Philosophy as Game and Plaything

My aim in writing this critique is not to destroy the translator or to make an impossible claim about the extent of the translator's potential abilities in translation and philosophical understanding. The aim, on the contrary, is a warning and a wake-up call, first and foremost to myself, secondly to the translator of this work, and thirdly to all young people who dream of translating philosophical works. I have titled this critique: “Philosophy as Game and Plaything.” The reason for choosing this expression is that examining the Persian translation of the book Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism by Houman Ghasemi truly created this impression in my mind that some actors in the field of philosophy in Iran consider philosophy an arena for games, and perhaps a plaything of playthings. In other words, “seriousness” is the last component considered in their work, as if philosophy is the realm of forgetting seriousness, expertise, and thoughtful diligence. Such translations, first of all, give rise to a kind of sense of “being futile” and “philosophical shame” within me. Shame arising from the thought: what if, instead of doing serious and momentous work, we are merely players in a game, and perhaps nothing more than a plaything! What if Dieter Henrich himself, who is one of the leading commentators on German Idealism, has accomplished nothing but participating in a not-so-serious game, and the translator's work in the playful translation of this toy-like work was merely a continuation of the same game, this time on the playing field of Iranian “philosophy”?

The book in question, in its Persian translation, consists of 440 pages. Examining all these 440 pages, even if within my ability, is beyond my patience. Therefore, by way of example, I randomly select one chapter and proceed to edit some of its parts (Chapter Seventeen: “The Paradoxical Character of Self-Ascription of Consciousness,” pp. 299-318 of the Persian translation and pp. 246-262 of the original text). Fortunately, the text of this book was originally dictated in English by the German Dieter Henrich, and moreover, the language used in it is not very difficult, and comparing the Persian translation text with this text is not a hard task. But as I will show, the Persian translator, if I cannot say none, at least I can say had little awareness and alertness to the content of Henrich's and the German Idealists' views, and this is clearly reflected in the Persian translation. I divide the problems of this work into three categories: (1) misunderstanding of the basic and technical elements of the discussion; (2) introducing irrelevant and sometimes erroneous phrases in explaining the book's content; and (3) using obscure, irrelevant, and non-standard terminology. However, since the third category may be considered somewhat a matter of taste and preference (an opinion I absolutely do not accept, though this is not the place to dispute it), I will ignore it in this critique and solely address cases where the problems are so profound that they practically turn this translation into a useless and fruitless, indeed destructive and misleading, work. Meanwhile, since it seems the phrases the translator has introduced into his translation complement his mistakes in translation, I will examine the problems of the first and second categories together.

Content Critique

Philosophy, at least as far as I understand it, is the movement of a tightrope walker on a rope stretched between two sides of a valley. Hence, I consider the work of philosophy to be a grave, delicate, and profound undertaking. In this respect, I have not done anything arduous, for any great philosopher you might cite will express nothing other than this opinion. As students of philosophy, we have, in the first step, only one goal: precision in reading and comprehending philosophical thoughts. In this work, in this grave and “serious” work, there is no room for “games” and “playthings” and “literary horseplay” and “linguistic shows of force” and the like: in this grave and delicate work, our task is to present ourselves before the teacher like a primary school child and strive to hear precisely each and every word that comes out of the teacher’s mouth and try to understand, and wherever we do not understand or sense that we do not understand (and this sense is very important and is cultivated through self-criticism), to ask and not let fear of asking into our hearts. In short, in translating philosophical texts, we have a difficult task ahead: the translator of philosophy, especially the translator of the German Idealists, is not merely a translator equipped with linguistic knowledge: he must also be an interpreter. But being an interpreter is not achieved except through familiarity with the subtleties of the thought of the philosopher being interpreted, and this itself is not achieved unless we regard the work of studying and attending to philosophical texts as “serious” work. Therefore, a translator who merely performs a linguistic task during translation will lose his way, let alone a translator who even performs this linguistic task incorrectly. Nevertheless, experience has shown me that linguistic knowledge sometimes falls short, and it is conceptual knowledge that comes to the aid of our linguistic knowledge. Thus, there is a perhaps dialectical relationship between our linguistic knowledge and our conceptual knowledge, and paying attention and precision to each of them is among the necessities of the work of translation.

It is my belief that the Persian translator of the book Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism unfortunately does not know English properly, is not even familiar with the philosophical concepts and contents discussed in Henrich’s book, and therefore, his undertaking to translate this work has been a playful and adventurous act, an act of play-seeking, rather than an act stemming from scholarly conscientiousness and research commitment. Below, I point to some “deplorable” instances that turn the text of the book into “gibberish, nonsense, and absurdities” of every stripe:

1. On page 299 of the Persian text we read: “In On the Soul, as Aristotle says in the Metaphysics, mental states and acts—for example, visual perception—carry with them, their own consciousness (as a parergon = accessory [= an adjunctive/subordinate act]).”

The English text is as follows:

In On the Soul as well as his Metaphysics, Aristotle says that mental states and acts—visual perception, for example—carry with them an awareness of themselves (as a parergon = accessory).

First problem: The phrase “In On the Soul, as Aristotle says in the Metaphysics” is supposed to be the translation of the English phrase “In On the Soul as well as his Metaphysics, Aristotle says.” But perhaps someone endowed with a basic knowledge of English would have translated this text as: “Aristotle says in On the Soul and also in the Metaphysics…”. This English sentence is among the simple and frequently occurring sentences, and the translator’s error in such cases is more unforgivable than in the rest.

Second problem: The phrase “carry with them, their own consciousness (as a parergon = accessory [= an adjunctive/subordinate act])” is supposed to be the translation of the English phrase “carry with them an awareness of themselves (as a parergon = accessory).” Given the title of this chapter (Self-Relatedness of Consciousness), if the translator had had an understanding of the subject of the translation while translating, he might have realized that the correct translation should be something like “carry with them an awareness of themselves…”. The phrase that appears in the text (“their own consciousness”) is entirely different from the phrase that appears in the original text (“an awareness of themselves”). The point turns precisely on this small, insignificant of, which has unfortunately been mutilated in the Persian translation.

2. In the footnote on page 300 of the Persian translation (without some of the phrases the translator has inserted into the text) we read a passage from Aristotle: “Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks, if it is the most excellent, and this thinking is the thinking of the object of thought. But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only by the way. Further, if thinking and being thought are different, in respect of which does goodness belong to them? For being an act of thinking and being an object of thought are not the same. We answer that knowledge may be the thing in itself (insofar as it is the object) [that is, knowledge is the actual realization of the thing in itself that is the subject of that knowledge]; in the productive science of poetry — and abstracted from matter — substance as essence, but in theoretical science, logic as thinking, is the thing in itself. Since thinking and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, they will be the same; and thinking and the object of thought become one.”

The English text is as follows:

Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking. But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only by the way. Further, if thinking and being thought are different, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought? For being an act of thinking and being an object of thought are not the same. We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the object. In the productive sciences (if we abstract from the matter) the substance in the sense of essence and in the theoretical sciences the formula or the act of thinking, is the object. As, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, they will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought.” Aristotle, Metaphysics XII 8–9, 1074b30–1075a5, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, rev. Oxford translation, vol. II, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 1698–1699.

This passage is a colorful collection and a complete portrait of the Persian translator’s errors. Moreover, since the Persian translator, while translating this passage of Aristotle, has also engaged in commentary and perhaps even interpretation, he may have consulted other translations as well; if that was the case, he should have indicated this in his Persian translation. In any event, we take this translation to be the result of the translator’s own work.

First Problem: The phrase “Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks, if it is the most excellent, and this thinking is the thinking of the object of thought” is supposed to be the translation of the English phrase

“Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things)”

I first quote the translation of the late Dr. Sharaf al-Din Khorasani from Aristotle’s Metaphysics: “Therefore thought, since it is the most excellent of things, thinks itself, and its thinking is a thinking on thinking” (p. 409 of the Persian translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics). What the translator of the text under review renders as “thinking” (ta‘aqqul), Dr. Sharaf al-Din renders as “thinking” (andishidan), which I do not consider an error. But the phrase “if it is the most excellent” is completely wrong, because both the English text by Henry and Dr. Sharaf al-Din’s Persian translation specify that “since it is the most excellent of things.”

Second Problem: The phrase “and this thinking is the thinking of the object of thought” is supposed to be the translation of the English phrase “and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.” First, the Persian translator has essentially translated “its” as “this.” Second, “is a thinking on thinking” means “a thinking on thinking” and not “the thinking of the object of thought”!

Third Problem: In translating the phrase

But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding have always something else as their object, and themselves only by the way

he has rendered: “اما به‌وضوح روشن است که هر یک از علم و ادراک حسی و عقیده و عاقله، همیشه [چیزی را به‌مثابه موضوع خودشان دارند] و خودشان فعلی الحاقی در آن هستند”. If this sentence has a key point, that point is reflected in “else,” which the Persian translator has unfortunately missed! Moreover, the phrase “something else as their object” is not an addition to the text but the text itself, yet the translator has placed it inside brackets, as if he himself had added it! And then, the translator has rendered “and themselves only by the way” as “خودشان فعلی الحاقی در آن هستند”! But the meaning of this clause is that perception, understanding, etc., always have another object and “only incidentally have themselves as an object.” Had the Persian translator consulted the Persian translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics by Dr. Sharaf al-Din, he would have encountered this correct and eloquent phrasing: “اما چنین می‌نماید که شناخت و احساس و گمان و فهم همیشه به چیز دیگری معطوف می‌شوند، ولی به خودشان فقط به‌طور فرعی”. But alas!

Fourth Problem: In translating the sentence

Further, if thinking and being thought are different, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought?

he has rendered: “به‌علاوه، اگر آن تعقل کردن و آن انعقال غیر از یکدیگر باشند، نیکی مطابق کدام‌ یک از آن‌ها ناشی می‌شود؟” And here is Dr. Sharaf al-Din’s translation: “و نیز اگر اندیشه کردن و اندیشیده شدن مختلف‌اند، خیر به اعتبار کدام یک از آن‌ها به عقل تعلق می‌یابد؟” Firstly, searching the internet, I did not find the word “انعقال” (for “being thought”). Secondly, “ناشی می‌شود” is a translation of which English phrase?

Fifth Problem: In translating the sentence

For being an act of thinking and being an object of thought are not the same.

he has rendered: “متعقل بودن و معقول تعقل بودن یکسان نیستند.” And Dr. Sharaf al-Din has rendered: “زیرا هستیِ اندیشیدن و اندیشیده یکی و همان نیستند.” “معتقل بودن” is supposed to be the translation of “being an act of thinking” and “معقول تعقل بودن” the translation of “being an object of thought.” But the correct translation of the first would be “فعلِ تعقلْ بودن” and the correct translation of the second would be “متعلق تعقلْ بودن”!

Sixth Problem: Consider the simple sentence “We answer that in some cases the knowledge is the object,” which Dr. Sharaf al-Din translates as: “جز این‌که در برخی موارد شناختْ همان شیء است.” But the Persian translator of the book Between Kant and Hegel has rendered: “بدین جهت پاسخ می‌دهیم که ممکن است علم، نفس‌الأمر (من حیث هو موضوع) باشد [یعنی علمْ همان تحقق بالفعل نفس‌الأمری باشد که موضع آن علم است]؛”!!! What a state a very simple and fluid sentence in the original text has been reduced to! I truly cannot understand whether the Persian translator, in writing these phrases, was seeking to translate the text of Henrich and Aristotle, or was conveying his own thoughts that have no connection to the text?!

Seventh Problem: The phrase “از آن جهت که در علم صناعیِ شعر ــ و مجرد از هیولی ــ جوهر به مثابه ماهیتْ، ولی در علم نظری، منطق به مثابه تعقل، نفس‌الأمر است” is supposed to be the translation of this English sentence:

In the productive sciences (if we abstract from the matter) the substance in the sense of essence and in the theoretical sciences the formula or the act of thinking, is the object.

First, let us see what Dr. Sharaf al-Din has rendered: “در دانش‌های سازنده ــ صرف‌نظر از ماده ــ این شیء جوهر و ماهیت است، اما نزد دانش‌های نظری، این شیء مفهوم و اندیشه است.” In Mr. Qasemi’s translation, “از آن جهت که” and “شعر” are translations of which English phrases? Do the productive or constructive sciences include only “poetry”? Why has he added poetry to the text? Does philosophy mean the association of meanings? That is, whatever comes to mind we insert into the text? Is this what philosophical work and translation mean?

«و مجرد از هیولی» با داشتن جزء «و» غلط‌انداز می‌شود، زیرا در متن انگلیسی if آمده و در ترجمه دکتر شرف‌الدین هم حالت قیدی رعایت شده، اما در ترجمه هومن قاسمی ابهام بر روی ابهام انباشته شده. اما در ادامه اشکالات دیگری نیز وجود دارد. کاری نداریم به این‌که object را نفس‌الأمر ترجمه می‌کند. «منطق» ترجمه کدام عبارت انگلیسی است؟ من متن بالا را این‌گونه ترجمه می‌کنم: «در علوم تولیدی (اگر از ماده صرف‌نظر کنیم) جوهر به‌معنای ذات همانا موضوع [یا شیء] است و در علوم نظریْ ضابطه‌ها یا فعل اندیشیدنْ موضوع [یا شیء] است.» در این بند، مترجم ترجمه را به مرحله تفسیر ارتقا داده و نتیجه کارش ارسطویی شده است که نه ما می‌شناسیم و نه دکتر شرف‌الدین هنگام ترجمه متافیزیک می‌شناخت.

اشکال هشتم: و اما، اشکال نهایی این بند: عبارت انگلیسیِ

As, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have not matter, they will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought

به این شکل ترجمه شده: «چون تعقل و معقول تعقل در مواردی که هیولایی حمل نمی‌شود، تفاوتی ندارند، یکسان خواهند بود؛ و تعقل و معقول تعقل یکی می‌شوند». عبارت «هیولایی حمل نمی‌شود» ترجمه have not matter است. چرا نمی‌تواند به‌سادگی بگوید «ماده ندارند»؟ آيا نوشتن عبارت «هیولایی حمل نمی‌شود» قرار است نشان از آشنایی مترجم با مفهوم حمل در ارسطو باشد؟ یا چه؟ نمی‌دانم.

3ـ در صفحه 303 از ترجمه فارسی می‌خوانیم: «حرکات لایبْنیتسی و لاکی در اندیشه کانت تلفیق شدند. کانت ایده لاکی را ــ که در حالی که ذهن خودـ انتسابی است هرگز نمی‌توانیم آن را به مثابه جوهر تفسیر کنیم ــ با ایده لایبْنیتسی ــ که خودـانتسابی ذهن جواز تنقیح مفهوم جوهر را به همان نحو می‌دهد که مشروعیت استفاده از آن را عندالأقتضاء ([یعنی،] ما این کار را علی‌رغم این انجام می‌دهیم که خود ذهن نمونه‌ای نیست که این امر را برای آن به کار ببریم) ــ ترکیب کرد.»! دوباره این عبارت شاهکار را بخوانید. حال به عبارت انگلیسی توجه کنید:

The Leibnizian and the Lockean moves merged in the thought of Kant. Kant combined the Lockean idea—that while the mind is self-referential we can never interpret it as substance—with the Leibnizian idea—that the self-reference of the mind allows us to deduce our notion of substance as well as to justify the use we can make of it. (This we do even though the mind is not itself an instance in which we can make use of this application.)

اشکال اول: جمله فوق در خط پنجم (can make of it.) به پایان می‌رسد و بعد از آن عبارتی داخل پرانتز آمده که حکم معترضه‌ای میان دو جمله قبل و بعد از خودش را دارد. اما در ترجمه هومن قاسمی عبارت داخل پرانتز به درون جمله قبل خزیده و جزئی از آن شده!

اشکال دوم: عبارت «کانت ایده لاکی را ــ که در حالی که ذهن خودـ انتسابی است هرگز نمی‌توانیم آن را به مثابه جوهر تفسیر کنیم» خود دو اشکال دارد. اول این‌که، عبارت that while توضیح ایده لاکی است و لذا باید جمله را این‌گونه شروع کرد: «این ایده که...»، زیرا در غیر این صورت موهم معانی دیگری خواهد بود که در متن نیست! اشکال دوم این‌که while در این‌جا به معنای «در حالی که» نیست، بلکه به معنای «اگرچه» است، چنان‌که منفی بودن جمله پس از آن نیز مؤید این امر است: «این ایده که اگرچه ذهن خودارجاعی است، ما هرگز نمی‌توانیم آن را به‌مثابه جوهر تفسیر کنیم.»

Third problem: The second long sentence in the paragraph above, if we disregard the parenthetical phrases, simply states that “Kant combined Locke’s idea with Leibniz’s idea.” But the Persian translator has moved the verb “combined” to after the phrase inside the parentheses, which is not even part of this sentence! And in this way has created an ambiguous phrase! Moreover, the term “تنقیح” as an equivalent for deduce is incorrect. In the discussion of Kant’s transcendental deduction, the term “تنقیح مناط” and not “تنقیح” alone has been used, which, according to Kant’s understanding of deduction, can be an accurate translation. But in Henrich’s present discussion, such a meaning is by no means understood from the text! Apart from this, the translator has deemed our redundant and instead of translating our notion of substance as “تلقی ما از جوهر” or “مفهوم ما از جوهر,” has simply and erroneously written: “مفهوم جوهر.”

Fourth problem: Now consider the fascinating (!) phrase “که خودـانتسابی ذهن جواز تنقیح مفهوم جوهر را به همان نحو می‌دهد که مشروعیت استفاده از آن را عندالأقتضاء,” which is supposed to be the translation of the following English phrase:

that the self-reference of the mind allows us to deduce our notion of substance as well as to justify the use we can make of it.

My translation is: “این ایده که خودارجاعیِ ذهن ما را قادر می‌سازد [یا به ما مجال می‌دهد] که مفهوم خویش از جوهر را استنتاج کنیم و همچنین استفاده‌ای را که می‌توانیم از آن [یعنی از مفهوم جوهر] بکنیم توجیه کنیم.” Now here you are, and here is Hooman Ghasemi’s translation; choose whichever you deem correct.

Fifth problem: The phrase “([یعنی،] ما این کار را علی‌رغم این انجام می‌دهیم که خود ذهن نمونه‌ای نیست که این امر را برای آن به کار ببریم” is supposed to be the Persian translation of the following English phrase:

This we do even though the mind is not itself an instance in which we can make use of this application.

My translation of this is: “این کار را انجام می‌دهیم هرچند که خود ذهن نمونه‌ای نیست که در آن بتوانیم از این کاربرد بهره ببریم.”

4— On page 304 of the Persian translation, it reads: “خودـانتسابی نه تنها ساختار ذومراتب ذهن، و نه حتی مراتب متقدم ساختار ذهن نیست.” The English phrase is as follows:

self-reference is neither the only, nor even the primary, structure of the mind.

My translation is: “خودارجاعی نه یگانه ساختار ذهن است و نه حتی ساختار آغازین ذهن”. The English phrase is such that one can in no way find an equivalent for “نه تنها” in it! Meanwhile, the translator, following his usual practice, adds phrases to the text that are not in the original, including “ذومراتب”! Read the sentence again: does it make sense? The phrase “نه‌تنها X و نه حتی Y نیست” fundamentally has no meaningful sense and is formally flawed.

5— On page 308 we read: “نتیجه [= به‌ خود بازگشته] ’متعینِ‘ وضع کردن، وجه مفهومی است. داشتن مفهوم، هو هویت با مباشرت در فعالیت ندارد. بیش از این، من می‌توانم به خودم فقط به خاطر عنصر مفهومی که در مراتب ساختار خود-انتسابی تضمین شده است، به مثابه چیزی متعین ارجاع دهم”. And the original phrase:

The “determinate” result of positing is the conceptual aspect. Having a concept is not identical with performing an activity. Moreover, I can refer to myself as something determinate only by virtue of the conceptual element that is implied in this selfreferring structure.

First Objection: What does the phrase “[= returned to itself]” explain? Moreover, how can the simple, eloquent, readable, and clear sentence “Having a concept is not identical with performing an activity” be transformed into a murky, vague, and smoke-filled phrase such as “having a concept is not identical with performing an activity”? Is the discussion here about “identical with”? Or is it simply about “being one”? Does performing mean “performing”? Even if one of its meanings is “to do something,” it does not convey the meaning in the first instance, and expressions like “carrying out” and “undertaking” convey the concept easily and correctly. In short, the sentence simply wants to say: “Having a concept is not the same as performing an activity.”

Second Objection: The phrase “Moreover, I can refer to myself as something determinate only by virtue of the conceptual element that is implied in this self-referring structure” is a translation of this English sentence:

Moreover, I can refer to myself as something determinate only by virtue of the conceptual element that is implied in this selfreferring structure.

The Farhang-e Hezareh dictionary lists these meanings for the adverb moreover: “in addition, besides, additionally, furthermore, moreover, what is more”! Which translator, after all, renders moreover as “more than this”?

But the phrase by virtue of has been translated by Hooman Ghasemi as “by virtue of.” The Farhang-e Hezareh gives for it: “by virtue of, by means of, by reason of, on account of.” At first glance, we might think that all these meanings correspond with one another. But in the phrase “by virtue of” there is a kind of semantic duality not present in the other three, namely that “by virtue of” has one conventional meaning, as when we say “I kept silent for your sake,” meaning I kept silent so as not to break your heart, and another meaning which is also used conventionally but is equivalent to “on account of,” “because of,” and that is when we say “he died because of illness.” Now let us see in the sentence above where “by virtue of” is used, which meaning was intended! “I can refer to myself as something determinate only by virtue of the conceptual element that ….” Is the meaning that “I can refer to myself as something determinate only for the sake of the said conceptual element, that is, so as not to break its heart,” or that “I can refer to myself as something determinate only on account of the conceptual element that …”? Obviously, the second option is correct, but Hooman Ghasemi’s translation remains in the abyss of ambiguity arising from “by virtue of,” which is not a philosophical term.

And the final objection to this translation concerns is implied, which the esteemed translator has rendered as “is implied.” What does the Farhang-e Hezareh say: “to hint at, to say implicitly, …, to be indicative of, to signify, to entail.” “Implication” has a specific meaning that clearly is not referenced in Henrich’s text, but the Persian translator has permitted himself to use it because he perhaps (perhaps) considered consulting a dictionary beneath his dignity, and perhaps (almost certainly) lacked the patience to look at it.

Conclusion

In this translation, Hooman Ghasemi (1) has omitted key phrases, (2) has translated key phrases incorrectly, (3) has added phrases to the text that not only have no relation to the text but also cause and bring about the reader’s misguidance, (4) has made mistakes in translating non-specialist and non-technical phrases, (5) in translating common verbs and nouns, due to not consulting a dictionary, has used strange, rare, and incorrect equivalents, (6) and as a result we can conclude that he has made philosophy an arena of game and Henrich’s book his plaything, and has taken the audience of philosophy for nothing. Despite this, I hope Hooman Ghasemi does not cease his efforts. Perhaps his only mistake was in the choice of book; perhaps by choosing an easier book a better fate would have befallen him; perhaps from now on, with greater precision in the source and target languages and deeper contemplation and reflection on the mission of translation and the concept of translation and the requisites and conditions of translation, he may produce good and valuable works. My aim in this critique is this and nothing more.

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Philosophy as Game and Plaything

A Critique of the Persian Translation of Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism

Translated by Hooman Ghasemi, Ketab-e Rayzan, 2016.

Author: Seyed Masoud Hosseini

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