اندیشهفلسفهخردگفتگوحکمتمعناپرسشفرهنگ
The book *On the Abolition of All Political Parties*, with an introduction by Mostafa Malekian, presents Simone Weil's critique of the nature of parties and proposes advocacy in their place; it explores the distinctive character of the philosopher's thought and action and compares her views with those of decentralist thinkers.

In the newly published book Abolishing All Parties (Nashr-e Negah-e Moaser), we are confronted with a different kind of discourse—we, the Persian-speaking people of the Middle East, before whose eyes the table of human misery and affliction is spread these days; a table also spread before the peoples of lands from Chinese Turkestan and Kashmir to Egypt and beyond, to Latin America, Africa, and Asia; realms thirsting for peace, bread, justice, and meaning!
We must seize the opportunity and acquaint ourselves and everyone with this different discourse; its good and its bad, all together. And certainly with discernment, if there is any "good" in it.
We know very little about the astonishing phenomenon of Simone Weil, who has remained unknown throughout the world—except to an elite few such as Albert Camus, André Malraux, Simone de Beauvoir, Trotsky, and others. We have not left ourselves the "opportunity" to get to know such different human types; let alone the opportunities that "pseudo-problem-makers" steal from us. In these writings, we find the opportunity to become a little more acquainted with her and with the different facets of her action and thought.
In short, Simone Weil was introduced to Persian speakers through the efforts of Mostafa Malekian and Forouzan Rasekhi (in two translation works), primarily as a thinker deeply engaged with questions of being, mysticism, love, God, perpetual seeking, attention, and concern for the affliction of the downtrodden. These two translations were great undertakings and placed us before a "personality" that is highly worthy of reflection, one that requires time to grasp her understanding of "what is to be done" in life and to place it on the list of options for "reflection for action."
But this time, we will become acquainted with a different facet of her action and thought:
One of the many wonders of the twentieth century was that three of its prominent political philosophers were women!:
Rosa Luxemburg,
Simone Weil,
Hannah Arendt.
The first two also had astonishing and tragic fates. These two were also "philosophers of action." People of philosophy for changing the world! With both pen and step, and not merely through interpreting it. We are somewhat familiar with Hannah Arendt, but not with those two.
This time, we become acquainted with Simone Weil's astonishing and entirely different view of one of the apparatuses of modern society; her critique of party dynamics. Something that all practitioners of social action consider self-evident and a necessity of social and political life.
In this essay, Simone Weil, while addressing the inherently harmful nature of the party and any institution, structure, and organization resembling a party, and attempting to substantiate her claim, also proposes a solution from her own perspective. The first question that comes to mind upon seeing the title of this book and reading a few pages of the text is, "What is to be done?"
Her answer is specific demands for concrete, measurable, and time-bound goals—individual and collective demands. The pursuit of specific action, with a specific goal, within a specific timeframe. In such a way that the elected representative (or representatives) of these two do not belong to any party and only pursue a specific demand or demands. In her view, demanding individuals and groups, and communities such as syndicates and councils, have the capacity and ability to engage in effective and meaningful social action around the axis of this or that concrete, specific, and time-bound goal and demand, without becoming enamored with the "pie in the sky" promises of parties and party-like or quasi-party factions; groups that propose mythical, vague, elastic, timeless, and placeless ideals and ideologies for the eternal recruitment of followers, for the infinite growth of the organization, and the acquisition of limitless power. These groups, instead, in the most optimistic scenario, succumb to the temptation of practically betraying their claimed ideals for the expediencies of acquiring, maintaining, expanding, and concentrating power and organization, or they engage in this betrayal from the very beginning.
Now, if one were to add a few points to his main message in this note, one point might be—in the words of Aldous Huxley—the downsizing of the organization of all human social units in such a way that the possibility of the emergence of gigantic monsters of social evil—evils such as totalitarianism, authoritarianism, kleptocracy, bureaucracy, cronyism, meritocracy, nepotism, large-scale technocracy, and so on—is eliminated, and evil remains only within small limits and dimensions, and within those small dimensions, far from the inaccessibility and complexity of large structures, is more easily resolved, rather than creating misery and catastrophe at global, national, regional, and local levels.
Another point is that Simone Weil, despite being an explicit critic of the unjust relations and relationships between labor and capital and proposing a reformist suggestion for improving the conditions of "alienation" and the dehumanization of the workforce in the factory, nevertheless presents her theory by taking mass industrial production, the global free market system, and the large centralized state for granted. Her practical action has been labeled anarcho-syndicalism, meaning the activity of workers within the framework of syndicates with the ultimate goal of taking control of the factory. Whether this label is correct or incorrect, it indicates that she thinks and poses the problem only within the existing space of large-scale production and technologism. In her mind, no image of alternative spaces is seen, and naturally, she does not think about ways out of this framework. Whereas there have been those who have broken out of this framework and have critiqued the "compulsory growth (the imperative to grow)" in the market economy and the centralized state organization arising from and supporting that economy.
In the views of figures such as Aldous Huxley, E. F. Schumacher, Leopold Kohr, Wendell Berry, Gilles Deleuze, Murray Bookchin, Mahatma Gandhi, Ivan Illich, Majid Rahnama, and others, other frameworks and paths are proposed that address the decentralization of production and the state, localism (as opposed to globalization), the downsizing of organizations, rhizomatic self-governance, self-governance through numerous small councils, simple living, and so on. They believe in the functionality of purposeful communities, effective and self-governing local associations and councils, and various structures of civil society; they pay more attention to the centrality of the decentralization of power and organization, self-governance, localism, and "ever more direct democracy," and consider these to be the tools of "good governance." Such thinkers generally believe that with the help of these tools, flourishing, well-being, justice, and freedom become more easily attainable in small, self-governing archipelagos.
This book has benefited from the editing, meticulousness, and efforts of Mostafa Malekian, a prominent thinker of contemporary Iran and an independent intellectual in the fields of moral philosophy and cultural studies. His particular regard for the thought and practice of Simone Weil once again stirred in him a desire to write about Simone Weil, so that a detailed and illuminating introduction for a better understanding of this strategic and rare discussion might also be gifted to the book.
I am sincerely grateful for this empathy, this shared perspective, and this collaboration.
Gholamali Keshani, Esfand 1397
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In this text, Simone Weil, the French philosopher, mystic, theologian, intellectual, and political activist (1909-1943), who was one of the greatest spiritualists of the twentieth century, by virtue of her fascination with truth, justice, and the public good, and out of her immense and profound humanism, and on the basis of a completely convincing reason, calls for the abolition of all political parties, because partisanship contradicts the pursuit of truth, the quest for justice, and the pursuit of the interests of all citizens, in such a way that party affiliation cannot be reconciled with the pursuit of these three great ethical ideals. She then shows that this spirit of partisanship, with all its harms and evils, is not exclusive to the institution of politics, but also finds its instances in the institution of religion and faith, the institution of education, and the institution of science, art, and literature, and in phenomena such as intellectualism and nationalism.
The crux of Simone Weil’s argument is that if republicanism means the exercise of the general will—which it does—and if democracy means the rule of the majority—which it does—then it must be said that parties are an obstacle to both republicanism and democracy; because every party—ultimately—prioritizes its own partisan interests over the public good. The elaboration of this summary is as follows:
1) The sole criterion of the good is truth and justice and, subsequently, the common benefit; that is, everything is considered good in proportion to the degree of truth, justice, or common benefit it possesses.
2) Only the good is intrinsically or essentially desirable, meaning only the good is desirable for its own sake, and as the (final) goal. All other things, including democracy, and also government and the state itself, power, wealth, economic production, the university, and national pride, are desirable only insofar as they serve the good and, in this sense, their desirability is accidental or extrinsic, and only because they are inescapable instruments and means for attaining the end and goal which is the good.
3) Only reason has the power to perceive and choose the good, that is, truth, justice, and the common benefit; feelings, emotions, and passions not only lack such power, but, indeed, drive human beings toward evil.
4) Reason is common and one in all human beings; whereas the feelings, emotions, and passions of human beings, in the vast majority of cases, are marked by difference and multiplicity.
5) Therefore, human beings, so long as, and to the extent that, they proceed according to the rule of reason and rationality in adopting an opinion and/or making a decision, draw closer both to truth, justice, and the common benefit, and to one another. In other words, reason and rationality make human beings both more successful in realizing ethical ideals and render them more cohesive, united, capable, and powerful. And, conversely, following feelings, emotions, and passions both hinders the realization of ethical ideals and weakens the cohesion, unity, capability, and power of human beings.
6) Consequently, the general consensus of human beings is only on the right track and leads to truth, justice, and the common benefit if human beings have proceeded according to the rule of reason and rationality, not according to the dictates of feelings, emotions, and passions. The general consensus of a nation, if it is the product of the feelings, emotions, and passions of that nation, can in no way have priority or preference over the opinion of a single individual, and if that individual has arrived at that opinion according to the rule of reason and rationality, their opinion is, certainly, superior to that general consensus.
7) At the same time, practically and in reality, most of the time, the will of all the people has preference over the will of a single individual, because the multiple, diverse, and conflicting feelings, emotions, and passions of an entire nation neutralize and enfeeble one another and, naturally, the field is left to reason and rationality.
8) For the exercise of the idea of the general will, first, several conditions must be fulfilled, among which two are very important:
a) At the time when the people become aware of their own intention and express it, no kind of collective feeling, emotion, or passion must exist, because, unlike the multiple and diverse passions of the individual members of a nation or society, which neutralize and nullify one another, a single, shared collective passion, in which all members of a nation or society participate and share, is not only not neutralized or nullified by anything, but, indeed, the more the number of members increases, the more its intensity and strength grows; and such an intense and powerful passion leaves no room for reason and rationality.
b) The people must express their will concerning the issues and problems of collective life, not merely choose one from among several different individuals or (worse still) several different, unaccountable organizations.
9) But, on the other hand, political parties have three essential characteristics:
a) A political party is a machine for producing collective passions;
b) A political party is an organization whose purpose in being established is to exert collective pressure on the minds of its individual members;
c) The first purpose and also the ultimate goal of every party is the limitless and boundless growth of the party itself.
Regarding the essential characteristic (a), it must be said that political parties do not educate their members, but rather condition them; that is, they prepare them for the much more rigorous ideological control and restraint that the party imposes upon its members. Evidence of this claim is that if a member of a party publicly pledges that “I swear that whenever I must examine a political or social issue or problem, I will absolutely consign my membership in a particular political group to oblivion, and my sole concern will be to ascertain what I must do in order to best serve justice and the public interest,” that party will consider that person’s membership annulled and will revoke it. The party demands the utmost possible loyalty from its members to the party, not devotion and commitment to the requirements and necessities of truth, justice, and the public interest; and, hence, it seeks to produce collective emotions in favor of the party. And, again for this reason, if a member of party X holds that on issue or problem P1, party X is right, on issue or problem P2, party Y is right, and on issue or problem P3, party Z is right, party X will reject his membership, even if the said member proves that his position on all three issues or problems was adopted in accordance with the dictates of truth-seeking, justice-seeking, and safeguarding the public interest. A member of party X has no right or permission to say: “I, as someone devoted and committed to truth, justice, and the public interest, believe that…”; rather, he has the duty and obligation to say: “I, as a member of party X, believe that…”
From this, it becomes clear that (b) is also among the essential characteristics of every political party; that is, the purpose of establishing a political party is to exert collective pressure on the minds of each and every member so that all hold a single opinion on every issue or problem, which is, of course, the very opinion held by the party leaders. The opinions of the party leaders, although expressed through party charters, manifestos, and bylaws, are so vague that no one is capable of disambiguating them. In theory and in principle, the party is an instrument in the service of realizing a particular conception of the public interest, but this conception is infinitely vague. This judgment has no exception and applies equally to all parties, meaning that all parties, to the same extent, speak with ambiguity about their ideological principles (in all likelihood, knowingly and deliberately)—an ambiguity so severe that no one can provide a clear and precise description of the ideological principles of any political party. Consequently, the leaders of any party can, in any circumstances, as required by the interests of their own party, and by resorting to that ambiguity, adopt a new position, without it becoming apparent that they have done nothing but opportunism and protecting their party’s interests.
By this account, it is understood that (c) is also among the essential characteristics of every political party; meaning that the first and last purpose of every political party is the endless growth of the party itself; and this is a particular instance of the inversion of the relationship between ends and means; and this inversion of the relationship between ends and means is a phenomenon that always occurs when a collective structure dominates and subjugates thinking individuals. As a rule, a political party ought to be a means to achieve an end, which is the public interest and justice; but, in reality, because this end is expressed with the utmost ambiguity, it becomes unreal. On the other hand, the existence of the party itself is something objective, external, and clear, and is perceived without any effort. Therefore, in an inescapable manner, the party, in reality, itself becomes its own end.
10) Because of these three inherent characteristics, every party is totalitarian. The party's totalitarianism has another cause as well: in order for the party to effectively serve the realization of the concept of the common good—which, allegedly, is the party's raison d'être—there is one necessary and sufficient condition, and that is that the party must possess immense power; yet, no finite power, however immense, ever seems sufficient, because the absence of thought (and reliance on collective emotions) causes the party's state of incapacity and impotence to persist, and this feeling of incapacity and impotence is, in turn, attributed to the inadequacy of the power attained so far. Even if the party becomes the absolute, undisputed, and unrivaled ruler of its own country, international events place limits on its power. Hence, the inherent tendency of all political parties toward totalitarianism is first at the national level, and then at the international and global level.
11) The result is that political parties are organizations that are, openly and officially, designed for the purpose of killing the sense of truth-seeking and justice-seeking in all souls. Through propaganda, it exerts collective pressure on a vast community; and the aim of this propaganda is not enlightenment, but rather persuasion, encouragement, and incitement. Therefore, when an individual joins a party, they abandon the idea of serving anything other than truth, justice, and the common good.
12) But, if we accept that truth exists, we cannot but have a concern for truth. In that case, if we hold an opinion on a subject, issue, or problem, it is not because we are white or Iranian or Muslim/Christian or Shia/Sunni or liberal/socialist or ... but solely because the irresistible light of evidence, indications, proofs, and signs has guided and led us to that opinion. The true seeker of truth must only increase their own inner light.
13) When a country has political parties, sooner or later it becomes clear that effective intervention in public affairs is impossible without joining a party. On the other hand, anyone who has a concern for public affairs wants their concern to be fruitful. Consequently, in such a country, those who have a concern for the common good must either consign their concern to oblivion, in which case they have neglected their moral duty, or submit to one of the parties, in which case they have turned their back on the concern for truth and following their own inner light. Thus, the very existence of political parties confronts a person with a dilemma, both horns of which are unacceptable and neither of which can be chosen.
14) Can a third option not be created in the face of that dilemma? Can those who have both a concern for the common good and a concern for truth not join a party and, at the same time, follow only their own inner light on every subject, issue, or problem? The answer is negative, because such people cannot announce this resolve and solution to their party and, therefore, are deceiving their party, and, hence, in the depths of their own soul, they are strengthening the root of untruthfulness, and it goes without saying that the tree of untruthfulness bears no fruit but inner darkness.
15) So, while, on the one hand, we are attentive to truth, justice, and the common good, and, on the other hand, we want to maintain the attitude expected of members of a political party, we cannot examine the extremely complex subjects, issues, and problems of public life. The scope of human attention is limited and does not have the capacity for simultaneous regard for these two concerns; and, in fact, whoever has one of these two concerns must, inevitably, neglect the other. Only when, with a heart and soul free and unburdened from anything that can take on the color of attachment, we are desirous of truth, without trying to guess the content of truth, do we find the inner light. The entire mechanism of true attention is nothing but this.
16) The striking and highly important reality is that the very existence of parties is problematic for those who wish to follow only their own inner light and are, in no way, willing to compromise or sacrifice their integrity, because, just as one cannot attend to truth, justice, and the common good while preserving the outlook and attitude of a political party, one cannot attend to truth, justice, and the common good while striving to react against the party's control and restraint. In other words, in the same way that the motive of loyalty to a party weakens our power of understanding and discernment and leads our faculty of judgment astray, the motive of opposition to a party's outlooks and attitudes also disrupts our understanding, discernment, and judgment, for neither of these two motives has anything to do with truth and truth-seeking, and both must be viewed with suspicion. True attention, which makes the inner light more luminous, is an elusive state, and any interference of feelings, emotions, and excitements, whether positive or negative, takes it off the correct path. Just as love makes you blind and deaf to the flaws and defects of your beloved, hatred also makes you blind and deaf to the virtues and perfections of the person you hate. The desire to oppose a party's outlooks and attitudes, exactly as much as the desire to agree with them, weakens our power of discernment and dims our inner light. Therefore, one must always earnestly strive to keep one's power of discernment and judgment immune and protected from the turmoil caused by personal fears and hopes.
17) Therefore, a political party is a phenomenon that, as soon as it appears in the realm of social life and political existence, makes everyone, both its supporters and opponents, susceptible to deviation from the path of truth-seeking, justice-seeking, and safeguarding the common good. It is from here that the emphatic ethical recommendation to abolish all political parties arises.
Now there is room for this question: "If parties are an obstacle both to republicanism and to democracy, what should be done to resolve the problems that arise in a society whose political system is meant to be both a republic and a democracy?"
Simone Weil's answer to this question, in brief, is that someone who wishes to attain a political position and office through elections should express their own personal views and opinions on every social problem and, naturally, agree with some on one issue and disagree with others, and on another issue agree with a different group and disagree with another. In other words, they should think for themselves and, as a result of this independent thinking, each time, and on each problem, converge with some and diverge from others. They should have no permanent bond of brotherhood with any person or group, but rather, case by case, enter one group and exit others. Such a person never says: "As a member of such-and-such party, I believe that...", but rather says: "I, through thinking for myself, have reached the conclusion that..." When such individuals constitute the political system of a country and society, one can hope that truth, justice, and the interests of all citizens will not be trampled upon, and that republicanism and democracy will be preserved.
If, throughout the 17 preceding paragraphs, we were to replace the term "(political) party" with the term "religion and creed," not an iota of the argument's soundness and strength would be diminished. As stated at the beginning of this writing, the spirit of partisanship applies, in addition to the institution of politics, to the institution of religion and creed, the institution of education, and the institution of science, art, and literature, and to phenomena such as intellectualism and nationalism; and it fundamentally originates from the institution of religion and creed, and has made its way into the institution of politics, and from there to other places.
The informed and fair-minded reader knows that this rightful opinion of Simone Weil bears not an iota of resemblance to the narrative of another group of proponents of abolishing political parties who believe: "Our party must be on the throne of power, and the rest of the parties in prisons and dungeons."
I wish and hope that the flame of the smokeless fire of benevolence and love for humanity may grow ever more kindled in the soul and heart of all of us, and that its light may illuminate our path, and its warmth may give us the sustenance and strength to go on. So may it be! May it be ever more so!
11/10/98
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Religion
Political Science
Economic Sciences
Political Science
Philosophy
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