The Moral Psychology of the Gods; an essay by Hossein Dabbagh

The core claims of Abdolkarim Soroush's moral philosophy can be found in his lengthy essay titled

For philosophers (Jewish, Christian, and Muslim), in terms of the epistemology of the God of the (Abrahamic) religions, among various attributes (such as being all-good and all-powerful), there is one distinguishable and important attribute, and that is being omniscient. That is, God is all-knowing. In explaining whether an attribute can be ascribed to God, there is much disagreement among the masters of the art. Some philosophers claim that no attribute can be positively ascribed to God; one can only say what God is not. For example, God is not ignorant, is not powerless, or... Some other philosophers, however, have conversely emphasized God's positive attributes and, for instance, say God is powerful, is just, is merciful, or... Regarding the attribute of being omniscient, they disagreed on whether God has knowledge of particulars or knowledge of universals. For example, Avicenna (according to one interpretation) held the view that God does not have knowledge of particulars. Setting aside all these disagreements, perhaps the majority of philosophers are unanimous on one point concerning God's knowledge and cognition: that the mode of God's knowledge, whether in knowledge of particulars or knowledge of universals, is entirely different from the mode of our human knowledge and epistemology. In my belief, paying attention to this point and explaining and elucidating such a somewhat obvious matter can untie some of our moral knots and problems. Thus, our current question in this article will be: what is the mode of God's knowledge or the mechanism of understanding of God (gods or godlike beings)?

Aristotle believed that God is "thought of thought" and claimed that God cannot "think" of anything other than Himself, because the "sublime" cannot contemplate the "lowly." This metaphor, which likens the gods to pure intellect, makes the conception of God being knowledgeable somewhat easier for us. It is in the shadow of this metaphor that an important truth about the mode of God's knowledge can be recounted.[4] In the sense that if we want to explain the mode of God's knowledge of the objects of knowledge, two important characteristics can necessarily be enumerated for it: first, that the gods, insofar as they are completely rational beings, whenever they encounter a phenomenon, fact, or reality, must necessarily believe it. The reason is this: imagine a god who affirms proposition P. He must believe proposition P, because if he does not believe it, we are faced with a god who knows the truth of proposition P but does not believe proposition P, and this is the very essence of irrationality. Also, the gods cannot affirm proposition P but suspend their belief about proposition P. For the problem of irrationality would arise again. Therefore, a perfectly rational being like the gods, when they affirm something, must believe it. Thus, the first epistemic characteristic of the gods, in general, becomes as follows:

(1) In all possible worlds, if a god affirms the truth of proposition P, then he believes proposition P.

But the mode of the gods' knowledge of the objects of knowledge has another epistemic characteristic as well. If the gods believe a proposition, they necessarily also affirm it, for it would be irrational if a god stated, "Although I oppose the truth of proposition P, I believe it." It is also irrational if a god believes proposition P but suspends his affirmation regarding proposition P. Therefore, being a god and at the same time a completely rational being necessitates that if you believe proposition P, you must affirm proposition P. By this account, the second epistemic characteristic of the gods, in general, will be as follows:

(2) In all possible worlds, if a god believes proposition P, then he affirms proposition P.

All instances of (1) and (2) pertain to completely rational beings; that is, beings that have a godlike characteristic, do not belong to this world, and suffer from limitation and imperfection. The reason is that if we accept (1), then the being in question will be omniscient. And if we accept (2), then the being in question becomes infallible. Therefore, the combination of (1) and (2) together represents the epistemic power of a godlike being.[5] By combining characteristics (1) and (2), the mode of God's knowledge emerges as follows:

(3) In all possible worlds, the gods have knowledge (cognition) of something like proposition A if and only if, when they affirm proposition A, they believe it, and if they believe proposition A, they affirm it.

But assuming the existence of such a special mode of knowledge for the gods, what can be said about their psychology? The simplest and most obvious initial answer might be that the psychology of the gods is also different and distinct from the psychology of humans. But where does this difference and distinction lie, and how can it be explained?

2. The Moral Psychology of Servants

Look at the image below; an image known as the "Müller-Lyer illusion."[6] In the upper figure, almost all humans see the middle line as longer than the other two lines. There is no escape from it. Every human, by virtue of being human, sees it this way because of a limitation in the retina of their brain. For this reason, upon seeing the image below, every individual arrives at the belief that "the middle line is longer than the other two lines." More interestingly, even if we show someone who holds such a belief the lower figure and make it evident that their belief was incorrect—since, as is clear, all the lines are the same length—the person in question still cannot see the lines any other way. In other words, once the actual length of the lines is revealed, our epistemological belief that the middle line is longer changes, but our psychological belief, which is based on what we "see with our own eyes," will not change, because our retina perceives reality in this way.[7]

Leaving aside perceptual-visual illusions, in our daily human lives, psychological beliefs also arise that become entrenched. As a simple example, imagine a group of people planning to go mountaineering. The group guide strongly advises them that if they encounter a rabid dog on the path, they should not run away and should stand their ground, because running away provokes the rabid dog and doubles the risk of being bitten. Despite all this, it is very natural that most people (if not all), upon seeing a rabid dog, would involuntarily start running and seek shelter. In truth, although most people trust the group guide, consider his words to have epistemic value, and hold an epistemic belief in them, at that moment they turn their backs on their epistemic belief and prefer flight over standing firm. What happens that our human psychology, in most moments, draws a veil over our epistemology? How can we explain that someone both believes and does not believe something? Saying that the belief in question was perhaps forgotten at that moment does not help us much, because it is highly unlikely that something present in our mind just a few minutes ago would suddenly be forgotten. It seems something else is going on.

Other simple examples can be considered that perhaps many of us or those close to us suffer from. Individuals addicted to cigarettes and alcohol generally believe and know that what they are doing is harmful. Even more than that, they deeply believe that they should not do it. Also, imagine a person who intends to lose weight. They believe that being overweight endangers their health and that they must reduce their weight. What happens that these individuals, despite their intention, fail to perform the act? Or, in the terminology of Islamic philosophers, what happens that despite the will for the said act, "muscle stimulation" does not occur and the aforementioned individuals refrain from performing the act? Why, in the words of Muslim sages, despite the existence of "confirmed desire" which is the prelude to will,[8] is the said act not performed?

Now let us bring morality into the arena as well. One can imagine that in many moral situations we humans know that telling a lie, breaking a promise, setting a cat on fire, killing another person, and so on are morally reprehensible and condemned. Yet, despite this, we cannot refrain from doing them? What happens that, as Hafez says, we sometimes all become tricksters and deceivers? What imposes itself upon us in the moments of performing an act, rendering us incapable of refraining from an action we believe to be wrong?

The insights of analytic and cognitive psychologists shed further light on the matter. Consider the term they use: "Implicit Bias."[9] Cognitive psychologists, following in the footsteps of Sigmund Freud, believe that from birth, beliefs are unconsciously (and perhaps involuntarily) formed within us that are almost impossible to abandon. These implicit biases seem to become intertwined with our very being, seeping and penetrating into us. Biases that sometimes cause people to make harsh judgments against one another. Perhaps Rumi had something like this in mind when he said:

Most people are man-eaters; seek little safety from their salutations and greetings.

The hearts of all are the house of the demon; accept little from the demon-people's murmur.

The issue becomes more complicated when, upon becoming aware of these biases, people cannot easily free themselves from them. For example, many wrongly believe there is a direct link between being Black and committing a crime. For this reason, if a crime occurs somewhere, the likelihood that a Black person committed it is considered higher. Now imagine we become aware of this unfounded bias and believe that such a notion is wrong. But is this enough to no longer hold such a belief and to act differently? Not at all. Psychologists have shown that even when we believe our biases are mistaken and should be set aside, in many situations we still act according to them. For instance, recall the police officer in New York who shot a young Black man on the pretext that he thought the plastic bag in his hand was a gun! Also, recall the officials of that British university who, while declaring that discrimination is a deplorable matter, set different salaries for men and women applying for jobs, even with completely identical qualifications, and placed women in a lower rank![10]

But what do moral philosophers say about this? Plato has a famous saying regarding ethics. In his view, (moral) knowledge is the same as (moral) virtue or (moral) action. According to his opinion, there is such a bridge between moral action and knowledge that if someone steps onto one side, they can be guided to the other. That is, if someone understands and knows a moral matter, they need nothing else to act upon it. For example, if someone learns the moral proposition "breaking a promise, as far as possible, is morally wrong" and incorporates it into their beliefs, then they can perform it as a "moral action." Aristotle was one of Plato's first critics who rebelled against this view, accusing Plato of "measuring others by oneself." Aristotle's point was that Plato, in his moral opinion, looked only at himself. Otherwise, average people are not such that they can always put a matter into action merely by affirming it. According to Aristotle, most people suffer from "Weakness of the Will" or "Akrasia,"[11] and their will does not always align with their epistemic belief. It is because of these views of Aristotle that commentators consider him the father of moral psychology.

Nearly twenty-odd centuries after Aristotle, the discussion of moral psychology regained strength and was taken up in earnest by the capable hands of David Hume, the renowned Scottish philosopher. Armed with “passions,” “sentiments,” and “motives,” Hume tackled the important philosophical puzzle of the relationship between belief and action. According to him, belief alone cannot motivate us to perform an action. Rather, something else is needed to combine with belief and provide the motivation for us to act. For Hume, that something is passions and sentiments. That is, we can perform an action when, first, we have a belief about it, and second, the passions and sentiments favorable to performing that action are present within us. It is the combination of belief and passions that constitutes the motive for action.[12]

Neuroscientists, brain researchers, and experimental moral psychologists such as Antonio Damasio[13], Shaun Nichols[14], and Jesse Prinz[15] have made great efforts to empirically prove Hume’s philosophical view and, through various experiments, have shown that the frontal part of the brain (Prefrontal Cortex), especially the amygdala, which is responsible for personality, passions, and sentiments, plays a very serious role in our daily lives. In the sense that without this part of the brain (for instance, when it is seriously damaged in an accident), people’s simple everyday decision-making becomes impaired, their behavior becomes childish, the ability to take risks disappears, and even epistemic beliefs cannot emerge or manifest. That is, it is as if our epistemic beliefs require passions to be actualized and come to fruition, and there is, of course, no escape from this. On the other hand, these same passions also cause disturbances in epistemic matters and wreak their havoc: “The peacock’s enemy is its own feathers.” For when our epistemic beliefs become infused with passions, their solidity and certainty are diminished, their truth becomes unattainable, and our trust and confidence in those beliefs vanish. This is the secret of being human: one cannot experience pure, unadulterated rationality (or anything else pure). Without the presence and emergence of passions, humans do not become “human,” and it is with passions that their lives proceed.[16]

If we wish to compare the psychology of humans with the epistemology of gods, it must be said that passions can cause humans, despite believing in something, to refuse to affirm it. Moreover, passions do such a thing to a person that even if a reality (fact) is presented to them, they refuse to believe it. That is, although a reality exists in the external world that they could affirm, they simultaneously refrain from believing it. For example, imagine a mother who sees and knows that her child is at fault—that is, she affirms that her child has erred—but in court, contrary to her belief, states something else. Furthermore, consider a person so filled with greed and avarice that they see the truths but do not believe them. Perhaps it is this being turned upside down by passions that prompted Saadi to say:

و ما اُبَرّيَ نَفسي وَ ما اُزَکّيها

For whatever is recounted of human nature is within the realm of possibility

Rumi, too, in his discussion of predestination and free will in the fifth book of the Masnavi, when he brings up passions and sentiments such as compulsion, anger, and forbearance (patience) and sets them against human “conscience,” cries out that greed and avarice can even alter reality for people. The greedy and avaricious person, at dawn, in order to eat more food, closes their eyes to the light and sees the day as night. It is as if greed casts a shadow over the sunlight of our epistemic beliefs:

Since the animal soul recognized free will, / Say not this, O human intellect, be ashamed

This is clear, but from greed for the pre-dawn meal, / That eater closes his eyes to the light

Since his entire inclination is toward eating bread, / He turns his face to darkness, saying it is not day

If greed can thus conceal the sun, / What wonder if it turns its back on proof

But for all the "ingratitude" that emotions show us, the meaning of the above remarks is not that rational propositions do not fundamentally exist and that rational dialogue is altogether unattainable and inaccessible. Rather, one can easily bring to mind at least mathematical, physical, geometrical, or even moral propositions that are considered rational in this world, and not in all possible worlds, and which the rational among people deem valid.[17]

3. The Moral Psychology of the Gods

But what is the connection and relation of what has been said so far to the "morality of the gods" mentioned at the beginning of the article? How can moral psychology help complete and expand the epistemological project of the morality of the gods? Recall that in "The Morality of the Gods," Soroush argues that our existing morality as servants in this world, being epistemically fallible and defeasible, is only suited to this world and no other. Seeking another morality that would fit all possible worlds is a futile endeavor that cannot be attained. Only the morality of the gods and divine justice possess such a requirement and capacity.

But in my belief, Soroush's point can be elevated further. If Soroush makes a normative claim that humans and servants "ought not" to pursue the morality of the gods and that applying the morality of the gods in the world of servants is not "right," following what the moral psychology of the gods teaches us, one can say that indeed one ought not to employ the morality of the gods, but with the explanation that such a thing is nearly impossible. That is, the psychology of servants lacks the capacity to practice and repeat the way the gods acquire knowledge, and for this reason, the specific psychology of humans does not permit them to do so. Even if humans wanted to pursue such a futile matter, the possibility of it would not be provided. In other words, since humans have a specific psychology, the robe of the morality of the gods fits their stature and frame tightly and uncomfortably. The psychology of servants explains to us quite well that pursuing the morality of the gods is an impossible, and therefore abandonable, matter.

The morality of the gods has a special psychology unique to them. Or, to put it another way, perhaps one could say that the gods have no psychology at all. That is, there is no gap between belief and acting in accordance with it. Whatever passes through the mind and conscience is reflected outwardly as well. But servants and humans, due to the structure of their brains and their emotion-based psychology, are deprived of such a thing. On the one hand, humans need emotion to carry on their daily lives; yet on the other hand, emotion so muddies the water of judgment for them that they either can hardly commit an act in accordance with their belief or can hardly acknowledge a reality in certain moments.

If it is the case that the morality of the gods requires a special psychology that servants are incapable of possessing, how is it that some humans harbor the ambition for such a morality in this world: "Do not harbor crooked ambitions, for you lack the capacity for it." The truth is that there is no capacity for such a morality in this world, because the capability for its existence is absent. By this account, the political, social, and economic theories that carry the morality of the gods behind them and endorse it are neither desirable nor feasible. As an example, consider the following theories one by one so that we may weigh their morality on the scale of investigation:

Consider dictatorship. Why, and according to what reasoning, can it be said that dictatorship is morally unjustified? In accordance with what was presented above, according to the moral psychology of the gods, it can be understood that the shadow of a dictatorial system—since someone sits in the rank of the gods and from them issues the morality of the gods—this theory is rejected. The same applies to monarchism, which places a dynasty of kings in a godlike position and expects the morality of the gods. And likewise, the attempt to establish a theocracy, which sees the religious as godlike in relation to the non-religious. When John Stuart Mill defended liberalism and attacked the paternalism[18] arising from government and the state, he had something like this in mind.[19] That is, a group in the position of government should not act as parents to the citizens. Rulers are not gods to determine good and evil for their servants.[20]

Reflect on the political (and not philosophical) theory of Marxism.[21] In my belief, according to what has been said, such a theory is morally indefensible. Placing workers at the top and in a godlike position falls under the morality of the gods. Mikhail Bakunin, the famous Russian anarchist, rightly criticized Marx, saying that the "workers" whose cause you champion will one day become "employers," and the cycle begins anew! In other words, Marx's theory seems to engage in god-worship.

Karl Popper, in his book The Open Society and Its Enemies, also criticizes Hegel and, consequently, Marx, arguing that their political theory of the state lacks the capacity to critique power. They have depicted the state as so transcendent and beyond morality that it seems no immoral act can ever issue from it: "Whatever that king does is sweet." This absence of a theory for critiquing power and the meta-ethical status of the state leads to a point where, even under the pretext of justice, one can trample upon the morality of this world, deem the existing morality of this realm insufficient, and nurture the dream of the morality of the gods.

Look at Thomas Hobbes's social theory in Leviathan[22] or Machiavelli's political theory in The Prince[23]. Both of these theories, in my belief, forget the morality of the servants. Hobbes imagined the condition among humans as something akin to the wild. In Attar's expressive phrase: "The truth of worldly people is like demons / Always clamoring and wailing." For this reason, he dreamed of a "monstrous" state and government that could prevent humans from tearing each other apart. Hobbes's monster sits so firmly in a godlike position that nothing but the morality of the gods issues from it. Machiavelli, like Hobbes, saw the human world as full of evil. For this reason, he recommended the augmentation of "power" as the primary goal for rulers and politicians, leaving nothing of their "responsibility" behind. Machiavellianism thus promotes a morality that reinforces the bipolarity of gods and servants, approves of the morality of the gods, and places it at the pinnacle.

The moral psychology of the gods, however, can also help us humans in our daily lives. In the sense that it provides a criterion and a touchstone to recommend humility towards one another and to invite tolerance and forbearance. Since moral psychology helps to reveal and clarify the ceiling of human capabilities, abilities, and capacities, people's expectations of one another become minimal, and through this, they find greater peace. In a more expressive phrase, the theory of the moral psychology of the gods prohibits perfectionism[24] and asks servants not to harbor the wish for a perfect morality for one another, for "whatever there is, stems from our own ill-fitting, unseemly stature."

A final word: moral epistemology is incomplete without psychology. If epistemology points its finger at the limits and boundaries of the understanding and the truth or falsity of propositions, psychology recognizes the emotions and feelings of human beings. Moral psychology takes seriously the existence and presence of servants and renders them in more realistic dimensions. It takes the “other” seriously, with all their imperfections, and invites human beings, despite all their existential inadequacies, to strive to build a world with less suffering and pain and more well-being, and to make life in this world more bearable.[25]

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[1] Kian Magazine, No. 18, 1994. Now in the book The Ethics of the Gods, Serat Publications, Tehran, 2001.

[2] moral constructivists

[3] This refers to the method that John Rawls, the American moral philosopher, called “reflective equilibrium.”

[4] Philosophers of language say that metaphors facilitate our epistemic access to phenomena. For example, see:

Hossein Dabbagh, 2014, Metaphor in Truth: The Entry of Metaphors into Science, Hermes Publications, forthcoming.

Boyd, Richard, “What is “metaphor” a metaphor for?”, (1993), in Metaphor and Thought, Ortony, A., (ed.,), Cambridge University Press.

[5] David Chalmers has a similar claim. In his view, by considering the epistemology of Frank Ramsey and G. E. Moore, one can play God! See:

Chalmers and Hájek, 2007, “Ramsey+ Moore=God”, Analysis 67: 170–72.

[6] Müller-Lyer illusion

[7] Daniel Kahneman, the American psychologist and Nobel laureate, gives many such examples in his fascinating book, Thinking, Fast and Slow. See:

Kahneman, D., (2011), Thinking, Fast and Slow, Penguin Publisher, pp. 1-50.

For more on this see e.g., (2012), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, Peter Goldie (Ed.), Oxford University Press.

[8] There is a difference of opinion among Islamic philosophers on this matter. Some sages said that will is the same as intensified longing. Others said that intensified longing is a prelude to will.

[9] See: http://philosophybites.com/2013/12/jennifer-saul-on-implicit-bias.html

[10] The subtleties of psychologists reveal to us how, in many instances, implicit biases replace our motivating beliefs and distort our will to perform an action. For an example of such biases, see:

Greene et al., (2007), “Implicit Bias among Physicians and its Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients”, Journal of General Internal Medicine, Volume 22, Number 9.

[11] For more details see e.g., Owens, D., 2002."Epistemic Akrasia". The Monist 85 (3): 381–397; Joyce, R. (1995). "Early Stoicism and Akrasia". Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 40 (3): 315–335.

[12]  Naturally, the "intention" behind the act is also important here. Due to its obviousness, I have refrained from elaborating on it.

[13] See Descartes’s Error

[14] See Nichols et al., 2010. Moral psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings. Wiley-Blackwell.

[15] See The Emotional Construction of Morals

[16]  To preempt an objection, I must say that my focus here on psychological-neurological explanations should in no way preclude us from other explanations, such as epistemological ones. I mention this point because some (mostly scholars in the empirical sciences) mistakenly believe that the findings of psychology and neuroscience render other philosophical explanations unnecessary. This error is the well-known fallacy of "confusing the essence with the aspect." As an example of a dialogue between neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, see:

The New Science of Mind and the Future of Knowledge: https://www.cell.com/neuron/abstract/S08966273(13)00991-4

[17]  Discussing whether rational dialogue, for instance in ethics, is still possible given the existence of emotions would lengthen this article. For this reason, to pursue this issue, see the author's articles on this topic:

Dabbagh, Hossein, 2013, “In Search of Lost Intuition”, Aristotelian Society and Mind Association.

Dabbagh, Hossein, 2011, “Wittgensteinian Approach to Partiality”, 34rd International Wittgenstein Symposium.

[18] paternalism or parentalism

[19] See Mill, J., (1859), On Liberty, new edition, 2005, Penguin Publisher.

[20]  [20]  This statement by Soroush can be understood as a critique of dictatorship, where he writes: "The worst betrayal that vile rulers inflict upon defenseless subjects... is to inculcate and teach them their own morality-breaking methods." The Ethics of the Gods, p. 39

[21]  Karl Marx; Friedrich Engels (2009). The Communist Manifesto. Echo Library. See also Craig J. Calhoun (2002). Classical sociological theory. Wiley-Blackwell; Karl Marx–Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 4 March 2011.

[22] See Leviathan, new edition, 2009, Create Space Independent Publishing Platform.

[23] See The Prince, new edition, 2011, William Collins Publisher.

[24] For more on this issue and alternative views see e.g., Hurka, T., 1993, Perfectionism, New York: Oxford University Press.

[25]  It should not be forgotten that the introduction of the concept of the "other" in ethics can have a normative dimension in addition to its psychological one. That is, attention to the "other" can justify us in moral judgment.

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