Religion and Essentialism

One of the fundamental claims of religious intellectuals is that religion cannot be considered to have an essence. Soroush Dabbagh attempts, in the first part of his essay titled “Do Not Now Do What You Have Done Hitherto” [1], to defend this claim with the aid of considerations in semantics and epistemology. In this essay, I will try to show that his arguments are unsuccessful, and even if his claim is, in principle, justified, his arguments in its favor fail to accomplish that justification.

Dabbagh presents two arguments to prove his claim, which I will call the “semantic argument” and the “epistemological argument,” respectively. First, I will introduce each of these arguments and then attempt to show that neither will succeed in justifying that claim.

1. The Semantic Argument

The basis of Dabbagh’s semantic argument is that the word “religion,” unlike natural kind terms, does not refer to the internal structure (or essence) of a phenomenon. Dabbagh first states his definition of the semantics of natural kinds:

1- “In contemporary philosophy of language, those who believe in ‘semantic essentialism’ hold that ‘natural kinds’ such as water, gold, copper… possess a necessary, immutable essence, and one can show and enumerate all the constituent components of that essence, for example, all the components that make gold what it is. In other words, when we use the concept of gold in language and determine its reference, the meaning of this word pertains to all the constituent components of this concept.”

There are two claims here. The first claim is that, from the perspective of semantic essentialists, natural kind terms like “water” and “gold” entail essentialism. This claim is correct. However, the second claim, which represents Dabbagh’s analysis of the semantics of natural kind terms and its relation to essentialism, is incorrect. We will address this matter.

After defining the semantics of natural kind terms and its relation to essentialism, Dabbagh points to the opposing view of essentialism, namely “nominalism,” and its connection to “linguistic pluralism”:

2- “In contrast, those who are nominalists and, in Putnam’s terms, believe in ‘linguistic pluralism,’ consider the ascertainment of the meanings of words to be contingent upon referring to the multiple ‘internal properties’ of instances, not a pre-determined and specified essence; for such an essence does not exist and should not be sought.”

According to Dabbagh’s definition, from the perspective of those who believe in linguistic pluralism, the meanings of words do not refer to any essential characteristic because such an essence fundamentally does not exist.

He ultimately states that the semantics of words referring to social phenomena corresponds to the model of “linguistic pluralism,” and not the model of essentialism:

3- “It seems to me that one can sympathize with the nominalists’ position, at least regarding concepts such as liberalism, democracy, secularism, mysticism, religion, ethics, play…. Concepts that, unlike concepts such as tree, mountain, river, sea… arise within human society and whose coherence depends on the coherence of humans and the interaction of language users with one another in a human society. The components of such concepts cannot be enumerated a priori and prior to experience; rather, the list of their constituent components can only be obtained a posteriori, by referring to experience; a list that is open and can, in principle, be added to or subtracted from.”

So, Dabbagh’s semantic argument, in summary, is that there are two models for the semantics of words: a) the model of natural kind semantics, and

b) the model of linguistic pluralism.

In his view, the first model entails essentialism, but the second does not. The semantics of the word “religion,” in his view, corresponds to the second model, which has nothing to do with essentialism.

But in order to examine this argument, I must first touch upon some points regarding Dabbagh's analysis of the semantics of natural kind terms and its connection to essentialism. It seems he has presented an incorrect analysis of the semantics of natural kind terms and its connection to essentialism.

Dabbagh says that natural kind terms, for example "gold," entail essentialism because "when we use the concept of gold in language and intend a designation by it, the meaning of this word refers to all the constituent components of this concept." Although Dabbagh does not elaborate further on this, what he seems to have in mind is that the properties generally attributed to the metal gold, such as luster, resistance to corrosion, being yellow in color, etc., are part of the meaning of the word "gold." In other words, the meaning of "gold" is nothing but "a metal that is lustrous, yellow in color, resistant to corrosion, etc." A more precise formulation of this would be that the proposition "Gold is a lustrous, yellow-colored metal resistant to corrosion" is an analytic proposition, which is true solely by virtue of the meaning of its constituent parts and not because of any state of affairs in the world.

But what is the connection between this semantic analysis and essentialism? To clarify the connection between essentialism and the semantics of "gold" from Dabbagh's perspective, it is necessary first to point out the connection between the concepts of "a priori," "essence," and "necessity." An a priori proposition is one whose truth is considered independent of sensory experience. According to the analysis attributed to Kant, analytic propositions are also a priori (though the converse is not true for Kant, meaning a priori propositions are not necessarily analytic). Dabbagh's definition of "essence" in Introduction 1 is something that is "necessarily immutable." We accept this definition, but the concept of necessity must be clarified. The accepted definition of necessity among philosophers is based on the concept of "possible worlds." A possible world means a possible state of affairs. For example, the president of Iran in 2009 could have been someone other than the current president. Such a state of affairs is a possible world.

Now the concept of necessity can be defined based on possible worlds. If something exists in all possible worlds, that thing exists necessarily. Likewise, if a proposition is true in all possible worlds, that proposition is necessarily true. According to this definition, analytic propositions are necessarily true because their truth is solely by virtue of their meaning and, consequently, they are true in all possible worlds. Furthermore, a priori truths are also true in all possible worlds because their truth is independent of "states of affairs."

In summary, according to the framework outlined above, the concept of essence has a fundamental connection with the concept of necessity, and given the definitions we have seen, only a priori propositions and also analytic propositions are necessarily true. Dabbagh's fundamental presupposition in the semantic argument is also this conceptual framework, for he clearly states in Introduction 3:

"The components of such concepts [concepts that are not natural kinds] cannot be enumerated in an a priori manner, prior to experience; rather, the list of their constituent components can only be obtained by referring to experience and in an a posteriori manner; a list that is open-ended and can, in principle, be increased or decreased."

Therefore, according to Dabbagh, natural kind concepts entail essentialism because their components can be enumerated in an a priori manner and "prior to experience." But such a thing is completely incorrect. In what follows, I will try to demonstrate the incorrectness of this analysis.

Essentialism arising from the semantics of natural kinds, contrary to what Dabbagh claims, is an entirely a posteriori matter (by reference to experience). Paying attention to this point is very important because Kripke's important philosophical discovery is that—contrary to what Kant thought—necessary truths are not necessarily known a priori, and a posteriori necessary truths also exist. The proposition "Water is H2O" or "The atomic number of gold is 79" are a posteriori necessary truths because they are true in all possible worlds. The word "water" refers to H2O in all possible worlds in which water exists, just as "gold" refers to atomic number 79 in all possible worlds in which gold exists. This very important point has been overlooked by Dabbagh.

In his highly acclaimed book, Naming and Necessity, Kripke demonstrates well that the components of natural kinds play no role whatsoever in the meaning of those terms. The reason for this is quite clear: in the semantics of natural kinds, according to Kripke's model, which is the standard view, the meaning of natural kind terms—and also the meaning of proper names—is determined through "direct reference." The properties generally associated with the metal gold, which are expressed by "definite descriptions" (a metal that shines, a metal that is malleable, etc.), have no function in its meaning. Fundamentally, what links the direct reference theory of meaning with essentialism is this very feature of unmediated reference. Kripke clearly shows that even if it were discovered one day that the properties of shininess, yellow color, etc., do not apply to gold, one still could not say that there is no such thing as gold (in other words, under such conditions one could not say "gold" is an empty name)[2]. This is because these properties play no role in determining the referent of gold. Consequently, they are not part of the meaning of "gold" either. [3]

The conclusion of the points mentioned above is that the issue of linguistic essentialism has nothing to do with the "a priori enumeration" of the components of concepts. The essence, or the referent, of natural kind terms is determined a posteriori. Therefore, even if we accept Dabbagh's view that the components of concepts that are socially constructed cannot be enumerated a priori, one still cannot conclude that such concepts do not refer to the essence of phenomena. This is because the issue of reference to the essence of a phenomenon is an a posteriori matter, not an a priori one.

2. The Epistemological Argument

In the previous section, we examined Dabbagh's semantic argument. We concluded that the argument is not convincing. In this section, we will examine his other argument, the epistemological argument.

Dabbagh's epistemological argument is as follows:

Premise 1: "As we know, modern epistemology was formed with an emphasis on the centrality of the subject. In his book 'Critique of Pure Reason,' Kant unveils a Copernican epistemological revolution; a revolution based on the centrality and involvement of the subject in knowing the surrounding world; a subject that actively (not passively) sets about understanding the surrounding world."

Premise 2: "It is clear that the entire diverse epistemic and educational background of the various human beings who approach religious texts (here the Quran and the Prophetic Sunnah) and sincerely and diligently seek a justified and reasonable understanding of them, naturally flows into producing a truthful, coherent, and knowledge-imparting reading of the text."

Conclusion: "The implication of this statement is that in reading a religious text, we are faced with a plurality irreducible to unity, because the epistemic and educational backgrounds of the readers of the text have obvious differences with one another. When such subjects actively set about understanding the Book and the Sunnah, multiple and diverse epistemic products will emerge and appear. Hence, 'Traditional Islam,' 'Fundamentalist Islam,' and 'Reformist Islam' have emerged naturally in Muslim society, and not as a result of prior conspiracy or planning by anyone" (emphasis mine).

The summary of the argument is that our "epistemic and educational" background plays a constitutive (in his terms, active) role in understanding the phenomena of the world, and since the epistemic and educational backgrounds of different individuals differ, it is logically possible to speak of multiple and even contradictory understandings. In what follows, I will critique this argument.

The first point we should note is that the existence of diverse and contradictory beliefs about a phenomenon does not show that the phenomenon lacks an essence. For it can be said that many of those diverse and contradictory beliefs are fundamentally not justified. Consequently, they are also not true. In other words, if individuals strive to hold justified beliefs about a phenomenon, then it can no longer be said that every belief (understanding) is justified. For example, it cannot be said that the set of beliefs about Islam known as "traditional Islam" are justified to the same extent as the set of beliefs known as "reformist Islam." Therefore, in order to conclude from the existence of diverse beliefs concerning a phenomenon that the phenomenon has no specific essence, one must first show that all those beliefs are justified beliefs.

It seems that this is what Dabbagh has in mind. For in the second introduction, he says, "diverse educational and epistemic backgrounds… naturally cascade into yielding a true, coherent, and informative reading of the text." It clearly emerges from this statement that he considers a person's epistemic background[4] to be constructively involved in justification and informativeness. Therefore, in his view, diverse beliefs are all equally justified because he considers justification to be a completely subjective concept, dependent on the person's epistemic background.

But such an interpretation of the concept of justification is incorrect. Epistemic justification, in addition to its subjective dimension, also encompasses an objective dimension. The objective dimension of justification means that in evaluating a person's beliefs, the correspondence of their beliefs and cognitive faculties with the world is of importance. In other words, in evaluating a person's beliefs, one does not merely suffice with their cognitive (epistemic) state and how things appear from their perspective. The correspondence of beliefs with the world also enters into the evaluation of a person's beliefs. It is for this reason that it is strongly accepted in epistemology that there is a close relationship between justification and truth. Also, due to the equal importance of both dimensions of justification, the subjective dimension and the objective dimension, the dispute between externalism and internalism regarding theories of justification arises.

Epistemic externalists, placing greater emphasis on the objective dimension of justification, defend the view that what justifies a person's beliefs is the reliability of their belief-forming process. In contrast, epistemic internalists, by highlighting the subjective dimension of justification, consider the person's epistemic perspective to be what justifies their beliefs. A precise explanation of the externalism-internalism dispute in epistemology requires another occasion. However, the persistence of challenges and debates between externalists and internalists in epistemology has reinforced the view that purely externalist theories, as well as purely internalist theories, are insufficient in explaining the nature of justification. Hence, epistemologists in recent years have shown a greater inclination towards hybrid views that encompass both subjective and objective dimensions. [5]

Consequently, Dabbagh's conception of the concept of epistemic justification is incorrect because defining justification as a completely subjective concept, limited to the individual's epistemic state and cognitive perspective, is insufficient. Justification also has an objective dimension that links it to the concept of truth.

3. Final Conclusion

Dabbagh's semantic and epistemological arguments in defense of the claim that religion has no specific essence were examined. The semantic argument rests on the incorrect presupposition that essentialism is an a priori matter, independent of experience. But as stated, essentialism about natural kinds is an a posteriori matter, dependent on experience. This shows that the discussion of essentialism is independent of the discussion of the a priori/a posteriori nature of meaning.

The epistemological argument claims that the different (religious) beliefs of various individuals are equally justified. And from this it concludes that none of these beliefs represent the truth of religion. But this claim is based on an inadequate conception of justification and considers justification to be a wholly subjective concept. As stated, justification also has an objective dimension that links it to truth. An adequate theory of justification must encompass both subjective and objective dimensions. Such a theory cannot evaluate the different beliefs of individuals solely by the criterion of their epistemic situation and from their own perspective.

.

---

.

References:

Kripke, S, 1981, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell

Vahid, H, 2011, “Externalism/Internalism”, in Routledge Companion to Epistemology.

.

---

.

Footnotes:

[1] Do not do now what you have done until now! Soroush Dabbagh

*I would like to thank Kusha Iqbal and Yaser Mirdamadi for their helpful suggestions in clarifying this piece.

[2] Kripke (1981), pp.117-8

[3] Kripke does not deny that certain descriptions can play an a priori role in fixing (and not determining) the referent of "gold." It seems that Dabbagh has misunderstood the distinction between fixing the referent of natural kind terms – which is done a priori – and determining the referent – which is an a posteriori matter.

[4] Of course, Dabbagh also considers a person's upbringing to be involved in justification. But this is entirely mistaken. Upbringing has no cognitive (epistemic) value whatsoever. This is because the concept of justification in epistemology is a normative concept, meaning that in order to have knowledge, a person must fulfill a set of epistemic duties. Accordingly, to have knowledge (whether religious or non-religious), one must adhere to a set of epistemic norms, and this adherence is independent of one's upbringing, such as place of birth, city, family, and type of education. In other words, a person's upbringing consists only of descriptive matters and not normative ones. Therefore, they cannot play a role in justification, which is a normative concept. That is, the environment in which a person has lived and grown up has nothing to do with what they must do to have knowledge.

[5] For more on the concept of justification and the dispute between externalism and internalism, see: Vahid (2011)

.

---

.

Religion and Essentialism

Author: Ali Saboohi

.

---

.