Reforming Religious Reform

It was 29 July 1191 when the scholars of Aleppo declared the blood of the thirty-eight-year-old Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi lawful to shed. It was 3 January 1521 when the thirty-eight-year-old Martin Luther was excommunicated by Pope Leo X. It was 27 July 1656 when the Jewish scholars excommunicated the twenty-three-year-old Spinoza. It was 1995 when the Egyptian Sharia court declared the fifty-two-year-old Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd an apostate, and... The history of religions is replete with such suppressions. But what has happened that these reformers, philosophers, and mystics have fallen outside the circle of faith in the eyes of the "official custodians of religion"? What forbidden thing has been revealed in the words of these great figures that disturbs a group of people? And to what extent can one still remain within the circle of faith?

In this relatively short piece, I will attempt, setting aside the important historical disputes over "religious reform"—which are of great significance—to offer a philosophical conception of religious reform and, to the best of my ability, clarify the boundaries of religious reform, elucidate the characteristics of theories of religious reform, and reveal the traits of a religious reformer.[1] I will also show that religious reform is not the exclusive domain of intellectuals, and that jurists, theologians, and philosophers of religion can all sit at the table of reform, contribute to its blessings, and benefit from its blessings.

Let us begin here: what is religious reform, and what are we talking about when we speak of this phenomenon? Most who have written on this subject use terms like "reconstruction," "revival," "renewal," and so on to explain this phenomenon. In my view, these terms are largely illuminating and can help us reach a common understanding. For this reason, I do not intend to create and coin a new concept, adding to the complexity of the matter. However, to further clarify the phenomenon of religious reform, I will merely note that religious reform is a spectrum in which "reconstruction" and "revival" are important players. It is not the case that those engaged in reconstruction are not reformers, or that only revivalists are reformers. I do not make an essential distinction here between reconstruction and revival, and I imagine that those engaged in reconstruction are in fact reviving something, and those seeking revival are in truth undertaking the reconstruction of something. In my view, separating reconstruction from revival is misleading and divisive, and adds to the difficulties of explaining the matter of religious reform.[2] The only important concept we face is religious reform. But this concept is elastic and gradational; that is, we have various types of religious reform. Those who have sought to separate "reconstruction" from "revival" have in fact recognized this multiplicity and plurality, but it is "a word of truth by which falsehood is intended." Let me explain a little about the types of religious reform.

On one side of the spectrum of religious reform, we encounter reformers who consider themselves "multi-source." That is, they believe that for reform, the Book and the Tradition alone are not sufficient, and one must also refer to and seek help from sources "outside of religion," such as philosophy, theology, mysticism, (secular) ethics, empirical science, and so on. Most who consider themselves religious intellectuals belong more to this side of the spectrum and deem the use of sources outside of religion as authoritative for the task of reform.[3]

On the other side of the spectrum are religious reformers who consider reference to the Book and the Tradition sufficient for reform and believe that contemplation and deep study of these sources is enough for reform, and there is no need for other sources. Most jurists, insofar as they are "single-source," can be considered as belonging to this side of the spectrum.[4] That most jurists are single-source does not, of course, mean that jurists cannot be multi-source. For example, even within the seminary, one can speak of a single-source/multi-source (Tafkiki/philosophical) dispute. The followers of the Tafkik school believe that the Quran and, more importantly, the narrations are sufficient for understanding religion, whereas the philosophical school says that reference to Islamic philosophy and mysticism is necessary for understanding the Quran and Islamic narrations.

The above example and others like it illustrate the difficulty and complexity of categorizing reformers. Reformers (whether intellectuals, jurists, theologians, or theosophists) move along a spectrum, and a great plurality and diversity among them is observable in the real world. It is even possible for an intellectual to oscillate along this spectrum over the course of their activity, moving from multi-source to single-source orientation. The same applies to a jurist who, in their intellectual life, moves from single-source to multi-source orientation. What is important is that all these individuals are reformers.

But how can reform be distinguished from heresy? How can one understand whether a theory falls within the category of reformist theories and has not departed from the sphere of reform? Is there a criterion or standard? Below, I will try to show that, at a minimum, several characteristics and features can be enumerated for reformist theories and for religious reformers in general, and a criterion and touchstone can be provided for distinguishing reform from non-reform (heresy). Let me confess here that in setting these criteria, I have kept the gates of reform as open and wide as possible and have acted very cautiously in restricting this door. Although this wide sieve may mistakenly let some reformist theories pass through the filter, I believe that having reformist theories (even incorrect and unjustified ones) is better than reformers falling silent for fear of heresy while we witness the corruption of religion. The corruption of a religion can create far greater dangers than heresy.

Let me seek assistance from Abdolkarim Soroush, where, in response to a question about the religiosity of religious intellectuals and the "shrinking" of religion, he says:

I insist on this point, and I have said in previous talks as well, that the criterion of religiosity is reference to the Book and the Tradition and understanding them; that's it... This is why I say the criterion of religiosity is that you continuously refer to the Book and the Tradition, that they are your reference. But what the result of this reference is, it can be anything; as long as it is reasoned, justified, and methodical.... The reference and proof for religious intellectuals in Iran is the Book and the Tradition. (Interview with Zeitoon: "Rereading the Foundations of Religious Intellectualism")

Soroush explicitly states that "continuous reference to the Book and the Tradition" is the criterion for considering an individual religious, and religious intellectuals, insofar as they adhere to such a criterion, remain within the circle of religiosity. If we consider the project of religious intellectualism as a project of religious reform (which we can easily do!), it can be concluded from Soroush's words that reference to the Book and the Tradition is sufficient for a reformer to keep them within the circle of religiosity. Accordingly, based on what has been said, it can be stated that individual A is a religious reformer if:

• They continuously refer to the Book and the Tradition.

But one can easily object that such a criterion and touchstone collapses if we consider the works of many Orientalists. They continuously refer to the Book and the Tradition for their research work, while they do not necessarily have a concern for reform. This problem becomes more serious if we take "Tradition" in its broad sense, which includes not only the sayings, actions, and tacit approvals of the Prophet and Shia Imams but also considers reference to the collective historical experience of Muslims from various traditions and denominations. It seems that at least another criterion, such as having the intention of reform, must be added to the previous criterion to escape this predicament. In accordance with the objection raised, it can be said that individual A is a religious reformer if:

(AA) They have at least the intention of reforming religion and do not explicitly intend destructive heresy. Also, A continuously refers to the Book and the Tradition—in its broad sense—for the reform of religion.

Introducing intention and purpose is important for several reasons: first, it distances the reformer from the accusation of heresy. Second, even if the results of an individual’s reform theory lead to heresy, according to the theory of unintended consequences, the obligation is lifted from him, or at least he can be considered less deserving of blame. Third, someone may explicitly have no intention of reform (or may even intend to create a new religion!), yet his works might still be utilized for reform theories. But why bring up the issue of heresy at all? Throughout the history of religions, heresy has unfortunately been one of the weapons used by some jurists to crush and eliminate rivals (such as mystics). Setting aside the thought-suppressing nature of this kind of encounter with thinkers, one must admit that not all jurists are like this, carelessly deploying the label of “heresy”; some have exercised precision in its application.[5] With these considerations, emphasizing that a reformer has no intention of heresy removes the pretext from the hands of jurists.[6] Bringing up heresy here helps us to distinguish—at least in a negative sense—between reform theories and heretical (religion-creating) ones.

But is merely having intention and referring to the Book and the Sunnah sufficient? Can one not imagine someone who genuinely intends reform and turns to the Book and the Sunnah for this purpose, yet arrives at unreasonable and unjustified results? It seems that the method of referring to the Book and the Sunnah and the individual’s reasoning are also of particular importance. Thus, one can say that person A is a religious reformer if:

(AAA) He at least intends to reform religion and explicitly has no intention of destructive heresy. Furthermore, A continuously refers to the Book and the Sunnah—in their broad sense—in a reasonable manner for the purpose of reforming religion, and provides justified reasoning for his reform theory.

Note that the conclusion the reformer reaches is not important. He is free to express whatever his reasoning necessitates. But his freedom is limited to the extent of the reasonableness and justification of his reasoning, nothing more! It is evident that here, the “religiosity” of the reformer plays no role in considering his theory reformist. The only instance where the results of a theory can be considered outside the project of religious reform is when the individual, within his own reform project, concludes that for reform, one must either abandon religion altogether or establish a new religion. Regardless of the correctness or incorrectness of such a conclusion, in these two cases, the individual cannot be called a religious reformer because he is either not a reformer or not religious!

Now it is time to unveil the characteristics of reform theories under what has been discussed so far. It seems that theories of religious reform, similar to religious reformers, must be formulated with the intention of reforming religion and be reasonably in harmony with the Book and the Sunnah. Therefore, theory A is a reform theory and falls under the category of religious reform theories if:

(B) It is formulated for the reform of religion and is not fabricated with the intention of heresy or creating a new religion. A must be reasonably in harmony with the Book and the Sunnah—in their broad sense—for the purpose of reforming religion, and be presented in a justified manner.

But suppose an individual, in his theorizing, refers to the Book and the Sunnah reasonably with the intention of reform, and strives to arrive at a reform theory through justified reasoning.[7] However, the community of believers, and even the community of rational people, does not see that theory as reformist and suspects that such a theory falls outside the project of religious reform. What is to be done? The real question here is whether reform theories must be approved by all other reformers. Of course, if this happens, it is desirable, but is the approval of other reformers necessary, and is it a necessary and sufficient condition for reform theories?

An initial response could be that the assessment of whether a theory is considered reformist should be left to history. Indeed, it is the historical experience of believers over time that shows whether a theory has been deemed reformist or not. However, it may be objected that history is full of possibilities, and a political, geographical, economic, psychological, etc. event might mistakenly fail to see a reformist theory as reformist, or vice versa. Leaving the assessment of the reformist nature of theories to history cannot necessarily attest to the truth of the theories. One must have a rule—however slender—for assessment at hand. The answer is that history, with all its possibilities, can to some extent be rule-forming. For example, if someone researches that throughout history reformist theories have generally possessed characteristics A, B, C, etc., one can know that for assessing reformist theories, at least one of those characteristics must be present. Of course, it should not be forgotten that this is not the whole story. Perhaps one can speak of a reformist theory whose novelty and creativity are so great that it does not necessarily possess the characteristics of previous theories, yet is still classified among reformist theories (like the very first reformist theory, which has no history behind it!). This matter is important because religious reformers, while needing to be equipped with the history of reformist theories, should not merely seek to imitate the characteristics of previous theories. As it happens, the history of thought has shown that some epoch-making theories that created a "paradigm" shift bore very little resemblance to previous theories and, so to speak, "leaped." Of course, providing a necessary characteristic for this leap is very difficult and can hardly be formulated into a rule.[8]

With this in mind, it seems that the connection and relationship between reformist theories and the history of reformist theories can hardly be formulated into a rule so as to provide a criterion and a touchstone for it. Therefore, one can say that theory X is a reformist theory and falls into the category of religious reform theories if:

(BB) It has been established for the reform of religion and has not been fabricated with the intent of heresy and creating a new religion. X must be for the reform of religion in a reasonable manner, in harmony with the Book and the Sunnah—in their broad sense—and be presented in a justified way. The existence of common characteristics between X and other reformist theories throughout history can be desirable, but it is neither a necessary condition for considering X reformist, nor a sufficient condition.

The final word is that judging whether religious theories are reformist or heretical is a grave matter. This writing attempted, firstly, to show that intellectuals, jurists, scholars, and theologians can all fall under the umbrella of religious reformers and benefit greatly from coexistence with one another. Secondly, a minimal criterion and touchstone was presented here for identifying reformers and reformist theories, in order to reduce, as much as possible, the division and disagreement among intellectuals and others.

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[1] On social and religious reform, refer to the Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation:

The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation, Edited by Hans J. Hillerbrand, Oxford University Press.

In this writing, I assume that religion can be reformed, and I say nothing about whether religion is fundamentally reformable or not.

[2] Those who follow the recent developments and disputes within the religious intellectualism movement are inevitably familiar with these distinctions. I refrain from elaborating on this matter.

[3] It could perhaps be said that multi-source religious people are, from one perspective, generally knowledge-oriented religious people, and from another perspective, proponents of reconstruction!

[4] It could perhaps be said that single-source religious people are, from one perspective, generally expediency-oriented religious people, and from another perspective, revivalists!

[5] On this matter, refer to: Abu Muhammad al-Sa'idi, Nafy Zahirat al-Takfir 'ind al-Imamiyyah, Mash'ar, Tehran, 1391, Chapter Five (Research One, Two, and Three).

[6] The mere fact that something is a “bid‘a” (innovation) does not prove a theory to be bad. Innovations that are destructive and unjustified must be set aside. An innovation that is rightful is good. For example, Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi, drawing on verse 27 of Surah al-Hadid (“…and monasticism, which they innovated; We did not prescribe it for them—only seeking God’s pleasure…,” Khorramshahi’s translation), argues that if an innovation is for the sake of drawing near to God and its due is fulfilled, it is among the divine traditions (al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya, Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Arabiyya al-Kubra, 1911, vol. 2, p. 562).

I am grateful to Yaser Mirdamadi for introducing this source and the previous one.

[7] One might object that introducing a subjective element (such as intention) into the definition of religious reform is problematic, for it entails that if someone does not have the intention to reform, the result of their work no longer counts as religious reform. Yet one can easily imagine that even theories of religion-making might be able to assist reformist theories. The answer is that the element of intention plays a strongly negative role in providing a criterion for reformist theories. That is, if a theory is explicitly formulated with the intention of innovation, it falls outside the scope of reform, but if there is no such explicitness, as mentioned above, these theories can contribute to the project of reform.

[8] If one objects to “I am a dervish in a single cloak,” then why have you attempted in this piece to provide a criterion and a touchstone for reform? One could answer, firstly, that the criterion in this piece is, as mentioned, minimal; secondly, the very fact that one cannot necessarily provide a criterion for the relationship between reformist theories and the history of reform can itself furnish us with a criterion!

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PDF file of the article Reforming Religious Reform

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Reforming Religious Reform

Author: Hossein Dabbagh

Source: Taghrirat Magazine, Issue Six

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