Religion, Religious Studies, and Religious Mythmaking

The writings and talks being published these days on religious studies, religious reformism, religious mythmaking, and so on are replete with various terms and interpretations, to the extent that any reflective activity concerning them is impossible without agreement on the precise meaning of these terms and interpretations. Therefore, as I set forth some reflections on these topics, I also try to clarify and distinguish certain concepts from one another. 1- The first concept requiring reconsideration and precision is the concept of “religion” and, following it, “Islam.”

A precise, comprehensive, and exclusive definition of “religion,” if not impossible, is at least a difficult task. However, since the discussion concerns stepping outside the bounds of a specific religion or remaining within them, we must more or less specify what we mean by religion. If we limit our scope of inquiry to monotheistic (Abrahamic) religions and consider them to possess a family resemblance, although none of the sets of resemblances among the members of this family alone suffices for a definition, the dominant and most prevalent characteristic can still be found among them (Hick, 1376: 16).

Furthermore, it seems that to clarify the matter, a distinction must be made between “religion” and “religiosity and faith.” At first glance, religion is an external matter, whereas religiosity and faith are internal. This distinction becomes even more important, especially if we believe in some form of realism in “religious studies.” In all forms of realism (naive realism, critical and complex realism, historical realism) (Guba & Lincoln, 1999: 109), reality exists independently of our perception. We may consider its knowledge and understanding to be fully accessible (naive realism), or consider only probable and incomplete knowledge and understanding of it to be possible and accessible (critical and complex realism), or consider it shrouded in a halo of social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values that only become fully embodied and apparent with the passage of time (historical realism). From a realist perspective, “religion” as the subject of “religious studies” is a concept independent of the various types of religious studies. Now one may ask: what is the dominant and most prevalent characteristic of the reality of Abrahamic (monotheistic) religions?

Religion, as an external reality, is a collection of signs and texts that, according to religious beliefs, have a divine origin.

To speak more precisely, everything goes back to an axis that can be called “revelatory data.” Employing this term requires emphasizing several more detailed points, the most important of which are as follows:

First. We are faced with a set of “data” (data). That is, a collection of symbols, words, numbers, and forms that indicate truths and events. However, they alone are not sufficient for conveying meaning and require processing. Data are transformed into information by adding features such as specifying context, calculation, categorization, linking with one another, and correction through comparison. Transforming data into information requires analysis and interpretation. What justifies the use of the term “data” for revelation is, on the one hand, the literal meaning of this term and, on the other hand, some of the transmitted accounts about the manner of revelation’s descent.

Revelation (waḥy) originally means “a swift indication” and, in speech, denotes cryptic and allusive utterance, uncombined sounds, and sometimes gestures of the limbs (Rāghib, 1394: 827).

The important point is that the revelatory data in Islam was “processed” once in the presence of the Prophet (PBUH) and with his guidance and explanations. The classification of verses into chapters (surahs), the Prophet’s (PBUH) explanations regarding the occasions of revelation, his clarifications to elucidate ambiguous matters… are among the instances of processing this data. The result of this processing is the formation of the “Book” and the “Sunnah” of the Prophet in interpreting the message of the Book. Muslims after the Prophet (PBUH) are confronted with revelatory data that has already been transformed into information by him. However, the disagreements among Muslims after the Prophet (PBUH) in understanding and explaining his Book and Sunnah demonstrate that they still need to strive for its comprehension.

Second. Revelation implies the establishment of communication and the transmission of a message. Revelatory data, without the assumption of God’s existence and His will to convey a message to humans, is a futile and meaningless act. Taking revelatory data seriously and striving to unveil the meaning hidden within them is based on the assumption that there is a “message” within them, which rescues it from being a futile and fruitless act.

Third. Attachment to a religion and loyalty to it occurs with the assumption that the revelatory data available to us is sufficient for receiving the message sent by God. If a person deems the existing revelatory data insufficient for conveying the message, they will seek other authoritative sources equivalent to the existing collection to complete the message. Interpreting revelatory data to derive new answers from it is one thing, and considering it insufficient is another.

Considering what has been said, it seems that to fall under a specific “religion,” the minimum acceptance of three axes and theoretical and practical commitment to them is necessary:

First, the belief that the prophet of that religion was raised to be the bearer of God’s message to humans. Second, the belief that God’s message is present in the revelatory text and the behavioral model of the Prophet. Third, the belief that the revelatory text of that religion and the behavioral model of its prophet are sufficient for receiving God’s message.

The negation of any of the three aforementioned beliefs leads to exiting the bounds of one religion and possibly entering the bounds of another religion or engaging in mythmaking. Remaining in the “Islamic” domain within the framework of the religion of Islam requires belief in the prophethood of Muhammad ibn Abdullah, the presence of God’s message in the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam (PBUH), and their sufficiency for receiving God’s message and accepting the lack of need for a new prophet to convey this message.

2- The second concept requiring reflection is the concept of “religious studies” and, subsequently, “Islamic studies”

Religious studies, in its simplest definition, is the “methodical” effort to answer the questions raised about a religion. What separates thinking about religion from fantasizing about it is its methodical nature. Method, in its simplest definition, means the manner of moving along a “path” to reach a “goal.” More precisely, the methodical nature of an endeavor means “moving based on specific principles and criteria and passing through defined stages to reach the designated goal.” As can be observed, being methodical requires a kind of “structuredness.”

Although religious studies and the empirical sciences are not of the same kind and are not comparable in terms of “subject,” “method,” and “outcome,” as Ian G. Barbour (Barbour, 1990) says, they can learn from each other and engage in dialogue, and in other words, they share similarities in some aspects and are comparable to one another. The most important similarities between religious studies and the empirical sciences can be sought in the following:

1. The authority of convention; 2. The use of institutional language, metaphor, and models; 3. Personal involvement; 4. The interaction of experience and reason; 5. The importance of doubt and skepticism; 6. The importance and role of language (meaningfulness of propositions, linguistic usage); 7. Criteria for evaluation (relevance to data, coherence, comprehensiveness).

Due to the aforementioned similarities, one can use the frameworks proposed for explaining scientific changes and transformations to understand and explain the transformations that have occurred in religious studies.

Today, one can hardly find a theorist who denies the existence of different perspectives in the field of religious studies (or, in Shariati's terms, various types of Islamology). To explain and understand the types of religious studies, Kuhn's concept of the dominant paradigm has sometimes been borrowed, and at other times Lakatos's concept of the research programme. At first glance, the various tendencies in religious studies are dominant paradigms in religious studies, and from the second perspective, each is a religious studies research programme competing with other research programmes.

It should be noted that this difference is not merely in naming and has many consequences. It is true that both Kuhn's and Lakatos's views see science (here, religious studies) as a "structured whole" and not as a collection of independent, isolated propositions and theories, but the dominant paradigms in Kuhn's view are incomparable and incommensurable, whereas this is possible with Lakatos's research programmes.

If we consider the existing types of knowledge about religion as different paradigms, these paradigms, besides being incompatible with one another, are also incommensurable, meaning they cannot be compared with each other or measured by a neutral and impartial criterion or standard. Any attempt at a rational choice among rival paradigms fails and will face the problem of circularity. Each dominant paradigm contains its own specific theories, methods, criteria, and standards.

One of the important consequences of the incommensurability of dominant paradigms is that the choice between paradigms is, to a large extent, non-rational. This non-rational conception of paradigm choice leads to the relativization of scientific knowledge and religious studies. Judging the merit of a perspective (whether in science or in religious studies) is done based on criteria that are themselves incommensurable. This non-cumulative and largely non-rational picture of the development of science and religious studies is unacceptable to objectivist and realist philosophers. Whereas in Lakatos's methodology, one must choose the research programme that is "progressive" and avoid "degenerating" research programmes. He not only considers comparison and judgment possible but also prescribes it.

Religious studies scholars who believe in the existence of a reality independent of our perception as "revealed data," accept the possibility of rational judgment among various types of religious studies, and, in addition to these, hold "connection to the data" as a criterion for evaluating different religious studies perspectives, will inevitably believe in some form of commensurability among different religious studies perspectives, even if they call them different paradigms.

If religious studies tends toward a specific "method" for religious studies that cannot be applied independently of the conception, intuition, individual characteristics, and imagination of individuals for understanding religious teachings, and makes the method of religious studies subject to the conception and intuitive judgments of religious studies scholars, it exits the realm of realism and enters a kind of "epistemic relativism" in religious studies. The logical conclusion of such a view is that no religious studies perspective is superior to other perspectives, and our criteria for judgment are themselves defined by each perspective.

A religious studies scholar may exit the realm of "realism" and fall under "relativism" in religious studies for various reasons:

The first case is if they do not posit a reality for religion independent of the perception and mind of religious studies scholars, which can be called an exit from metaphysical (ontological) realism.

The second state is when the aim of religious studies is not considered to be understanding the message contained within religious “signs and texts,” and it does not seek to establish a relationship between our epistemic situation (what we know as religious perspectives on the message of religion) and what actually exists in religious sources. This position can be called a departure from epistemic realism. Epistemic realism claims that our best interpretations of religion are (approximately) correct and provide an (approximately) accurate description of the message present in revelatory data.

3- The third concept that can be proposed in this context is the concept of “religious mythmaking” or “Islam-making”

The term “Islam-making” was first used by Morteza Motahhari in 1972 (Abolhasani, 1983: 417).

Islam-making, or religious mythmaking in general, emerges when religion, instead of being a subject of “cognition,” becomes a subject of creative imagination. Religious mythmaking takes shape when we turn religion, in a tasteful manner reliant on the faculty of imagination, into a subject for composing poetry, but in prose form. In other words, religious mythmaking is the presentation of religion without adherence to a specific “method” in religious studies. Religious mythmaking is sometimes carried out with a positive view of religion, aiming to showcase its beauties and attractions, and sometimes with a negative view, aiming to create aversion and hatred toward religion.

Although the boundary between religious studies and religious mythmaking is “methodicalness,” one should not make the mistake of thinking that merely having a method guarantees the correctness of the results of a religious-studies endeavor. Only a method that possesses justified theoretical foundations and has also demonstrated its efficacy in practice can be considered a prelude to achieving acceptable results. Therefore, the critique of “method” itself is a way to compare different cognitions of a subject. For example, the “discipline of jurisprudence” is perhaps the most methodical among the collection of Islamic sciences. The science of the principles of jurisprudence is responsible for discussing and justifying this very method. However, despite this methodicalness, due to the incorrectness and unacceptability of some of the foundations and assumptions of its method, the product of applying this method to understanding the doctrinal teachings of religion is, in numerous instances, unacceptable.

What has been said so far can be summarized in several axes and used as a basis for discussion as the conclusion of the matter:

First. The primary subject of religious studies is “revelatory data.” In Islam, revelatory data was once processed by the Prophet in the form of the “Book” and “Sunnah.” Therefore, it cannot be considered devoid of “meaning” and ready to accept any kind of interpretation. Second. Through the conceptual analysis of “religion,” specific criteria and regulations can be determined for “presence” within the framework of a particular religion or for exiting it. Third. Various currents in religious studies can be studied within the framework of competing “research programs.” Hence, for each of them, one can specify a “hard core,” “protective belt,” “positive heuristics,” and “negative heuristics,” and compare them with one another under these four headings. Fourth. Every current of religious studies must introduce the foundations and axes of its “method” in religious studies and justify them. Otherwise, what they present as religious studies should be considered a form of “religious mythmaking” and called a “tasteful” undertaking.

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References:

Hick, John. Philosophy of Religion. Translated by Behzad Saleki. Tehran, 1997, Al-Hoda.

Ian Barbour –Religion in an age of science- 1990

Egon g.Guba- Yvonnas s.LINcoln- Competing paradigm in qualitive research

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Religion, Religious Studies, and Religious Mythmaking

Author: Alireza Alavitabar

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