The What and Why of Existential Philosophy and Psychology: A Conversation Between Hedayat Alavitabar and Mohammad Reza Sargolzaei

The What and Why of Existential Philosophy and Psychology

A Conversation Between Hedayat Alavitabar and Mohammad Reza Sargolzaei

Published in Sepideh Danayi Monthly — Issues 125 & 126 — February & March 2019

Sepideh Danayi: For some time now, a topic called existential philosophy and psychology has been raised in Iran's academic sphere. On this occasion, we had the opportunity to hold a roundtable on the what and why of existential philosophy and psychology with the presence of Dr. Hedayat Alavitabar (Professor in the Philosophy Department at Allameh Tabataba'i University) and Dr. Mohammad Reza Sargolzaei (Psychiatrist and faculty member at Mashhad University of Medical Sciences). These two esteemed thinkers, who have been researching and studying in the field of existential philosophy and psychology for many years, express concerns in this roundtable that have probably not been raised in the Iranian media space until now. Concerns such as Iranian society's flight towards philosophical and existential discussions, which is one of the important reasons for the reading public's intense interest in the works of authors like Irvin Yalom.

* Dr. Alavitabar, before delving into existential philosophy and existential psychology, could you explain what the word "existential" means?

Dr. Alavitabar: "Existential" in these terms is the translation of the word existential. The word existence is derived from the Latin root existere (to come into being). This word is formed from the prefix ex (out) and sistere (to stand) and overall means "to stand out," that is, to stand out from nothingness. This is why, in its general sense, it means existence as opposed to non-existence. However, Kierkegaard, who is the father of existential philosophy or modern existentialism, used this word to mean the specific existence of the human being, and the existentialist philosophers of the twentieth century followed him in this regard. Heidegger sometimes writes this word as ex-sistence to better clarify its etymological meaning. To illuminate the difference between the human being and other beings, he says in a famous phrase: "The being that has existence is the human being. Only the human being has existence. Stones are, but they do not have existence. Trees are, but they do not have existence. Horses are, but they do not have existence. Angels are, but they do not have existence. God is, but He does not have existence." The human being is a separate, distinct entity. The human being is the only being that can stand outside of itself. It can go beyond itself and, by leaping toward future possibilities, move from what it is to what it ought to become. Thus, the precise translation of existentialism into Persian is "the primacy of human existence," which shows the central position of the human being in this school. Of course, existentialist philosophers have sometimes, for various reasons, used other terms in their philosophy instead of the human being, for example, Dasein (Heidegger) and being-for-itself (Sartre).

The focus on the human being and its problems has meant that the philosophers of this school have little interest in discussing nature, and if they do discuss it briefly, it is from the perspective of nature's relationship with the human being. Thus, when the term "existential philosophy" is used in the following discussion, one should bear in mind what is meant by "existential."

* In philosophies older than existential philosophies, the human being was also discussed. So, the discussion of the human being and its problems is not new and is not exclusive to existential philosophy.

Dr. Alavitabar: As I mentioned, Kierkegaard, the nineteenth-century thinker, is considered the father of modern existentialism. For although his thought founded a school that came to be called existentialism in the twentieth century, the themes and issues raised in this school have a prior history. In truth, existentialism has roots as old as human existence itself, and what is discussed in this school is connected to the permanent condition of human existence. Therefore, one can say that existentialism underwent an embryonic development throughout history and came into being in the contemporary era. If we go back to the period when humans thought mythically and expressed the truths of their lives symbolically, we see that their minds were engaged with issues that are today central themes of existentialism. They questioned their own existence and the mystery of being, and strove to know themselves as free and finite beings and to find an answer to the contradictions within their existence. If we look at the ancient philosophers, we can observe in Socrates a turning point in the formation of existentialist thought, because in his philosophy attention shifted from nature to the human being.

With the advent of Christianity, a new understanding of the human being was presented, expressed in the New Testament, in the teachings of Jesus and Saint Paul. In this period, we also encounter Gnosticism, which emphasizes the loneliness and lostness of the human being in a vast and alien world. In the period of the Church Fathers, we come to Saint Augustine, who is one of the most important figures in the genealogy of existentialism. He considered the human being a profound entity and an endless mystery, and emphasized human restlessness and the desire to transcend oneself. In the medieval period, the roots of existentialism must be sought not in rationalist Scholastic thought but in its opposite, namely the mystical thought of figures like Meister Eckhart. In the period of the Reformation, we encounter Luther. In his view, faith does not mean accepting a few religious beliefs but is a personal relationship between the human being and God. The Renaissance witnessed the emergence of humanists like Erasmus, who emphasized human freedom and responsibility. Pascal, who is regarded as one of the most important roots of existentialism, lived in the seventeenth century, that is, after the Copernican revolution in astronomy. In his view, the assurance humans felt at being at the center of the universe gave way to the terror of confronting the silence of infinite spaces. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Schelling, in his lectures at the University of Berlin, put forward "positive philosophy," which deals with concrete existence. One of the participants in these lectures was Kierkegaard.

In short, existentialist themes have a long history, but because they were raised sporadically and in a scattered manner, they did not coalesce into a school. However, in the twentieth century, great thinkers, influenced by Kierkegaard, addressed these themes in a single era and formed the school of existentialism or the philosophy of existence.

* What necessity was there for the formation of this school, and what new plan did the thinkers of this school devise that predecessors like Plato and Aristotle overlooked?

Dr. Alavitabar: Existential philosophy was a reaction to traditional philosophy. In the view of existential philosophers, one of the flaws of traditional philosophy is that in it, the knowing subject is placed on one side and the object of knowledge on the other, thus creating an unbridgeable separation and gap between them. In this state, subject and object exist outside of and in opposition to each other. Traditional philosophers believed this gap was necessary for knowledge of the external world to be possible, and that the subject, in order to attain more objective knowledge, must separate itself as much as possible from the object. But existential philosophers remove this gap and declare that there is a close and fundamental connection between the human being and the world, such that the two are inseparable. Existential philosophers consider being-in-the-world to be fundamental, just as being-with-others is fundamental for them. They replace Descartes' "I am" with "I-am-with-others-in-the-world."

One of the consequences of rejecting the separation between subject and object is a distrust of rational, theoretical, and abstract knowledge. Traditional philosophers have tried to free themselves from the changing and transient world, and by sitting in an ivory tower and using only their reason, to explain the world and definitively solve its problems, oblivious to the fact that philosophical truth cannot be known through theoretical reason but must be lived in practice. Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel's philosophy was that one cannot live with this philosophy. Existential philosophers reject abstract thinking because this type of thinking deals only with general concepts and not with particular instances. The concrete thinking that existential philosophy advocates, when discussing the human being, does not consider them as a general type but pays attention to the particular, individual human beings who live in the world and are engaged with issues and problems. Existential philosophers criticize traditional metaphysics because, although metaphysics discusses existence, this existence is abstract, and, as a result, metaphysics remains in the realm of concepts and does not enter the arena of concrete existence.

Since in traditional philosophy there is a distinction between subject and object and knowledge is obtained through rational and abstract thinking, traditional philosophers view feelings, emotions, desires, and experiences as nuisances that can, through their interference, disrupt rational knowledge. Therefore, they emphasize that to achieve objective knowledge, one must completely separate oneself from these matters to be safe from their destructive influence. Traditional philosophy considers the discussion of feelings and emotions to be the domain of psychology, not philosophy, which deals with reason. But existential philosophy, as I said, begins with being-in-the-world and being-with-others as fundamental matters. The human being is in a fundamental interaction with the world and other human beings, and for this reason, is not merely a thinking entity but, alongside reason, also possesses feeling, will, and desire, and engages in action. It is the sum of these that constitutes the human being.

Existentialism is a philosophy that considers all aspects of human existence and assigns a role to all of them. This philosophy, unlike traditional philosophy, does not believe that philosophical truth can only be reached through reason, but believes that feelings can also reveal the truth of existence in general, and the specific existence of the human being, provided these feelings are intense and exceptional and operate in conjunction with reason. A human being does not think only with their brain but, in addition, thinks with their flesh and blood. In the words of Unamuno, "The philosopher philosophizes not only with reason but with the will, feelings, flesh, and bones—that is, with the whole soul and the whole body." A human being does not understand truth by separating themselves from the world and thinking abstractly about it, but experiences truth by living in the world. To reach the truth, they must participate in the world and with others, not explain the world and others from the outside. The discussion of human feelings and emotions has caused existential philosophy to somewhat resemble psychology. In fact, it can be said that many existentialist topics are the same psychological topics that have been discussed using a philosophical method.

* Dr. Sargolzaei, it seems from what Dr. Alavitabar said that the reason for the emergence of existential philosophy among other philosophical schools is that the subject of other schools was the human being's relationship with God, nature, etc., and existential philosophy deals only with the human being. But in psychology, whose subject is specifically the human being, why did existential psychology emerge?

Dr. Sargolzaei: I must also state some preliminaries. Of course, since parts of the preliminaries are philosophical and I am an amateur in philosophy and may say things incorrectly, Dr. Alavitabar has proxy authority on my behalf to edit the philosophical part of my discussion.

I think it can be said that existential psychology began with psychoanalysis; that is, many of those we traditionally consider psychoanalysts were, in a sense, existential psychologists. For example, Erich Fromm, in his book To Have or to Be?, raises the existential question and discusses how people encounter problems in two modes: at times they are troubled by “having,” and at other times by the problem of “being.” A person may have lost their love or failed to get into university; these are problems people encounter in the domain of having. But the next problem is being; that is, apart from my academic degree, job, social status, and the relationships I have and the things I become part of, there are a number of other things that engage me. So when Erich Fromm speaks of having or being, he is in fact raising an existential issue, even though we know him as a psychoanalyst and philosopher. Or when Carl Gustav Jung, in defining neurosis, says: “Neurosis is wanting to solve a collective problem individually,” he raises an existential issue; that is, the struggle with meaning, freedom and choice, death, and existential loneliness. So Jung’s point is that a neurotic is someone who wants to solve an existential problem alone; that is, they do not realize that we are alone because we stand before a silent universe that does not answer us. The neurotic thinks that if they feel lonely, it is because someone has left them, and they can free themselves from the deep feeling of existential loneliness by struggling alone within an emotional relationship.

It can be said that psychoanalysts who were predominantly German-speaking (Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Viktor Frankl, Carl Gustav Jung) were largely influenced by those same German phenomenological philosophers like Edmund Husserl and Karl Jaspers, who also held an existentialist view. But for historical and traditional reasons, we mainly know them as psychoanalysts; however, they were the initiators of existential psychology, and, as it happens, their methodology was very similar to that of the existential philosophers, and their methodology was phenomenology.

In Jung’s books, you see that he largely theorizes based on reflections about himself and his experiences. A major part of Jung’s theorizing is like this: he reviews personal memories, dreams, and fantasies, or examines the trace (impression) a client has left on him, and theorizes in this way. Even Freud, who tried very hard to speak scientifically and on the basis of biology, you see that a large part of his work is the interpretation of his own dreams in the book The Interpretation of Dreams. Consequently, it essentially seems that psychoanalysts were that group in psychology whose method was not at all scientific, unlike experimental psychologists such as Wilhelm Wundt, who, contemporaneously with them, founded the first experimental psychology laboratory in Leipzig.

Beyond this historical discussion, in existential psychology, following this discussion of having or being, it is as if we humans have a dimension that is our Daily Life Mode (a term I have taken from Irvin Yalom's book The Gift of Therapy). For instance, the fact that I missed the metro or got stuck in traffic is part of the Daily Life Mode. We also have another dimension called the Ontological Mode, which is our ontological realm and attention. The fact that we have an ontological realm leads existential psychologists to conclude that many of our concerns in the Daily Life Mode are an escape from a fundamental concern called the concerns of the Ontological Mode; therefore, if I consider my fundamental issue to be with death and loneliness and am aware of the precipice I stand upon, many of these potholes of daily life may seem entirely negligible to me. With this view, various currents have emerged in psychology that help people place themselves in the Ontological Mode and, instead of being concerned in the position of "having," place themselves in the position of "being." Some of these have strayed very far from experimental psychology; that is, a kind of new religion has been created, a religion according to which each of us has a transcendental mission given to us before birth, and if we reach the Ontological Mode and find that mission and look at our path in this life and its choices from that position—this is where the current called Transpersonal Psychology, or the fourth wave of psychology, is said to have originated, so that people, through exercises, approaches, and rituals, place themselves in that Ontological Mode and look at life from there. This is, of course, entirely open to criticism; that is, if you look at it from the perspective of scientific psychology, you see that none of these theorizings are data-driven; that is, conclusions that have no testability or falsifiability, so they are not much different from storytelling, and from this perspective, existential psychology completely separates itself from scientific and experimental psychology, the fruit of which is cognitive-behavioral psychology.

* So you mean that existential psychology is not bound by the methodology of the science of psychology.

Dr. Sargolzaei: Yes, exactly. In fact, it does not bind itself to scientific methodology at all. For example, Irvin Yalom readily calls into question all the articles concerning the data-driven nature of cognitive-behavioral therapies. Of course, criticisms have been leveled at Popperian scientific methodology, but it seems that Yalom's critique is based more on his personal choice than on the philosophy of science, as if he is saying I have chosen to step outside this school and therefore I set it aside, and instead of all the frameworks and techniques of cognitive-behavioral therapy, I base therapy on a vague foundation called "authenticity"!

One of the criticisms leveled at this discourse is whether we humans truly possess such an authenticity within our being, or whether this too is one of our possessions and not a form of being. Does an authenticity truly exist, independent of physical-emotional symptoms, culture, language, and socio-professional relations, upon which we can rely in therapy? How is the existence of such an authenticity, independent of symptoms, proven?

Another interpretation in psychology derived from existential philosophy is based on Jean-Paul Sartre's famous phrase that in humans, existence precedes essence, unlike other beings whose essence precedes their existence. Perhaps in existential psychology, a willful interpretation has been made of this philosophical statement, that the human being is a completely free creature and can choose what to be. Consequently, any person with any kind of neurosis who visits an existential psychologist with this view has their fundamental problem interpreted as an escape from freedom. That they are a free being who does not want to accept the burden of responsibility for freedom, and therefore says my father or mother behaved this way, and my society and my genes were such that I became ill! The existential psychologist's response is: No! Your fundamental problem, that is, the definition of neurosis, is the flight from freedom and dodging the burden of responsibility that freedom has placed on your shoulders as a human being.

Here, existential psychology seems to take a stance against Freudian and behaviorist determinism. For example, Freud considered a large part of our drives to be a phylogenetic endowment. That is, as Freud says, monkeys become sexually mature between the ages of 3 and 5; consequently, although we humans differ from other monkeys in the age of sexual puberty, our brains, under the influence of this "phylogenetic endowment," become sexually mature between the ages of 3 and 5. Therefore, at these ages, we pay attention to the genital organs, and there is no way to prevent it.

Similarly, the discussion of archetypes that Jung raises is an anthropological one, meaning it pertains to the human species and is unrelated to a specific environment or culture. These are the biological determinisms that the first generation of psychoanalysts (most of whom were physicians) proposed.

The second generation of psychoanalysts, whether the Neo-Freudians like Harry Stack Sullivan, or the British psychoanalysts, or the psychoanalysts of the Tavistock school like Melanie Klein, Edith Jacobson, and John Bowlby, proposed family-related determinisms, suggesting that the impact of the first one or two years of a child's life whose mother did not mother well (Maternal Fault), or the insecure and unstable objects present in the child's life, lasts until the end of life. Well, this is a determinism that says if you have a problem now, part of it stems from genes and part from the family system. In social determinism, which social and behavioral psychology emphasizes, we do not grow up independent of culture and social mechanisms, and even our beliefs do not escape the linguistic-cultural framework. Here, existential psychologists, based on the idea that a person's essence is posterior to their existence, again propose human choice and freedom, which is often somewhat extreme and exaggerated. The idea that every person who complains about anything is themselves responsible for choosing this situation is also open to criticism; that is, it can be criticized both with genetic findings and with the findings of cultural psychology. Even in a discussion like will, genes are determinative, and there are objective findings for this. Furthermore, any kind of thinking we have cannot be abstracted from language. At least one socio-cultural factor without which thought is impossible is language. Not to mention political and economic determinisms, class-related determinisms, etc., when you consider all of them, you see that this discourse of "you choose what you become" sometimes turns into a slogan. These are the subjects and presuppositions of existential psychology, and there are also criticisms of it.

Dr. Alavitabar: There were two points in Dr. Sargolzaei's remarks that I would like to elaborate on. The first point is that he referred to the distinction Erich Fromm made between having and being. In existential philosophy, we hear this distinction from Gabriel Marcel, and perhaps Fromm took it from him. In his book Being and Having, Marcel distinguishes between two fundamental modes of relating to the world: relating through being and relating through having. Humans usually tend to identify themselves with their possessions, but this tendency stems from their ignorance of their own existence and being. Marcel considers being separate from having. In his view, these two modes of human connection to the world, which are irreducible to one another, are essential for human life. Danger threatens a person when they place excessive importance on the aspect of having and, conversely, attach little importance to the aspect of being, and, as a result, sacrifice being for having.

Interestingly, another existential philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, holds a completely different view on this matter. For Sartre, “the totality of my possessions reflects the totality of my being. I am what I have.” Just as having is meaningless without being, being is also meaningless without having. The things that belong to an individual constitute a part of their existence. Let me explain Sartre’s view with an example. You have surely heard that lovers often say to each other, “I do not want you for your possessions, but for yourself.” Now suppose a woman has fallen in love with a man, or vice versa. Then one of the parties gradually loses their possessions, such as beauty, wealth, power, fame, morality, spirituality, faith, and so on. If at this point the other party says, “Although you have lost all these, I still love you for yourself,” they have spoken incorrectly, because as possessions weaken, the self also weakens. The lover loves the beloved for one or more qualities, and as these qualities, which are the beloved’s possessions, diminish, love also diminishes. Therefore, the collection of possessions constitutes the self, and when all possessions are destroyed, no self remains.

* But it seems that when we use terms like “my body” or “my thoughts” in our speech, we are referring to an “I” that is something other than thoughts and body.

Dr. Alavitabar: These are additions of a part to the whole. I say “my body” because this body is a part of me. I say “my morality” because morality is a part of me. When you add up all these adjuncts, you get the self. This is a disagreement between Sartre and Marcel. I should point out here that there is a great deal of disagreement among existential philosophers. They have reached different conclusions in many areas. For example, while Kierkegaard emphasizes solitude and Sartre considers other people to be hell, Marcel and Jaspers emphasize the authentic relationship between human beings. Also, while Marcel and Heidegger have explicitly spoken of the mystery of being, Sartre considers being devoid of any mystery. These disagreements are partly because existentialists believe that reality cannot be placed within a coherent system. Hence, their philosophy lacks the mold and framework we see in other philosophical schools. For this reason, some believe that existentialism, or existential philosophy, cannot be considered a philosophical school but should be seen as a movement or current of thought whose affiliated thinkers have influenced one another. In any case, what places these thinkers under the umbrella of a school is not shared conclusions but a shared method and shared subjects.

The second point is Dr. Sargolzaei’s reference to Sartre’s dictum, namely the precedence of existence over essence in the human being. This statement demonstrates human freedom. Sartre is the philosopher of freedom and has emphasized freedom more than any other existential philosopher. It is for this reason that he opposes Freudian psychoanalysis. In his psychoanalysis of his patients, Freud confined himself solely to their past and did not take into account their plans and projects for the future. Sartre does not accept Freud’s emphasis on the role of the individual’s past in their future actions and rejects his hypothesis of the “unconscious mind” along with its “psychological determinism.” Instead, he introduces the concept of the “project” and states: “Man is nothing other than his own project.” The human being as a project means that he always wants to be ahead of himself. He wants to leap toward the future. The human being is what he projects, and nothing else exists prior to this project. He has no predetermined destiny. Human destiny does not precede his existence but is subsequent to it. His destiny is in his own hands and depends on which project he chooses. By introducing the theme of “the human being as a project,” Sartre seeks to emphasize the role of the human being’s future goals in giving direction to his present actions. The future plays the same role in Sartre’s thought that the past plays in Freud’s, and this demonstrates Sartre’s emphasis on human freedom. In his view, future possibilities are open to the human being, and he must decide for his future alone. In opposition to Freudian psychoanalysis, Sartre proposed his own specific psychoanalysis, namely “existential psychoanalysis,” in which the concept of choice is emphasized. Sartre insisted that every individual can be understood as a unity of the totality of their choices.

* What have been the implications of existential philosophy’s engagement with feelings and emotions?

Dr. Alavitabar: One of its implications has been the importance given to the role of the body. It must be noted that participation in the world and with others is made possible through the body. We live in the world with our bodies and relate to other human beings. Without a body, we would have no presence in the world and would be deprived of the feelings and emotions we spoke of. Therefore, the discussion of experiences and feelings leads us to the discussion of the body. In the view of existential philosophers, one of the flaws of traditional philosophy has been its neglect of the body. The root of this neglect was that philosophers distinguished between the soul and the body, considered the true self or the real human being to be the soul, and regarded the body as something appended to it; consequently, they encountered insoluble problems regarding the relationship between the soul and the body. Two things that are completely separate and have no affinity with one another cannot form a unity. This problem is resolved in existential philosophy by starting from being-in-the-world, in which case the human being is from the outset a psychosomatic unity, and the body is not an appendage but a constitutive component of the human being. In everyday conversation, a person does not say “my body is thirsty” but rather “I am thirsty.” In Marcel’s expression, “I am my body.” In this way, the body takes on a fundamental role. It is only through the existence of the body that the human being can affect objects and persons and be affected by them.

Of course, not all existential philosophers have addressed the subject of the body to the same extent. Kierkegaard, with his ascetic tendencies, was suspicious of the body, and Heidegger also did not speak much of it. But, in contrast, Marcel, Sartre, de Beauvoir, and Merleau-Ponty have spoken of the body in detail. Due to its emphasis on emotions, feelings, the body, and the concrete affairs of human life in general, existential philosophy has found an affinity with literature. For this reason, some of the great figures of this school, such as Sartre, Marcel, and Camus, have expressed their views not only in philosophical works but also in literary works, and in this way, they have brought existential philosophy to the people, allowing those who are not inclined toward philosophy to become acquainted with this school by reading existentialist plays or novels.

From the perspective of existential philosophy, every kind of knowledge is more or less rooted in personal experiences, feelings, and states, and cannot completely separate itself from them. This is why there is a great resemblance between what existential philosophers have experienced in their own lives and what they have said in their philosophies. As examples, one can point to the story of Kierkegaard's engagement and its influence on the important role of choice in his philosophy, or the three stages he himself passed through in life and which were later reflected in his philosophy as the three stages on life's way; the torment Marcel suffered from loneliness in childhood, which later caused human relationships to play an important role in his philosophy; and Sartre's experience of the meaninglessness of life and the place of nausea in his philosophy.

Dr. Sargolzaei: First, Dr. Alavitabar made a very good point that in existential philosophy, compared to abstract philosophy and metaphysics, the issue of the body is very important. Therefore, I now want to address the topic that if the body becomes this important, why shouldn't we think that even when we prescribe medication for the body, we are influencing the individual's view of their own experience and their phenomenology? It is true that we do not have a prescription for existential anxiety that we can say is for treating existential anxiety, but doesn't the brain, as an experiencing and perceiving apparatus, have a purer experience of existential issues and a more authentic and existential experience when its psychological anxieties are reduced? Thus, one can address the fact that when you prescribe medication for a person, you are still engaging in a kind of indirect existential intervention.

Second, you pointed out that science is criticized because, for example, when it says water boils at 100 degrees Celsius at sea-level air pressure, we rarely find such water in the world; but this very proposition allows us, when we want to build a water heater, to think that whether our water is salty or fresh, it will eventually boil at around 100 degrees. So we install a thermostat that cuts off the heat when the water temperature exceeds 90 degrees so that our water heater tank does not explode. It is the same with human matters. It is true that every human being is different, but social psychology, which is an empirical science, shows that when people repeatedly see a person's face in the media, they are more likely to vote for them, even if that person is not qualified. Therefore, social psychology helps us in the same way physics does. Physics says if you are building a water heater, install a thermostat so the water temperature does not exceed 90 degrees. Social psychology says if you are going to hold elections, from a year before, you must not discriminate in showing the faces of those who are candidates on national media. Thus, science helps us make our lives more predictable, safer, and even more ethical. Although its rules are full of individual exceptions, at the macro level, the rule prevails over the exception. In this sense, it seems that the macro achievements of science, with all its reductionism, quantification, objectivism, and pursuit of averages instead of individual instances, have more achievements for human life than abandoning science and replacing the scientific perspective with another institution, discourse, or viewpoint.

Dr. Alavitabar: The emphasis of existential philosophers on the inseparability of subject and object and the human being's a priori being-in-the-world has led them to criticize science. Of course, they do not accept that a complete separation between subject and object exists in the realm of science, because if we assume that humans have a fundamental connection with the world and therefore have practical interests, we must conclude that they cannot completely detach themselves from these interests and become mere spectators. Hence, no science is value-free. Nevertheless, existential philosophers accept that the interests of the scientist differ from the practical interests of humans in everyday life, and therefore, in the realm of science, there is a degree of separation between subject and object, and for this reason, this realm is more objective and impersonal.

Another criticism that some existential philosophers, such as Jaspers, level against science is that science cannot provide a comprehensive view of the world because each science has its own specific axioms and is entirely based upon them, and since different sciences have different axioms, each science is fundamentally different from the others. Therefore, each science offers us only a partial view of the world, and there is no absolute science. On the other hand, even if we place all the sciences side by side, we still do not arrive at a comprehensive view of the world because certain domains remain outside the scientific perspective.

Existential philosophers have criticized science from another angle as well. In existential philosophy, the individuality of the human being is emphasized. The human being is not a part of a whole and, consequently, subject to it, nor can they be considered a member of a genus or species. If we regard all human beings as instances of the specific essence of humanity, they will all possess a single essence and lose their individuality. The human being is a unique and singular entity, to the extent that one could say each individual human is a species unto themselves. In the sciences, we can set aside one stone and test another, or replace one animal with another, but this is not possible with a human being because they are irreplaceable. Of course, in some sciences such as psychology or sociology, the human being is studied statistically, that is, as an individual of a type, but this comes at the cost of losing their individuality. The scientific approach considers the human being a thing, not a person. Therefore, it is simplistic to regard scientific progress as genuine human progress. Berdyaev says in this regard: "The whole of modern history, with its rationalism, positivism, and faith in science, has been a period of night, not of day."

It should be noted that what existential philosophers criticize is not science itself, but pure scientism, according to which only scientific knowledge possesses objectivity and no other form of knowledge is valid. They accept the scientific perspective in its proper place but do not consider it the sole perspective or even the fundamental one. Science has limitations that must be acknowledged. The scientific method is ineffective where the subject of inquiry is being or the human being. This approach cannot reveal the truth of being or the human being.

* In existential psychology and existential philosophy, what concepts are most addressed, and what differences exist in their concepts, such as the present state and anxiety?

Dr. Sargolzaei: Traditionally, existential psychology now primarily addresses four fundamental themes, which are in fact existential themes and are not related to what individuals possess but rather to the condition of being human. One is the issue of death, from which no human being can escape. One is the issue of loneliness; in the domain of loneliness, we define three types of loneliness: intrapersonal loneliness; interpersonal loneliness; and finally, existential loneliness.

Intrapersonal loneliness is not an existential issue. A person with schizophrenia has a private, imaginary mental world (an autistic world) that they themselves have created. The intrapersonal loneliness of this schizophrenic patient is not something that concerns existential psychologists. Interpersonal loneliness means that a person remains alone because they lack the necessary skills to connect with others. This, too, is not an issue for existential psychology. It is something that cognitive-behavioral psychologists address, and it is supposed to be resolved through skills training or changing beliefs. But existential loneliness means that a person is among others and their relationships with others are of good quality, yet they still feel lonely. In fact, their loneliness is neither intrapersonal nor interpersonal; Viktor Frankl calls this spiritual loneliness. This loneliness is actually due to the fact that in the world, before oneself, a person cannot find an interlocutor with whom to dialogue and finds the world silent and Absurd, so that whatever they say to it, they only hear the echo of their own words. Consequently, if this human being deeply enters their human condition, or their very "existence," no matter how high-quality their relationships with others are, they can never escape this loneliness. They see everything from the atom to the galaxy and are curious about them, but they receive no answer to their questions.

The third existential issue is freedom and choice. The fourth issue is meaning, what meaning we assume for the world. If someone has a problem in these areas, the existential psychologist addresses them. There is a challenge here as well; just as a person may flee from existential issues to everyday problems—that is, instead of confronting the fear of death and the meaninglessness of life, they flee to why my spouse doesn't understand me or why I can't find a suitable job—the opposite also exists, meaning a person may flee from their social and relational inadequacies to existential issues. There are many people who underperform, do not challenge themselves, have low social commitment, but when they go to a counseling session, they start raising existential questions, that is, they turn the counseling session into a philosophical discussion about existential issues. Whereas, when we look closely, this person's problem is not existential, but they have learned that when they talk about these things, they are taken more seriously than if they say, "I can't solve my problem with my mother."

*: For example, what kind of issues do they raise?

Dr. Sargolzaei: For example, they ask their therapist, "Have you found the meaning of life or not? Why should I go to work when I don't even know why I exist?!" That is, they take refuge in existential issues to avoid addressing the fact that at the age of 37, they take money from their mother and are still dissatisfied and demanding, wanting more. When we are in the realm of theorizing, our task is clear, but when we enter the clinical space, then a person may take refuge in relational and interpersonal issues to escape their existential problems, or conversely, flee from interpersonal issues to existential ones, and this is a challenge the psychotherapist must be mindful of. If a psychotherapist introduces themselves as an existential psychologist, they very easily fall into the trap of a client who shifts the discussion from the point of their personal growth problem to the human domain, so that the ball ends up in someone else's court.

Dr. Alavitabar: The fundamental difference between philosophical (existential) states and psychological states is that psychological states have a specific causative factor. To explain the matter, I draw on the distinction Heidegger made in this regard. To clarify this difference, he distinguishes between two terms: one is Befindlichkeit (state of mind) and the other is Stimmung (mood). The first term is derived from the infinitive befinden, meaning "to find," and for this reason, it is sometimes translated into English as "findedness" and into Persian as "یافتگی" (yaftegi). The first point to note about state or findedness is that it does not refer to a mental or psychological condition and, consequently, psychology cannot address it; rather, it has an existential aspect and must be discussed in ontology. But Stimmung is the very mental and psychological condition that psychology deals with.

A psychological or mental state arises from something external, that is, from a person's encounter with a particular thing in the world. For example, fear from seeing something or anger from hearing some news. These are mental states, and because they refer back to a being and not to Being, Heidegger considers them ontic (pertaining to beings), but he uses the philosophical mood in an ontological (pertaining to Being) sense. Philosophical moods have neither an external nor an internal cause; rather, they arise from the relationship between Dasein (the human being) and Being-in-the-world, and they reveal a mode of this kind of Being. For this reason, although animals have psychological states, they do not have existential moods. Anxiety, thrownness, depression, and boredom are moods of this kind. A person knows they are anxious or bored but cannot point to any specific thing as their cause. Because mental states are caused by a specific factor, they are posterior to that factor, but existential moods have a fundamental and constitutive aspect. They are the ground upon which the world becomes manifest to us. In other words, these moods color the affairs of the world. When we are in one mood, we see the world in a particular way, and when we are in another mood, we observe it in a different way. Existential moods befall the human being, and we find them within ourselves. We cannot create a mood within ourselves. On the other hand, we are always in this mood or another and cannot be without a mood. To Heidegger's discussion, one can add that philosophical and psychological moods, apart from their origin, differ in that psychological moods can be altered by prescribing medication, but such a possibility does not exist for philosophical moods.

One of the fundamental moods that Heidegger discussed in detail is anxiety (Angst/anxiety). In this discussion, he is influenced by Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard distinguished between fear and anxiety, saying that fear, whether real or imaginary, has a specific and definite object, such as fear of a snake or a ghost. But anxiety has no specific object. The anxious person does not know exactly the cause of their anxiety. Heidegger makes the same distinction between fear and anxiety and adds that it is not a specific thing in the world that makes me anxious, but the world itself that makes me anxious. Anxiety, like other existential moods, reveals my thrownness. My situation in this world as a thrown being causes my anxiety. For this reason, Heidegger considers fear to be an ontic matter because it arises from my relation to beings in the world, but anxiety is ontological because it relates to my Being in the world. There was a time when I was not, and from nothingness I was thrown into this world and Being, but now that I am, I am once again thrown from this Being toward nothingness and death. Therefore, I am situated between two nothingnesses and am thrown from one toward the other. Being situated between two nothingnesses shows my finitude and makes me anxious. Anxiety reveals my "Being-toward-death" and shows the complete annihilation that awaits me. Thus, nothingness lies on both sides of Being, and for this reason, it can be said that nothingness is the ground of all Being, and Being floats in nothingness. Anxiety reveals the nothingness and fundamental nullity of Dasein. Dasein is from nothingness, in nothingness, and toward nothingness, and anxiety shows this situation.

It should be noted that anxiety is not a sign of weakness or a psychological or mental problem; rather, as mentioned, it is an existential mood and, for this reason, is intrinsic to human nature. To be human means to be anxious. Since enduring anxiety is difficult for humans, they try to cover it up in various ways. In order not to feel anxiety, a person immerses themselves in everyday life and covers up anxiety by engaging in the preoccupations of the everyday world. They live as the conventions of society tell them to and, as a result, forgo actualizing their possibilities. Their notion is that if they live like an ordinary person, they have lived correctly; it is here that they become distant from their humanity and fall into inauthenticity.

There are few human beings who can tolerate anxiety. They courageously accept anxiety and do not cover it up. They are aware of the possibilities of their own existence and strive to actualize them. Awareness of these possibilities and accepting the responsibility of actualizing them is anxiety-provoking, but this anxiety is beneficial. A person who realizes the specific possibilities of their own existence is no longer subject to the conventions of society and does not become immersed in everyday existence. They do not act based on what others want from them but choose their own path. For this reason, anxiety brings about human individuation.

* Now, considering all that you have said, what are the differences between existential psychology and existential philosophy? From the perspective of psychiatry and psychology, please explain these differences.

Dr. Sargolzaei: In terms of theoretical frameworks, existential psychology has nothing more than existential philosophy. I think the only difference is that existential philosophers have expressed their views on their cognitive system much more transparently. That is why Dr. Alavitabar can very clearly state what the differences between Sartre, Heidegger, and Kierkegaard were; but because existential psychologists began working in the clinical field, it can be said that they have drawn from various schools of existential philosophy whenever they wanted, meaning they have drawn from different schools quite arbitrarily. Therefore, you see a lot of duality, contradiction, and inconsistency in the theories of existential psychologists. For example, Erich Fromm writes in the book "Escape from Freedom" that the most important choice and dilemma for a human being is the choice between freedom and security. A neurotic person chooses security over freedom, thus relinquishing their freedom, whereas a responsible person puts themselves at risk, forgoes their security in order to preserve their freedom; but in the same book "Escape from Freedom," Erich Fromm says, give me the genome or genetic blueprint of any animal, and I can tell you what it will become, but regarding a human being, apart from their genome, you must give me another sign for me to predict, and that is their era. The instincts of a medieval human being are different from those of a Renaissance human being. The instincts of a person in a capitalist society are different from those in a communist society. Now, while Erich Fromm is talking about how the most important choice of a responsible person is to choose freedom, he also says right there that if you give his genome and DNA and say in what era and society he lives, this human being becomes predictable; that is, you see on the one hand a human being is so predictable, and on the other hand so free, and this much predictability alongside freedom are incompatible.

For example, Irvin Yalom, through whose works most Iranians have become acquainted with existential psychology, in his numerous books, on the one hand, talks about freedom and the right to choose, but in the book "Momma and the Meaning of Life," regarding dreaming, he says that the dream-making dwarf exists in my brain every night and moves these neuronal cables around, and I dream. Even this metaphor shows how limited we are in terms of freedom and free will, and this is different from the freedom and free will given to the client in the therapy room. Therefore, I think the most important difference between existential philosophers and existential psychologists is this clarity and transparency in the cognitive system of an existential philosopher and this arbitrariness and eclecticism in the theories of existential psychologists.

* Dr. Alavitabar, now that we understand the differences between existential philosophy and existential psychology, please tell us what influence existential philosophy has had on existential psychology and psychiatry?

Dr. Alavitabar: Existential philosophy has led to the establishment of “existential psychology” and “existential psychiatry.” Before addressing this topic, I should mention that some existentialists, such as Jaspers and Sartre, were interested in psychology and dealt with this subject in their works. In their discussions in this field, they opposed the application of natural science methods in psychology. Jaspers initially worked as a psychiatrist and wrote his first major book, General Psychopathology, on this subject. In this book, he criticized conventional scientific psychology and the psychotherapy based on it. In his view, the positivist approach of conventional psychotherapy is misleadingly deterministic because, according to this approach, the outcome of the patient’s current life is an inevitable result. Jaspers believed that the human being possesses a true self that lies behind their empirical self and cannot be revealed through scientific and empirical investigation.

Binswanger and Laing are among the main representatives of existential psychiatry. In their view, the path that existentialism offers for understanding the human personality is better than the path of Freudian psychoanalysis. In his critique of Freudian psychoanalysis, Binswanger stated that the symptom of neurosis should be explained not in terms of the patient’s unconscious content but according to the state of their consciousness, and the fundamental concept in this explanation is not causality but meaning. He derived his understanding of the various possible states of consciousness directly from Heidegger and considered the contribution of existential philosophy to psychiatry to be the a priori analysis of all possible modes of “being-in-the-world.” He largely rejected the biological determinism of human behavior. Binswanger tended to emphasize, even at the biological level, the interpretation of behavior in terms of the meaning that behavior holds for the agent.

Laing, in his book The Divided Self, used Sartre’s philosophy to study schizophrenia. In Sartre’s philosophy, human beings, as subjects, strive to reduce one another to the status of objects. Laing drew on this explanation regarding patients whose identity has been lost due to the decisive actions of another person.

* To summarize the discussion, my question is: what capabilities do existential psychology and philosophy have in Iran, and what are the issues afflicting Iranian society based on these two separate disciplines?

Dr. Sargolzaei: I return to a point I made at the end of my previous remarks. Very often, when addressing a tangible problem is difficult and bothers us, we prefer to turn to a more abstract matter and talk about it. Iranian society is now fundamentally fleeing toward philosophical and existential discussions. The basic psychosocial problems of Iranian society are not among the existential problems of humanity. We Iranians are still confused about civic issues: my problem vis-à-vis my neighbor, my problem vis-à-vis the government, social, civic, and civil rights. All these areas are problematic, and we do not know what to do with them. Consequently, we prefer to flee toward an issue that is safe to talk about. Because if I want to talk about my problem vis-à-vis institutions of power, it is dangerous. If I talk about myself vis-à-vis my neighbor, it entails responsibility, and I must have the skill to raise the issue with my neighbor and negotiate with them—all of which incur costs. But when I talk about the problem of meaning, no one threatens me, I threaten no one, and no responsibility falls upon me. In my opinion, Iranian society, as an evasive, non-pragmatic society, flees from issues for which it must pay a cost toward existential topics. The more general and vague the theories are, and the fewer social responsibilities they create for us, the more we flee toward them. I think this is one of the reasons existential psychology has become fashionable today.

The second issue is that when a psychotherapist says in a therapy session that they are existential, they are in fact relying on vague words like authenticity and meaning, and can shirk accountability. Because when a psychologist says their approach is behavioral, they must teach techniques to their clients, monitor their clients, administer tests, and demonstrate whether their technique is effective or not. When a psychologist says they do cognitive work, they must assign homework, ask their client for the homework, review it, and correct it. But the existential psychologist—especially one who knows neither existential philosophy nor the history of existential psychology and has merely read Irvin Yalom's books, and on that basis says, "I am present here and now in the therapeutic relationship with the most authentic aspect of myself"—uses these vague and unmeasurable phrases and lightens their own burden of responsibility. And if anyone asks them, "Why did you embrace your patient?" they say, "My existential authenticity told me in that moment that this was the most authentic relationship with the other."

* So existential psychology has no methodology and no epistemological method?

Dr. Sargolzaei: Precisely so, it does not.

* Even in Yalom's view?

Dr. Sargolzaei: Yes. The interesting point in Yalom's view, and as it appears in his works, is that whenever he speaks with rigor and calculation, he uses psychoanalytic theories. In his books, you repeatedly see him taking dreams from clients, analyzing them, and breaking down their psychological defenses; that is, he uses the training from the period when he underwent psychoanalysis. He is a psychiatrist who, at the outset, like all psychiatrists, learned neurology and pharmacotherapy and prescribed medication for years. After that, he learned psychoanalysis and completed psychoanalytic training. When you read his books, you see that time and again he uses psychoanalytic frameworks for treatment, but by saying "I am an existential psychotherapist," he creates a private sanctuary for himself, so that if he wants to say something that has no support other than his own feeling, perception, and experience, he can say, "I am existential and I act on the basis of my own human authenticity." Therefore, the easiest thing for a novice and inexperienced psychologist is to claim, "I am an existential psychologist and I do Yalom-style work," and then be accountable to no one except their own existential authenticity! Thus, I see the fashionability of existential psychology in Iranian society as an evasion of one's entirely concrete civic responsibilities, and I see the fashionability of existential psychology as a shirking of the burden of framework, skill, and knowledge. Therefore, I do not see this development as an opportunity, growth, or advancement for Iranian society, but rather consider it a repetitive pattern of "speaking poetically and living roguishly."

Dr. Alavitabar: To see what role and influence existential philosophy can have in our society, we must return to the earlier discussion about the reason for the emergence of this school and its role in Western society. Existentialism, or existential philosophy, in opposition to traditional philosophy, by removing the distance between subject and object and giving importance to feelings and emotions, declared that we must consider the human being not as a mere observer and spectator, but as an agent and actor who lives in the world and acts within it. In life, the human being faces fundamental issues and problems, makes basic choices, and commits themselves through these choices. These issues and problems are not merely subjects to be looked at from the outside to satisfy one's curiosity; rather, they are of vital importance to the individual, who engages with them with their whole being. Therefore, the topics raised in existentialism are those that the human being deals with in practice and that constitute the main concerns of their life. For the existential philosopher, philosophizing is not a mental pastime. Through philosophizing, they seek to find an answer to the fundamental questions and problems of their own life, which is an instance of typical human life. The goal of the existential philosopher is not to think about the world and provide a theoretical explanation of it, but to live in it in a correct and authentic way. In traditional philosophy, the connection between philosophy and life is severed. This philosophy is only useful in the classroom and cannot be lived by. Existential philosophy is an applied philosophy and seeks to address the pains of contemporary humanity and find a remedy.

With this explanation, the application of existential philosophy in our country becomes clear. A student who sits in an "Existentialism" class, or someone who reads a book about this school, realizes that the topics discussed are objective and tangible, and that they deal with them every day. This signifies the descent of philosophy from the ivory tower and its entry into the fabric of society. Thus, the first step, moving beyond abstract subjects and addressing concrete ones, has been taken, and it can be said that the nature of the problem has been identified. What we must do is define the topics raised in this school—such as freedom, choice, responsibility, abandonment, anxiety, finitude, alienation, despair, boredom, loneliness, absurdity, hope, love, and fidelity—within the context of our own society. The youth of our country, whether we consider them a burnt generation or not, live in a turbulent country and grapple with problems that can be called "existential problems." What existential philosophy does, compared to some other philosophies, is that it at least engages with these problems, whether it can ultimately find a solution for them or not.