Revisiting the Russell–Copleston Debate on the Existence of God, Kaveh Behbahani

Anyone who has read the celebrated translator Najaf Daryabandari’s brilliant translation of Mark Twain’s novel Huckleberry Finn or his translation of Doctorow’s Ragtime knows that they are dealing with an expert and skilled translator who is well acquainted with the intricacies of the corpus of both the source and target languages and has managed the task of rendering texts in the finest manner. In my opinion, however, his philosophical translations, although they are the pioneers of the arduous path of the tradition of translating philosophical texts into Persian—which is “like chewing sugar”—lack the brilliance of his literary translations. One reason is the flawed system of equivalence in the sphere of philosophy in his time, a system of which he himself was sometimes one of the founders. The translation of the debate between Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston on the existence of God is one such unsuccessful example; by reading this translation, the Persian-speaking reader does not gain access to the true essence of that debate.[1] If I were to point out a few cases among the many instances of incorrect translations, I could mention the rendering of “explanation” as “tawjih” (justification) (instead of “towzih” or “tab’in” [explanation or explication]) throughout the debate, as well as the translation of the two-part or phrasal verb “explain away” as “tawjih kardan” (to justify) (p. 192) instead of “to evade” or “to shrug off,” which have been the source of many misunderstandings. Also, the translation of “a priori” as “hozuri” (presential) (instead of “pishin” or “pishini” or “mataqaddam” [prior]) and “a posteriori” as “hosuli” (acquired) (instead of “pasin” or “pasini” or “mata’akhkhar” [posterior]) (p. 173), which are undoubtedly incorrect renderings. Such is the translation of the Kantian concept of “categorical imperative” as “vajeb-e qat’i” (definite obligation) instead of “amr-e motlaq” (absolute command). And of course, there are many other instances throughout the book that have diminished the text’s precision. Thus, about eight or nine years ago, I decided to use a more vibrant system of equivalence to pen a clear and, in my own view, precise account of that famous debate. The note below is the result of that writing from those distant years, intended to provide a report on this debate. I did not deem it unseemly to share this short, old note with friends.

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An Inconclusive Dialogue

A Report on the Russell–Copleston Debate on the Existence of God

Does God exist? Does a personal, transcendent being who is separate from the world and created it have an external existence?[2] Some hold the opinion that such a question is meaningless. They say “Does God exist?” cannot be asked in a meaningful way, for the very same reason that in physics, the question “Does the electron exist?” cannot be asked meaningfully, because physics presupposes the existence of the electron, and in the same manner, the existence of God is a presupposition of religions.[3] But Sir Bertrand Russell, one of the fathers of the Anglo-Saxon philosophical school and author of the book “Why I Am Not a Christian,” and also the Holy Father, Frederick Copleston, the Thomist Christian philosopher (i.e., a follower of Thomas Aquinas) and author of the hefty eleven-volume history of philosophy, both considered this question meaningful and askable, and in response to it, on one of the BBC’s hot programs, they arranged a duel with the pistol of argument. Copleston argued that God exists for three reasons, and Russell rejected his reasons, saying I do not know whether such a being exists or not. In the philosophy of religion, Copleston’s view is called “theism” (or, more precisely, “monotheism”) and Russell’s view is called “agnosticism.”

1- The Cosmological Argument: Does the Human Race Have a Mother?

For Copleston, the world is a collection of separate objects, none of which contains the reason for its own existence within itself, and all of them are contingent and accidental. In other words, in the world outside the human mind, everything has a cause and nothing is the cause of its own existence. Among the many causes of the existence of the person named Mahatma Gandhi is the union of his father and mother; had that not occurred, the person named Mahatma Gandhi would not have been in this world. But the totality of these individual objects, taken together, also has a cause. Now the question that arises is: what is the cause of the existence of the totality of objects? That is, why does the totality of the external world exist rather than not? The cause of the existence of all things, whatever it may be, cannot be other than one of two states: either it is the cause of its own existence, or it is not the cause of its own existence. If the cause of the existence of the totality of the world is the cause of its own existence, we have, as philosophers say, arrived at a "factor outside the system" or a deus ex machina, a factor which, unlike all worldly things, is itself the cause of its own existence. But what if the cause of the existence of the totality of the world is not the cause of its own existence? Well, this time we must seek the cause of the cause of the world's existence, and once we find it, we must again ask whether it is the cause of its own existence or not. Again, if it is, we have found what we sought, and if it is not, we must repeat the same process. But we cannot keep asking this question for eternity, because even if we had the patience, our lifespan would not suffice to answer this endless chain of questions! So, somewhere this questioning must stop! Why? Copleston's answer can be formulated as follows:

Premise one: If this questioning continues forever, then the existence of the whole world has no cause, and thus Being (with a capital "B") will have no explanation.

Premise two: There is an explanation for Being (Being has a cause).

Therefore (with regard to a logical rule called denying the consequent):

This questioning must stop somewhere, and we will necessarily arrive at something that is the cause of itself. According to this argument, the existence of a being that is the cause of itself is a necessary matter.

Copleston takes us from the contingent things of this world—or, in the terminology of the ancients, possible existents—to a necessary being (or, as the ancients said, the Necessary Existent). This was the old priest's first argument for the existence of God.

Russell responded to this proof by saying that to claim things and objects are contingent or necessary is meaningless. He said that only propositions can be characterized by the attribute of necessity, and specifically analytic propositions, that is, propositions whose denial leads to a contradiction. Like the proposition "every father is a man" or "Bertrand is Bertrand." Such propositions cannot be denied without falling into contradiction. But when we say something (anything, for example, God) exists, this proposition is not analytic, meaning its denial entails no contradiction and therefore it is not necessary. Russell's other criticism was to ask: from where, fundamentally, have we obtained the notion of a cause? He answered that human beings arrived at the notion of causality by observing the cause of particular objects in the material world. But what reason is there that the "totality of objects" should also have a cause, just like each individual one? To mock such an argument, he gave the example that all human beings in the external world have a mother, but this does not mean that the human race also has a mother. By the same analogy, one cannot say that things as a whole have a cause.

2- The Religious Sense: Japanese Novels

Some people, and especially mystics, claim to have undergone a state or experience in which this state is an awareness of something that the subject cannot help but regard as transcending themselves and all their everyday experiences. Something that cannot be put into words, before which reason stands bewildered, and which the human intellect cannot encompass, yet at least while we are in that state we cannot doubt the reality of that thing. This state is a pleasant one which, though somewhat vague, has been experienced by some people—an experience called “religious experience.” Today, some believe that a person may experience such a state through the consumption of certain psychedelic substances. Copleston’s point is that the best explanation one can give for the existence of such a state is to say that these sorts of experiences have an objective cause.

In response to this argument, Russell says that to move from the existence of a mental state within ourselves to the existence of something outside ourselves is “thoroughly fraudulent.” He says that in Japan there is a successful novel for whose fictional character a large number of people commit suicide, but the meaning of these suicides is not that the fictional character of Japanese novels has an external existence. He also says that from the existence of “religious experience” in some people who are mystics, one cannot arrive at the existence of something outside their minds, unless all human beings have a consensus that that thing exists in the external world, just like the existence of the external material world on which we all have a consensus. In Russell’s view, if we accept Copleston’s argument, then we would have to say that since some people speak of experiencing jinns or the devil, such beings must therefore exist, and with this state of affairs the world is quite crowded and we are unaware of it! Russell’s argument can be logically rewritten as follows:

Premise one: If all our mental contents had external counterparts, then beings such as jinns, the devil, angels, and so on, could all possibly have external counterparts.

Premise two: Beings such as jinns, the devil, and angels do not have external counterparts, because only those mental contents have external counterparts about which all people have a consensus.

Therefore (with reference to the rule of denying the consequent):

Some of our mental contents have no external existence. Mental contents (such as God) about which there is no consensus have no external existence.

In response, Copleston tries to convince Russell that religious experience differs from illusion and imagination. An effort that is not met with success.

3- Absolute or Relative Morality: Imitating the Behavior of a Predatory Dog

Father Copleston says that most people distinguish between good and evil and feel a kind of moral responsibility within themselves, but Frederick Copleston’s question is: what reason is there that a human being understands the morality of certain things and feels certain moral laws and duties within themselves? In his view, the best explanation that can be given in this regard is that moral values are rooted in a transcendent and supreme being who promulgates moral laws. Copleston’s main point is that because absolute moral values exist, therefore God exists. Copleston makes this point against those who believe that “God does not exist, therefore absolute moral values do not exist.” Ivan Karamazov, the fictional character from Dostoevsky’s novel The Brothers Karamazov, was of this group. He said, “If there is no God, everything is permitted,” and in Copleston’s view, the Russian author is right. Copleston’s argument can be formulated as follows:

Premise one: If there is no God, then doing anything is permitted.

Premise two: Doing anything is not permitted, and absolute moral values exist.

Therefore (and with reference to the rule of denying the consequent in logic):

God exists.

Russell did not accept Copleston's second premise; the belief that moral values are absolute matters belongs to Kant. But Russell said he did not like the word absolute and that nothing is absolute. In Russell's view, moralities are constantly changing; he gave the example that

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Revisiting the Russell–Copleston Debate on the Existence of God

Kaveh Behbahani

For a detailed examination of the debate, refer to the book Mysticism and Logic by Bertrand Russell.

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