What Is Moral Skepticism?

What exactly is the moral skeptic's position? In other words, what does moral skepticism mean?! We should probably ask the skeptic themselves. But David Copp, although not a skeptic himself, explains moral skepticism for us. He believes that this position—that is, moral skepticism—has not been properly explicated, and by spelling it out clearly we can understand precisely what moral skepticism is.

Moral skeptics have a common strategy; they say: different societies have different moral codes, and none of the members of these different societies have an objective justification for their moral codes. Suppose we ask this skeptic, you who follow moral codes yourself, what justification is there for the moral codes you believe in? Faced with this question, they might try in various ways to state what justifies their moral codes.

For instance, they might say that following moral codes is in every person's interest; they themselves are a member of society, and like any other society, the society they live in has its own moral codes. Moral codes bring about the cohesion and survival of society, and therefore that is the justification for the moral codes they follow. That is, its justification is a practical one. They say we want society not to perish. Since every society has its own moral codes, this is therefore a practical justification; it is not a justification of the objectivity of moral values.

In another case, the skeptic can say that we should only follow society's moral codes once we have criticized and examined them. That is, after the moral codes have been examined and accepted, they find justification; a justification that is rational and individual. We can examine whether a coherent set of moral codes exists in our society. For example, if in our society it is said that violence is bad but children are beaten at school, we can say that there is an incoherence here. We say violence is bad, so we should not punish children.

Therefore, the skeptic can say that we examine all the moral codes that exist in our society and wherever there is an incoherence, we correct it. Here too, the skeptic does not believe in an objective justification for moral codes. They say we individually or collectively examine moral codes rationally and assess their coherence.

Both of these positions that the skeptic can adopt make the justification of moral codes contingent upon individuals, society, or a particular person, and do not provide an objective justification for moral codes. A set of moral codes might lead to the bonding of society's members and its survival, or individuals might, upon examining these codes, conclude that these codes are justified. These two types of justification differ from the objective justification of moral codes, and the skeptic can subscribe to these two types of non-objective justification.

Then, to clarify for us why the objective justification of moral codes differs from individual and social justifications, David Copp gives an example: Suppose an evil, extraordinarily powerful, large, and extraordinarily intelligent being—like a science fiction creature—threatens the members of a society that if they do not follow its moral codes, it will kill, detain, or torture them. Under these conditions, the members of society are justified in following these moral codes. In this way, if we do not follow those codes, the powerful villain will kill or torture us. But this justification is not objective. That is, the justifiability of following the moral codes of this extraordinarily powerful evil being is not based on objectivity; rather, it is a justification that comes back to the individuals in society. They are afraid and want to preserve their lives, and consequently, they comply.

همچنین از آنجایی که علایق ما انسانها با هم متفاوت است‌،‌ ممکن است کدهای اخلاقی متفاوتی برای هرکدام از ما موجه به نظر بیاید. مثلا من به حیوانات علاقه زیادی دارم، فکر می‌کنم در صورتی که ضرورتی نداشته باشد، نباید آنها را بکشیم و گوشتشان را بخوریم و شما برعکس من فکر می‌کنید که گوشت خوشمزه است و همیشه باید کباب خورد. در نتیجه ما اینجا از کدهای اخلاقی متفاوتی پیروی می‌کنیم. به صرف این که من بگویم به این دلیل نباید گوشت خورد، و شما بگویید به آن دلیل باید گوشت خورد، دلیل نمی‌شود کسی فکر کند که توجیه کدهای اخلاقی‌اش عینی است. بنابراین شک‌گرا در مورد کدهای اخلاقی برای بقا، موارد زیر را نفی نمی‌کند: بقای جامعه و بقای شخص در جامعه به پیروی از کدهای اخلاقی ضرورت می‌بخشد.

هر شخصی در هر جامعه‌ای به دنیا می‌آید احتمالا باور دارد که کدهای اخلاقی جامعه‌اش درست هستند. شک‌گرای اخلاقی وجود دلایل متفاوت، از جمله دلایل اجتماعی و فردی برای پیروی از کدهای اخلاقی را هم نفی نمی‌کند. او تنها چیزی را که نفی می‌کند این است که نمی‌توان برای کدهای اخلاقی توجیهی عینی پیدا کرد.

شک‌گرای اخلاقی را می‌توانیم با شک‌گرا در مورد جهان خارج هم مقایسه‌‌ کنیم و موضع او را بهتر متوجه شویم. در فلسفه، شک‌گرایی در مورد جهان خارج موضعی کاملا شناخته شده‌است به خصوص که تقریبا همه دانشجویان فلسفه با آثار دکارت آشنا هستند. این در حالی است که اگر کسی در مورد شک‌گرایی در مورد ارزش‎های اخلاق صحبت کند دقیقا مشخص نیست منظورش چیست و معمولا از او می‌خواهیم توضیح دهد شک‌گرا بودن در مورد اخلاق یعنی چه و بر خلاف شک‌گرایی در مورد جهان خارج که ما علیه آن استدلال ارائه می‌کنیم - یعنی آن را به عنوان موضع رقیب معتبری می‌شناسیم که بر علیه آن استدلال ارائه می‌کنیم - وقتی کسی می‌گوید که شک‌گرای اخلاقی است معمولا به او می‌گوییم که ابتدا از خود دفاع کن تا ببینیم در حدی هست که بخواهیم جواب دهیم یا خیر!

دیوید کوپ می‌گوید این برخورد دوگانه با شک‌گرایی اخلاقی در مورد جهان خارج و شک‌گرایی در مورد توجیه عینی کدهای اخلاقی خیلی جالب نیست! می‌گوید باید موضع شک‌گرایی اخلاقی را جدی بگیریم چون شک‌گرای اخلاقی نتیجه‌اش این می‌شود که پیروی از کدهای اخلاقی حالت دلبخواهی پیدا می‌کند.

کوپ همچنین شک‌گرایی در مورد کدهای اخلاقی را با شک‌گرایی در مورد وجود خداوند مقایسه می‌کند. این دو نوع شک‌گرایی هر دویشان عواقب اخلاقی و سیاسی بسیار مهمی دارند. در حالی که شک‌گرایی در مورد جهان خارج بر مبنای استدلال بنا نهاده شده شک‌گرایی در مورد اخلاق و وجود خداوند معمولا استدلالی ندارد. اغلب افرادی که به وجود خداوند یا توجیه عینی اخلاق شک دارند، می‌گویند که برای ما قابل تصور یا فهم نیست که خدایی وجود داشته باشد، یا کدهای اخلاقی عینی ممکن یا اصلا معنادار هستند. همچنین باید توجه داشته باشیم که برخلاف شک‌گرایی در مورد جهان خارج و خداوند - که این دو معرفت‌شناختی هستند - شک‌گرایی در مورد اخلاق معرفت‌شناختی نیست. در مورد جهان خارج و خداوند و آیا اینها وجود دارند یا ندارند، اینها سوال‌هایی هستند که به لحاظ متافیزیکی قابل بررسی هستند. سوال دیگر این است که ما چگونه می‌توانیم از وجود آنها آگاه شویم. ولی شک‌گرایی در مورد اخلاق آنچنان که کوپ تعریف می‌کند معرفت‌شناختی نیست. کوپ با اشاره به دکارت می‌گوید که دکارت می‌خواست در مواجه با شک‌گرا همه باورهایش را به یکباره توجیه کند. از آنجایی که برای یک چنین کاری باید برویم به جایگاهی که بتوان از آنجا همه باورها را به یکباره توجیه کنیم، چنین چیزی ممکن نیست و پروژه دکارتی، پروژه موفقیت آمیزی نخواهد بود.

Instead, we must examine our beliefs piece by piece and individually, finding justification for each one. As Neurath points out, when the ship is at sea, we must repair it plank by plank and piece by piece; we cannot replace the ship all at once when we are in the middle of the sea. Since in our human life we are in a position where we always already have a set of beliefs and cannot step outside this human position to examine all our beliefs at once, we are consequently forced to examine them piecemeal. However, we should note that the moral skeptic does not say we should replace the entire ship at once in the middle of the sea—that is, he does not say we should examine all our beliefs at once. He merely says that the objectivity of moral codes is unintelligible to him. He does not speak about our beliefs regarding the external world, facts of the external world, and so on. Therefore, we can say that, unlike the skeptic about the external world, the skeptic about morality asks us, while retaining our beliefs about the external world, the existence of individuals and societies, to examine moral codes one by one.

Skepticism, according to David Copp, means someone claiming that there is no objective justification for moral codes. Unlike Mackie, who says we have no moral facts (read Mackie's position in this post). For Mackie, objective values do not exist, but for Copp, there is no objective justification for moral codes and values. The skepticism that Copp introduces accepts practical, individual, and social justifications for moral codes; it only says that objective justifications do not exist.

For Copp, moral codes that have objective justification are codes whose acceptance is rational and supported by evidence. If we live in a society that has its own particular moral codes and we follow them, this cannot be an objective justification for our society's moral codes. That is, the mere fact that a set of codes exists in society and we follow them is not an objective justification. Although if we follow these codes because our lives would otherwise be endangered, or because we personally agree with them, this adherence cannot be considered a reason to deem the individual irrational. In fact, it should be noted that the objective justification of moral codes is not dependent on the individual or society and their inclinations and existing laws. What we do, which moral codes we follow, and for what reason—for instance, whether it brings us benefit or poses a danger—these do not count as objective justification. In other words, objective justification is not dependent on individuals and their beliefs but pertains to the moral propositions themselves. The objective justification of moral codes is not dependent on what happens in society but on the evidence presented for the moral codes. If we want to understand how this is possible, we can look at the example of scientific theories. When we say a scientific theory is objectively justified, it is because it provides the best explanation for the available evidence. Similarly, moral codes are objectively justified when they pay the most careful attention to the evidence concerning human beings.

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What Does Moral Skepticism Mean?

Zohair Bagheri Type-Parast

For a deeper study of David Copp's position, refer to the following article:

Copp, D. (1991). Moral skepticism. Philosophical Studies, 62(3), 203-233.

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