Varieties of Religious Morality: An Introduction to the Ethics of Shame, Hossein Dabbagh

The present article may be considered a supplement to Soroush's theory; in the sense that it attempts, alongside the three types of religiosity, to speak of three types of religious morality.

.

Varieties of Religious Morality: An Introduction to the Ethics of Shame

Dear friends,

let shame find a place within your hearts.

Homer

Abdolkarim Soroush, a representative of late religious intellectualism, in his article "Varieties of Religiosity"[1] has sought to shed light on the theory of varieties of religiosity; distinguishing three different types of religiosity and enumerating attributes and characteristics for each.[2] In brief, expediency-oriented religiosity, which itself comprises three varieties (vulgar expediency-oriented, worldly scholarly expediency-oriented, and otherworldly scholarly expediency-oriented), pertains to a group of people who always want religion for something (for example, revolution), whose defining characteristic is "ideological dogmatism," and who prioritize action over truth.

Knowledge-oriented religiosity, according to Soroush, however, includes those who are not on good terms with dogma; their distinguishing feature is "rational wonder," and they consider their task to be entirely one of reflection and contemplation. Finally, experience-oriented religiosity must be recognized by its "certainty." If we consider knowledge-oriented religiosity to be rational, experience-oriented religiosity can be called mystical-intuitive.

The present article may be considered a supplement to Soroush's theory; in the sense that it attempts, alongside the three types of religiosity, to speak of three types of religious morality.

It hardly needs emphasizing that there is no necessary concomitance between the type of religiosity and the religious morality described. In the sense that any kind of morality can be imagined for any kind of religiosity. What this article undertakes is to express the compatibility between the types of religiosity and religious morality, meaning that a type of religiosity with specific characteristics demands a specific morality that is compatible with it.

It seems that livelihood-oriented morality has greater affinity and proportion with utilitarian ethics, and knowledge-oriented morality, since it focuses on "reason," is compatible with a combination of Kantian-Rawlsian deontological theories, rule-consequentialism, and contractarianism. However, the main focus of this writing is also to propose a new ethical theory that can be referred to as the theory of the "ethics of shame." In this theory, the component of "shame" becomes associated with the component of love and is used as a criterion for understanding right and wrong. In what follows, each of the varieties of religiosity, along with its corresponding morality, will be elaborated separately.[3]

1. Utility-Oriented Consequentialism as the Morality of Livelihood-Oriented Religiosity

Livelihood-oriented religiosity, which also takes the name of end-oriented religiosity, considers the result and consequences of a religious act to be important. According to Soroush's view, this type of religiosity can be succinctly described as "causal (non-rational), inherited, deterministic (derived not from choice and free will), emotional, dogmatic, ritualistic-ceremonial, ideological, identity-based, superficial, collective-liturgical, legalistic-jurisprudential, myth-laden, imitative, devotional, traditional, and habitual."[4] In the worldview of these religious people, an act is more religious if its result yields greater divine reward, and by the same measure and manner, an act is less religious if less reward is consequent upon it, and perhaps an anti-religious act warrants severe punishment. In the worldview of an expediency-oriented religious person, acts can even be made "calculable," and those that possess a greater quantity of reward must be performed. By this account, the entire attention of an expediency-oriented religious person can be summed up in two things: one, the consequence of the act, and the other, the utility of that act.

With these explanations, it seems that the ethics of this type of religiosity can be considered a consequentialist, utility-oriented ethics.[5] The normative theory of consequentialism in ethics, as its name suggests, focuses on the outcome to provide a criterion for performing an action. This means that to perform a moral action, one must consider the result of that action. Consequentialism itself comprises several types, the most famous of which is utilitarianism. A utility-oriented consequentialist is someone who, in performing actions, considers an action moral if it is, firstly, concerned with the outcome and, secondly, brings the greatest benefit to everyone. Another interpretation is that an action is moral if its result maximizes utility and pleasure for all and minimizes pain and suffering.

In the lower form of consequentialism[6], one can point to egoistic consequentialism, in which utility and pleasure are maximized for the individual themselves, and pain and suffering are minimized for the individual themselves. It seems that in expediency-oriented religiosity, both types of consequentialism (i.e., utility-oriented and egoistic) exist. Thus, sometimes expediency-oriented religious people, who keep the end and result of the action in view, seek reward for themselves, and sometimes for everyone. With all this, for expediency-oriented religious people, from reward and punishment to reckoning and accounting, everything is for the sake of the result; it is as if the religious person pays no attention to the action itself.

It is natural that in this type of religious ethics, the flavor of duty (as opposed to right) becomes very pronounced. The expediency-oriented religious individual considers it their duty to obtain the most reward for themselves (and in some cases for other people) according to the teachings learned from the sacred text, and of course, they do not question this duty or subject it to scrutiny. In truth, for an expediency-oriented religious individual, since ethics lacks independence and relies on religion, it holds a secondary status and is considered an ornamental matter.[7] A matter that is, incidentally, set aside by the knowledge-oriented religious individual, where ethics independently finds a position for itself and becomes, so to speak, secular. I will address this important point in the next section.

2. Reason-based Ethics (Kantian-Rawlsian Deontology, Rule-Utilitarianism, and Contractualism); The Ethics of Knowledge-Oriented Religiosity

If we consider expediency-oriented religiosity as the "thesis," in the Hegelian sense of the word, we can regard knowledge-oriented religiosity as a kind of "antithesis," and in the same vein, experience-oriented religiosity as the "synthesis." Knowledge-oriented religiosity, in Soroush's interpretation, is "reason-based (as opposed to cause-based), investigative, interpretive, voluntary-selective, perplexity-ridden, theological, non-mythological, without a clerical class, individualistic, critical, fluid, and non-imitative."[8] It is clearly evident that some components of knowledge-oriented and expediency-oriented religiosity stand in opposition to each other. As much as expediency-oriented religiosity insists on imitation and duty, knowledge-oriented religiosity emphasizes reflection, critique, and right. This means that, as its name suggests, knowledge-oriented religiosity seeks to reconcile human knowledge with religion, and for this reason, the requisites and concomitants of "knowledge," which is critique, also permeate religion.

The knowledge-oriented religious person is in a constant state of rebirth; he subjects his own states and thoughts to criticism; he questions their coherence; he abandons some and expands others. In short, he never ceases questioning and considers it his right to question the duty imposed upon him. This type of religiosity, in the language of epistemologists, is on good terms with moderate foundationalism[9]; meaning that foundationalism and coherentism are linked together; both the religious "foundation" is preserved and the "superstructure" of coherence and consonance of religious beliefs is the concern of the religious person. In a specific variety of this religiosity, one can also speak of instances where questioning uproots and burns all religious foundations from the ground up—and what fear is there in trembling over one's own faith, for this is the very secret of being turned upside down and safeguarding rationality. What appears important to the knowledge-oriented religious person, in the realm of knowledge, is the matter of reasoning; reason (intellect) is that before which he bows. Motives are set aside, and statements, not states, become the criterion for his judgment. The gist of the matter is that the knowledge-oriented religious person is a servant of reason. In the words of Avicenna: "Naḥnu abnāʾ al-dalīl, namīlu ḥaythu yamīl." [We are the children of reason, and we incline wherever it inclines.]

But the ethics of knowledge-oriented religiosity is of another kind. According to what has been said, it can be stated that in this type of religious ethics, the individual looks at the act itself and, apart from the effects and consequences of the act, contemplates the act itself in an epistemic manner. Moral duty is not the primary priority for the knowledge-oriented religious person. It seems that deontological ethics in all its forms and aspects (referring both to Kantian ethics and its refined version in the hands of David Ross) can be close to this type of religiosity. With this explanation that Kant (in the common reading), in his epistemology, places the emphasis on the self-founding critical reason and sets the courage to think as a model. In his moral epistemology, however, he becomes attached to a kind of monism in ethics and sees all moral principles as emanating from it.[10] David Ross, the ethical intuitionist philosopher, in his moral epistemology criticizes Kant and favors ethical pluralism.[11] In the sense that in ethics, we are faced with principles (and not a single principle) that sometimes come into conflict, and for this reason, to find the final moral duty or principle, one must resort to judgment that comes from reason.

When reason is brought into the discussion, it is natural that moral reason also becomes important. To find the moral duty, one must look at the reason offered in its favor. It should not be forgotten that in the realm of ethics, it is very difficult to speak of a final reason; from one situation to another, reasons sometimes fade and sometimes gain color. Essentially, the task of a committed moral agent is precisely this: to bind himself to reasoning and, wherever he sees greater solidity, to attach his heart to that reason.

It seems that with this account of deontology, that is, introducing the discussion of reason, the ethics of knowledge-oriented religiosity can be explained: the knowledge-oriented religious person is in pursuit of questioning, and for this reason, the concept of right is very prominent for him; in the sense that he considers it his right to subject matters to the blade of criticism by resorting to his self-founding reason and even to set aside some of the duties imposed upon him with new reasoning. He envisions moral duties for himself, but these duties are diverse. There is no fixed matter. In different situations, different moral principles can take on various forms. Which moral duty and principle should be chosen is the work of reason and reason-giving; and of course, reasons sometimes grapple with one another, and this is their nature. One must see which emerges victorious from the field of competition. The knowledge-oriented religious person, in his ethics, pays attention both to moral principles and to the reasons for accepting them. The fact that some principles appear in sacred texts, even if they are necessary for him, is not sufficient; for this reason, he makes his own reason and reasoning his measure. It is natural that sometimes these reasons accord with what is in the texts and sometimes oppose it. For this group of religious people, moral virtues are oriented toward "better and more error-free knowledge," and in contrast, moral vice is synonymous with "fraud, deceit, distortion, arrogance, pretentiousness, cunning, and... aversion to proof."[12]

In recent years, from 1990 onward, philosophers have given a new lease of life to reason-based ethics. These philosophers have tried, in their metaethical discussions, to refer to moral principles as reason-giving entities; that is, they have endeavored to defend “reason-based justification” against the discussion of “ought-based justification.” This series of discussions, which came to be called the “rediscovery of reasons,” was carried out by figures such as Scanlon, Parfit, Raz, Skorupski, Broome, and others. However, Scanlon and Parfit did not confine themselves to metaethical discussions and went on to propose normative theories. In 1998, in his book What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon defends a reason-based contractualist theory. After him, in 2011, in his book On What Matters, Parfit defends a combination of three types of normative theory: Kantian, rule-consequentialist, and Scanlonian reason-based contractualism. What is important for the present discussion is simply that all these reason-based normative theories are compatible and reconcilable with knowledge-oriented religiosity. What is difficult to reconcile with reason-based ethics is virtue-centered ethics. I will address this important point in the next section.[13]

3. The Ethics of Shame; An Ethics for Experience-Oriented Believers

Experience-oriented religiosity brings forth a loftier paradigm than the two previous types. It is mainly the elite who cherish this type of religiosity. Just as moral philosophers sketch a pyramid for the well-known ethical theories (consequentialism at the base of the pyramid, deontology in the middle, and virtue ethics at the apex), in the same manner, a pyramid can be drawn for religiosity as well (expediency-oriented at the base of the pyramid, knowledge-oriented in the middle, and experience-oriented at the apex). Even the religious varieties of ethics are no exception to this rule; that is, one can say that utilitarian consequentialist ethics lies at the base, Kantian-Rawlsian deontological ethics in the middle of the pyramid, and finally, the ethics of shame, whose description follows, at the apex. The components of this religiosity, as Soroush puts forth, can be considered “amorous, revelatory, experiential, certain, individual, compelling, essential, conciliatory, blissful, unitive, intuitive, sacred, mystical, and mysterious.”[14] In this type of religiosity, what holds the upper hand is the mystical perspective; meaning that the religious individual sees themselves before a transcendent and infinite entity that stands opposite them and addresses them. In the words of Rumi:

Do not say we have no access to that King;                                                          With the generous, matters are not difficult.

And again from him:

I see all Your beauty when I open my eyes,                                          I drink all Your wine when I raise my lips.

I deem it forbidden to speak with people,                                                          And when talk of You comes, I prolong the speech.

And from Hafez:

Show me the path to my private retreat, so that henceforth                                    I may drink wine with You and no longer suffer the world’s sorrow.

It is natural that in this constellation, the very concept of sin, right, and duty takes on a different form. If an individual commits a contrary act, they are not upset because a sin has occurred, nor do they regret having made a mistake. Rather, the individual becomes sorrowful and ashamed for having offended their “magnificent Beloved.” The religious individual’s relationship with their Beloved is a personal one, in which the consequence of the act and the act itself are not of primary importance. It is as if the individual stands at a height and bids farewell to both past paradigms (right and duty) and embraces their Beloved.[15] It is not without reason that, in expressing experience-oriented ethics, one can consider it an ethics of love.[16]

But this is not the whole story. What is the ethics of love, and what can be said in its articulation? In the experientialist ethics of religiosity, which is truly of a different kind, neither imitation nor ratiocination is at play. It is the station of lover and beloved. It is a matter above both matters, in the sense that the paradigm of right and duty is fundamentally removed and another concept emerges. This concept can be called "shame." The religious individual here finds themselves before an infinite matter that reinforces shame within them. The religious individual neither considers themselves duty-bound—for whatever they do is out of love for the Creator—nor considers themselves entitled to abstain from certain matters. For whatever they do is based on a shame-laden relationship between them and their God. If they err, they are not embarrassed at having committed a sin, but rather ashamed that they have not attained their beloved's satisfaction.[17] For this reason, the meanings of "shame" and "embarrassment" must be distinguished from one another.

Embarrassment is a psychological feeling that also entails physical effects (blushing and sweating) and sometimes arises due to a lack of self-confidence. But shame should be considered a combination of an existential feeling and an epistemic-cognitive matter. In the sense that, firstly, like many moral emotions, it causes a person's state to change. Furthermore, shame can also be considered a kind of epistemic ability (just as love can be) that enables a person to discern moral right and wrong. Shame also, as it were, splits a person's being in two. The individual can rise above themselves and look down upon themselves from above, and, in the parlance of modern psychoanalysts, engage in self-criticism. The ashamed individual constantly asks themselves: will this action cause me to become ashamed or not?[18] That is, shame can serve as a guide to action for the individual. I will elaborate on these points below to illuminate the reader's mind.

1.3. On the Station of Shame

The first thing that the term shame brings to mind is the meaning of embarrassment and bashfulness. It sometimes happens that we call individuals who do not possess relatively high self-confidence ashamed, and of course, in this meaning, an element of reproach is also implicitly present. But with a distinction, these two can be recognized from one another. The discussion of this difference can be traced in the works of Gilbert Ryle under the subject of mental states. In his book The Concept of Mind, in his philosophical analyses of emotions, he brings forth two elements: "disposition" and "occurrence."[19]

A disposition is a state that becomes established in a person, or to put it more simply, settles in the individual's soul and resides there, becoming a part of the individual's being. It is as if the individual involuntarily partakes of (suffers from) it. But an occurrence is a characteristic that has a short lifespan, and its form in a person changes with the passage of days. An occurrence is the diluted form of a disposition, and a disposition is its true essence. Look, for example, at the concept of love: sometimes love takes on a passionate form, and this occurrence is what we often attribute to other people. But this passion is transient. If this passion becomes permanent and settles in the individual's soul, then it can be said to have taken on an existential form. This existential form becomes of a different kind and no longer possesses the former characteristic of passion. Shame and embarrassment are also of this kind. Embarrassment is an occurrence that appears in a person and waxes and wanes. It emerges with an event and fades after that event. But shame is of a different kind. It is an existential form that has always taken up dwelling and station within the person. It is not dependent on the coming and going of an incident. It is the existential abode of the individual. It is as if the individual is perpetually ashamed, but not in the primary sense of embarrassment; rather, it has found another, transcendent form.

Shame should also be considered a second-order act. That is to say, first-order acts such as eating, sleeping, buying, and so on are often acts that occur out of instinct, over which a person has no supervision or volition. But second-order acts, which are generally moral acts, must be viewed from a higher vantage point. In fact, they pertain to the existence of the human being and are about the person's other acts. In simpler terms, second-order acts study first-order acts. Consider, for example, the act of self-restraint. Someone who practices self-restraint does something about other acts. Or, more precisely, does not perform other acts. It is not the case that self-restraint is placed in the same category as sleeping. It is an act about other acts. Shame, too, as an act, is about the existence of the human being, because shame is a kind of self-criticism. A person stands at a height and observes their own acts. When they realize a mistake, they become ashamed of it. [20]

The shame discussed in this essay has this meaning: it dwells within the individual, and in this respect, the individual can be considered to possess the station of shame. On the other hand, it is a second-order act that constantly supervises the person's other acts. Accordingly, the ashamed individual in this sense is someone who is perpetually engaged in self-criticism and evaluates themselves, and this, of course, in religious parlance, is very close to the term "piety" (taqwā).[21]

On the other hand, love can also become like this. That is, it can be found continuously within a person's being, dwell there, and take on an existential form. Love and shame should be considered two sides of the same coin. If shame is engaged in evaluation and seeks to discover mistakes, love seeks to count the good deeds. If we wish to prepare our minds with a metaphor, we can say shame resembles love. With the difference that love encourages a person to perform righteous acts, whereas shame prevents a person from committing mistakes. But both of them require a motivator, which in our essay is, of course, the Lord who is the Beloved of the wayfarer. The ashamed person strives for their Beloved not to commit a mistake, and the loving person seeks to perform righteous acts for the satisfaction of their Beloved:[22]

We are ashamed that, on the Day of Reckoning, in the face of Your forgiveness, we did not commit a sin

******

According to what was said above about shame, the morality of experientialist religiosity can be considered based on shame. The individual is placed in the station of a lover and connects with the truth of existence. When the experientialist individual steps into the realm of morality, their love becomes shame-like. If moral love excites them to perform an act for the satisfaction and to win the favor of their Beloved, moral shame prevents them from performing an act, and of course, the motivation is not to offend the Beloved. In truth, love and shame are two sides of the same coin; love is the affirmative dimension of the moral matter, and shame is its negative dimension. In the words of Hafez:

Do not boast of your haughtiness, O cypress of the stream, for if you reach Him, you will bow your head from shame

The astute reader has undoubtedly realized by now that I have refrained from using the term "virtue of shame." I must add that shame should not necessarily be considered a virtue or a duty, but rather it can be employed as a "method." Several reasons can be given for this: First, we escape the criticisms leveled at moral monism. That is, we do not make only one virtue the criterion for action, and assuming shame as a method is in harmony with moral pluralism. Secondly, we make ourselves similar to the school of moral intuitionism and can apply many of their epistemological reasons. For example, we do not conceive of shame as a strange, queer faculty so that critics like J. L. Mackie can criticize it.[23] Also, shame should not be considered merely a moral feeling, lest we fall into the trap of emotivism. Epistemological results can also be derived from shame, just as intuitionists do for intuition.[24]

4. Final Word

If this piece has managed to do two things, it has fulfilled its task well: first, to introduce three varieties of religious morality, and it is natural that these three types should not be considered final, and one can imagine other sociological distinctions alongside them. One could even combine these three introduced types and create another variety. For example, one can imagine expediency-minded believers who take morality seriously and, while taking duty-oriented jurisprudence seriously, also attend to rights-based morality. Second, if this article has not entertained an immature fancy, it aspires to open a door for introducing a mystical morality that it has called the “ethics of shame.” In this ethical theory, shame and love are considered central elements, whereby the individual, by strengthening and cultivating these capacities, can epistemically discern moral right and wrong. Likewise, the paradigm of shame, in contrast to the paradigms of right and duty, stands at a higher level and can subsume the right-duty duality within itself. It should not be forgotten that although shame becomes meaningful within a mystical ethical theory, one can also speak of shame as an epistemological matter, the explication of which requires another article. But when we speak of shame in a mystical ethical theory, it means that whatever the ashamed individual does or refrains from doing is to gain the approval and, perhaps, avoid offending their beloved (most believers consider God to possess these attributes). It must also be added that one should not think that being shamefaced means suspending reason. That a believer makes the beloved the cornerstone of their morality does not conflict with questioning, which is precisely neo-Muʿtazilism[25].

I am ashamed before the Generous One’s grace / To call my sin great before His pardon

My heart gives me hope, time and again / That God might feel shame before my white hair

I wonder if He feels shame for me / When I feel no shame for myself

Saʿdi

.

---

.

[1] See Kiyan magazine, issue 50. Also see Abdolkarim Soroush, The Ethics of the Gods, Tarh-e No Publishing, Tehran, 2001.

[2] It is quite clear that the separation of these three categories should not be considered final. In the sense that the door is still open and one can reach other conclusions through further induction and investigation.

[3] For understanding various theories of normative ethics and grasping the fundamentals of ethics, see:

Driver, Julia (2006), Ethics: The Fundamentals, Blackwell Publishing.

Shafer-Landau, Russ (2011), The Fundamentals of Ethics, Second Edition, Oxford University Press.

Rachels, James and Rachels, Stuart (2009), The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 6th edition, McGraw-Hill Publisher.

[4] The Ethics of the Gods, pp. 144-145

[5] On this, see the following book:

Hooker, Brad (2000), Ideal Code; Real World, Oxford University Press.

[6] I use the term “inferior” here because in the view of some philosophers, such as Levinas, this type of theory is not considered a theory at all.

[7] Refer to: The Ethics of the Gods, p. 146.

[8] The Ethics of the Gods, p. 150

[9] moderate-foundationalism. For more details, see: Audi, R., (2003), Epistemology, Routlege Publisher, Ch. 7.

[10] The author considers that one of the critiques leveled at the Kantian deontological model is precisely that it advises agents to "tell the truth, even if the heavens fall." Clearly, in this phrase there is a kind of unconditional adherence to moral principles. David Ross, the prominent intuitionist philosopher of the twentieth century, expands upon Kant's ethics and promotes moral pluralism. It is for this reason that it was said here that a combination of the ethics of Kant and Ross carries our burden.

[11] On this, see:

Stratton-Lake, Philip (2000), Kant, Moral Worth and Duty, Rutledge Publisher.

[12] The Ethics of the Gods, p. 151

[13] On the relationship between ethics and reason, see:

Scanlon, Tim (1998), What We Owe to Each Other, Harvard University Press.

Parfit, Derek (2011), On What Matters, Oxford University Press.

[14] The Ethics of the Gods, p. 154

[15] That shame stands above right and duty has been discussed by Abdolkarim Soroush in two separate lectures. See the lecture on his website entitled "The Virtue of Shame."

[16] See: The Ethics of the Gods, p. 155

[17] On the difference between guilt and shame, see the readable book by Bernard Williams:

Shame and Necessity, Ch. 4.

[18] Let us not forget that in this context, being ashamed of oneself is the same as being ashamed before God.

[19] See

Ryle, Gilbert (2000), The Concept of Mind, With an Introduction by Daniel Dennett, University of Chicago Press.

[20] On the idea that moral emotions can play an epistemic role, see below:

Deigh, John, 1994, “Cognitivism in the Theory of Emotions,” Ethics, 104: 824–854.

[21] In the literature of Western moral philosophy, shame is generally not viewed positively. What these philosophers mostly consider is the concept of guilt and moral error. For a negative view of shame, see the following source:

Taylor, Gabrielle, 1988, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, Oxford: Clarendon Press

[22] It is quite evident that secular ethics, which does not rely on religion, is also on friendly terms with this model and they can sit together amicably.

[23] See the famous book by J. L. Mackie:

Mackie, J. L., (1990), Ethics; Inventing Right and Wrong, New edition, Penguin Publisher.

 [24] If it is said that we are making ourselves resemble ethical intuitionism, this might raise the objection: what, then, is the difference between the morality of experiential religiosity and the morality of epistemic religiosity, as espoused by Rawls, for example? The answer here is that the discussion concerns intuitionism in metaethics, not as a normative theory. In any case, the idea that shame can be viewed in a manner akin to intuition is something I have elaborated in a separate article, to be published soon.

[25]  See, on this subject, the book by Mohammad Reza Vasfi, Neo-Mu'tazilites, Negah-e Mo'aser Publishing, Tehran, 1387 [2008/2009].

.

---

.

Varieties of Religious Morality: An Introduction to the Ethics of Shame

Author: Hossein Dabbagh

.

---

.