What Is Pragmatism?

A fundamental characteristic of pragmatist thought is that pragmatists deal with human actions and habits. Philosophical views and concepts are evaluated in terms of such experiential and practical frameworks. However, this does not mean that action/practice takes precedence over theory; rather, in the first place, no precise and clear-cut dichotomy between theory and practice is established. Even the most theoretical scientific or philosophical problems are evaluated in light of their potential connections to practical human actions.

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[Translator's Note: This piece is actually part of the introduction that Sami Pihlström wrote for the book The Continuum Companion to Pragmatism. Today, while reviewing this introduction, I suddenly decided to translate it, perhaps partly due to a brief discussion we had with Messrs. Sheykh-Rezaee and Abbasi at the Society of Wisdom; regarding William James's famous dictum that "the true is whatever proves itself to be good" having discredited pragmatism in Iran. In this short piece, Sami Pihlström defends the idea that there is no fundamental thesis upon which all pragmatists share a consensus. I naturally recommend reading it. And if I find the resolve, I also intend to translate something brief about one of the key doctrines of classical pragmatism, namely the Pragmatic Maxim, because I believe this doctrine holds a more important place in this philosophical movement than William James's well-known and notorious view on truth.]

It is important, in my view, to remember that pragmatism has no essence, no fundamental thesis or doctrine that all pragmatists accept. Rather, there are significant, even vital, tensions within the pragmatist tradition. Different pragmatists defend very different, and often conflicting, views. Historically, it is often an important question whether a particular thinker can be considered a pragmatist or not: of course, there are full-fledged pragmatists (i.e., Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead, Addams . . . ). And there are philosophers who have pragmatist tendencies and inclinations that are more or less close to or distant from the first group of pragmatists (i.e., Kant, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Sellars, Brandom . . .). In many respects, determining whether a particular thinker should be considered a pragmatist is a difficult task.

We repeat, one cannot simply determine whether a specific philosopher is a pragmatist or not, and precisely this fact is a sign of the vitality and flourishing of this tradition: pragmatism is not a finished project, but a truly living philosophical orientation, and historical interpretations over whether a particular philosopher is a pragmatist or not play an important role in the ongoing formation and structuring of this tradition, thereby, by retelling its narrative, ensuring it remains alive and flourishing. Yet this tradition remains highly ambiguous. No clear and precise criterion for being a pragmatist can be offered.

A fundamental characteristic of pragmatist thought is that pragmatists deal with human actions and habits. Philosophical views and concepts are evaluated in terms of such experiential and practical frameworks. However, this does not mean that action/practice takes precedence over theory; rather, in the first place, no precise and clear-cut dichotomy between theory and practice is established. Even the most theoretical scientific or philosophical problems are evaluated in light of their potential connections to practical human actions.

We will see in this book that adding certain particular thinkers to the pragmatist tradition—someone like Quine, for example—is not without its difficulties. A similar story, albeit to a more diluted degree, holds true for Richard Rorty as well. For some historically oriented pragmatists claim that he has deeply distorted the classical pragmatists. Yet the reception of the ideas of Quine and Rorty has to a large extent shaped the way we view the pragmatist tradition today, for it is a tradition we inevitably view from a perspective that has itself been partly shaped by the neo-pragmatist ideas of Putnam and Rorty. And the ideas of Putnam and Rorty would likely have been very different were it not for Quine's influence upon them. But one can add Quine to the pragmatist tradition, just as one can Rorty, and Rorty is someone whom a number of important thinkers believe (for good reasons) has violated some of the central commitments of this tradition. Among these commitments one can point to the conception of philosophy as inquiry, which Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, emphasized. In any case, Quine and Rorty should not be cast out of the pragmatist camp for the wrong reasons. One wrong reason is the assumption that pragmatism possesses a single, true essence to which one can appeal in order to classify thinkers—and to deem them inside or outside the pragmatist tradition.

Thus, the question of whether Quine, Rorty, or anyone else is really a pragmatist cannot by any means be answered with a simple yes or no. The pragmatist tradition, like any other tradition, is highly dynamic, alive, and changing; it is not something that was shaped once and for all. Therefore, the path of a thinker like Quine or Rorty within this tradition—which involves challenging and fraught relationships with other thinkers present in the tradition—always alters this tradition and keeps it alive, because it ensures that the ongoing, contentious debate over what our (pragmatic?) criteria truly are for calling a given philosopher or thinker a pragmatist remains alive. If it were completely clear who is a pragmatist and who is not, pragmatism could hardly be the attractive philosophical framework it remains today, or has once again become (after its period of decline in the mid-twentieth century).

Nor can we say that the pragmatists we examine in this introduction have managed to settle the philosophical problems that preoccupy them once and for all. In fact, the vitality and flourishing of pragmatism are rooted in its genuine philosophical problems. Its depth is precisely due to the fact that it has offered no final, ultimate theory about anything. It is not the case that the acceptance of a shared doctrine has unified the pragmatists; an uncritical and wholesale submission to a common dogmatic principle is another matter entirely. What gathers pragmatists under one umbrella is their infinitely open and vague conception of how to confront certain specific problems in philosophy; each in their own way. I believe that Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin have captured the heart of the matter, and we should concur with them: "Pragmatism's resistance to precise definition is a sign of its vitality, an indicator that pragmatism is a living philosophy and not something belonging to the past. This means that questions concerning its fundamental implications, major themes, and central arguments remain open questions, and pragmatists are still working on them. Pragmatism, whatever it is, is still working on itself, still trying to determine what it is." The present book sympathizes with their anti-essentialist view (though not with all the details of their views),

The following historical inquiry into the major pragmatists, as well as their disputes and views regarding pragmatist methodology in various fields of research in the chapter on research methods and problems, should be read in light of this spirit of openness. This introduction will not tell you the final truth about the essence of pragmatism, because no such final truth exists in principle.

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What Is Pragmatism?

Source: Afternoon Website

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