The Moral Validity of Male Circumcision: Recommended or Forbidden? An essay by Hossein Dabbagh

It was July 2013 when a tragic piece of news drew everyone's attention and transfixed their gaze: “At least thirty teenage boys in South Africa died within a single month due to ‘tribal circumcision’[1] and the resulting hemorrhage.” Such circumcisions in Africa generally take place in mountains and deserts where tools, medical-hygienic equipment, and skilled personnel are absent. When the health minister was asked what should be done to stop such practices, he replied: “It is a tradition.”[2] It was precisely around that time that, at a seminar at the University of Oxford, its keynote speaker (namely, Brian Earp) issued a ruling on “the immorality of male circumcision”[3] and rolled up the scroll of Muslims (and, of course, Jews)—for performing such a precept. His two main ethical arguments were as follows:

A. The Argument from Harm to Others

(1) Acts and behaviors that fall under the category of “harm to others” (whether to oneself or to people) are immoral.

(2) Circumcising (boys)[4] is among these acts.

(3) Therefore, circumcising (boys) is immoral.

B. The Argument from Free Will

(1) Acts that violate a person’s will and autonomy (i.e., human sovereignty over one’s own destiny or self-governance) are immoral.

(2) Circumcising a child (boy), since it is done without his permission, negates his will.

(3) By this account, the act of circumcising (a boy) is immoral.

Assuming the above arguments are sound (which, I believe, are open to doubt!), imagine your (male) child has just been born. Those around you have circumcised their own children due to religious and ethnic beliefs. You are entangled and faced with a decision. On the one hand, some moral philosophers forbid you and consider circumcision an immoral act. On the other hand, religious beliefs have tied your hands and feet. You ponder whether you should abandon religious beliefs and elevate morality to the highest rank, or conversely, place religious beliefs unquestioningly at the top. It is not clear to you that, even if you refer to ethical beliefs, which group’s reasoning you should choose; those who decree the performance of circumcision or those who prescribe its abandonment!?

The generality of average religious people, in Abdolkarim Soroush’s expression, are “livelihood”-stricken and, out of “expediency,” do not let such states and questions pass through their minds. They generally give a positive answer to what has been commanded (here, jurisprudence) and do not investigate: “We submit; the judgment is God’s.” When religious sentiments and emotions crowd out religious knowledge, such a religiosity is born. David Hume[5] and John Stuart Mill[6] also said that for the majority of people, emotions constrain rationality to such an extent that when it arrives, poor reason creeps into a corner.[7]

But what should knowledge-oriented religious people do? How should they extricate themselves from the confrontation between religion (jurisprudence) and ethics? When faced with arguments of equal weight (both in ethics and in jurisprudence), how can they navigate these dilemmas?

The specific audience of this article consists of religious people whose type of religiosity has moved beyond expediency and livelihood-thinking and become knowledge-oriented; who have taken the new world seriously; who have the concern of being a Muslim and, most importantly, place ethics on a par with, indeed higher than, jurisprudence and do not give a penny for “jurisprudence without ethics.” In the eyes of some ethicists, these individuals have committed a moral error, because they have deemed the circumcision of boys permissible and, in this sense, have attached their hearts to a ruling in jurisprudence that is not morally justified. Where is the way of escape and deliverance?

My claim in the present article is that in these ethical (and even jurisprudential) dilemmas and impasses, the knowledge of religious thinkers, whichever way they rush, has not fallen short of ethics and jurisprudence, and they can set the moral conscience at ease. As an example, in the aforementioned story, both those who, for justified ethical reasons, deem circumcision morally permissible and those who consider it ethically impermissible have acted within the sphere of ethics and have not overstepped the bounds of fairness. But where does jurisprudence stand in this discussion? What can be said about the relationship between religion and ethics?

Of course, my intention in the present space is not to enter into such a weighty discussion. The only point I emphasize is that even among jurists, diverse opinions are found regarding circumcision. Perhaps the reason is that no single ruling on circumcision is found in the Quran. In other words, I will show that since contradictory jurisprudential rulings exist regarding circumcision, and many jurists consider circumcision a "recommended" (mustahabb) matter, and no necessity for performing it is explicitly stated in the Quran, abandoning it on ethical grounds does not incur punishment. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that one cannot easily demonstrate that performing circumcision is necessarily unethical everywhere. Perhaps in many instances, one can rule on its ethical impermissibility, but its generality and a universal ruling on it are not easily attained. This means that perhaps it can be shown that the aforementioned arguments for rejecting and condemning circumcision do not work everywhere and have counterexamples. However, Muslims for whom living ethically is a serious concern can rest assured that not performing circumcision does not entail otherworldly punishment, and yet they still remain within the bounds of jurisprudence. These ethically-minded Muslims can, by resorting to the device that there are differing and diverse opinions among jurists, refrain from performing circumcision and at the same time not commit a jurisprudential sin.

Circumcision According to Muslim Jurists

The common perception among Muslims is that the act of circumcision (also called sunnat kardan) is considered an obligation for Muslim men and boys and is among the "necessary" practices and rituals of the Islamic religion.[8] In this respect, deviating from it is a religious sin, and opposing it is opposing the "command of God." In contrast, some moral philosophers and (religious) intellectuals believe that if performing circumcision is based solely on intra-religious reasons and has no extra-religious rational basis, then its performance should be postponed until the child reaches the age of intellectual maturity, and the decision about it should be left to the child himself. Otherwise, we have violated the child's right over his body.[9] But contrary to the common perception of Muslims, the act of circumcision is considered among the "recommended" (mustahabb) acts, not obligatory, by many jurists (Shia and Sunni). Since the performance of circumcision is not explicitly mentioned in the Quran[10], various and even conflicting opinions, fatwas, hadiths, and narrations are found among Muslim scholars on this matter.[11] Of course, it should not be forgotten that the practice of circumcision, due to its frequent mention, is among the "well-known reports" (akhbar mashhura). With all this, it is difficult to rule that performing circumcision has been stated as a "necessity" in Islamic jurisprudence.

For example, regarding female circumcision, jurists have predominantly and mostly either ruled it permissible or declared it forbidden. Sheikh Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, the Sheikh of Al-Azhar Mosque and a high-ranking religious authority in Egypt, for instance, declared female circumcision forbidden (haram) in a fatwa in 2005.[12] He believes that no indication of such a practice is emphasized anywhere in Islam. However, Ayatollah Sistani, while stating in 2013 that female circumcision is "not forbidden," has stated elsewhere: "If the purpose of female circumcision is cutting the prepuce of the female genital organ (clitoral hood), the correct view is that this is not a religiously recommended practice; rather, it is forbidden if it causes harm to the girl. And as for cutting the female genital organ itself or cutting a part of it, this is certainly considered a crime against the girl, and parents have no justification whatsoever for undertaking it."[13]

The matter of male circumcision is, of course, somewhat more complex, as opposition to it is not as widespread as opposition to female circumcision. Although many jurists have ruled it to be recommended (mustaḥabb), there are also jurists who consider it a religious obligation for Muslims. The late Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir, a Shīʿī scholar, in his renowned work Jawāhir al-Kalām fī Sharḥ Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām, has ably demonstrated the intertwining of differing and contradictory ḥadīths and narrations concerning circumcision. Citing al-Wasāʾil, he relates (vol. 31, pp. 260–263) that according to one narration, circumcision is obligatory (wājib) for a mature boy, just as it is for a newly converted disbeliever. A few lines further on, however, he states that according to the well-known opinion, circumcising a child is recommended and is not obligatory upon his guardian.[14] He also adds that circumcision for girls at the age of seven, and for a newly converted disbelieving woman, is recommended and not obligatory (Jawāhir al-Kalām, vol. 31, pp. 262–263). Moving beyond the late Ṣāḥib al-Jawāhir, Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī, a Shīʿī traditionist, in his weighty book Maḥajjat al-Bayḍāʾ fī Tahdhīb al-Iḥyāʾ, under the chapter “Secrets of Purity” and the section “Removing the Superfluities of the Body’s Exterior,” has cited various ḥadīths and narrations from the Prophet and the Imams, some of which deem circumcision a tradition (sunna) and recommended, while others deem it obligatory (vol. 1, pp. 524–526).

Among the Sunnīs, the Ḥanafīs and Mālikīs generally consider circumcision recommended, whereas the Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs have spoken of its obligation. For instance, in al-Shawkānī’s commentary Fatḥ al-Qadīr (1/63), it is stated that circumcision is a tradition for men and there is no compulsion. Likewise, in the book Sharḥ al-Kharashī (Fatḥ al-Jalīl), the recommendability of circumcision is mentioned (3/48). Among the Shāfiʿīs, however, the majority, conversely, have reported the obligation of circumcision. For example, in the book Tuḥfat al-Muḥtāj fī Sharḥ al-Minhāj (9/198), performing circumcision is considered a religious duty. The Ḥanbalīs, too, as an example in the book al-Rawḍ al-Murbiʿ Sharḥ Zād al-Mustaqniʿ (1/237), have affirmed the obligatory nature of circumcision.[15]

Beyond these disagreements, nearly all jurists are unanimous that having been circumcised is a condition for leading congregational prayers. This means it is disapproved (makrūh) for an uncircumcised person to lead the congregation, and it is not even permissible to follow him in prayer (Jawāhir al-Kalām, vol. 13, pp. 384–385). Regarding the Ḥajj, however, there is disagreement among scholars: the majority of jurists have considered circumcision a condition for the validity of the ṭawāf (Jawāhir al-Kalām, vol. 19, p. 274). Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī, for example, under the discussion of “The Virtue of Ḥajj,” has deemed circumcision among the obligatory conditions (vol. 2, p. 237). Yet some have doubted whether circumcision is an absolute condition for the validity of ṭawāf (see Madārik al-Aḥkām fī Sharḥ Sharāʾiʿ al-Islām, by the late ʿĀmilī, vol. 8, p. 118).

These jurisprudential disputes, if they reveal nothing else, demonstrate one thing: that many jurists in the Islamic world (Shīʿī and Sunnī) consider circumcision “recommended” and do not regard its performance as a religious duty incumbent upon Muslims. This means that performing it or not is a matter of individual judgment. Consequently, not performing circumcision does not expel someone from the fold of Islam, nor does performing it necessarily bring someone into the fold of Islam. Accordingly, if the exigencies of life in the modern world for Muslims are such that the practice of circumcision causes disruption to their ethical life, they can desist from performing it without having committed a transgression according to religious law.

Circumcision in the View of Moral Philosophers

Many moral philosophers, as mentioned earlier, since they consider the act of circumcision (whether for boys or girls) an instance of mutilation, therefore deem it unethical. This is because, in their belief, it clearly entails irreparable and unwarranted harm. My aim here is merely to cast doubt on the reasoning of this group of moral philosophers, while acknowledging their concern. The main focus of my argument is also limited solely to male circumcision.

Recall the “harm to others” argument. In my view, premises (1) and (2) are open to doubt. These two premises can be reconstructed as follows: “The act of circumcision is among those actions in which harm to others is inherent and implied, and harm to others is itself an ‘immoral’ matter.” My suspicion is that attributing the general label of “harm” to the act of circumcision is somewhat difficult and problematic. Let us compare circumcision with another act that carries a faint suspicion of harm; namely, vaccination. We humans vaccinate our children in childhood so that they do not suffer from incurable diseases in adulthood. Not only do we do this, but there is also compulsion and mandate from the state in this regard. I do not suppose anyone would object that vaccination should be abandoned because it causes suffering and pain for children. The reason is that vaccinating children yields considerable benefit and advantage in the long term. But does circumcision do likewise? Does it truly offer a significant benefit considering the pain it causes? Numerous and contradictory answers have been given to these questions. The important point is that there is no simple and clear answer. Some believe that circumcision helped people in the past to remain safe from various diseases. For this reason, it is of no avail in the present day. But on the other hand, some others (the World Health Organization)[16] believe that performing circumcision increases the possibility of preventing AIDS and penile cancer. This divergence in answers, if it cannot prove anything else, strongly demonstrates one thing: that in the discussion of harm, we are not faced with simple and clear-cut cases such that circumcision can easily be driven from the stage with a single stroke. This means that if we wish to judge in a utilitarian manner, when the benefit of performing an action somewhere outweighs its harm, that action cannot be unequivocally deemed irrational and immoral.[17] It is evident that this is not a universal judgment and takes on different forms in various instances.

But with all this, even if we have managed to somewhat diminish the force of the harm-to-others argument, how can one cast doubt on the argument from free will? The second argument appears to be a bit more complex and robust. In truth, the negation of autonomy and free will leaves nothing of morality intact. Let alone the fact that many moral psychologists believe that unconscious thoughts and emotions direct most of our actions without us, as humans, willing them. But imagine, for the sake of the present article, that the arguments and evidence of these moral psychologists are not valid. That being so, would performing circumcision be an immoral act because it is done without the child’s will and permission? My suspicion is that this premise can also be doubted. We perform many actions for our children that carry no suspicion of being immoral, yet the child’s permission and will are not involved. As an example, recall once more the case of vaccination. As a rule, most parents do not doubt for a moment that they are not committing an immoral act by carrying out vaccination. Although parents do not obtain any permission from their children, their supposition is that they are performing a moral act. As another example, consider the piercing of little girls’ ears. Most parents suppose that because they are bringing an aesthetic matter to their children, they are not committing an immoral act. That is, because they have a good intention and purpose, there is no moral problem. Yet, according to the rule of autonomy, such an act turns out to be immoral. And beyond vaccination and ear piercing, there are many other simple matters that we perform on a daily basis that carry no suspicion of being immoral, yet at the same time constrain the noble rule of free will. For instance, we forcibly send our children to school; we teach our children to observe social etiquette; to fulfill moral principles, and so on.

It may be objected that the analogy between circumcision and vaccination, ear piercing, sending children to school, etc., is a false analogy and does not advance the argument. That is to say, vaccination and sending children to school are considered basic and essential human matters, which are impossible to avoid in the modern world. Moreover, the general consensus of reasonable people agrees on performing these actions. However, circumcision by no means possesses the necessity and essentiality of vaccination; not performing it does not endanger human life or threaten the survival of individuals (just as many in the modern world do not circumcise and live normal lives). Whereas those who are not vaccinated or are deprived of learning literacy do not have a normal life, and the course of their lives is not considered normal.

If the above objection is correct, which I believe it is, it can be admitted that the universality of the ruling on circumcision is called into question. In other words, since parents can make decisions for their children in essential matters—and only essential ones—depending on, for example, which geographical region they live in, they can determine whether circumcision is considered an essential matter or not. For instance, parents living in deprived areas of Africa can consider circumcision an essential matter and perform it, because according to World Health Organization statistics, the rate of HIV infection in these areas is very high. But in a geography where there is no necessity for circumcision, parents can leave this matter to their children, so that when they reach the capacity for decision-making, they can make a choice about it themselves.

In sum, as discussed, of the two moral arguments presented against performing circumcision, the first, i.e., the argument from harm, although it emphasizes an important point, is not very forceful, and counterexamples to its claim can be found in some instances. However, the second argument, i.e., the argument from free will, proved more effective and managed to diminish the universality of the ruling on circumcision. This is because it linked its performance to evolutionary-geographical conditions, and since in some cases there is no necessity for performing it during childhood, parents can defer its performance to the child themselves in adulthood. By this account, one can neither say that performing circumcision is necessarily immoral, because in certain instances where its necessity is determined, it is rational and moral; nor can one claim that performing circumcision is necessarily moral, because in cases where there is no necessity for it, performing it violates the noble principle of free will and autonomy, and is therefore morally unjustified.

Conclusion

If this article is successful in its aim, it has argued that circumcision, as some moral philosophers have claimed, is not necessarily and essentially an immoral act, and for this reason, it can be moral in certain instances. Secondly, it has shown that, from a jurisprudential perspective, there is no single consensus among Muslim jurists regarding the necessity of circumcision; rather, the majority of jurists have ruled it as recommended (mustahabb). For this reason, given such a multiplicity of juristic opinions, Muslims who act in either way remain within the bounds of jurisprudence and have not committed a religious sin. However, those Muslims who have a strong ethical concern and place the moral life above jurisprudential disputes can resort to the recommendation of circumcision and place the decision upon the shoulders of their children, so that the suspicion of violating free will and immorality is removed. Likewise, Muslim parents should not think that performing circumcision is an inescapable parental duty and that not performing it constitutes a jurisprudential error. Since in Islamic jurisprudence, no ruling of absolute necessity has been issued for circumcision, but rather its recommendation has also been mentioned, not performing circumcision by parents is not considered a jurisprudential sin, lest the tension between ethics and jurisprudence lead to a weakness of faith. Epistemological faith, of course, is attained through inquiry.

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[1] tribal circumcision

This refers to the circumcision practiced by various tribes in South Africa, both due to religious beliefs and ethnic convictions.

[2]http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/488031/20130709/south-africa-initiation-ceremony-botched-circumcision-penises.htm

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/10073918/33-men-die-in-South-African-circumcision-ceremonies.html

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/07/30-south-african-men-killed-in-ritual-circumcision/

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23284898

[3] Brian Earp (2013), “The ethics of infant male circumcision”, Journal of Medical Ethics, vol. 39, 418-420.

[4] In this article, the focus and concentration of my moral argument is on the circumcision of boys. I believe the issue of female circumcision is one about which judgment is somewhat straightforward; that is, it is obviously morally unjustified and does not require moral argument. Nevertheless, I have included a discussion of the jurisprudential disputes surrounding female circumcision in the article.

[5] See David Hume, (1975), A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Book II, 3.3 415.

[6] See John Stuart Mill, (1869, 1999), On Liberty, Lonodn: Longman, Roberts and Green, Ch. 1.

[7] Rumi also said: Reason is like the sheriff; when the Sultan arrives, the poor sheriff creeps into a corner.

[8] Jews consider circumcision to be among the necessary acts. A specific group of Jews in America perform a particular type of circumcision that has provoked the objection of many doctors. In this type of circumcision, the Jewish cleric takes the boy's penis into his mouth to mix the blood from the circumcision with red wine and suck it. The contact of the rabbi's mouth with the infant's penis causes serious illnesses, which can even lead to death.

[9] For example, Arash Naraghi, a religious intellectual of the second generation after the revolution, wrote on his Facebook page:

[11] Some (such as Bukhari and Muslim) attribute a hadith to the Prophet (narrated by Abu Hurairah) in which circumcision is counted among the five practices of cleanliness and purification. "He said: Ahmad ibn Yunus narrated to us, Ibrahim ibn Sa'd narrated to us, Ibn Shihab narrated to us, from Sa'id ibn al-Musayyib, from Abu Hurairah — may God Almighty be pleased with him — I heard the Prophet — peace and blessings be upon him — say: 'The fitrah is five: circumcision, shaving the pubic hair, trimming the moustache, clipping the nails, and plucking the armpit hairs'" (Sahih al-Bukhari; 5891 and Muslim; 257). As is evident from the hadith, circumcision is mentioned alongside other recommended acts. On this hadith, see also: Tabari, Muhammad ibn Jarir, Tarikh-e Balami [Tarikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk], translated by Abu Ali Muhammad ibn Balami, edited by Mohammad-Taqi Bahar, with the efforts of Mohammad Parvin Gonabadi. Tehran: Zavvar, 1379, pp. 143–144.

[12] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/42914.stm

[13] http://www.sistani.org/persian/qa/0896/

Apart from jurists and religious authorities, many Muslims have rejected female circumcision. For example, see:

Gruenbaum, ‎Ellen (2000), The Female Circumcision Controversy, University of Pennsylvania Press.

[14] Ayatollah Sistani also considers performing circumcision to be among the recommended duties of parents. See:

http://www.sistani.org/persian/qa/0896/

[15] Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, the Iranian jurist and theologian, whose works are significant for both Sunnis and Shiites, also offers noteworthy points on circumcision in his magnum opus Ihya' Ulum al-Din, under the quarter on customs and acts of worship, in relation to Hajj and marriage.

[16] http://www.who.int/hiv/topics/malecircumcision/en/

[17] In the foundations and principles of Islamic jurisprudence, it is also stated that cutting any part of the body is, as a primary ruling, emphatically forbidden; however, as a secondary ruling, if there is a more important or compelling interest at stake, the prohibition transforms into permissibility (lawful or discouraged). In simpler terms, one could say that cutting any part of the body is only permitted when its benefit outweighs its harm.

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