Mohammad Hassan Qaramaleki's Article, 'Differing Responses to the Apostasy Ruling'

Apostasy and Its Types

Apostasy (irtidād) is derived from the root "radd" and means to return and turn back; as lexicographers have written: "al-radd ṣarf al-shayʾ wa rajʿuhu wa al-radd maṣdar radadtu al-shayʾ"⁽²⁾ "wa al-irtidād al-rujūʿ wa minhu al-murtadd wa al-riddatu al-ism min al-irtidād."⁽³⁾

But in religious terminology, it is used in two senses: 1 - Turning back from the religion of Islam and denying it; 2 - Denying some of the definitive and essential teachings of the religion.

Jurists have divided the apostate, based on their prior history with Islam, into two types: fiṭrī (innate) and millī (national), and they have established a very important and decisive difference in the ruling for the two, which is the execution of the fiṭrī apostate for the mere act of apostasy, unlike the millī apostate, who is first asked to return to Islam; if they return, their apostasy is disregarded, and if they do not repent, they are sentenced to death.

Three Definitions of the Fiṭrī Apostate

However, the important point is the explanation and presentation of a clear picture of these two, regarding which there are three different views:

1. Islam of one of the parents at the time of conception: Some jurists believe that what is meant by a fiṭrī apostate is that at the time of the individual's conception, the parents or one of them were Muslim. If such a child apostatizes, they are a fiṭrī apostate and are sentenced to death without any conditions. A corollary of the above basis is the realization of the description of fiṭrī apostasy even if the parents of that child adopt another faith after conception and the child is raised after birth in a non-Muslim family, but by the mere fact of the parents' Islam at the time of conception, they will have the ruling of a fiṭrī apostate. Proponents of this basis, such as Shahīd al-Thānī ⁽⁴⁾ and Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir,⁽⁵⁾ have relied on the apparent meanings of narrations in which expressions such as "wulida ʿalā al-islām" (born upon Islam) and "wulida ʿalā al-fiṭrah" (born upon the primordial nature) appear, like this narration: "A man born upon Islam then disbelieved, associated partners, and left Islam; should he be asked to repent or be killed without being asked to repent? So he (the Imam) wrote: He is to be killed." ⁽⁶⁾ In another narration from Imam Ali, peace be upon him, it is stated: "As for those among the Muslims who were born upon the fiṭrah and then became heretics..."⁽⁷⁾ They have interpreted "wulida" (was born) as referring to the formation of the sperm, indicating that birth refers to the point of the beginning of birth and formation.

2. Islam of one of the parents at the time of birth: The second view takes the narrations according to their apparent meaning and believes that what is meant by fiṭrī in a fiṭrī apostate is that at the time of the individual's birth, the parents or one of them were Muslim, even if they leave Islam after the birth. ʿAllāmah al-Ḥillī ⁽⁸⁾ and Muḥaqqiq al-Jazāʾirī⁽⁹⁾ are in agreement with this view.

3. Comprehension of Islam during the age of maturity: Another view holds that what is meant by the Islam of the parents at the time of birth—as mentioned in the narrations—is their Islam both initially and continuously; meaning that the child's parents remained in their Islam and raised the child in an Islamic environment, and the child, by observing the Islam of the parents or one of them, as well as the Islamic society which is accompanied by propagation and a suitable foundation for accepting Islam, chooses the sacred religion of Islam during their period of growth and maturity. Now, if they subsequently take the path of apostasy, the description of fiṭrī apostasy is realized. In other words, what is meant is the nurturing and upbringing of the child under the umbrella of Islamic propagation, even if their parents died from the time of birth. The above view has not received much attention from jurists. Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd,⁽¹⁰⁾ al-Fāḍil al-Hindī ⁽¹¹⁾ and Muḥaqqiq al-Ardabīlī⁽¹²⁾ are considered among the proponents of this view.

The above definition is inferred from the apparent meaning of some narrations. In the reliable tradition of ʿAmmār al-Sābāṭī, it is narrated from Imam al-Ṣādiq, peace be upon him:

«کل مسلم بین مسلمین ارتد عن الاسلام و جحد محمد صلی الله علیه و آله نبوته و کذبه فان دمه مباح...»⁽¹³⁾

در این روایت اشاره ای به تولد نشده و موضوع ارتداد، مسلمانی ذکر گردیده که در میان مسلمانان و جامعه اسلامی باشد یعنی متأثر از تبلیغات اسلام بوده و دوره ای از عمر خود را به آن آیین گذرانده باشد و سپس مرتد شده باشد.

در روایت صحیح دیگری آمده است: «سألته علیه السلام عن مسلم تنصّر. قال علیه السلام : یقتل و لایستتاب».⁽¹⁴⁾ در این روایت نیز موضوع قتل و ارتداد مسلمانی آمده که در دوران بلوغ خود نصرانی شده است. از عبارت «مسلم تنصّر» استفاده می شود که این عبارت با فطری بودن کفر ابتدایی کودک تنها به دلیل اسلام والدینش هنگام انعقاد نطفه یا تولدش نمی سازد، به تعبیر دیگر همان طوری که صاحب جواهر مدعی است. مراد از «رجل» و «مسلم» در روایات، رجل و مسلم بالغ است و به کودک صدق نمی کند.⁽¹⁵⁾

اما درباره روایاتی که در آنها به «ولد علی الاسلام» یا «علی الفطرة» تعبیر شده و طرفداران دو قول اول به آنهااستشهاد کردند، باید گفت که مقصود از تولد بر اسلام یا فطرت توحیدی، حدوثا و استمرارا است و اشاره به این نکته عرفی و زبانی دارد که گفته می شود «ناف زید را بر فلان چیز بریده اند»، یعنی اسلام و تعالیم آن رگ و خون فرزند را فراگرفته و به تعبیر دیگر، وی در دامن اسلام تولد و تربیت یافته است. این ادعا را روایات دیگری که ذکر شد تأیید می کند. علاوه بر این که در برخی از روایات «تولد»، موضوع ارتداد صرف تولد بر اسلام ذکر نشده، بلکه بعد از آن قیدهای نظیر «ثم کفر و اشرک و خرج عن الاسلام»، «فبّدل دینه» و «ثم تزندق» آمده است.⁽¹⁶⁾ که تأمل در آنها مثبت مدعا چرا که تحقق کفر و شرک و خروج از اسلام با فرض تدیّن به اسلام، هر چند مدتی اندک، میسر است و کودکی که از ابتدا در محیط کفر رشد می یابد و صرفا نامی از اسلام را دارد، نمی توان کفرش را کفر بعد از اسلام وصف کرد.⁽¹⁷⁾ امام خمینی نیز در تبیین ارتداد فطری می نویسد: «ولد المرتد الفطری قبل ارتداده بحکم المسلم فاذا بلغ و اختار الکفر و کذا ولد المسلم اذا بلغ و اختار الکفر قبل اظهار الإسلام فالظاهر عدم اجراء حکم المرتد فطریا علیهما».⁽¹⁸⁾ به دیگر سخن، ارتداد یعنی برگشت از دین، دینی که خود فرد آگاهانه و محققانه برگزیده است، نه این که انتخابش تقلیدی و ایمان و یقینش به دین یقین روان شناختی بوده است.

استاد جوادی آملی در این باره می گوید:

ارتداد آن است که کسی محققانه دین را بپذیرد، سپس دین را کنار بگذارد. در ارتداد یک نکته مهم این است که پیش از این، دین را با برهان منطقی پذیرفته باشد، اگر کسی واقعا شاک متفحص است، یعنی هر چند در خانواده مسلمان تربیت شده ولی اسلامی را که قبول کرده، «اسلام روان شناختی» است نه اسلام معرفت شناختی و یقین منطقی ؛ دید پدر و مادرش مسلمان هستند، او هم مسلمان شد، نه از معصوم شنید و نه از حکیم متأله دریافت کرد، اسلام موروثی دارد که اگر هم یقین داشته باشد، یقین روانی است نه یقین منطقی، چنین شخصی اگر به ایمان خود باقی بماند، ممکن است خداوند متعال منت گذاشته و دین او را بپذیرد. اما اگر شک کرد، معلوم نیست که خداوند متعال احکام ارتداد بر آن بار کند و معلوم نیست که تعریف ارتداد شامل آن بشود. بنابراین، ارتداد یعنی کسی که یقین معرفت شناختی دارد، با این حال دین را به بازی بگیرد و از آن اعلام بیزاری نماید. ⁽¹⁹⁾

احکام ارتداد

فقیهان برای مرتد احکام مختلفی از متون دینی (کتاب و سنت) استنتاج کرده اند که در ذیل به آن اشاره می شود:

1. قتل: حساس ترین و مهم ترین حکم مرتد، حکم قتل است که با تحقق شرایط آن، فقهای سنی و شیعه بر آن اتفاق نظر دارند. نکته شایان ذکر این که این حکم اختصاص به مرتد مرد دارد وزن مرتد به هیچ وجه کشته نمی شود، بلکه به حبس دایم محکوم می گردد و در صورت توبه، توبه اش پذیرفته می شود. همچنین اجرای حکم قتل در مرتد ملی منوط به عدم توبه اوست، یعنی در وهله نخست از او می خواهند که در مهلت سه روز توبه کند و در صورت عدم توبه در روز چهارم حکم مزبور اجرا می شود. مستند تعلیق حکم قتل به توبه در سه روز، ظواهر بعضی روایات است که تحلیل آن خواهد آمد.

2. Automatic dissolution of the marriage contract: With the apostasy of a Muslim, the legitimacy of the marriage contract is nullified and its continuation becomes forbidden. The above ruling is agreed upon by jurists and explicitly stated in the narrations, which will be referred to.

3. Division of property: Another ruling concerning the apostate is the division of his property among his legal heirs. This ruling has been emphasized in the narrations; however, a noteworthy point is that this ruling is specific to the innate apostate (murtadd fiṭrī), and the property of the national apostate (murtadd millī) is not divided. In the case of a national apostate, his property is held in trust and returned to him if he returns to Islam. In the authentic narration of Muḥammad ibn Muslim, it is transmitted from Imam al-Bāqir (peace be upon him): "Whoever turns away from Islam and disbelieves in what was revealed to Muḥammad after his Islam... his wife is separated from him, and what he leaves behind is divided among his children."⁽²⁰⁾

Conditions for Apostasy

The establishment and application of the aforementioned rulings for an apostate, including the death penalty, depend on the fulfillment of the following conditions:

1. Puberty;

2. Sanity;

3. Free will;

4. Intent;

5. Individual nature: Some contemporary scholars, reflecting on the conduct (sīra) of the Prophet of Islam and Imam ʿAlī (peace be upon him), have deduced another condition for the execution of the death penalty, which is that the apostasy must be individual and not collective. This means that the death penalty is applied to an apostate, when the conditions are met, only if the apostasy is limited to one or a few, countable individuals. In other words, the apostasy must not be the result of the poisonous propaganda of the enemies of religion, which causes a group of Muslims to apostatize. In such a case, executing the death penalty cannot block the path of disbelief. Proponents of this condition have cited three reasons or pieces of evidence for their claim: The first reason is reliance on the conduct of Imam ʿAlī and Imam al-Ṣādiq (peace be upon them) in not killing the leaders of apostate groups, such as Ibn al-Kawwāʾ and Ibn Abī al-ʿAwjāʾ;⁽²¹⁾ the second reason is the claim that the evidence for apostasy rulings is restricted (inṣirāf) to individual apostasy and does not apply to collective apostasy;⁽²²⁾ the third reason is the ineffectiveness of executing the death penalty in preventing apostasy when it is collective. Ayatollah Subḥānī says in this regard: "In the presence of such an atmosphere, one can no longer prevent the deviation of individuals' beliefs; therefore, the ruling of apostasy is not applied to them."⁽²³⁾

In analyzing the first reason, it must be said that the Imams' (peace be upon them) not killing a group of apostates may have had other causes, for instance, being attributable to ignorance, lack of obstinacy, or consideration of other expediencies, the details of which will follow.

Therefore, the mere fact that a group of apostates was not killed cannot be attributed to the collective nature of their apostasy. Moreover, in some narrations, the Imams (peace be upon them) ruled on the legitimacy of killing groups of apostates, such as the heretics (zanādiqa), the Qadarites, and the exaggerators (ghulāt); as the governor of Imam ʿAlī (peace be upon him) reported the collective apostasy of a group of Muslims to him as follows: "I found a group of Muslims who are heretics and a group of Christians who are heretics." The Imam replied: "As for those who were Muslims, born upon the primordial nature (fiṭra) and then became heretics, strike their necks and do not ask them to repent."⁽²⁴⁾ In another narration, regarding a people who believed in his divinity, the Imam first asked them to repent, and when they did not repent, he ordered their execution.⁽²⁵⁾ Thus, the first reason of those who hold the above condition is not complete.

Regarding the claim of the restriction (inṣirāf) of the narrations, its weakness becomes clear from the preceding points. Again, concerning a tribe of Christians who had embraced Islam and then apostatized, after asking them to repent, the Imam ruled for the execution of that tribe.⁽²⁶⁾ Regarding the third reason, it must be said that it cannot be accepted absolutely; preventing the deviation of belief and safeguarding the sacred religion of Islam may well be facilitated by applying the apostasy ruling to an obstinate and stubborn group that propagates its corrupt beliefs, and it may well backfire if this ruling is applied to a people who claim intellectual and scientific belief and the violation of their rights. The conclusion is that the application of the apostasy ruling to collective apostates depends on the opinion of the religious ruler (ḥākim al-sharʿ) and the assessment of expediencies and the principle of "the more important and the important" (al-ahamm wa al-muhimm), and collective apostasy itself cannot nullify the apostasy ruling.

Analysis of Viewpoints

Here, we will analyze and evaluate the viewpoints of jurists regarding the ruling on killing an apostate.

First viewpoint: Absolute killing of the apostate (with or without repentance)

The first approach belongs to the majority of jurists, who believe that the ruling for a fitri apostate—namely, execution—is general and applies whether or not the apostate repents, meaning that the apostate’s repentance has no effect on the ruling of execution. The reality of apostasy is realized in two different forms: the first form is turning away from the religion and denying the truth of the religion itself; the second form is, while acknowledging the religion itself, denying some of the necessities of the religion. Due to the difference and variance in the foundations and proofs for the two forms above, we will analyze them separately:

1. Turning Away from the Religion

The overwhelming majority of jurists believe that by the mere realization of turning away from the sacred religion of Islam, the ruling of execution is applied to the fitri apostate, regardless of ignorance, doubt, repentance, or the choice of another religion.

Shaykh Tusi says on this matter: “The apostate is of two kinds: one of them is born upon the innate nature of Islam among Muslims; whenever he apostatizes, his execution becomes obligatory and his repentance is not accepted.”⁽²⁷⁾ Allamah Hilli holds a similar view. Among other jurists who support this theory are Ibn Idris al-Hilli, Kashif al-Ghita, Imam Khomeini, and Ayatollah Khoei.⁽²⁸⁾

Proofs for the View

We will now explain and examine the proofs for the above theory.

a) The Holy Quran: Some proponents of the above view have relied on the verses of apostasy to prove their claim; for example, Shaykh Tusi, after generalizing disbelief and apostasy to its various types, says: “When a Muslim apostatizes from Islam—that is, commits any kind of disbelief... his execution becomes obligatory, due to the Almighty’s saying: ‘And whoever desires other than Islam as religion—never will it be accepted from him.’”^(29)(30)

Recourse to the verses of apostasy to legitimize the ruling of executing an apostate is rarely observed in jurisprudential books, and perhaps the reason for this is their lack of belief in deducing this ruling from the verses, because the verses of apostasy typically refer to the nullification of worldly deeds and punishment in the Hereafter, and they do not indicate the worldly ruling for apostates, or they are silent about it. On this basis, some jurists, such as Muqaddas Ardabili, have explicitly stated that the Quran does not indicate this claim.⁽³¹⁾ Among the verses of apostasy, only the following verse refers to the worldly punishment of the apostate: “...and disbelieved after their Islam... So if they repent, it is better for them; but if they turn away, Allah will punish them with a painful punishment in this world and the Hereafter.”⁽³²⁾ However, the above verse does not specify the type of painful worldly punishment—whether it is execution or other types of punishment, such as heavenly calamities and various afflictions. Therefore, the ruling of executing an apostate cannot be deduced from it.

In addition to this, the language of the verse is that of reporting, not legislating and law-making; the verse says that God will afflict the apostates with a punishment, but what the type of punishment is, its nature, who its executor is, and how it will be, the verse does not provide an answer. Another point is that, considering the previous verse,⁽³³⁾ it becomes clear that the addressees of the verse are the disbelievers and hypocrites who had a hostile confrontation with the Prophet of Islam, and in response, God gave that Prophet the ruling of retaliation.

b) Narrations: The most important evidence for the above view is the apparent meanings of the narrations whose absolute and general scope includes the two different states (repentance and non-repentance). Proponents of the above view argue that if apostasy did not encompass the two mentioned states, the Prophet of Islam and the other Imams would have had to elaborate and explain it.

Some narrations are referred to here. It is narrated from the Prophet of Islam, peace and blessings be upon him and his family: “The blood of a Muslim person who testifies that there is no god but Allah and that I am the Messenger of Allah is not lawful except for one of three individuals: a life for a life, the married adulterer, and the one who abandons his religion, separating from the community.”⁽³⁴⁾ “Whoever changes his religion, kill him.”⁽³⁵⁾

The Prophet of Islam, peace and blessings be upon him and his family, during the conquest of Mecca, ordered the execution of several people for apostasy.⁽³⁶⁾ In addition to the above narrations, which by their absolute nature indicate the claim, there are specific narrations that are explicit in not accepting the apostate’s repentance; among them:

In the reliable narration of Ammar from Imam Baqir, peace be upon him, it is stated: “Any Muslim among Muslims who apostatizes from Islam, denies Muhammad’s prophethood, and calls him a liar, his blood is lawful for everyone who hears this from him... and it is incumbent upon the Imam to execute him and not to ask him to repent.”⁽³⁷⁾

In the ṣaḥīḥa of Muḥammad ibn Muslim from Imam al-Bāqir, peace be upon him, it is also stated: “Whoever turns away from Islam and disbelieves in what was revealed to Muḥammad, may God bless him and his family, after his Islam, there is no repentance for him and his killing has become obligatory.”⁽³⁸⁾ Al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī, al-Shahīd al-Awwal, al-Shahīd al-Thānī, Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir, al-Muqaddas al-Ardabīlī, and al-Baḥrānī are among the jurists who cited traditions as the basis for the above ruling. The analysis and evaluation of the above reason will come in the examination of the second form of apostasy (denial of a necessary doctrine).

c) Consensus: The second reason of the proponents is consensus. Some jurists claim that the Imāmī consensus is on the killing of the apostate and that no one has opposed it. Al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī⁽³⁹⁾, al-Shahīd al-Thānī⁽⁴⁰⁾, and Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir⁽⁴¹⁾ are proponents of consensus. In analyzing the consensus, two points are noteworthy. The first point is that the very realization of consensus, given the existence of opponents such as al-Iskāfī, is subject to reflection. It is possible that the said consensus is the agreement of the majority of the Imāmiyya, not all of them; as Ṣāḥib al-Ḥadāʾiq has raised this possibility.⁽⁴²⁾

The second point is that the claimed consensus, even if its occurrence is established, cannot be authoritative due to its being based on evidence (madrakī) or the probability thereof.

Some contemporary jurists, in critiquing the consensus, have resorted to the dispersion of the statements and expressions of those who formed the consensus. In five or six instances, the expression “lā yustatāb” (he is not asked to repent) is used, and in six or seven instances, the expression “lan tuqbala tawbatuhu” (his repentance will not be accepted) is used. The first expression is broader than whether the apostate repents or not, meaning the apostate is not asked to repent, but in the case of repentance, the language of the traditions and the expressions of those who formed the consensus do not address it.

2. Denial of a Necessary Doctrine

The second type of apostasy is the denial and rejection of one or more established and necessary doctrines of the religion. The principle of this issue, like the previous issue, is almost agreed upon by the jurists; however, the ambiguous and controversial point is the determination and clarification of the minor premise, i.e., the essential doctrine of the religion, which has provided a ground for disputes; as some have claimed a specific doctrine to be necessary and others have denied it, the most prominent of which is the issue of Imamate: is it a necessary doctrine of the religion or of the school (madhhab)?⁽⁴³⁾

Another controversial point is the condition of the denier’s awareness and attention to whether the denied doctrine is necessary or not. The proponents of the above view believe that the denial of a necessary principle absolutely leads to disbelief and apostasy, whether the denier denies it knowingly and with awareness, or without awareness of its being necessary and merely out of ignorance and lack of knowledge. In another formulation, the denial of a necessary doctrine is in itself an independent cause for disbelief, whether its denial leads back to the denial of the Sacred Law and the Lawgiver or not; as Ṣāḥib Miftāḥ al-Karāma has attributed this to the apparent statement of the companions.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Al-Shaykh al-Anṣārī claims that the jurists before the time of al-Muqaddas al-Ardabīlī held the view of the disbelief of the denier of a necessary doctrine of the religion absolutely, without elaboration regarding knowledge or lack thereof.⁽⁴⁵⁾ The apparent meanings of the statements of the earlier jurists confirm al-Shaykh al-Anṣārī’s claim that they ruled absolutely on the disbelief and apostasy of the denier of a necessary doctrine of the religion, some of which are pointed out here:

Al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī, mentioning the example of denying the obligation of prayer, states the ruling for its killing among the companions without disagreement:

Al-Shahīd al-Thānī, in explaining its criterion, says: “The criterion is the denial of what is known of the religion by necessity, and there is no difference in the ruling between its occurrence out of obstinacy, belief, or mockery, based on outward appearances.”⁽⁴⁶⁾

Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir considers the criterion and standard for apostasy to be the absolute denial of a necessary doctrine of the religion, citing the disbelief of the “Khawārij” and the “Ghulāt” as an example, even if they did not pay attention to it. He considers the reason for the theory to be the absoluteness of the traditions and the legal opinions of the jurists, and criticizes Ṣāḥib Kashf al-Lithām, who believes in restricting the denial of a necessary doctrine to knowledge.⁽⁴⁷⁾

Reason for the Theory

The most important reason for the above theory is the apparent meanings of the traditions that, with reliable and unreliable chains of transmission, indicate the disbelief and apostasy of the deniers of religious doctrines absolutely, whether knowingly or unknowingly, which are referred to below:

In the ṣaḥīḥa of ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sinān, it is narrated from Imam al-Ṣādiq: “Whoever commits a major sin from among the major sins and claims it is lawful, that removes him from Islam and he will be punished with the severest punishment.”⁽⁴⁸⁾

Imam Ali (peace be upon him) says in a narration: "Whoever denies the obligatory duties is a disbeliever." ⁽⁴⁹⁾ In analyzing the above narrations as well as the narrations on the first type of apostasy (apostasy from the foundation of religion), the following points are worth mentioning:

1. Denial (Juḥd) is concomitant with knowledge: The subject of disbelief (kufr) is the "denial" (juḥūd) and "deeming lawful" (istiḥlāl) of what God has forbidden, and vice versa, which outwardly indicates the knowledge and awareness of the denier regarding the lawfulness of a ruling, such that despite having knowledge, he proceeds to deny the divine ruling. ⁽⁵⁰⁾

2. Disbelief conditioned upon belittlement: Proponents of the necessary correlation between the ruling of disbelief and apostasy must also note that the subject of disbelief is not merely exiting Islam and denial; rather, in other narrations, disbelief is conditioned upon various qualifiers such as "belittlement" (istikhfāf) and "disdain" (at-tahāwun); as lexicographers like Jawharī ⁽⁵¹⁾ and Ibn Manẓūr ⁽⁵²⁾ have mentioned, these two mean contempt, seeking to demean, and insult. ⁽⁵³⁾ 3. Non-necessity of correlation between disbelief and apostasy: A point worthy of reflection is that "apostasy" (irtidād) and "disbelief" (kufr) cannot be considered equal and necessarily correlated in all rulings, and merely upon the realization of disbelief or the inference of disbelief from narrations on a subject, one cannot deem the disbeliever an apostate and apply the rulings of apostasy, including execution, to them. This is because the rulings of apostasy in the narrations—referred to at the beginning of the article—are predicated not upon disbelief and the disbeliever, but upon apostasy and the apostate. No narration is found that applies the specific rulings of apostasy, including the ruling of execution, solely upon disbelief. In other words, disbelief and apostasy have a general-specific relationship, and apostasy is one of the types of disbelief. The specific ruling cannot be applied to the general, unless the proponents of correlation prove that the specific rulings of apostasy are not due to apostasy but due to absolute disbelief, which is contrary to the apparent meanings and context of the narrations.

4. Inclusiveness of narrations regarding denial of the necessary and the non-necessary: Those who hold the view of disbelief and apostasy for the denier of the necessary have restricted disbelief to the denial of the necessary. However, the narrations make no mention of denying the necessary tenets of religion; rather, the narrations are absolute and include the absolute denial of religious rulings, whether necessary or non-necessary, and whether conscious or unconscious.

Second View: Distinction between the repentant and unrepentant apostate

The first view held the absolute execution of the apostate, but this view claims that the ruling of execution for the apostate by nature (murtadd fiṭrī) is contingent upon the absence of repentance. In the case of repentance, not only is his repentance accepted in the Hereafter, but it is also accepted in this world, and the ruling of execution is lifted from him.

As previously mentioned, the apostate is divided into two types: the apostate from religion and the apostate who denies the necessary. Now, the question arises here: do the proponents of accepting repentance hold this view in both cases, or do some hold it absolutely while others make a distinction? Reflection on the opinions of jurists reveals the view of distinction.

1. Repentance of the denier of religion

A small number of early and later jurists hold that the ruling of execution is lifted upon the repentance of the apostate by nature. Iskāfī (d. 382 AH) is a well-known early jurist who advocated this view, believing: "Apostasy is one category, and he should be asked to repent; if he repents, then [he is spared], otherwise he is killed."⁽⁵⁴⁾

The above view is inferred from some statements of Ibn Barrāj (d. 481 AH); as he says: "If the apostate was born upon the natural disposition of Islam, his execution is obligatory without asking him to repent. But if he repents, no one has any authority over him."⁽⁵⁵⁾ The Second Martyr (Shahīd Thānī) in Masālik notes that the majority of jurists reject the acceptance of the apostate's repentance, but the language of the authentic proofs for repentance is general and absolute, which also applies to the case under discussion (the apostate's repentance):⁽⁵⁶⁾ Ṣāḥib Jawāhir believes that the Second Martyr inclines toward Iskāfī's theory.⁽⁵⁷⁾ In another place, after reporting Iskāfī's opinion, the Second Martyr explicitly states that the stronger view is the acceptance of the apostate's repentance absolutely.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Some contemporary jurists, such as Shaykh Muḥammad Jawād Mughniyya, Makārim Shīrāzī, Jaʿfar Subḥānī, and Sayyid Muḥammad Shīrāzī, hold the view of accepting the apostate's repentance in the absence of obstinacy, whose opinions will be presented.

2. Repentance of the denier of the necessary

The view of accepting the repentance of the denier of the necessary tenets of religion has more proponents than that of the denier of religion.

Shaykh Mufīd, after declaring the heretical sects disbelievers, says:

The Imamiyya have agreed that all people of innovation are infidels, and that it is incumbent upon the Imam to call them to repentance when he is able, after summoning them and establishing clear proofs against them. If they repent of their innovations and return to what is right, [it is accepted]; otherwise, he is to execute them for their apostasy from faith."⁽⁵⁹⁾

Fāḍil Hindī believes in accepting repentance in cases of apostasy arising from doubt. In his analysis, he casts doubt and criticism on the inclusion of denying a necessary tenet of religion under the proofs for apostasy when doubt is present, and in such a case, the general proofs for repentance remain without opposition.⁽⁶⁰⁾ Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir, after a detailed discussion, describes the acceptance of both the outward and inward repentance of an apostate as the "strong" opinion.⁽⁶¹⁾ The views of other proponents of the above perspective will be presented within the analysis of its proofs and also under the third perspective.

Proofs of the Perspective

The proponents of the above perspective have cited the following proofs to establish their claim:

a) Quranic Verses: Numerous verses explicitly indicate the acceptance of repentance, and their absolute and general import encompasses all types of disbelief, polytheism, sin, and also the issue of apostasy: 1 - The Verse of Repentance: "Allah only accepts the repentance of those who do evil in ignorance and then repent soon after. It is they to whom Allah will turn in mercy."⁽⁶²⁾ ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī considers the matter of repentance to be more general than polytheism, disbelief, and sin, citing the generality of the verse as the reason.⁽⁶³⁾ Shahīd al-Thānī and Fāḍil Hindī have mentioned the general import of the verses on repentance as one of the foundations for accepting the repentance of an apostate.

It seems that the verses on repentance are in the context of expressing the acceptance of the repentance of sinners in the sense of removing the afterlife punishment, a glad tiding God gives generally and before death to all sinners, including polytheists, apostates, and wrongdoers. However, this glad tiding does not include the removal of worldly punishment for criminals; for example, the execution of ḥudūd and taʿzīrāt punishments, such as amputating the hand of a thief, is not halted merely by repentance based on these verses, or at the very least, the indication of the verses for the claim is not explicit and clear. Furthermore, the verses that hypothetically indicate the acceptance of an apostate's repentance pertain to the apostasies at the dawn of Islam, all or most of which were of the national apostasy type, the acceptance of whose repentance is agreed upon by the companions.

Another group of verses are the verses on apostasy, some of which refer to the issue of repentance. Here we refer to three verses:

1 - "How shall Allah guide a people who disbelieved after their belief... except for those who repent after that and make amends, for indeed Allah is Forgiving, Merciful."⁽⁶⁴⁾ In approximating the reasoning, it can be said that the beginning of the verse mentions the lack of guidance for the stubborn apostate and the promise of afterlife punishment as a general rule, but the end of the verse makes an exception to the ruling, stating that those who repent and perform righteous deeds are excluded and exempted from both the lack of guidance in this world and the promise of afterlife punishment, and the repentant can once again be counted among the guided people. It is clear that the ruling of immediate execution of the apostate without regard to repentance is not commensurate with the description of the apostate attaining guidance, which apparently implies continuity. Another witness is the phrase "and make amends," which is another reason for permitting the continuation of the apostate's worldly life after repentance, because in the case of immediate execution, there is no opportunity for the realization of "and make amends."

2 - "...and disbelieved after their submission... So if they repent, it is better for them; but if they turn away, Allah will punish them with a painful punishment in this world and the Hereafter. And there will not be for them on earth any protector or helper."⁽⁶⁵⁾

The above verse also implicitly indicates the acceptance of repentance; with the explanation that the verse considers the repentance of apostates to be a source of "good" in this world and the Hereafter. The context for this absoluteness is the end of the verse, which describes the lack of repentance as causing worldly and otherworldly punishment and the absence of any guardian or helper, the implication of which signifies the removal of both types of punishment through repentance. Likewise, with the apostate's return to the fold of Islam, he will enjoy a "guardian" and "helper" on earth (in this world). It is clear that such a blessing is incompatible with the ruling of immediate execution of the apostate. Among contemporaries, Sheikh Muhammad Jawad Mughniyah ⁽⁶⁶⁾ and Seyyed Muhammad Hussein Shirazi⁽⁶⁷⁾ have cited the above verse. 3 - "And whoever of you reverts from his religion and dies while he is a disbeliever – for those, their deeds have become worthless in this world and the Hereafter, and those are the companions of the Fire; they will abide therein eternally." ⁽⁶⁸⁾ Some contemporaries⁽⁶⁹⁾, in approximating the reasoning, have said that the above verse does not state the nullification of the apostate's deeds and his being among the people of the Fire in absolute terms, but rather restricts it to dying in a state of apostasy; its implication is that in the case of repentance and return to Islam before death, the rulings of a true Muslim apply to him, one of which is the removal of the worldly punishment of the apostate. However, the above verse, like the verses on repentance, pertains to the removal of the rulings for the apostate in the Hereafter (nullification of deeds and eternal abode in the Fire) and does not indicate the removal of worldly punishment, and in other words, it is not in the position of expressing that.

B) Narrations: The second and most important reason for those who advocate repentance is various narrations, some of which absolutely indicate the acceptance of repentance, and others have been transmitted on the subject of apostasy and are explicit regarding granting respite to the apostate – whether national or innate – which narrate the practical stance of the Infallibles, including Imam Ali (peace be upon him) as a religious ruler.

In the reliable narration of Sakuni, it is transmitted from Imam Ali (peace be upon him): "The apostate from Islam is granted respite for three days; if he repents and returns to the command of God, the Mighty and Majestic, [it is accepted]; otherwise, he is killed on the fourth day."⁽⁷⁰⁾ "Ali granted respite to a man who disbelieved after his Islam for a month, but he refused, so he killed him."⁽⁷¹⁾

Imam Sadiq (peace be upon him) states in the following reliable narration: "A man from the Muslims converted to Christianity, so he was brought to the Commander of the Faithful, and he granted him respite"⁽⁷²⁾. In another narration, Imam Ali (peace be upon him), regarding the Qadariyya who denied a religious doctrine, first commands that they be granted respite: "Grant them respite; if they repent [it is accepted], otherwise kill them."⁽⁷³⁾ There are other narrations in which Imam Baqir (peace be upon him) and Imam Sadiq (peace be upon him), without citing the conduct of Imam Ali (peace be upon him), mentioned the ruling for the initial apostate as granting respite. Imam Baqir (peace be upon him) stated in the authentic narration of Ibn Mahbub: "Regarding the apostate, he is granted respite; if he repents [it is accepted], otherwise he is killed."⁽⁷⁴⁾ Proponents of the above view argue that the aforementioned narrations, with their absoluteness and generality, include both the innate and national apostate, and accordingly, the repentance of the apostate is accepted; otherwise, it would have been necessary for the Imams (peace be upon them) to differentiate between the innate and national apostate.

Response to an Objection (Narrations of Not Granting Respite)

Opponents of granting respite to the innate apostate, who were aware of the absoluteness and generalities of the aforementioned narrations, sought to interpret the narrations and added that there are specific narrations that explicitly and clearly indicate the execution of the innate apostate without granting respite, which in reality are the elucidator and clarifier, or the restrictor and specifier, of the absolute and general narrations; meaning that what is meant by granting respite to the apostate is not the absolute apostate but rather the national apostate. Sheikh Tusi, through the above reconciliation, sought to resolve the contradiction between the narrations.⁽⁷⁵⁾ Jurists after him also acted in the same manner. However, proponents of granting respite were not satisfied with this reconciliation and believe that if another solution and reconciliation exists to resolve the apparent conflict of narrations, one should not abandon the explicit absoluteness of the narrations and the practical conduct of the Imams on an important and sensitive matter such as shedding the blood of a true Muslim (one who has repented from apostasy). Some proponents, like Shahid Thani, have added that the alleged specific narrations cannot restrict or specify the absoluteness of the narrations on repentance.

Fadhil Hindi and Sahib Jawahir have offered another reconciliation, which is interpreting the narrations of not granting respite to the innate apostate as referring to the obstinate innate apostate; meaning that the narrations indicating the execution of the apostate without granting respite refer to the obstinate apostate and do not include doctrinal apostasy or cases of doubt. ⁽⁷⁶⁾

Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi, a contemporary jurist, writes on this matter:

The narrations that have unconditionally raised the issue of summoning apostates to repentance are not specific to the national apostate (murtadd milli); that is, they include both the innate apostate (murtadd fitri) and the national apostate. Regarding the reconciliation of these two groups of narrations, various possibilities exist, but we consider it probable that the first group [denying the call to repentance] is specific to individuals who knowingly take the path of opposition, while the second group pertains to those who have fallen into error or have been influenced by one-sided propaganda and malicious indoctrination. Since "legal punishments are averted by doubts" (al-hudud tudra' bi-l-shubuhat), the execution of punishments in cases that are not definitive is suspended; this very probability of reconciling the narrations is sufficient for us to postpone the execution of the 'death penalty' for apostates, in the absence of malicious intent.⁽⁷⁷⁾

Among contemporary jurists, Ayatollah Sobhani and Ayatollah Shirazi have also favored this reconciliation, whose opinions will be discussed in the analysis of the "Fifth View."

In analyzing the narrations, it must be pointed out that although the initial apparent meaning of the repentance narrations is absolute and general, encompassing both the national and innate apostate, the explicit text of the specific narrations, which clearly indicate a distinction between the innate and national apostate, restricts the absoluteness of the repentance narrations. However, the subtle point lies in the scope and extent of the principle of the narrations indicating that the innate apostate is not to be summoned to repentance: does their initial appearance and absoluteness include both the obstinate and non-obstinate (doubt-ridden) apostate, or were they specific to the obstinate apostate from the outset, with the non-obstinate innate apostate being excluded from their absoluteness from the beginning?

The second answer supports the latter reconciliation, which appears to be one of the most acceptable ways of reconciling the narrations of the two different groups (summoning to repentance and not summoning to repentance), a more detailed explanation of which will be provided in the analysis of the Fifth View.

Another reconciliation has been proposed by some contemporaries: that the narrations denying the call to repentance pertain to the scenario of summoning to repentance, i.e., the request for repentance by the religious judge, meaning that it is not obligatory for the religious judge to ask the innate apostate to repent. The narrations denying the call to repentance negate this obligation; however, if the apostate repents on their own, the narrations denying the call to repentance do not address this, and one cannot rely on them to prove the legitimacy of killing a repentant apostate. In this case, the proofs for repentance and the sanctity of killing a protected soul come into effect.

Regarding this reconciliation, it must be said that deriving this interpretation from the narrations seems far-fetched, because the apparent meaning of the narrations is that the ruling of execution is consequent upon the mere act of apostasy; as indicated by the narrations of the Prophet and the Imams—reported in the First View—and the absoluteness of their initial parts also includes the case of the apostate whether they repent or not. The absoluteness of the initial part of the narrations is confirmed by the explicit text of the narration of Muhammad ibn Muslim from Imam al-Baqir (peace be upon him): "Whoever turns away from Islam and disbelieves in what was revealed to Muhammad (peace be upon him) after his Islam, there is no repentance for him, and his killing has become obligatory."⁽⁷⁸⁾ In this narration, the repentance of the apostate is negated absolutely—both before and after being summoned to it. Nevertheless, it seems that the repetition of "he is not to be summoned to repentance" (la yustatab) in seven or eight narrations strengthens the probability that the apostate's repentance before the execution of the sentence can halt the ruling; otherwise, there would have been no reason for the repetition of "la yustatab." However, as to whether summoning to repentance and compelling the apostate by the religious judge is necessary or not, the narration denying the call to repentance removes its obligation and effect, and it does not pertain to the ineffectiveness of repentance prior to being summoned. But the narration of Muhammad ibn Muslim ultimately conflicts with the narrations of summoning to repentance, and recourse is made to the generalities and absoluteness of the proofs for repentance, the sanctity of killing a protected soul, and the Prophetic hadith: "Legal punishments are averted by doubts."⁽⁷⁹⁾

C) Reason: Others, in explaining the view that distinguishes between repentance and its absence, have invoked rational proof, claiming that reason accepts the apostate's repentance, because punishing a repentant person is morally ugly (qabih), and since the subject of apostasy is removed by repentance, its ruling also changes, and the rulings of Islam, such as the sanctity of life, apply to it.

Sheikh Muhammad Jawad Mughniyah writes in his commentary on verse 217 of Al-Baqarah: "It explicitly indicates that if the apostate repents before death, God accepts it from him and the punishment is lifted from him, and reason rules accordingly."⁽⁸⁰⁾

In analyzing the rational argument, it must be said that the intellect's ruling on the moral repugnance of otherworldly punishment for a repentant apostate is certain, but regarding its extension to worldly punishment and other jurisprudential and penal rulings, the various dimensions of the subject must be explored. For example, concerning the execution of a repentant apostate, although the intellect initially rules on the repugnance of killing, yet upon considering other aspects, such as the deterrent effect of the death penalty, the intellect no longer definitively rules on the repugnance of worldly punishment for the apostate. Nevertheless, in analyzing the apostasy ruling, one should not ignore the sensitivity of the intellect and its ruling on the initial repugnance of killing a repentant apostate. Rather, by claiming the exclusion of the repentant and doubtful apostate from the narrations on killing an apostate and incorporating the narrations on granting respite for repentance (istitābah), a comprehensive and inclusive analysis of the apostasy ruling can be achieved.

The Time for Repentance

For a national apostate (murtadd millī), by consensus, and for a natural-born apostate (murtadd fiṭrī), according to the aforementioned view that he is granted respite for repentance, is a specific deadline or time considered for his repentance? Or does it depend on the opinion of the religious judge? Upon reflecting on the narrations, we witness discrepancies in the narrations regarding the time for repentance. In some narrations, a three-day deadline is considered for the apostate's repentance, and if he does not repent, the apostasy ruling is carried out on the fourth day. In other narrations, ten days, and in yet others, twenty days have been considered. With the variation in narrations, the fatwas of jurists also differ, but two well-known opinions exist. The first opinion limits the deadline to three days and execution on the fourth day. The second opinion limits the deadline to the point when hope and the possibility of the apostate's repentance are exhausted, meaning no specific time is set for the apostate's return to Islam, and the days mentioned in the narrations, such as three, four, ten, and twenty days, are not intrinsically significant. Rather, their purpose is instrumental, i.e., a suitable time for repentance; hence the language of the narrations has varied. Accordingly, the ruling of executing the apostate is postponed for as long as the possibility of repentance exists, from one day to several days or months, and one could say several years if a fundamental scholarly doubt exists. Renowned jurists such as Shaykh Ṭūsī, ⁽⁸¹⁾ Shahīd Thānī ⁽⁸²⁾ and Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir ⁽⁸³⁾ have favored this opinion.

The Third View: Distinction Between the Apostate Who Knows and the One Who Is Ignorant of the Necessity

It was previously mentioned that one of the types and causes of apostasy is the denial of certain necessary doctrines of the religion. However, there is a difference of opinion among jurists in its analysis and explanation. Some interpret the denial of a religious necessity as the direct subject and cause for the realization of unbelief and apostasy, whether the denier is aware and knowledgeable of its being a necessity or is ignorant of it. Others interpret the act of denying a necessity as being contingent upon the denial of the religion and the Lawgiver, and do not believe in its independent subjecthood. Instead, they emphasize that the occurrence of unbelief and apostasy through the denial of a necessity is due to its implication of denying the religion itself and the Lawgiver. Accordingly, if the denial is accompanied by knowledge of its being a necessity, its consequence is the repudiation and denial of the religion itself. But if it is without knowledge and awareness, since it does not lead to the denial of the religion, unbelief and apostasy cannot be deduced from it.

Both interpretations have proponents. A reference to the first approach was made in the analysis of the first view, and here some opinions of the second approach are mentioned.

Shahīd Awwal: In the chapter on impurities, he interprets apostasy as the denial of the necessities of the religion without the condition of knowledge. However, in the Book of Zakāt, he makes the ruling of unbelief for one who deems withholding zakāt permissible contingent upon the absence of doubt.⁽⁸⁴⁾

It is clear that restricting the denial of zakāt to the absence of doubt is not specific to that case and applies to all religious necessities and matters of consensus.

ʿAllāma Ḥillī: After defining apostasy as deeming what God has forbidden lawful and vice versa, he claims consensus on it. However, he excludes the ignorant person and the one who has doubt from it, and mentions the initial ruling for such a person is to grant respite for repentance (istitābah).⁽⁸⁵⁾ Elsewhere, he considers the ruling for a Muslim who denies the universality of the prophethood of Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him and his progeny) or the very blessed existence of the Prophet to be his guidance.⁽⁸⁶⁾

Muḥaqqiq Ḥillī, ⁽⁸⁷⁾ Ṣāḥib al-ʿUrwa, ⁽⁸⁸⁾ Muqaddas Ardabīlī, ⁽⁸⁹⁾ Fāḍil Hindī,⁽⁹⁰⁾ Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir, ⁽⁹¹⁾ and among contemporaries, Ḥakīm Khūʾī, Imam Khomeini, Gulpāygānī, Shaʿrānī, Muntaẓirī, Shaykh Jawād Tabrīzī, Fāḍil Lankarānī, Makārim Shīrāzī, Ṣāniʿī,⁽⁹²⁾ Subḥānī, ⁽⁹³⁾ and Khamenei ⁽⁹⁴⁾ have stipulated that the apostasy of one who denies a religious necessity is conditional upon attention and awareness of the qualification of necessity.

Arguments for the View

Here, some of the arguments for the above view are mentioned, and others will follow under the arguments for the fifth view.

1. The outward meaning of jaḥd (denial) and inkār (repudiation): In the analysis of the first view, it was noted that the apparent meaning of jaḥd and inkār is denial predicated on knowledge, and denial without advertence is not the subject of kufr (unbelief) or irtidād (apostasy). This reason has been cited by most proponents of the above view.

2. The explicit text of certain traditions: The explicit text of certain traditions distinguishes between denying the truth of Islam and the Imamate based on knowledge and based on ignorance, such that the subject of kufr and, consequently, the denial of Islam and the Imamate is specified as being based on knowledge and recognition. In response to Abū Baṣīr’s question about the kufr of a person who doubts God, Imam al-Ṣādiq (peace be upon him) said: “A kāfir, O Abā Muḥammad.” He (Abū Baṣīr) said: “And doubt concerning the Messenger of God?” He (peace be upon him) said: “A kāfir.” Then he turned to Zurārah and said: “He only becomes a kāfir when he denies (jaḥada).”⁽⁹⁵⁾

ʿAllāmah Shaʿrānī, in explaining the above ḥadīth, writes: “The implication of the ḥadīth is the absence of kufr and irtidād for a researcher who doubts the existence of God or the truthfulness of the Prophet of Islam (may God bless him and his family), provided he does not express it.”⁽⁹⁶⁾ In another ḥadīth, not only is doubt about God not called kufr and irtidād, but it is also described as a characteristic of faith: “That, by God, is pure faith.”⁽⁹⁷⁾ In another ḥadīth, Imam al-Ṣādiq (peace be upon him) considers one who denies the Imamate excused on the condition that no conclusive proof has been established for him.⁽⁹⁸⁾ It emerges from the traditions that mere doubt and hesitation regarding religious teachings, and foremost among them the existence of God, does not entail kufr and irtidād. In other words, the claim that the very act of denying a religious necessity is itself the subject, without it reverting to belying the religion and obstinate hostility toward it, is an unfounded claim. Another point is that even assuming the existence of consensus (ijmāʿ), it cannot be adduced as evidence because it is based on other sources (the absolute traditions). Moreover, the very formation of consensus is undermined by the assumed opposition of most jurists, and as the author of al-Ḥadāʾiq has pointed out, it can be interpreted and justified as “widespread fame” (shuhrah).

3. Restricting denial to istikhfāf (disdain).⁽⁹⁹⁾

The explanation of this reason will come in the seventh view.

The Fourth View: Distinction between Public and Non-Public Apostasy

This view holds that the ruling of apostasy is contingent upon the individual denier’s expression of his inner belief; as long as he has not personally engaged in denying Islam, the ruling of apostasy cannot be applied to him, even if we come to know his inner belief through other means. Abū al-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī is among the jurists from whose definition of apostasy the above view can be inferred.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

Ṣihr Dashtī, a student of al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, also says: “Apostasy is to manifest unbelief in God Almighty and His Messenger and to deny what He has bestowed…”⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Among contemporaries, Ayatollah Mūsawī Ardebīlī, by dividing the subject into four scenarios (1. doubt about the existence of God without expression, 2. certainty of God’s non-existence without expression, 3. the two above scenarios with the condition of expression but without propagation and promotion, 4. the same with the condition of practical action in disseminating and promoting one’s position), believes that traditions concerning kufr and irtidād, such as “then he committed kufr, associated partners, and departed from Islam,” do not apply to the first scenario. In his view, the tradition applies to the latter two scenarios, but the applicability of “committed kufr, associated partners, and departed from Islam” to the first two scenarios is doubtful. If, through investigation and inquiry, we realize that a person has turned away from belief in God without uttering it (the second scenario) or has fallen into doubt and hesitation (the first scenario), the above expression does not apply.⁽¹⁰²⁾

Arguments for the View

Proponents of the above view claim that the apparent meanings of traditions, such as “associated partners” (ashraka), “apostatized” (irtadda), and “committed kufr” (kafara), indicate the expression and manifestation of one’s inner belief. Furthermore, there are other traditions indicating that inner kufr, as long as it is not expressed, does not entail worldly punishment or sanction: 1 – “Nine things have been lifted from my community: error… and reflection upon creation as long as it is not spoken with the lip.”⁽¹⁰³⁾

2 - “Indeed, Allah has pardoned my community for what they whisper to themselves or what crosses their minds, so long as they do not act upon it or speak of it.” ⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ 3 - The outward manifestation of seeking repentance (istitābah): In numerous and widely transmitted narrations, the apostate is asked to repent, meaning the religious judge requests him to repent. It is clear that the request for repentance applies only when the apostate reveals his inner belief and his apostasy becomes evident to all. Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili, in expounding this argument, states:

It is clear that turning away from one’s belief or falling into doubt about one’s belief, without expressing it, is not subject to istitābah. Belief arises through causes and factors and is lost through causes and factors; therefore, it is not subject to istitābah and being called to repent. What is subject to istitābah and repentance, or refusal to repent, is the expression of belief; rather, one repents from the expression and manifestation of disbelief. ⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

The above view has been accepted by some other contemporaries. ⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ In analyzing the above view, the following points are worthy of reflection:

1 – Is apostasy merely the denial of the religion of Islam or one of its necessities in belief and heart, such that upon its realization in belief and heart, even without expressing or manifesting it to anyone, the description of apostasy and, consequently, its rulings are realized and take effect? Or does the realization of the rulings of apostasy, in addition to heartfelt denial, require the expression and disclosure of the inner belief? Such that without expression and without others becoming aware of it, none of its rulings—such as the annulment of marriage, division of property, and execution—are applied even at the level of actual establishment. It seems that the subject of apostasy, especially otherworldly punishment, is heartfelt denial, but the application of other rulings is necessarily conditional upon the expression and manifestation of disbelief, because without the expression of inner apostasy, the person’s state remains unknown and hidden, and without knowledge of it, the rulings of apostasy automatically lack a subject and will not be applied. Of course, if we become aware of the apostate’s apostasy through a means other than expression—for example, by seeing a writing of his—we investigate and question the apostate himself for greater certainty. If he expresses his inner belief, the subject of apostasy is realized, and if he denies and justifies it and confesses to Islam, according to numerous narrations, his confession is accepted.

2 – The absoluteness of the narrations: The absoluteness of some narrations indicates the realization of disbelief and apostasy in an absolute sense, whether one expresses it or not, such as “then he disbelieved, associated partners, and departed”⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ where the term “departed” is general and includes departure from Islam, or the narration “whoever turns away from Islam” ⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ which includes any kind of turning away.

3 – The explicitness of the narrations: Some other narrations explicitly describe disbelief and apostasy as a matter of inner belief (“za‘ama”). “Whoever commits a major sin among the major sins and claims it is lawful, that act expels him from Islam, and Allah will punish him with the severest punishment.”⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ 4 – The final point is that the expression and manifestation of apostasy is one of the conditions for implementing the rulings of apostasy, but its implementation depends on the realization of other pillars, the most important of which is the state of “enmity” (‘inād). In other words, the expression of apostasy is a necessary condition for apostasy (the application of rulings) and not a sufficient condition.

The Fifth View: Distinction Between Apostasy of Enmity and Apostasy of Belief

This view divides the apostate into two categories based on his motive: 1. The hostile apostate (murtadd mu‘ānid), whose purpose in apostasy is enmity and stubbornness towards Islam or the Prophet, peace be upon him and his family. Such an apostate deserves execution. 2. The doctrinal apostate (murtadd i‘tiqādī), whose aim is not enmity; rather, his apostasy is the product of doubt, misconception, ignorance, or incomplete research—in technical terms, superficial and incorrect knowledge. The ruling for such an apostate is not execution.

It is said that all or most of the apostasies that occurred in early Islam were of the first type, whose origin and source was not doctrinal or intellectual doubt but rather enmity, stubbornness, the preservation of material interests, and ambition. Some other apostasies were collective and merely due to following the chief of one’s tribe, such as the apostasy of the Banu Hanifa tribe in accepting the call of Musaylima.⁽¹¹⁰⁾ Hence, it can be said that most of the texts on apostasy in early Islam are directed away from the doctrinal and doubting apostate.

Some jurists—whose opinions were discussed in the analysis of the third view—can be counted among the proponents of the above view, because their criterion for not excommunicating one who denies a necessary tenet of religion in cases of doubt and ignorance is the repugnance of imposing an obligation and the inapplicability of the traditions to such a case; hence, most of them hold that the ruling of apostasy is lifted when a doubt exists, as previously mentioned in the opinions of ʿAllāma Ḥillī, Shahīd Awwal, the author of al-ʿUrwa, Fāḍil Hindī, and others. Nevertheless, the apparent wording of some jurists distinguishes between denying a necessary tenet of religion and denying the principle of religion itself, a distinction that does not accord with their own foundational position. Here we will refer to some opinions.

Abū al-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī: After defining apostasy as the outward display of the symbols of unbelief, he speaks clearly of a form of unbelief that results from conviction and reasoning, such as belief in predestination, anthropomorphism, or the denial of the Imamate, and he explicitly states that although such a false conviction may be considered unbelief, "apostasy" cannot be inferred from it.⁽¹¹¹⁾

A group of contemporaries: Ayatollah Makārim Shīrāzī, in distinguishing between apostasy born of obstinacy and apostasy born of conviction, writes:

Sometimes, unknowingly and as a result of the insinuations of misguided missionaries or errors that have occurred in his studies, he bids farewell to Islam and turns toward unbelief, without having any ill intent whatsoever. At other times, he opposes Islam knowingly and out of obstinacy and enmity; it is not that he has made a mistake in recognizing the truth.⁽¹¹²⁾

Arguments for the View

The arguments for the above theory are to some extent shared with the arguments for the third view, and we will merely refer to them here.

1. A specific tradition: Upon examining the traditions, we encounter a specific tradition that indicates a young Muslim who has converted to Christianity because one of his parents was Christian should not be killed.⁽¹¹³⁾ It is clear that the child's inclination toward the religion of one of his parents stems not from denial and rejection but from emotion and conviction.

2. Reason: Reason does not accept punishment for mere conviction that is the product of intellectual effort; as Fāḍil Hindī says: "Imposing the obligation of faith in the presence of doubt is an obligation beyond one's capacity."⁽¹¹⁴⁾ Some others have given precedence to reason in cases of conflict between reason and transmitted text.⁽¹¹⁵⁾

3. The apparent meaning of the traditions concerning denial (juḥd).

4. Traditions indicating that doubt is not unbelief: Some traditions not only do not consider doubt about God to be unbelief but also describe it as the very foundation of faith; as when a person asked the Prophet of Islam about doubting God and God's being created, the Prophet said: "That, by God, is pure faith."⁽¹¹⁶⁾

However, regarding the objection that in other traditions the doubter is described as an unbeliever, it must be said, as some contemporaries have mentioned,⁽¹¹⁷⁾ that those traditions are interpreted as referring to a doubter who has the ability to investigate and examine but remains in a state of doubt despite having the capacity to do so. Moreover, "unbelief" (kufr) has multiple meanings. Some meanings of "unbeliever" (kāfir) in the language of the traditions do not refer to an unbeliever as opposed to a Muslim, particularly an apostate.

5. The excused status of the ignorant and the doubter: In numerous and widely transmitted verses and traditions, obligation and punishment are contingent upon clarification and the completion of proof. Imam al-Ṣādiq, peace be upon him, was asked about an ignorant person and whether he is subject to punishment. He replied: No.⁽¹¹⁸⁾

The Sixth View: Distinction Between the Combative Apostate and the Non-Combative Apostate

The previous view restricted the death penalty to an apostate whose departure from the sacred religion of Islam was not due to doubt and erroneous investigation but solely due to obstinacy and stubbornness. Upon reflection, obstinacy can be divided into two types: 1. An apostate who has turned away from Islam purely out of obstinacy and remains in a state of doubt or has adopted a specific creed, but nonetheless undertakes no armed or cultural action, such as disseminating and promoting his false ideas and weakening Islam, and is occupied with his personal life while maintaining his obstinate stance; 2. An apostate who, in addition to obstinacy, engages in various conspiracies against Islam; for example, he seeks to weaken the religious beliefs of Muslims, propagates his deviant ideas in Islamic society, or undertakes armed action against Islam. The previous view, which identified the subject of the apostasy ruling as solely the apostate's obstinacy, holds that the apostate should be killed in both of the aforementioned types, but the sixth view distinguishes between the obstinate apostate and restricts the death penalty to the second type of obstinate apostate, which can be termed the "combative apostate" (murtadd muḥārib) or "active apostate." This distinction has been raised by some contemporaries.⁽¹¹⁹⁾ Some have written:

An apostate is a Muslim who opposes Islam not out of inquiry but out of obstinate hostility, and who, moreover, declares his view and seeks to create a social or political movement; one who presents his view in a scholarly manner in a book is not subject to this ruling.⁽¹²⁰⁾

Some others say:

"Those who have left the religion are punished when they transmit their unbelief to others and attempt to propagate irreligiosity and undermine people's faith."⁽¹²¹⁾

Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Hassan Marashi also writes:

If, after the completion of proof and necessary guidance, one deliberately and obstinately refuses to accept Islam and persists in disbelief and apostasy, and is a dangerous individual for Islam, it is certainly necessary to treat them reciprocally, and the unqualified application of the aforementioned rulings concerning apostates pertains to this category of apostates.⁽¹²²⁾

In analyzing the above view, it must be pointed out that upon examining the narrations, we do not witness the aforementioned distinction, and the narrations unconditionally include the obstinate apostate, whether or not they rise to the level of waging war against and weakening Islam, unless a claim is made that the narrations are exclusively applicable to the warring and conspiring apostate—a claim that seems far-fetched given the narrations; indeed, in instances where the Prophet of Islam, peace be upon him and his progeny, or Imam Ali, peace be upon him, ordered the execution of an apostate, there was no indication that the apostate was a warrior.

Seventh View: Restricting Apostasy to the Belittlement of Religion

Another possibility is that the intended apostate subject to the death penalty is not the previous categories of apostate (absolute, declarer, obstinate, and warrior), but rather the apostate who, in addition to apostasy and disbelief, has set out to undermine religious teachings and to belittle and insult them;⁽¹²³⁾

as stated in the following hadith: "The meaning of disbelief is every act of disobedience to God committed by way of denial, belittlement, and disdain, in every matter small or great, and its perpetrator is a disbeliever." It is clear that without the realization of the attributes of "belittlement" and "disdain," disbelief and, consequently, apostasy are not realized, and the death penalty remains suspended.

The above view is a middle ground between the obstinate and the warrior; according to it, the death penalty for the obstinate apostate is restricted by "belittlement," even if it does not reach the level of "waging war" and serious, practical action against Islam, and upon reaching this threshold, the subject of execution is realized a fortiori. Upon closer scrutiny, this view can be reduced to a layer of the "waging war" view, since undermining and weakening religious teachings, as explained, is itself a form of waging war against religion. The claim that the narrations on apostasy are exclusively applicable to the obstinate apostate restricted by the condition of belittlement, given the evidence from the narrations themselves as reported, does not seem far-fetched, and it can be said that obstinate apostasy is always or often concomitant with the weakening and belittling of religious teachings, which is the intended meaning of the narrations.

Eighth View: Execution as a Governmental Ruling

The preceding views, in their various formulations, considered the death penalty for the apostate to be a primary ruling of Islamic law, which the Prophet of Islam and other religious rulers were commanded and obligated to implement; however, this view claims that the death penalty is not among the primary rulings but is among the governmental rulings of the religious ruler, who, after considering the interests and corruptions and weighing them, decides whether to implement the ruling or not. In other words, the death penalty for the apostate is not a "prescribed punishment" (hadd) but a "discretionary punishment" (ta'zir).

The above view has been put forward by some Sunni scholars such as Ibn Qayyim, Dehlavi, Abduh, Ghannouchi, and Hassan al-Turabi.⁽¹²⁴⁾ They cite the "pardoning" of apostates by the Prophet of Islam as their reason, arguing that if the death penalty for the apostate were a divine and primary ruling, the Prophet, peace be upon him and his progeny, could not have refrained from implementing it.

In the words of some contemporaries, social rulings are subject to the custom of the rational, and since the death penalty for the apostate was specific to the era of Islam's weakness, its implementation today is not compatible with reason and the rational.⁽¹²⁵⁾

In analyzing this view, it must be said that the apparent meaning of the traditions of the Pure Imams is an expression of the primary religious ruling of Islam, and its ruling has been clearly stated as "execution," although there are differences in determining its subject, as mentioned. Ultimately, the official responsible and in charge of its implementation is designated as the religious judge, and this does not contradict its being a primary ruling, because according to the well-known basis, the religiously responsible official and authority for other prescribed punishments is also the religious judge. However, the pardon of the Prophet (peace be upon him and his progeny) or the religious judge, and the consideration of expediencies and corruptions, cannot prove the above claim. This is because pardoning a criminal under its conditions, as well as assessing expediencies, is not specific to apostasy and also applies to other divine rulings and prescribed punishments, concerning which traditions have also been narrated.⁽¹²⁶⁾

The Authority Responsible for the Apostate's Ruling

Up to this point, we have refined and processed eight views on the ruling of the apostate, and it has become clear that all eight views, in terms of affirmation and theory, are not opposed to the ruling itself; however, there are different interpretations in its exegesis, limitation, and expansion. Here, the question arises: who is the religiously and legally responsible official and authority for the ruling of executing the apostate? Has Islamic law designated a specific authority and official for it, or has it entrusted its execution to all Muslims? Jurists generally hold a common and unified position on this matter, considering it among the prerogatives of the Prophet of Islam and the Imams, and during the Occultation, among the prerogatives of the general deputies of the Imam, i.e., the comprehensively qualified jurists. They emphasize that no one except a comprehensively qualified jurist has the right to execute the above ruling, and if it is carried out arbitrarily and without the permission of the religious judge, not only has no meritorious act been performed, but a sin has been committed, and the religious judge will punish the offending person for said act. One of the proofs for the above basis is the exclusivity of implementing the prescribed punishments of the Sharia to qualified jurists, which is derived from the import of the traditions. Imam Ali (peace be upon him) in Nahj al-Balagha considers one of the duties of the Islamic ruler to be the implementation of divine prescribed punishments: "The Imam is not responsible except for... establishing the prescribed punishments upon those who deserve them."⁽¹²⁷⁾

Imam al-Sadiq (peace be upon him), in response to who is responsible for implementing the prescribed punishments, said: "The establishment of the prescribed punishments belongs to the one who holds authority."⁽¹²⁸⁾ In a tradition, the exclusivity of implementing the ruling of apostasy to the Imam is explicitly stated: "Any Muslim among Muslims who apostatizes from Islam... it is upon the Imam to execute him."⁽¹²⁹⁾ However, the opinion of some jurists such as Sayyid Murtada⁽¹³⁰⁾, Shaykh Tusi in some places⁽¹³¹⁾, and Ibn Idris⁽¹³²⁾, Abu al-Salah⁽¹³³⁾, al-Fadil⁽¹³⁴⁾, and Kashif al-Ghita⁽¹³⁵⁾, who hold the view of non-exclusivity, is based on the beginning of the tradition of Ammar, in which it is stated:

"Any Muslim among Muslims who apostatizes from Islam and denies the prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him and his progeny) and calls him a liar, then his blood is lawful for whoever hears such a statement from him."⁽¹³⁶⁾

In analyzing this, it must be said that firstly, its beginning contradicts its end, which restricted execution to the Imam; secondly, the chain of transmission of the tradition is subject to scrutiny from some perspectives; thirdly, the above tradition conflicts with traditions indicating the exclusivity of executing the apostate and other prescribed punishments to the Imam, and after conflict and mutual cancellation, the reference point is the generalities and universal applications of the verses and traditions indicating the sanctity of killing a protected soul. The fourth point is that, disregarding the previous objections, the above hadith at most indicates the permissibility of the people killing an apostate who is characterized by the attributes of "denial" and "calling a liar"; however, the intellectual apostate, the one with doubts, or the ignorant one is excluded from its scope.

Shaykh Mufid,⁽¹³⁷⁾ Sallar,⁽¹³⁸⁾ Ibn Barraj,⁽¹³⁹⁾ Ibn Hamza,⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ Shaykh Tusi,⁽¹⁴¹⁾ Muhaqqiq al-Hilli,⁽¹⁴²⁾ Allama al-Hilli,⁽¹⁴³⁾ Fakhr al-Muhaqqiqin⁽¹⁴⁴⁾, and Shahid al-Awwal⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ are among the jurists who believe that implementing divine prescribed punishments is among the prerogatives of the religious judge. Some others have explicitly stated regarding the ruling of apostasy that its implementation is solely within the competence of the religious judge, such as Shaykh Mufid,⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ Ibn Quhd,⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ Allama al-Hilli,⁽¹⁴⁸⁾ Shaykh Tusi,⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ Shahid al-Awwal,⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ Fadil al-Hindi⁽¹⁵¹⁾, and Allama Majlisi.⁽¹⁵²⁾

Imam Khomeini⁽¹⁵³⁾ and Ayatollah Khamenei⁽¹⁵⁴⁾, as religious rulers, have supported the above view and have explicitly stated that during the time of an Islamic government, the implementation of prescribed punishments is among the prerogatives of the government and the Islamic ruler.

Final Assessment

In this article, eight viewpoints were analyzed and evaluated, their common features being the following three points: 1. Most jurists advocate restricting the denial of a religious necessity to cases where the person has knowledge, which entails that the ruling on the apostate remains suspended in cases of ignorance of the necessity; 2. The primary ruling regarding an apostate who has doubts is to resolve those doubts through dialogue and reasoning; 3. The legitimacy of carrying out the apostasy ruling ultimately depends on the permission of the religious authority.

On this basis, since all three matters have been endorsed by Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei as religious authorities, one cannot simply condemn someone to apostasy and death for denying a religious necessity. For it must first be clarified whether the person was aware of the necessity or not? Does the person have doubts or not? Have logical and rational proofs been presented against their doubts or not? If the above points are proven and it is established that the apostate is acting out of obstinacy, the legitimacy of the death sentence is contingent upon the permission of the religious authority, and in the event of arbitrary action, the religious authority will punish the offender for their act.

.

---

.

Endnotes

1. Hujjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Qaramaleki, faculty member of the Research Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought.

2. Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-Arab, vol. 3, p. 172, entry "radd."

3. Jawhari, Sihah al-Lugha, vol. 2, p. 473; Ibn Faris, Maqayis al-Lugha, vol. 2, p. 386; Raghib Isfahani, al-Mufradat, vol. 2, p. 386.

4. See: Masalik al-Afham, vol. 15, pp. 22 and 23, new edition.

5. See: Muhammad Hasan Najafi, Jawahir al-Kalam, vol. 41, pp. 604 and 605.

6. Muhammad ibn Hasan Hurr al-Amili, Wasa'il al-Shi'a, vol. 18, chapters on the punishment for apostasy, chapter 1, hadith 6.

7. Ibid., chapter 5, hadith 5.

8. Irshad al-Adhhan, (included in: Ali Asghar Marwarid, al-Yanabi' al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 40, p. 191).

9. Quoted from: Jawahir, vol. 41, p. 604.

10. "And the Muslim, and one born between Muslims, when he apostatizes, his blood is lawful." (al-Yanabi' al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 23, p. 391).

11. See: Kashf al-Litham, vol. 2, 435.

12. "There is no doubt that he is considered fitri if one of his parents was a Muslim from the time of conception until he reaches maturity, and he was bound by the Sharia, knows the rulings of Islam, and acts upon them, and this is the apparent meaning of their words." (Majma' al-Fa'ida wa al-Burhan (Qom: Islamic Publishing Institute, 1416 AH) vol. 13, p. 318).

13. Muhammad ibn Hasan Hurr al-Amili, op. cit., vol. 18, chapters on the punishment for apostasy, chapter 1, hadith 3.

14. Ibid., chapters on the punishment for apostasy, ch. 1, hadith 5.

15. See: Jawahir, vol. 41, p. 603.

16. See: Ibid., vol. 6, 5, and chapter 5.

17. See: Abdolkarim Mousavi Ardebili, "Apostasy, A Second Look," Islamic Government Quarterly, no. 14.

18. Tahrir al-Wasila, vol. 2, p. 625.

19. Jomhuri-ye Eslami newspaper, Sahifeh-ye Howzeh special issue, no. 48 (May 20, 2002) p. 14.

20. Muhammad ibn Hasan Hurr al-Amili, op. cit., vol. 18, p. 544.

21. See: Sayyid Muhammad Shirazi, Kitab al-Hudud wa al-Ta'zirat (Qom: Dar al-Quran al-Karim Publications) p. 533.

22. Ibid., p. 524.

23. See: Ja'far Sobhani, Mabani-ye Hokumat-e Eslami, p. 432.

24. Muhammad ibn Hasan Hurr al-Amili, op. cit., vol. 18, p. 552.

25. Ibid., p. 522, and chapters 6 and 7.

26. Ibid., chapter 3, hadith 6.

27. Muhammad ibn Hasan Tusi, Kitab al-Khilaf, Book on the Apostate, Issue 3 (included in: Ali Asghar Marwarid, op. cit., vol. 31, p. 59).

28. Irshad al-Adhhan, Book of Punishments, the Eighth Objective (included in: Ali Asghar Marwarid, al-Yanabi' al-Fiqhiyya, vol. 31, p. 191). For information on the opinions of jurists, refer to jurisprudential books, chapters on punishments, the prohibition of khums and zakat, impurities, impediments to inheritance, and disbelief.

29. Āl ʿImrān (3), verse 85.

30. Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 8, p. 71.

31. "Its evidence from the Book is not apparent" (Majmaʿ al-Fāʾida wa al-Burhān, vol. 13, p. 319).

32. Al-Tawba (9), verse 74.

33. "O Prophet, strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh upon them."

34. Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ, vol. 9, p. 6; Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, Al-Musnad, vol. 6, p. 198.

35. Ibn Māja, Sunan, vol. 2, p. 848; Dār Quṭnī, Sunan, vol. 3, p. 13; Mustadrak al-Wasāʾil, vol. 18, p. 163.

36. See: Ibn Athīr, Al-Kāmil fī al-Tārīkh, vol. 2, pp. 248–251; Ibn Hishām, Al-Sīra al-Nabawiyya, vol. 2, p. 417.

37. Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan Ṭūsī, Tahdhīb al-Aḥkām, vol. 1, pp. 136 and 541; idem, Al-Istibṣār, vol. 4, pp. 253 and 957; Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan Ḥurr ʿĀmilī, op. cit., vol. 28, p. 324.

38. Ibid.

39. Al-Khilāf, vol. 2, p. 434; Al-Mabsūṭ, vol. 7, p. 281.

40. See: Sharḥ al-Lumʿa, vol. 9, p. 337.

41. See: Jawāhir, vol. 6, p. 46 and vol. 41, p. 615.

42. See: Al-Ḥadāʾiq al-Nāḍira, vol. 11, p. 15.

43. For further explanation, see: Muḥammad Ḥasan Qadrdān Qarāmalekī, "Separating Imamate from the Principles of Religion," Nāmeh-ye Mofīd Journal, no. 14 (Summer 1998).

44. Sayyid Jawād ʿĀmilī, Miftāḥ al-Karāma, cited in: Sayyid Abū al-Qāsim Khūʾī, Al-Tanqīḥ, Kitāb al-Ṭahāra, vol. 2, p. 59.

45. Sayyid Abū al-Qāsim Khūʾī, Al-Tanqīḥ, Kitāb al-Ṭahāra, p. 139.

46. Sharḥ al-Lumʿa, vol. 9, p. 334.

47. Muḥammad Ḥasan Najafī, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 46.

48. Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan Ḥurr ʿĀmilī, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 22.

49. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 23.

50. See: Jawharī, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 451; Ibn Manẓūr, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 106; Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan Ḥurr ʿĀmilī, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 32.

51. See: Jawharī, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 1353 and vol. 6, p. 2218.

52. See: Ibn Manẓūr, op. cit., vol. 9, p. 80, vol. 13, p. 438.

53. See: Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan Ḥurr ʿĀmilī, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 36.

54. Cited in: Shahīd Thānī, Masālik al-Afhām, vol. 2, p. 451, chapter on apostasy; Muḥammad Ḥasan Najafī, op. cit., vol. 41, p. 608.

55. Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 2, p. 552. It is noteworthy that he did not elaborate on the above detail in Kitāb al-Farāʾiḍ wa al-Liʿān wa al-Irtidād (pp. 160 and 314); hence, some believe there is an omission in the above passage.

56. Masālik al-Afhām, vol. 2, Kitāb al-Qaḍā; Sayyid Yūsuf Baḥrānī, op. cit., vol. 11, p. 17.

57. Muḥammad Ḥasan Najafī, op. cit., vol. 41, p. 608.

58. Masālik al-Afhām, vol. 2, Kitāb al-Qaḍā.

59. Awāʾil al-Maqālāt, p. 49.

60. Kashf al-Lithām, cited in: Muḥammad Ḥasan Najafī, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 298.

61. Muḥammad Ḥasan Najafī, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 298 and vol. 41, p. 608.

62. Al-Nisāʾ (4), verse 137.

63. Al-Mīzān, vol. 4, pp. 238–240 and vol. 3, p. 341 and vol. 5, p. 113.

64. Āl ʿImrān (3), verse 89.

65. Al-Tawba (9), verse 74.

66. Al-Tafsīr al-Kāshif, vol. 1, p. 325.

67. Kitāb al-Ḥudūd wa al-Taʿzīrāt, pp. 525 and 531; and also Sayyid Muḥammad Ḥasan Marʿashī, New Perspectives in Islamic Criminal Law (Tehran: Mizan Publishing, 1994).

68. Al-Baqara (2), verse 217.

69. Shaykh Muḥammad Jawād Mughniyya, Al-Tafsīr al-Kāshif, vol. 1, p. 325; Sayf Allāh Ṣarāmī, The Rulings on the Apostate from the Perspective of Islam and Human Rights, pp. 348–351.

70. Mustadrak al-Wasāʾil, vol. 18, p. 548.

71. Kanz al-‘Ummal, hadith 1474, cited in: Muhammad Muhammadi Reyshahri, Mizan al-Hikmah, vol. 4, chapter on apostasy.

72. Muhammad ibn Hasan Hurr al-‘Amili, op. cit., vol. 18, p. 545.

73. Ibid., p. 553.

74. Ibid., p. 547.

75. Tahdhib al-Ahkam, vol. 10, p. 137.

76. Muhammad Hasan Najafi, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 298; Sayyid Muhammad Shirazi, Kitab al-Hudud wa al-Ta‘zirat, p. 525.

77. Maktab-e Islam Magazine (August 1984), p. 17.

78. See: Abdolkarim Mousavi Ardebili, Hokumat-e Islami, no. 15, p. 77; Sayyid Muhammad Shirazi, Kitab al-Hudud wa al-Ta‘zirat, p. 527.

79. Mustadrak al-Wasa’il, vol. 18, p. 336.

80. Al-Tafsir al-Kashif, vol. 1, p. 325.

81. See: Al-Mabsut, vol. 7, p. 283; Al-Khilaf, vol. 5, p. 356.

82. See: Sharh al-Lum‘ah, vol. 9, p. 342.

83. See: Muhammad Hasan Najafi, op. cit., vol. 41, p. 613.

84. Al-Durus al-Shar‘iyyah (Qom: Islamic Publications), vol. 1, p. 229.

85. Tahrir al-Ahkam, vol. 2, p. 236, old edition.

86. “And if he denies the universality of his prophethood, may God bless him and his family, or his existence, may God bless him and his family, he is alerted to that” – (Irshad al-Adhhan, Kitab al-Hudud).

87. Al-Mu‘tabar, Kitab al-Sawm.

88. ‘Urwat al-Wuthqa, beginning of Kitab al-Zakat.

89. Majma‘ al-Fa’idah wa al-Burhan, vol. 13, p. 360.

90. Kashf al-Litham, vol. 2, Kitab al-Hudud, the eighth objective, and Kitab al-Irth, impediments to inheritance, and Kitab al-Najasat, the third objective.

91. Muhammad Hasan Najafi, op. cit., vol. 6, pp. 46 and 49.

92. See: Tawdih al-Masa’il of the aforementioned maraji‘, chapter on impurities, discussion on the unbeliever.

93. Al-Iman wa al-Kufr fi al-Kitab wa al-Sunnah, pp. 50 and 59.

94. Risalat Ajwibat al-Masa’il, vol. 1, p. 92, questions 332 and 348.

95. Muhammad ibn Hasan Hurr al-‘Amili, op. cit., vol. 18, p. 569.

96. Commentaries on Wasa’il, ibid.

97. Usul al-Kafi, vol. 2, p. 425.

98. Muhammad ibn Hasan Hurr al-‘Amili, Wasa’il al-Shi‘ah, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 38.

99. Ibid., p. 36.

100. Al-Kafi fi al-Fiqh, p. 311.

101. Ali Asghar Morvarid, op. cit., vol. 9, p. 171.

102. Abdolkarim Mousavi Ardebili, “Apostasy: A Re-examination,” Hokumat-e Islami Magazine, no. 14, p. 79.

103. Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, Bihar, vol. 2, p. 28; vol. 5, p. 303.

104. Al-Tashri‘ al-Jina’i, vol. 2, p. 463.

105. Ibid.

106. See: Sayyid Husayn Mousavi Tabrizi, Pasdar-e Islam Magazine (June 1984), p. 39; Ahmad Azari Qomi, Resalat (September 3, 1991), p. 3; and Hawzah Magazine, no. 41, p. 79.

107. Muhammad ibn Hasan Hurr al-‘Amili, op. cit., vol. 18, p. 544.

108. Ibid., p. 546.

109. Ibid., p. 23.

110. See: Waqidi, Kitab al-Riddah, pp. 144 and 83; Tarikh Khalifah ibn Khayyat, p. 117; Mousavi Ardebili, Hokumat-e Islami, no. 13.

111. Al-Kafi fi al-Fiqh, p. 311.

112. Maktab-e Islam Magazine (August 1984), p. 16.

113. Muhammad ibn Hasan Hurr al-‘Amili, Wasa’il al-Shi‘ah, op. cit., vol. 18, rulings on the apostate, chapter two, second hadith.

114. Kashf al-Litham, vol. 2, Kitab al-Hudud, rulings on the apostate.

115. Sayyid Muhammad Shirazi, Kitab al-Hudud wa al-Ta‘zirat, p. 525.

116. Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 281; Muhammad ibn Ya'qub al-Kulayni, Usul al-Kafi, Kitab al-Iman wa al-Kufr, Bab al-Waswasa, Hadith 3, and also see: Usul al-Kafi, vol. 2, p. 463.

117. Ja'far Subhani, al-Iman wa al-Kufr fi al-Kitab wa al-Sunnah, op. cit., p. 98.

118. Muhammad Baqir Majlisi, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 281.

119. Muhammad Hasan Mar'ashi, "Apostasy and Its Rulings from the Perspective of Legal Sources in Islam," Judicial and Legal Journal of the Judiciary, no. 9, p. 38.

120. Mohsen Kadivar, Kiyan, no. 45, p. 16.

121. Hawzah Journal, no. 41, p. 79 and no. 42; and also Rahnamun Journal, no. 7, p. 79.

122. New Perspectives in Islamic Criminal Law, p. 92.

123. Muhammad ibn Hasan al-'Amili, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 36.

124. See: Tahawwul-e Fiqh Journal, no. 3, p. 34; Judicial and Legal Journal of the Judiciary, third year, no. 9, p. 38.

125. See: Mehdi Ha'eri Yazdi, Kiyan, no. 46, p. 3; Abdolkarim Soroush, Kiyan, no. 46, p. 34.

126. See: Muhammad ibn Hasan al-'Amili, op. cit., pp. 231, 423, 488 and Mabani Takmilat al-Minhaj, vol. 1, p. 177 and Sayyid Mahmud Hashemi, Fiqh-e Ahl-e Bayt, no. 7.

127. Nahj al-Balaghah, Sermon 104.

128. Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Hurr al-'Amili, Wasa'il al-Shi'ah, op. cit., vol. 18, p. 220 and vol. 10, p. 246.

129. Ibid., vol. 18, p. 549.

130. See: al-Intisar, Kitab al-Qada, Masa'il al-Qada wa al-Shahadat.

131. See: al-Khilaf, Kitab al-Qada, Mas'alah 41.

132. See: al-Sara'ir, vol. 3, Kitab al-Hudud, p. 546.

133. See: al-Kafi fi al-Fiqh, Kitab al-Hudud.

134. See: Ali Asghar Morvarid, op. cit., vol. 31, p. 235.

135. See: Kashf al-Ghita', p. 418.

136. Muhammad ibn Hasan al-Hurr al-'Amili, op. cit., vol. 18, p. 549. A noteworthy point is that proponents of non-exclusivity have relied on other proofs such as the principle of shared obligation, the necessity of emulating the Imams, and the refinement of the basis of the ruling; however, given the existence of specific narrations, these cannot be acted upon. Moreover, ruling on the legitimacy of implementing punishments for the general public would entail corrupt consequences, such as the outbreak of chaos in society, which can be institutionalized by delegating the authority for implementing divine punishments to the religious ruler.

137. al-Muqni'ah, Kitab al-Hudud, p. 810.

138. al-Marasim al-'Alawiyyah, cited in: Ali Asghar Morvarid, op. cit., vol. 9, p. 67.

139. al-Muhadhdhab, cited in: Ali Asghar Morvarid, op. cit., p. 106.

140. al-Sara'ir, cited in: Ali Asghar Morvarid, op. cit., p. 189.

141. al-Nihayah, p. 300.

142. Cited in: Ali Asghar Morvarid, op. cit., vol. 9, p. 220.

143. Qawa'id al-Ahkam, Kitab al-Hudud, discussion on al-Amr bi al-Ma'ruf; Mukhtalaf al-Shi'ah, vol. 1, p. 339.

144. Idah al-Fawa'id, vol. 1, pp. 398 and 339.

145. al-Durus al-Shar'iyyah, cited in: Ali Asghar Morvarid, op. cit., vol. 31 and 235.

146. al-Muqni'ah, p. 43.

147. al-Muhadhdhab al-Bari' fi Sharh Mukhtasar al-Nafi', vol. 4, p. 342.

148. Refer to the books of 'Allamah al-Hilli such as: Talkhis al-Maram, Tabsirat al-Muta'allimin, Irshad al-Adhhan (chapters on Hudud and Jihad).

149. al-Mabsut, vol. 7, pp. 25 and 384.

150. al-Durus, vol. 2, p. 51.

151. Kashf al-Tham, Kitab al-Hudud wa al-Jihad wa al-Amr bi al-Ma'ruf.

152. Kitab Hudud wa Qisas wa Diyat (Qom: Mu'assasah Nashr-e Asar-e Islami, n.d.) p. 58.

153. "And no one has the authority to undertake political affairs such as the execution of legal punishments and judicial matters... and during the Occultation, his general deputies stand in his place" (Tahrir al-Wasilah, vol. 1, p. 463, Kitab al-Amr bi al-Ma'ruf).

154. See: Ajwibat al-Istifta'at, Question 109.