the issue from a methodological perspective and believed that modern scientific theory, or positivist theory, only describes the existing situation and has nothing to do with the desirable situation; this is the work of the ruling power or class to preserve the status quo, and to some extent, they were right.

The Frankfurt School thinkers stated that science should consider the desirable situation more than the existing situation; if it describes the existing situation, it is positivist and has been created by the ruling class to preserve its sovereignty. In another interpretation, the social sciences are specific to the human sciences and are founded upon the system of domination.

The book Dialectic of Enlightenment (written by Horkheimer and Adorno) is, in a way, the manifesto of the Frankfurt School. Since they were Marxists, they believed in dialectics. Many of the themes of Frankfurt School thought appear in this book. The book points out that when the Enlightenment emerged, it did not merely recommend that we exercise reason and advance with science; according to the principles of the Enlightenment, science provided both this world and the hereafter. Science brought justice, goodness, happiness, and health; the result of science was not merely to organize the world, it also had a hue of spirituality. Happiness is not just welfare and is something beyond it. They entered with this optimism, and the work ultimately led to World War II with 50 million dead.

The Frankfurt School was founded in 1923, and its activities intensified between the First and Second World Wars. Initially called the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, their central question was: how did fascism emerge from the heart of the Enlightenment? In their analysis, they approached the issue by arguing that the ruling class, in order to perpetuate itself, creates a culture that the Frankfurt theorists termed the culture industry. Just as the automobile industry is a form of production, television, cinema, books, and the human sciences produce a culture whose function is the continuation and safeguarding of the ruling class's dominion.

In summary, the critique of modern science is an examination and delineation of the limits and boundaries of science; in these examinations, greater emphasis was placed on pure philosophy and, subsequently, on philosophers of the social sciences.

Q&A

• When Fardid put forward his discussions in the 1930s, Iranian society, in its quest for liberation, tried to turn to thinkers belonging to this tradition, yet approached them from a critical stance. Given the socio-political developments in Iranian society, such as the Islamic Revolution and the epistemological consequences these developments entailed, a series of currents formed in universities, especially in humanities faculties, and figures entered this field who had more traditionalist leanings. Their notion was that we could use our own traditions to critique modernity. What is your assessment of this project, particularly if we were to look at this current through a Foucauldian lens? Is it fundamentally possible to achieve the production of indigenous theories in a non-ideological sense? Can we continue on this path? Can we arrive at a specific epistemological domain?

First, the critique of modern science arose from within modernity itself. There is no doubt that this matter has been accompanied by ideological claims in our society, claims that were often not even epistemological. Indigenous science has not yet been realized; science has a set of prerequisites, and science is a social product; it is not a monologue, but a dialogue that, incidentally, requires many practitioners. It seems that these discussions, although they have not reached their goal and are indeed not destined to reach it, and have been more ideological and aimed at establishing something, and although they have been tainted by certain pretensions, are nonetheless very welcome.

In any case, we are confronted with the phenomenon of science. It seems the issue can be formulated in two ways, and if we pursue one of them, it would be authentic and likely acceptable. One way, which we have pursued so far, is as if we claim to accept these things, but we want to do it ourselves; in fact, we want to create a science for ourselves, in other words, we have the pretension of establishing something; it is like me wanting to critique your precious possession in order to appropriate it for myself. We want to take the place of modernity ourselves. If we have the pretension of establishing an indigenous science, we must know that science is not something that can be created at all; science does not require a will to create, it is a collective product and science comes into being. If anyone has the notion that we can sit down and write a manual to create an indigenous science, it is simply not feasible.

But it is also possible to pose the problem correctly. The issue is that the ossified scientific method has so penetrated our minds, and we were so overawed that we could not think at all, we could not differentiate between the problems of these two domains and say that if science originates from concrete problems, the problems of the West are different from our problems. One must know that this plan that has been set forth was not the only possible plan; it seems that although these discussions have not progressed on a good path and have been greatly marred, if anything is to be achieved, it will emerge from within these very discussions. One cannot claim that indigenous science, indigenous psychology, indigenous sociology, or indigenous philosophy has been created, but discussions have been raised suggesting that we must seek our own specific problems within science, and this is no small matter.

• You mentioned Foucault being influenced by Ferdowsi, but I think Foucault was influenced by Francis Bacon in this phrase knowledge is power. And I think they believe in power, whereas Ferdowsi believes in ability, which is an ethical and transcendent matter.

Yes, that is correct; to approximate the idea, we cited the verse “Able was he who was wise,” but ability is not power.

Let me refer to another point about what was raised in the first question; it was asked whether we need the formation of indigenous thought. I must say that indigenous thought is in the process of being formed. The fact that we speak of knowledge-based thought and that we stipulate that science must produce wealth, although it does not seem to be correct thinking—because our thinking about science will become mercantilist—in any case, this type of thinking is taking shape. The next topic concerns mental illnesses. From health to illness is a spectrum, and we are compelled to initiate treatment when an individual’s social functioning is impaired.

It was initially stated that this critique of ours does not mean criticism, although at times it may take on a sharp tone, because the other aspect of the matter has been neglected. It was said that one of the theories of psychiatry is function, and it also has rival theories. When facing an issue, we always examine the neglected aspects; if someone considers mental illness to be entirely a functional matter, we must remind them that this disorder can also occur at the cellular and molecular level; for example, when the dopamine level in a patient’s brain rises, they become psychotic. The dopamine theory of psychosis is not a theory that can be easily dismissed, but the neglected aspect must be emphasized. Normal blood pressure is 12 over 8; is this normality dependent on molecular-cellular function? Is tissue oxygenation better at this blood pressure level? No, it is not. The blood pressure of the majority of the human population is 12 over 8; it is the norm. This aspect of public authority must be seen.

• The critique of modern science creates the understanding that power and science have a very strong relationship with one another. The approach that exists in our society is the discussion of scientific authority, and the Supreme Leader has also emphasized it. Considering the difference in philosophical outlook between us and the West, is it even possible for us to become a scientific authority? Is scientific authority possible without scientific dominance? If it is such that we need to propose scientific authority within our own territory, can we confront them, especially since Western culture is advancing in a fully consolidated manner? Can we create scientific authority without having first created its intellectual-philosophical prerequisites? If we do so, does the existing entity have the capacity for it?

I am only stating my own opinion. Our entire argument is that science arises from a lifeworld, and a type of philosophical outlook and worldview. The reality is that the dominant game in the current world is apparently not our game. The intention is not to go to extremes or bring up discussions of the decline of Western man and Eastern man, but the dependence of science on social, intellectual, and economic aspects is a very deep dependence. If what is meant by science is what it currently is, and if what is meant by technology is what currently exists, it seems highly unlikely that we can take the lead. But the whole point is that this has become the knowledge formation of this era; certainly, science is not only this, certainly, another way of living, another thinking, another science, perhaps with far greater capabilities, can be brought into existence. Science is currently destroying; perhaps many distortions have occurred. If other foundations are at work, another science will be tailored to the stature of those foundations; the intended scientific authority is not in this very science, it is epistemic authority.

If the game is what it is, we cannot be very hopeful of being the winner of this game. However, since the Revolution, an understanding has been created within us to the effect that we must not be overawed and must seek ourselves and our own issues. At the beginning of the Revolution, in the late 1970s, the whole world was pursuing material gain, but we sought something else, and this seeking of something else is still with us, and we live it. Here is the ball and here is the field, for seeking something else, another world, another human being.

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Download the audio file of this lecture from here.

Size: 23 MB.

Duration: 98 minutes.

Time and place: 7 September 2014, Tehran Elite Foundation.

Audio file source: Farhang-e Emrooz website, link to part one | link to part two (This lecture was published in two parts, which we have combined into one file.)

Download the full text of this lecture from here or read it below.

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