Lectures on the Philosophy of Science by Dr. Mehdi Nasrin

The discipline of the philosophy of science is a second-order knowledge that engages in rational inquiry into the method and structure of science. In the modern era, attention to the philosophy of science has increased, both due to the progress of the sciences and the irreplaceable role of the empirical sciences among human knowledges. Today, the philosophy of science course is a required or elective unit in many universities across various fields of knowledge. The upcoming series of sessions comprises the lectures of Dr. Mehdi Nasrin at Sharif University of Technology in 2004. These lectures were presented as an introductory acquaintance with the topics of the philosophy of science.

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Session One of the Philosophy of Science Lectures

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Topics Discussed:

1_ Examination of Schlick's article 2_ The positivist approach 3_ The principle of the verifiability of meaning 4_ The grounding of knowledges on immediate sensory knowledge 5_ The criterion of meaningfulness 6_ The concept of observability 7_ The meaninglessness of metaphysical propositions

Every philosophical school, after emerging, gradually undergoes changes and transformations, and there are always individuals within the school who are considered orthodox, and also individuals who stand against the principles that the orthodox members advocate. Positivism, too, since the term was used by Auguste Comte, has undergone changes, and there were individuals who were considered positivists but did not speak on a single subject. For example, specifically, the positivism of Mach and Comte differed from the positivism of the Vienna Circle. Here, Schlick wants to introduce positivism. From Schlick's perspective, positivism means a school whose goal is the rejection of metaphysics and considers this its duty.

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Session Two of the Philosophy of Science Lectures

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Topics Discussed:

1_ The distinction between the theory of meaning and meaningfulness 1_ Semantic overload 2_ Fact-stating propositions 3_ The relationship between philosophy and science 4_ A priori assumptions in scientific propositions 5_ Psychological states 6_ The results of Schlick's discussion 7_ The modification of verifiability to confirmability 8_ The difference between analytic and continental philosophers 9_ An examination of Bridgman's theories and views in logical positivism 10_ Bridgman's operationism

The philosophical claim of the Vienna Circle is that when scientific theories change, philosophies also change. Because in Schlick's time, Newton's theory of absolute time had been rejected and the theory of relativity had been confirmed, propositions that speak about absolute time are meaningless, because according to Einstein's theory, one cannot say what the semantic overload is. The Vienna Circle viewed science as a current that becomes more successful every day, so today's science is more successful than past science, but in science, no concept can be defined absolutely and a fixed meaning can be considered for it, and one must always await the change of concepts used in a science. Therefore, philosophers cannot make universal, general propositions about scientific concepts and must be ready for the evolution of these concepts at every moment.

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Session Three of the Philosophy of Science Lectures

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Topics Discussed:

A) Some points regarding previous discussions 1_ The meaning of observability 2_ Time in Newtonian and Einsteinian physics 3_ Explanation and prediction 4_ Meaningfulness and truth 5_ The meaningfulness of historical propositions 6_ Meaningfulness in relation to the reality of the world B) Continuation of the discussion on Bridgman's theory 1_ The relationship between scientific terms and the concept of measurement 2_ Openness to presuppositions 3_ Connection and disconnection between theoretical concepts 4_ The necessity of accepting a plurality of theoretical concepts 5_ The relative character of scientific knowledge 6_ Examination of some examples of scientific propositions in relation to Bridgman's theory

In psychology, the Vienna Circle's position is logical behaviorism, and according to this view, any proposition in which a psychological predicate such as pleasure, happiness, etc., is used, if it is meaningful, must be translatable into a set of propositions in which only physical predicates are used. The difference here between Schlick and the Vienna Circle on one hand, and Bridgman on the other, is that Bridgman's focus of discussion is concepts, whereas for Schlick and the Vienna Circle it is propositions. According to the theory of behaviorism, for example, a person who pretends to be insane, if they act in all possible circumstances in a way that indicates their insanity, then they are insane. Or if someone has a toothache, this proposition is meaningful when it is translatable into a finite set of behavioral propositions. Such as moving towards a dentist, or placing their hand on their face, and having an elevated heart rate, and so on... The further claim that the qualitative character of a toothache for two people, despite identical behaviors, could be different, is unintelligible.

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Session Four of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Science

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Topics Discussed:

An examination of the views and theories of Rudolf Carnap 1_ The difference between internal and external questions 2_ Adding a new linguistic framework and accepting it 3_ The nominalists' objection and Carnap's response 4_ Summary

An excerpt from the session: The title of the article by Carnap that we are reviewing is: Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology. The article began with the statement that radical empiricists (nominalists) view abstract entities with suspicion. It seems that even if a nominalistic language could be constructed, it would not be much to the liking of physics, because physics genuinely uses numbers, and what it recognizes as the quantity of things and represents with numerical values truly exists. (However, positivist philosophers of science like Mach were expected to expel abstract entities from science entirely. But it seems such a move could not be made). Classical empiricists like Locke and Hume considered only the information obtained through the senses (the given) to be meaningful. In that case, one must move towards a nominalistic language. But on the other hand, if we do not deny abstract entities, will we then fall into Platonic realism and transcendental metaphysics? So the first question in this article is: ultimately, what should we, as empiricists, do with abstract entities?

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Session Five of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Science

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Topics Discussed:

1_ Examination of Popper's Views and Theories 1. Induction and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science 2. The Resistance of Theories to Falsification 3. Conjecture and Falsifiability 4. The Aim of Science; Approximation to the Truth 5. Summary: 2_ Popper's View on Carnap

From Popper's perspective, there are 4 periods in Carnap's work: 1- The period of providing a physicalist language based on physical data. 2- The period of the unified science thesis, which is very close to the physicalist language. 3- The period of the logical syntax of language, which attempts to formulate propositions within a formal language based on conventional rules. 4- The period of conceptual frameworks that are close to science. In Popper's view, Carnap's perspective has always been that scientific propositions should remain and metaphysical propositions should be eliminated. Ultimately, he resorts to pragmatic considerations.

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Sixth Session of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Science

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Topics Discussed:

Continuation of the Discussion on Popper's Theory 1_ Deductive Testing of Theories 2_ Rules of Scientific Method 3_ The Relation Between Logical Rules and Methodological Rules Pertaining to Theory 4_ Commitment to Generalizing Methodological Rules 5_ Critique of the Conventionalists' Theory 6_ The Relationship Between Observation and the Process of Falsification 7_ The Trilemma of Dogmatism, Psychologism, and Infinite Regress

Popper's critique of the conventionalists is like Russell's critique of radical skepticism. Russell said of radical skepticism that adopting a skeptical stance, although logically consistent, is an irrefutable position and opens no path to knowledge. In a similar vein, Popper maintains that the conventionalists' stance, although it involves no logical inconsistency, results in a kind of irrefutability. That is, the propositions favored by conventionalists can be accepted logically, but since these are rules for permanently preventing theories from being eliminated, they cause a kind of irrefutability. In this respect, the disagreement between Popper and the conventionalists lies in matters such as simplicity and the ability to cognize the reality of the world, and these matters are not achievements of logic and experience. What settles the dispute here are external questions and considerations.

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Seventh Session of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Science

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Topics Discussed:

Review and examination of Hilary Putnam's article

Continuing the examination of Quine's