The Intolerant Minority Rule in Social Systems

Suppose you walk into a private party. At this party, there are 10 women and a number of men. One of the women is wearing a chador. Eight of the women wear some form of hijab, though it may not be a complete, full hijab. One of the women is unveiled. This is a private party, so the law of compulsory hijab is not in effect. Your conclusion:

90 percent of the women in this community believe in hijab, although their definition of hijab may differ. 10 percent of the women in the community do not believe in hijab.

Correct? Not necessarily. I want to explain to you that it is possible that in this community, only 10 percent of the women believe in hijab.

Now, one of the guests tells you what happened before you arrived (this is a real example; and relates to the author's last days in Iran):

"A number of guests, men and women, were mingling together and no one was wearing a hijab. Suddenly, the host announces to everyone that the last guest, Mr. R, along with his wife, just called and are on their way. The host, apologizing to everyone, informs them that Mr. R is extremely religious, so if there is an unveiled woman in the gathering, he will not come inside. And since Mr. R is very dear, the host asks all the guests to put on a hijab. The guests, some with indifference and some grumbling, put on a hijab. One person, however, is stubborn and does not put on a hijab. Mr. R and his chador-wearing wife enter. Mr. R, upon noticing the unveiled woman, lowers his head and remains silent; but he does not leave the party. The group starts talking again and the party warms up once more."

What happened? In reality, 90 percent of this community did not believe in hijab, and only 10 percent truly believed in it. Your conclusion as an outside observer was that 90 percent of the community were veiled. 180 degrees wrong. Why was your conclusion so wrong? And why did Mr. R, contrary to the host's prediction, not leave the gathering?

This is the basis of a discussion that can be called the intolerant minority rule, and is the subject of a chapter in Nassim Nicholas Taleb's forthcoming book, which I am reading. This rule concerns the one-way street of intolerance, and how the intolerant, even if they are an absolute minority, can turn their rule into a societal norm and impose it. Taleb himself thought about this issue when, while attending a conference, he noticed that all the drinks provided for the attendees were kosher (kosher is the preparation of food and drink in a way that is permissible for Jews to consume, roughly equivalent to halal food for Muslims). Taleb's astonishment stemmed from the fact that he knew the number of Jews present at the conference was truly negligible, yet all the drinks had been made kosher. Why did this happen? The answer lies in the one-sided behavior of Jews:

Non-Jews drink both kosher and non-kosher drinks. But Jews only drink kosher drinks. -T

Result: The conference, to put its mind at ease, gives everyone kosher drinks. Those who are not intolerant (are tolerant) consume the drink in any case (indeed, many of them do not even notice whether the drink is kosher or not; Nassim Taleb himself only realized this when one of his friends pointed it out). The Jews also drink their preferred beverage. In this way, the majority of the conference submits to the minority.

Another example from me, the author (again, real): I was making pomegranate soup for a party. I believe that 51 percent of the soup's flavor comes from its shredded meat. But at the same time, I knew that two or three vegetarians were present in the gathering. Vegetarians also behave in a one-sided manner:

Non-vegetarians eat both vegetarian and non-vegetarian food, whereas vegetarians only eat vegetarian food.

As the host, I either had to endure the trouble of making two separate pots of stew, or choose the simpler path and make the stew without meat. Which one do you think I chose? (A hint for the answer: the author is from Shiraz.)

In this way, an intolerant minority, if it behaves intolerantly enough, forces the rest of society to follow that minority's rule. The vital and driving factor in this rule is asymmetry. One side behaves symmetrically—"I will eat both this and that"—and the other side is strictly asymmetrical—"I will eat this, and I will never eat that."

Another example from Nassim Taleb:

Why are some books banned? Certainly not because the average member of society demands it. Most people in society are more inert than that, and they don't really care {what the books say}. Even if they do care, they don't care enough to get up and petition for a book to be banned. It seems that, to ban a book, or to ban someone's image from being shown, it is enough for a small number of opposed people to be committed. —T

For instance, a limited number of people might go and make a fuss and demand the banning of a certain book or a certain concert, or prevent the establishment of a music school in the city, even though the majority of the city had no particular problem with that school.

Taleb explains that the minority rule is one of the best examples showing how the functioning of complex systems can be so different from the behavior of the individual members of the system. If you follow the behavior of a single ant, no matter how carefully, it is infinitely unlikely that you will understand how the entire ant colony behaves. What distinguishes a complex system from its individuals is the interaction among its members. It is the interaction among the individuals in the system that causes the system's behavior to differ from the behavior that the individuals, or the majority of individuals, prefer.

Another example: At diplomatic banquets where the P5+1 host Iranians, alcoholic beverages are not served. Why? You already know the answer:

The European side will sit at a table both with and without alcohol. The Iranian side will only sit at a table without alcohol. The result: a table without alcohol.

Here too, if we were to bring an observer from Mars and ask them to comment on the majority's preference for drinking alcohol, they would unequivocally conclude that the majority's wish was for alcohol not to be served. This is anyone's natural understanding of democracy and majority rule. Whereas, the earthly observer, unlike the Martian observer, knows that at this table, only one person out of seven objected to serving alcohol. This outcome was merely the wish of the party that insisted on its preference more intolerantly and stubbornly. Therefore, the intolerant minority can influence society in two ways:

Firstly, it can force society to submit to its favored norm. Secondly, it can lead the uninformed observer to the false conclusion that what occurred in society was the wish of the majority.

According to Taleb, understanding the behavior of complex systems is still unfamiliar to the human mind, which is why such errors in judgment occur so frequently.

Taleb also adds that the only prerequisite for the intolerant minority's success is appropriate geographical distribution, such that they can impose this norm in every region of society. It is enough for three or four percent of every village, city, or province to consist of a committed, intolerant minority. This suffices for the entire society to conform to the desired norm.

Taleb provides numerous and interesting examples of the global spread of many historical, social, and economic phenomena that conform to the intolerant minority rule:

The global spread of the English language: Suppose that in an international administrative meeting, 19 people are fluent in German, and one person does not know German. The result: the meeting is held in English. —T

The proliferation of automatic transmission cars in America: Drivers familiar with manual transmission can also drive automatic. But automatic drivers cannot drive manual. Result: the price of manual cars drops and their production gradually tends toward zero. -T

Taleb also discusses the one-way street of religions, and tries to explain the rate of population growth of different religions based on the minority rule and asymmetry.

Hyper-stubbornness: Victory belongs to the one who is more stubborn

Let us complicate the conditions of the examples. Conditions where not just one intransigent group, but two or more intransigent groups are present in society. For instance, imagine two stubborn drivers speeding toward each other on a single-lane road. The road is so narrow that if one does not pull over onto the dirt shoulder, both will collide and be destroyed. This example is a familiar one in game theory, and almost everyone knows that the equilibrium prediction of this game is that both will pull over out of fear of collision, and practically no one will claim the road.

Now suppose one side breaks the symmetry. For example, the driver of the red car rips out the steering wheel and throws it out of the car, thereby signaling to the opponent that he cannot pull over even if he wanted to. Result: the opponent, muttering,

It is precisely for this reason that certain minority groups deliberately try to create the impression that the cost of non-compliance with their demands is very high. Resorting to threats and strong reactions, and uttering phrases such as “We will not remain silent”; “They themselves will bear the consequences of this”; “The people will take matters into their own hands”; all serve to create the impression that in the cost/benefit equation, the cost is very high, and thus to persuade the majority that acquiescing to this group’s demand is more rational.

But as soon as a more stubborn party confronts the stubborn party, the equation changes completely. Now that the threat has not been effective, it is practically the minority group that must formulate its own cost/benefit equation, and usually the rational solution is some form of compromise. In the party example, Mr. R must compare the utility of leaving the gathering with the utility of staying, and if he truly wishes to be at the party, it is not unlikely that he will settle for lowering his head and continuing his presence.

Another example: the threat that a football match must under no circumstances be held on a religious day. If FIFA, in this example, plays the role of the more stubborn party and refuses to change the match date, the initial stubborn party is forced to accept some kind of compromise—for instance, holding the match and, in return, performing the rituals during halftime.

In Defense of the Vanguard Minority

Now let us, following Taleb, rewrite the minority rule in a more interesting form:

An upright person never commits a wrongful act, but a wrongdoer participates in both wrongful and legitimate acts. —T

In the Quranic narrative of the sons of Adam, Cain first tries to push Abel aside through legitimate competition, making an offering to God. But when he cannot, he then resorts to violence. Abel, in contrast, will never resort to violence: “If you stretch out your hand to kill me, I will never stretch out my hand to kill you.” The result of this asymmetry was Abel’s death.

It is for this reason that Taleb believes that in the face of Salafi fundamentalists who have immigrated to the West, Western society is confronted with a fundamental question:

Can a tolerant society, in dealing with intolerant enemies, trample upon its tolerant values and act intolerantly? —T

Taleb’s answer is yes. Tolerance toward an intolerant enemy is like showing mercy to a wolf, and he concludes that the course America and Europe are currently taking toward Salafi fundamentalist immigrants resembles suicide. Because Salafi fundamentalists fundamentally do not accept the host society and are its enemies. These guests, as an intolerant minority, have the capacity to impose their own norms on society in the long run.

Taleb has a very interesting discussion about how certain moral laws have become widespread and universal. He argues that all universal moral laws possess a kind of asymmetry: “Theft, under any circumstances, is an ugly act” or “No one should ever be tortured under any circumstances.” In Taleb’s view, the reason these laws have become widespread over time is not that the majority agreed with these propositions (there may well be those who believe torture and theft are legitimate under certain conditions). The reason is that the “never” and “under no circumstances” have made these laws asymmetric. If such an approach did not exist regarding torture, the repugnance of torture might well have diminished, and the situation would be far worse than what currently prevails in the world.

From this discussion, a good conclusion can be drawn. The rule of the intolerant minority does not necessarily lead to adverse outcomes. On the contrary, this rule can sometimes move society in the right direction.

Based on the rule of the intolerant minority, to advance a society, it is not necessary for the majority of that society to be progressive; the mere presence of an elite minority that stubbornly insists on the correct position is sufficient to move society toward the desired state. This is an important conclusion with many subtle and significant implications.

Footnote: The examples in the text are used solely within the limited scope of the example. The examples should not be generalized to broader domains without sufficient evidence.

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The Intolerant Minority Rule in Social Systems

Author: Mehdi H

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