A Comparative Study of John Mackie's Error Theory and Allameh Tabatabai's Theory of Constructed Perceptions

Authors:

Omid Keshmiri PhD Candidate in Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran (Farabi Campus)

Mohammad Reza Amini PhD Candidate in Philosophy of Ethics, University of Religions and Denominations

Abstract

The present article is an effort to explain and compare the two meta-ethical theories of "error" and "constructed perceptions" by John Mackie and Allameh Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabai. This paper, which employs a library-based research method, is an attempt to discover, analyze, explain, and formulate the implicit and explicit presuppositions of two important meta-ethical theories, under the titles "Error Theory" and "Constructed Perceptions," proposed by John Mackie and Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabai, respectively. Since moral language, moral metaphysics, moral rationality, and moral epistemology are some of the most important meta-ethical presuppositions, in the present research we analyze these components. The result of the comparison is that although an important point of divergence between the theory of constructed perceptions and the error theory lies in one of the anthropological foundations of moral epistemology in these two theories—where one (the theory of constructed perceptions) speaks of the existence and validity of fixed constructed perceptions rooted in human nature—nevertheless, moral anti-realism in moral metaphysics, cognitivism in moral language, moral realism in moral rationality, and anti-realism in moral epistemology are significant commonalities between the two theories.

.

---

.

Published in the journal Philosophical Meditations

Volume 13, Issue 30, Pages 531-568, September 2023

Download the PDF of this article

.

---

.

Keywords: Error Theory, Theory of Constructed Perceptions, Moral Ontology, Moral Epistemology, Moral Rationality, Moral Linguistics.

Introduction

Among the important issues in the field of metaethics is the discussion of the existence and non-existence, and the quality of moral properties and knowledge. In the specialized literature of metaethical discussions, these two issues are framed in terms of the dichotomies of moral realism/anti-realism and cognitivism/non-cognitivism. Two philosophers who have offered innovative and independent theorizing in this area are Allameh Tabatabai and J.L. Mackie, who have presented the two theories of "Constructed Perceptions" and "Error Theory," respectively. In the authors' view, apart from some differences, the thought-provoking similarities between the views of these two philosophers make the theoretical and practical capacities of these two theories clearer and more comprehensible. In any comparison, it is necessary to keep in mind the roots and foundations of the intellectual system within the school/theory, and before anything else, to speak of the feasibility of the comparison in question. Mackie is a philosopher who defends naturalism[1] and, therefore, in his philosophical positions on religion[2] and ethics, does not invoke supernatural matters[3]. Thus, it seems clear that, given this basis, Mackie's position in ethics is a strong anti-realism[4]. But what can be said about Allameh Tabatabai's position? Can commonalities be found between Mackie's view as a naturalist philosopher and the view of a supernaturalist philosopher and mystic like Allameh Tabatabai? We believe this comparison is both possible and justified. First, mere foundational differences in some bases (even important bases of an intellectual system) do not mean that other branches of the two philosophers' intellectual worlds do not overlap; second, while paying attention to and pointing out some differences between these two theories, we will see that not only is this comparison possible, but this comparative application also enhances insight for understanding both philosophers' views in the realm of ethics. According to the explanation that will follow, Allameh Tabatabai, in proposing the theory of Constructed Perceptions, speaks of fixed constructeds to avoid slipping into the trap of relativism; constructeds that, by virtue of our being human, are permanent and eternal (Javadi, 1374: 23). This category of constructeds, which is rooted in human primordial nature, prevents ethical anarchy and weakness in the foundation of morality. Although, as will be explained, in accounting for ethical disagreements, the motivational aspect of moral language, and so on, he approaches moral anti-realism in modern parlance. In this article, while paying attention to some differences related to the common language of analytic moral philosophy, we attempt to formulate the theory of Constructed Perceptions so that, firstly, a judgment about the 'possibility' of comparing these two views regarding the very principle of comparing these two views becomes more prepared, and secondly, following the principle of 'things are known by their opposites/others,' the philosophical insights of the two theories become more apparent.

In his discussion of constructeds, Allameh, by distinguishing between constructed and real perceptions, has considered moral predicative concepts and affirmations to be of the constructed type. In his view, real perceptions are universal, permanent, and verifiable or falsifiable, have an external and independent referent, and are worthy of demonstration. On the other hand, constructed perceptions are relative, temporary, and non-necessary, and have no independent external referent; and since they lack the condition of necessity, universality, and certainty, they are not worthy of demonstration either; since they have no external property or correspondence in the external world, they are false, but of the kind of useful falsehoods (Tabatabai, 1393: 388-389; 394-395). The usefulness of these constructeds is also due to their practical benefits. In contrast, real perceptions are in no way dependent on conventions, and individual and social likes and dislikes—whether before society or after society—do not tarnish the existential and epistemic dignity of this type of concepts and affirmations.

Furthermore, in the domain of moral language, unlike many who defend moral skepticism[5] and also accept non-cognitivism[6], Mackie is a cognitivist[7] and believes that our meta-ethical intuitions regarding moral language favor their truth and falsity, and that the mere "capability"—and not the "attainment"—of verification and falsification is sufficient to consider a cognitive stance—only at the level of concepts—for moral language (Kashmiri, 1394: 1). Nevertheless, in his view, although moral language has the "capability" of verification and falsification, since no moral properties exist in the external world, they are all false and erroneous. At the same time, Mackie believes that the assumption of these propositions and the projection of these internal values onto the external realm is due to their practical utility, arising from the fulfillment of needs and based on the attainment of benefit and the repulsion of harm (Akhavan, 1395: 160).

1- The Theory of Constructed Perceptions

1- 1- Types of Perceptions

Philosophers divide perceptions into presential and acquired. In presential perceptions, the very object of perception is present to the perceiver. In this type of perception, there is no mediation of concepts; hence, it falls under self-evident truths. In acquired perceptions, it is not the object itself but its form and essence that is present to the knower. Acquired knowledge is itself divided into real and constructed.

1-1-1- Real Perceptions

By real perceptions is meant that category of apprehensions which directly pertain to the realities existing in the world and have no relation to behaviors, actions, and deeds (Tabatabai, 1370: 283). In fact, this type of knowledge falls within the domain of theoretical rationality and does not include practical rationality with its various branches. These perceptions speak of matters whose existence, non-existence, and quality do not depend on human likes and dislikes and are obtained through the five senses. Mental conceptions are the very real concepts that the mind has grasped by attending to the external world, such that no effect of external existents is attributed to them. Therefore, as long as it is in the mind, the term "perception" applies to it; for this reason, since it pertains to an existent in the external world that has real effects, it is called "real." In the sense that unless something exists externally, our mind is incapable of such a perception (Shariati Najafabadi, 1390: 250).

1-1-2- Constructed Perceptions

According to Allameh Tabatabai, social life is not only impossible without constructeds, but every human being, in their most basic and essential needs, willingly or unwillingly, engages in construction (Olyaei, 1389: 97; Tabatabai, 1388: 255). To the extent that it can be said constructeds are a requisite of every voluntary act. In defining constructed perceptions, he states: "This mental act can be delimited and said that the aforementioned act is to give the limit of one thing to another thing by means of emotional factors; for the purpose of arranging effects that are related to their own emotional factors" (Tabatabai, 1390, a: 116). That is, to take something that is not really an instance of a concept and make it an instance of it, so as to arrange practical effects upon it. This mental act exists only within the context of action, because it finds no meaning and no construction takes place beyond external influence and affection.

Construction is an act; an act performed by the constructor and requiring a goal. Although this goal has no counterpart in the external world. However, it should be noted that what is meant by the act of construction is not the description of the subject or predicate, but rather the description of the proposition and, in fact, the judgment (Kashmiri, 1394: 6).

1-2- Types of Constructed Meanings

At least five meanings are intended by the concept of "constructive perception" (iʿtibārī): (1) constructive in the social sciences (Tabatabai, 2006: 201); (2) constructive in the rational sciences (constructive in the sense of secondary intelligibles); (3) constructive as opposed to fundamental (aṣīl); (4) constructive in the sense of dependent existence; (5) and constructive in the sense of realization within the context of action. The latter meaning of constructive perceptions is the one Allameh has in mind in the theory of constructive perceptions in the sixth article of The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism. According to this meaning, construction (iʿtibār) is a conception or assent that is not realized outside the context of action and is, in truth, nothing but a metaphor (Tabatabai, 2011, d, vol. 3: 153). Such perceptions are constructed for individual and social purposes throughout life. Thus, no will or act issues from a human being through mere true thoughts. Conversely, without constructive knowledge, which arises before every action, no act can issue from a human being either (Nabavian, 2011: 121-122).

1-3- Divisions of Constructive Perceptions

Since this article pursues the evaluative and ethical aspects of the topic of constructive perceptions, we will examine the sections that encompass this aspect more thoroughly. Therefore, it is fitting to independently address the semantics of these sections, their domain of use, whether they are true or constructive, and Allameh's reasons, and also to refer to the divisions of constructive perceptions from these perspectives.

1-3-1- Constructive Perceptions in the General and Specific Sense

Constructive perceptions in the general sense stand in contrast to quiddities and are also referred to as abstracted concepts (intizāʿīyāt). Constructive perceptions in the specific sense are practical constructive perceptions that a human being creates in the context of action (Tabatabai, 2011, a: 123). Allameh's intention in the discussion of constructive perceptions is the second type.

1-3-2- Fixed Constructive Perceptions and Variable Constructive Perceptions

According to Allameh's view, constructive perceptions in the specific sense are the effects of feelings and motivations proportionate to the active faculties, and in terms of fixity and non-fixity, they are also subordinate to them. Since feelings are divided into two categories, fixed and variable, constructive perceptions are consequently also divided into two categories, fixed and variable ( , 1984: 138; Tabatabai, 2011, a: 123). His argument for this claim is a reference to innate inclinations. He points out that the inclination toward good and the avoidance of evil exist innately in human beings, and from this discussion, he concludes that given fixed innate inclinations, the constructive perceptions related to them are also fixed, and inclinations that are subject to conditions and non-innate cause the construction of variable constructive perceptions (Tabatabai, 1983: 137-140).

1-3-3- Constructive Perceptions Before and After Society

Whether a human being is in society or not, some constructions are never suspended. "The construction of constructive sciences is the effect of the exigency of the natural and genetic active faculties of the human being, and it is clear that the activity of these faculties, or some of them, is not limited or dependent on society. According to Allameh Tabatabai's view, constructive perceptions are divided, by the first division, into two types: 1- Constructive perceptions before society; 2- Constructive perceptions after society" (Tabatabai, 2014: 202; Tabatabai, 2011, a: 125). The distinguishing feature of these two types is that constructive perceptions before society rely on the individual human; but constructive perceptions after society are dependent on the collective (Shariati Sabzevari, n.d., vol. 2: 305-306). Another difference is that in every contact with an act, a human being has no escape from constructive perceptions before society and brings them into existence through the very connection of human nature with matter in the act; hence, they never disappear and no change occurs in their essence, unlike constructive perceptions after society (Tabatabai, 2006: 322).

3-2-1- Constructive Perceptions Before Society

Constructive perceptions before society are divided into several categories:

1-3-2-1- The Construction of Obligation (Ought)

This construction is in fact the very necessity present in “ought,” and “ought” here means necessity (Misbah Yazdi, 2007: 53). Every living being stands between itself and its actions. Thus, every action that issues from an agent is issued with belief in the principle of obligation (Tabatabai, 2011, a: 124). Of course, it must be borne in mind that what is meant by necessity here is philosophical necessity, not logical necessity. Unlike logical necessity, which pertains to the realm of the mind, philosophical necessity pertains to the world of existence (Kashmiri, 2015: 15).

1-3-2-2- The Construction of Goodness and Badness

Human creation is such that it attracts what is agreeable to its nature and repels what is repugnant to its nature. Therefore, “goodness” and “badness” mean that very agreeableness and disagreeableness with the perceptive faculties, which exists in all human beings (Tabatabai, 1995: 204). The construction of goodness and badness, which in Allameh’s terms is “the immediate offspring of obligation” (Tabatabai, 2014: 203), like “ought” and “ought not,” belongs to the category of general constructions prior to society (Tabatabai, 1995, a: 173; Tabatabai, 2011, a: 127).

Concerning the metaphysics of ethics and the debate over whether goodness and badness are essential or rational—one of the most protracted discussions between the Ash‘arite and Mu‘tazilite schools (Fanai, 2005: 23)—Allameh, although he affirms rational goodness and badness and holds a cognitivist and supra-religious stance in moral epistemology, adopts a position similar to the Ash‘arites in ontology and considers the world devoid of moral facts. He offers reasons in favor of the constructed nature of goodness and badness, including: (1) moral goodness and badness differ across societies and among various individuals; therefore, it is relative (Javadi, 1996: 186-187); (2) another reason is that when “ought” is constructed for an action, that is, that action appears “good,” and this agreeableness is constructed (Shariati Sabzevari, n.d.: 280), otherwise it would be necessarily issued or perpetually issued, whereas this is not the case (Sarai, 2012: 60); (3) another argument is that the description of constructed matters is necessarily constructed (Tabatabai, 2014: 203).

1-3-2-3- The Construction of Choosing the Lighter and Easier

Whenever a human being finds themselves at a crossroads where all paths lead to a single result, but some of those paths are more difficult and some easier, they choose the less costly and more easily accessible path (Tabatabai, 2011, a: 139). This construction, which is another expression of instrumental rationality[8], is, in his view, rooted in human nature. The reason for this type of construction is also that a laborious task, although it becomes the object of the active faculties, is naturally incompatible with the active faculties. The result is that the obligation of a laborious task is, for the active faculty, in the form and on the condition of the absence of a less laborious task; otherwise, it inclines toward the lighter task. On this basis, many constructions in all individual and social aspects of human life have undergone change and transformation. For example, early humans ate raw meat and grass to satisfy hunger, but modern humans are not merely concerned with being full, and this has led to the complexity of their lives (Tabatabai, 2014: 203).

1-3-2-4- The Principle of Utilization and Society

Humans seek assistance from everything that leads to the attainment of their goals and ends. Therefore, it is clear that this principle is among the constructions prior to society, and essentially, the secret of the formation of societies and even the constructions born from them is the product of this principle; for if the principle of utilization did not exist, there would be no society either (Tabatabai, 2014: 205; Tabatabai, 2011, b: 294).

3-2-2- Constructions After Society

Since the number of this category of constructions is too great to be addressed in full, and also because addressing this part of the constructions falls outside the mission of this article, their explanation is omitted.

1-4- Constituents of Constructed Perceptions

It is now necessary to address the features and components of this theory. It should be noted that these components are all among the constituents of the theory of constructions and also include ethical constructions, which are a specific type of constructions.

1- The distinguishing feature of real perceptions is that they have a noumenal and actual referent in the external world, and their truth or falsity can be assessed; however, constructed perceptions have no noumenal or external correspondence whatsoever (Cultural Congress on the Anniversary of the Passing of Allameh Tabatabai, 1984: 151); for example, the proposition “Truth-telling is good” is a proposition that, firstly, has no domain whatsoever for determining its truth or falsity and is fundamentally not truth-apt; secondly, the relation between subject and predicate is a constructed matter, dependent on the convention of the speaker.

But as previously mentioned, in Allameh’s view, constructed perceptions are of the genus of propositions[9], not pseudo-propositions (Soroush, 1991: 346); therefore, they are truth-apt. It is true that in his view, instead of speaking of the truth or falsity of these perceptions, one should speak of their being futile or non-futile (Tabatabai, 2014: 174), but according to the explanation he gives of the nature of these propositions, if we present these statements to the external world, their falsity becomes apparent. More precisely, they have the possibility of truth[10] but lack truth-value[11]. This is the very important commonality that this view shares with Mackie’s error theory, which we will address in the comparison section of this research.

To clarify this important point, Allameh draws upon literary metaphors (Tabatabai, 2011, Vol. 8: 54). According to his analysis of constructed perceptions, this type of perception is of the same kind and category as metaphors, and since in metaphors, logical or epistemological truth and falsity fundamentally have no relevance (or even instrumental value), this category of perceptions is likewise. Of course, it goes without saying that in various types of metaphors, we seek to excite and motivate the audience, and we have a practical purpose and aim, and this is the very point we must keep in mind when analyzing the nature of constructed perceptions (Tabatabai, 2014: 158-159). Therefore, from the above consideration, it emerges that the justification underlying this type of action is the attainment of utility and practical results. For this reason, “if a scholar, from the viewpoint of realism, were to confront the task of distinguishing and recognizing the correspondence or non-correspondence of concepts and determining the truth or falsity of propositions with these metaphorical concepts and propositions, he would find their singular terms non-correspondent with their referents and their compounds [would judge] their propositions to be false. Because the external referent of the word ‘lion’ is a predatory animal, not a human, and the referent of the word ‘moon’ is a celestial sphere, not a terrestrial beauty” (Tabatabai, 2014: 160). To demonstrate that there is a serious difference between these two types of “non-correspondence,” Allameh provides a criterion for distinguishing them. He considers this criterion to be “emotional-affective influence” which has external and real effects. Thus, “the aforementioned scholar will see a difference between these two types of error and falsehood, which is that real error and falsehood have no effect, whereas poetic error and falsehood have real and actual effects, because they entail the excitation of inner feelings and the external effects consequent upon inner feelings” (Tabatabai, 2014: 161-162).

2- Since the nature of feelings is based on instability and the possibility of expansion and contraction always exists, consequently, the judgments and propositions based on them also remain valid only as long as these feelings themselves exist; otherwise, those judgments and propositions will be negated by the removal of their subject (Olyaei, 2010: 136).

3- The word “illusory” is attributed to practical and constructed perceptions and thoughts; because none of those perceptions is an image of a real matter, nor do they report a noumenal truth, and they have no referent other than what the human being has assumed within the vessel of their own imagination (Tabatabai, 2006: 233). On the other hand, Allameh Tabatabai, in the fifth article of The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism, in the discussion of knowledge and perception, believes that it is impossible for the mind to create an image entirely on its own, in a completely fabricated and inventive manner, whether that concept has a real referent (realities) or not (constructed perceptions).

4- Although these concepts and meanings are not real and actual, since the philosophy of their emergence is practical desires, they have real and external effects. Therefore, it can be said that if we suppose one of these illusory meanings to have no external effect, it would not be of this type of meaning and would be a real error or real falsehood, and futile. Whereas these meanings are never futile (Tabatabai, 2006: 161).

5- Since this type of perceptions arises from emotional factors, they cannot have a connection with true knowledge. In other words, constructed perceptions cannot have a “productive connection” with true perceptions. In fact, this logical law is one of the most important teachings of the laws of thought. In explaining productive connection, it must be said that in order to make an unknown known, the mind uses its prior knowledge and information as a means and transforms the unknown into the known, thereby adding to its knowledge, and this progression continues. However, regarding the possibility of a productive connection among perceptions, it must be said that the well-known view of the ancients concerning the relationship among true forms of knowledge is that a productive relationship is only possible between two or more true perceptions. But since in constructed perceptions, the relationship between the two sides of a proposition is conventional and hypothetical, and the constructor has devised it to achieve a goal, the only rational rule applied in constructed matters is the utility or non-utility of the construct (Ramezani, 1387: 174). Therefore, although these propositions are not suitable for demonstration in its specific sense, this does not mean they lack status and function in the realm of ethics; for one can speak of the practical justification and the motivational-emotive role of these statements. A feature that is one of the difficulties facing moral realists, and according to non-realists, it is not possible for realists to explain this feature; because in purely declarative propositions, it is difficult to explain the motivating aspect of this class of propositions.

2- Error Theory

Moral non-realism began roughly with the views of Ayer, a famous member of the Vienna Circle of positivists, and G. E. Moore also inadvertently paved the way for its expansion (Tavakoli, 1391: 7). Most criticisms of moral realism originate from positivist positions. The rejection of moral realism had problems, one of which was its incompatibility with the moral and common intuitions of people; such that there were still unanswered questions. Such critiques and problems prompted them to offer a new interpretation of moral language. Hence, they considered the structure of moral language to be pseudo-propositional; that is, we superficially think these are propositions, but in truth, the pseudo-propositional structure of morality has fueled the illusion that there are moral facts in the external world, and “this false assumption has caused moral philosophers to engage in a futile and vain effort to attain these facts. Whereas, moral sentences are either of the creative (insha'i) type or are fundamentally speech acts; and in any case, they lack truth-value” (ibid: 8). But this answer also had corrupt consequences that did not escape the notice of realists; incompatibility and corrupt consequences, including that this conception of moral language did not align with its functions in logic—functions that could not be justified except by accepting the declarative aspect of this language (ibid). In the midst of this, John Mackie tried to remain immune from the incompatibilities raised by realists while maintaining a belief in non-realism. In the domain of moral language, unlike other anti-realists, he adopted a cognitivist position and believed that these propositions are all truth-apt. In his view, since no moral property exists for these propositions to successfully refer to, they all systematically fail. Thus, while believing in cognitivism, he still adheres to his view regarding moral metaphysics, and error theory thus escapes many criticisms (Kashmiri, 1394: 27).

Error theory is, in fact, a path that says we are not faced with a dilemma between non-realism and non-cognitivism; rather, one can speak of a third way regarding moral metaphysics, which is neither a non-cognitivist position nor a realist one. Some of Mackie's arguments, advanced in favor of the world being devoid of values, are shared among other anti-realists, and some are independently and separately his own innovations. The set of arguments concerning the “queerness of values” can be considered Mackie's specific theory.

2-1- Arguments for Error Theory

Unlike the view of the majority of moral skeptics, Mackie is a cognitivist[12] in the domain of moral language and considers the truth-aptness[13] of moral judgments and propositions to be justified (Akhavan, 1395: 148). At the same time, he strongly defends an anti-realist position (Risberg, 2020: 1). He holds that belief in truth is conditional upon the existence of a property in the external world as the correspondent of the proposition, and since he believes that no moral property[14] is to be found in the external world, all such propositions in the realm of morality are erroneous and non-correspondent with reality (Miller, 2003: 116-117; Miandari, 1390: 68). He also puts forward and defends moral subjectivism[15]. He does, however, attend to the important point that the model of subjectivism he defends differs from the subjectivism common in the literature of analytic philosophers. In his view, common subjectivism is primarily concerned with semantic and linguistic analyses, whereas his position is a defense of a kind of ontological subjectivism that stands in opposition to moral objectivism (Mackie, 1977: 18). He also describes and explains the mechanism and process of validation in human beings within the social arena, arguing that all these moral values and rules are constructed by human beings and serve to meet their practical needs (Mackie, 1977: 199).

1-2-1- The Dependence of Truth on the Existence of Moral Properties

Mackie believes that the act of objectification can be valid if it aligns with our desires. Therefore, this explanation contains at least two main points: first, that we are justified in our moral beliefs as long as they satisfy our desires, and the justification offered in favor of this validity is practical justification[16]; second, that we have here detached "goodness" from its original place—which is our desirability and liking—and applied it where it does not truly belong; yet we are justified in this process, because a significant part of this process consists of the exigencies and requirements of social life (Mackie, 1977: 199).

1-2-2- The Difference in Method Between Analyzing Objective and Conceptual Propositions

Mackie believes that although ontological conclusions cannot be drawn from moral descriptions, later analytic moral philosophy has been largely occupied with linguistic analyses and has conflated judgments pertaining to conceptual analysis[17] with objective [ontological] analysis[18], whereas the level of linguistic analyses must be distinguished from ontological analyses (Mackie, 1379: 197). He clarifies that he defends the position of subjectivism in the domain of values not as a linguistic idea, but as an ontological theory; for subjectivism in metaethics is primarily concerned with semantic and linguistic analyses, which is not his focus, and he advances his discussions around the nature, quality, and existence or non-existence of moral values (Lossau, 2022: 12). Nevertheless, his discussion of moral language is important in his project insofar as it relates more to the ontology of values. In the domain of moral linguistics, he believes that although no objective property exists in the external world to which we can refer for assessing the truth or falsity of moral judgments, our linguistic conventions rule in favor of the cognitivism of moral language[19]. The result is that, in Mackie's view, cognitivism is compatible with anti-realism[20] (Akhavan, 1395: 150), and in his opinion, the fact that human beings have moral beliefs that purport to refer to the external world is consistent with the view that all such beliefs are erroneous/false (McCord, 2010: 467).

1-2-3- The Lack of Provision for Objective Moral Values in the Structure of the World

According to Mackie, absolute value, including moral values, does not exist in the world. To prove this ontological claim^[21] he generally employs two arguments: the argument from queerness and the argument from inference to the best explanation and moral disagreement (since the argument from inference to the best explanation and the argument from disagreement share the same subject, we will explain it in another section). A brief account of each follows:

1-2-3-1. The Argument from Queerness^[22]

This argument comprises four distinct arguments: the queerness of objective moral values,^[23] the queerness of the mode of knowing objective moral values,^[24] the queerness of the supervenience^[25] of moral properties upon natural features, and the queerness of the motivating character of natural data^[26] (Mackie, 1977: 38-41).

1-1-3. The Queerness of Objective Moral Values

Moral values are different from the things we experience around us (Olson, 2014: 85). In Mackie's view, moral values, if they existed, would be entities entirely different from other entities/facts with which we are familiar. Therefore, these values are queer and unusual entities (Mackie, 1977: 38).

2-1-3. The Queerness of the Mode of Knowing Objective Moral Values

To know moral ought-judgments, a person must take an unconventional path (Fanaei, 2003: 12). This epistemic path must be made possible through moral perception^[27] or intuition.^[28] But such a path is distinct from the usual ways of acquiring knowledge (Mackie, 1977: 38). Therefore, instead of resorting to queer methods, it is better to believe that moral values do not fundamentally exist. In fact, since one of Mackie's important presuppositions is naturalism, for him only beliefs derived from sensory experience are valid. Another presupposition of his is that if someone believes in objective moral beliefs with moral objects, they are necessarily compelled to also assume a separate faculty and epistemic path. Thus, because of these two untested presuppositions, he considers belief in moral values to be a source of epistemic wonder.

3-1-3. The Queerness of the Supervenience of Moral Properties upon Natural Findings

In his view, assuming the existence of moral values, the manner in which value properties are attributed to natural/non-value things is incomprehensible and inexplicable. For example, when we consider torture to be a morally ugly/wrong/vicious act, the manner of the connection and supervenience of viciousness/ugliness/wrongness upon the natural act of "torture" is strange. By natural matters, he means that which "scientifically fits into a naturalistic worldview" (Olson, 2014: 88). It is on this basis that Mackie considers any attribution and connection of moral properties to natural data to be queer (Fanaei, 2003: 12). In fact, in this argument, even assuming the existence of moral values, we are faced with something astonishing/unacceptable.

4-1-3. The Queerness of the Motivating Character of Natural Data

Mackie's argument in this case, in brief, is as follows: (First premise) Moral beliefs are intrinsically motivating; (Second premise) Natural beliefs do not possess such a motivating property; (Conclusion) Therefore, moral beliefs are not natural beliefs (Tavakoli, 1391: 16). Hence, realists are incapable of providing a motivational explanation for moral judgments. So it is better to fundamentally deny the existence of objective values and believe in the subjectivity of values (Mackie, 1977: 40). Therefore, according to the above argument, assuming anti-realism, the motivating characteristic of moral propositions and judgments can be better explained.

1-2-3-2. Inference to the Best Explanation^[29] and Moral Disagreement[30]

According to Mackie, the existence of widespread moral disagreements testifies that there is fundamentally no moral reality to which disputing parties could refer in order to provide satisfactory answers to their questions (Kashmiri, 1394: 35). In Mackie's view, the pervasiveness of moral disputes over fundamental moral values and rules yields no conclusion other than the absence of such rules and values, and the secret of these disagreements must be sought elsewhere (the subjectivity of values) rather than in a futile effort to discover them. Likewise, many defenders of the error theory, following Mackie, believe that to understand and explain the breadth and diversity of serious disagreements in moral theories, we must choose a path that is internally and externally more coherent and simpler (with minimal metaphysical presuppositions) than other explanatory paths (Olson, 2014: 88). In Mackie's explanatory theory as well, the non-existence of moral facts provides a more parsimonious explanation of moral phenomena (Fanaei, 2003: 19). Therefore, the best explanation for these disagreements is that they are apparently disagreements but really differences in taste. Although the argument from disagreement and the argument from the best explanation are both thematically directed at the same matter (disagreement), we must consider them as independent arguments; for the former is supposed to logically deduce non-realism from the existence of disagreements, and the latter, in a conjectural manner, considers non-realism to be the best explanation of this fact.

1-2-4- Projection[31] in Explaining Belief in Moral Realism

Mackie believes that in order to attribute to the world things that do not exist in it, human beings employ the mind's objectification^[32] function. Since "denying objective values can provoke an extreme emotional reaction, and people consider a world devoid of objective values to be a meaningless world, in order to give meaning to the world, they project their own subjective affairs onto the objective world and endow them with objectivity" (Hosseini Ghaleh Bahman, 1383: 37-38). He clarifies, of course, that even with various arguments in favor of non-realism, human beings are inevitably compelled to fabricate and create moralities in the social arena, and a kind of practical necessity forces them to resort to and follow constructed rules (Lassau, 2022: 11). In his view, "we need morality to regulate and moderate interpersonal relations. Therefore, objective validity creates the necessary obligatoriness of these judgments" (Mackie, 1977: 42-43).

Thus, as long as moral beliefs satisfy human desires, these beliefs are practically justified^[33].

3- A Comparative-Analytical Study of Error Theory and Constructed Perceptions

In this section, we attempt to compare these two theories from relevant aspects. These aspects fall into four categories: theoretical ethics[34], practical ethics[35], the language of ethics, and moral epistemology. Our effort is to provide, at the beginning of each section, a concise explanation of the core views of proponents and opponents of the aforementioned positions, to describe the locus of their dispute, and then to re-examine the application and comparison of the two theories of constructed perceptions and error theory within the context of those accounts.

3-1- Realism and Anti-Realism in Theoretical Ethics

In theoretical realism and anti-realism, the discussion concerns the existence/non-existence or the “mode” of existence of moral properties, their quality and nature. The debates surrounding this duality are primarily and essentially about the metaphysics of ethics, and secondarily and incidentally encompass the semantic, epistemological, and even psychological aspects of ethics. Realists hold the view that moral propositions are primarily and essentially declarative, descriptive, and indicative of reality, and secondarily and incidentally, they have or can have a prescriptive and obligatory character. In contrast, anti-realists believe that these statements are primarily and essentially imperative, performative, and recommendatory, and secondarily and incidentally, they are or can be descriptive and declarative (Dabbagh, 1391: 40-41). Although moral realism has various narratives, perhaps the common denominator of all of them can be considered the belief in the “existence” or “reality” of moral properties, a belief that is denied in moral anti-realism.

The common denominator of the moral realists’ position is support for these two beliefs: first, moral claims are propositions that are inter-subjectively true or false, and second, some of these propositions are genuinely/really true. For this reason, the position of moral cognitivism[36], which holds that moral propositions are truth-apt, constitutes one of the components (belief a) of moral realism; although the converse is not necessarily the case;[37] because anti-realists deny at least one of the two main and central pillars of the realists (Kashmiri, 1394: 42).

It should be noted that although moral non-cognitivists and anti-realists also speak in some way of the relation and connection of propositions to the external world so that they may guide our action in some manner, their difference from realists lies in the “how” of these relations. In moral realism, we seek the “correspondent” signification of these propositions, not their “connotative” or “implicative” signification. From the perspective of moral realists, the correspondent signification of moral propositions is found in the world, and alongside it, other significations, including connotative and implicative significations (such as imperative, motivational aspects, etc.), may also exist; but anti-realists believe that the correspondent signification of this category of propositions does not or cannot exist in the external world. Therefore, the explanations of the point of contention between realists and anti-realists concern the possibility/realization of the correspondent signification of these propositions, not the other types of significations they may have.

In light of and based on the preceding explanations, the formulations of the two theories—the error theory and the theory of constructed perceptions—become clearer. According to Allameh Tabatabai, if we present moral propositions to the external world, since they lack a real and true external correspondent, their falsehood becomes apparent (Tabatabai, 1370: 283), and he set forth the secret of the falsehood of these judgments through several arguments in favor of the non-existence of moral facts. One of his reasons was that the description of constructed matters is necessarily constructed (Saraei, 1391: 60). Another reason is that moral "goodness" and "badness" differ across societies and individuals, and are therefore relative (Javadi, 1375: 186-187). Then another reason is that when an "ought" is constructed for an action, that is, the action appears "good," and this congruity is constructed; otherwise, that action would be necessarily occurring or perpetually occurring, whereas this is not the case (Saraei, 1391: 60). To put it more clearly, both Allameh Tabatabai, according to the aforementioned arguments and the account we have given of his view, and Mackie, in his arguments from queerness, deny the existence of ethical-style properties such as good/bad, virtue/vice, beauty/ugliness, ought/ought not, right/wrong, and so on, which have a predicative role in moral propositions. However, it should not be overlooked that although Allameh Tabatabai speaks of the constructed nature of ethics, his belief in fixed constructed perceptions, which are rooted in human genesis and nature, prevents ethical relativism; for fixed constructed perceptions in a way prevent the fabrication of any moral rule or judgment. On the other hand, one of Mackie's most important arguments in defense of the error theory is the ontological queerness of ethical properties (Akhavan, 1395: 154). In this way, since moral values differ from what we generally experience and feel in our surrounding environment, they are therefore mysterious and strange entities (Olson, 2014: 85); because, based on the "idea of Ockham's razor"[38], rationality requires us to explain the world by assuming as few entities as possible and not to clutter existence without cause. Another reason of Mackie's is his appeal to disagreement in moral judgments, in which respect he concurs with Allameh Tabatabai's argument. Mackie also presents another form of his argument as the argument from the best explanation (Akhavan, 1395: 159). Here too, according to Ockham's principle, the best explanation is the one that is more economical and less costly (Olson, 2014: 88). Another argument of Mackie's is the motivational queerness of ethics, according to which, since natural propositions lack the property of motivation, moral propositions, which are motivating, cannot be natural (Akhavan, 1395: 175).

Based on the above explanations, both Allameh Tabatabai and John Mackie are in agreement and share the same view in denying the metaphysical aspect of ethics. Yet, despite this commonality, they have a fateful point of divergence, and that is the belief in fixed constructed perceptions, which in a way prevents slipping into the abyss of relativity. To elaborate, in the error theory, no theoretical provision has been devised to prevent sliding into ethical relativism[39]. Although Mackie believes that by developing rule-based utilitarianism[40] we can provide a consequentialist (of the rule-based variety) justification for evaluative matters such as rights, duties, virtuousness, and so on (Mackie, 1977: 199), in our opinion, this is a claim that is incompatible with Mackie's naturalistic and entirely constructed foundations and is not resolved by expanding and changing the meaning of utility/consequence. With fixed constructed perceptions, which are rooted in human nature and prevent normative and principled chaos, a secure foundation can be provided for the aforementioned concepts, whereas with the error theory, this possibility is not theoretically available; for, assuming utilitarianism, one can still ask the serious question: if the aggregate interests of the majority are secured or their harms averted, why should we not trample upon the rights of a minority? This question can also be raised regarding other moral concepts such as rights and unconditional moral duties that have an absolute character. A question that is, of course, justifiable with a belief in fixed constructed perceptions, not in the absolute negation of values (both fixed and variable) that exists in the error theory.

3-2- Realism and Anti-Realism in Practical Ethics

Regarding the principle of moral living and commitment, there is also dispute among moral philosophers. Since the acceptance of morality and a morality-based life is among voluntary actions, and voluntary actions can in principle be subject to evaluative oughts and ought-nots, including rational norms, the epistemic agent[41] is therefore obliged to follow a justified reason in exercising their volition. In other words, the question is whether a moral agent can also be a rational agent. What answers can we give to the question “Why should one be moral?” Philosophers fall into two camps in answering this question: those who affirm the rationality of morality and those who are moral skeptics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Moral Skepticism”).

Defenders of the rationality of morality, despite their differences, fall into two groups: the first group believes that the above question is fundamentally meaningless and, in the words of George Edward Moore, we are faced with a closed question;[42] for rational obligatoriness is embedded within the meaning and concept of morality, and the correct formulation of this question becomes “Why should one have moral rationality?” or “Why should one be rational?”. For this group of philosophers, the relationship between rationality and morality is a necessary and internal one. These philosophers’ answer is “not to answer,” and they see its solution as dependent on dissolving it. They consider the internalist[43] position on the relationship between rationality and morality to be justified and see no need for separate reasons to justify the rationality of morality (Kashmiri, 1394: 47-48). The second group believes that the rational justification of an action is different from its moral justification, defending externalism[44] regarding moral life. They deny a necessary relationship between rational considerations and moral considerations. Rationally, they see themselves as obliged to provide independent rational reasons outside the realm of morality for moral living/commitment. Externalists on moral rationality themselves divide into two groups: some, while believing the question of the principle of morality is open, believe that reasons can be provided in its favor. Some of these reasons are theological, some are prudential, some legal, and so on. On the other hand, some believe there is no satisfactory answer for the very act of moral living. Hence, regarding the relationship between rationality and morality, they believe that rational reasons cannot be provided for adhering to moral reasons. In this view, morality has no rational backing, and a life based on it is contrary to rationality (Kashmiri, 1394: 48).

Now, although error theory and the theory of constructed perceptions (iʿtibāriyyāt) theoretically fall under anti-realist theories, regarding the rationality of morality and the principle of reasonableness, moral life is not anti-realist, and both theories defend the reasonableness of morality; for there is no necessary relationship or entailment between belief in theoretical moral anti-realism and practical moral anti-realism, although the reverse is not the case.

Under the discussion of “the necessity of construction (iʿtibār)” in The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism, Allameh speaks in detail of the human need for constructed ideas, and the bulk of his reasons have an instrumental and pragmatist aspect, to the extent that, in his view, individual and social human life cannot be organized without these ideas. There are certain individual needs in humans that create a set of constructed perceptions, and there are certain social needs in humans that cause the act of construction. He also defines good and evil (ḥusn and qubḥ) as congruity with nature and agreement with purposes and goals. This itself indicates that moral judgments possess rationality; for they all have an instrumental and practical status. Therefore, the justification in favor of the rationality of morality is consequentialist and prudential.

John Mackie also defends a more or less similar theory. Although his error theory turns away from theoretical moral realism, it does not conclude in the invalidity of morality. Mackie only rejects theoretical moral realism. He distinguishes between a broad and a narrow sense of morality and rejects only one of these two. According to the broad sense, morality refers to the set of practical principles and guidelines that humans construct (Mackie, 1977: 199). He also places serious emphasis on the utility of believing in and committing to morality and following conventions (Kashmiri, 1394: 49). Mackie does not, in general, negate morality or moral rationality. He also mentions a social criterion for the validity of morality. Mackie says: “We need morality to regulate interpersonal relations and to control some of the things people do to one another—often in opposition to conflicting inclinations. We therefore want our moral judgments to be authoritative for ourselves and for other agents as well” (Mackie, 1977: 42). In his models of objectification[45], Mackie also considers social desires and conventions as a basis for morality and its rationality (Mackie, 1977: 43). As was explained, he considers humans compelled to establish morality and specifies that even if we disagree with a moral system, we might set about changing it, but we cannot deny it and set it aside; because we need it (Lassau, 2022: 11). Consequently, in their metaethical theories, although Allameh and Mackie oppose theoretical moral realism, they defend pragmatic moral realism, and the defense they make of moral rationality is based on individual and/or collective utility and expediency.

3-3- Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism in Moral Language

In the dispute between moral cognitivists and moral non-cognitivists, the contention is over the nature, function, and primary meaning and the corresponding referent of those propositions, not over their nature, function, and secondary meanings and their implicative and connotative referents. The question is whether the relation and connection of moral judgments and propositions to the external world is of the type of a necessary-concomitant relationship or of the type of a correspondence relationship?

Commenting on moral language without considering moral metaphysics is an incomplete analysis. Armstrong considers skepticism about moral truth to be among the skepticisms that have both a linguistic and a metaphysical aspect. He formulates skepticism in the domain of moral language as follows: “Skepticism about moral truth means that no genuine moral belief is true. This claim is usually based on one of these three claims: (1) Skepticism about moral truth-aptness:[46] a genuine moral belief is not the sort of thing that can be correct or incorrect; (2) Skepticism about moral truth-value:[47] no moral belief is truly either correct or incorrect; (3) Skepticism with moral error: every genuine moral belief is incorrect and false. Since these three types of skepticism are not directly about knowledge or justification, they cannot be considered epistemological skepticism. Instead, these are theories about truth, and are therefore based on theories of moral language or moral metaphysics” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “moral skepticism”).

With the aid of the above discussion, we can better articulate the dichotomy of cognitivism and non-cognitivism. To consider a metaethical theory concerning moral language as belonging to the cognitivist camp, we must (1) provide an explanation of the nature of moral judgments as well as their meaning and content that demonstrates those judgments and propositions have the capacity and possibility of being true or false, and (2) if the truth or falsity of those judgments is also actualized, we have also come to believe in the truth-value of those propositions; (3) now, in the third step, we face a dilemma: the first path is that the actuality of these propositions is such that at least some true propositions can be found among them. Believers in this can be called "realists." The second path is to believe in the necessary falsity of all these judgments, without at least one true proposition. The first path, which leads to moral realism, we call "success theory"[48], and the second path, which is anti-realist, we call "error theory"[49].

Therefore, error theory acknowledges that moral judgments are descriptive judgments capable of being true or false, but claims that all such judgments are false. According to success theory, the truth-value of moral judgments is positive, and at least some moral judgments are true. Thus, this theory is one of the constituents of theoretical moral realism (Fanaei, 2003: 15).

The theory of constructed perceptions (iʿtibāriyyāt) also falls into the third step alongside error theory; because both theories (1) believe in truth-aptness, and (2) both believe that moral judgments and propositions can be actually true or false; (3) they also lead to moral falsity. As previously stated, Mackie adopted an intermediate position between the two camps of moral realists and moral non-cognitivists. On the one hand, he denied the existence of moral values, and on the other hand, he sympathized with the realists' view regarding the cognitive nature of moral language. Allameh Tabatabai also by no means holds a non-cognitivist position regarding language. Allameh specifies that these propositions are truly and actually false. It is evident that falsity is subordinate to having truth-value, and having truth-value is subordinate to truth-aptness.

According to Armstrong's classification, error theory and the theory of constructed perceptions share common ground in truth-aptness, in having truth-value, and ultimately in the falsity of propositions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "moral skepticism"). The opposite of these theories is success theory, which is in fact moral realism with its logical implications, such as moral cognitivism. Both the theory of constructed perceptions and error theory agree with success theory on truth-aptness and having truth-value, but what separates them is the absence of moral properties, which causes all constructed propositions and moral propositions to necessarily fail in attaining truth.

3-4- Realism and Anti-Realism in Moral Knowledge

«What makes moral skeptics skeptics is that they doubt common and widespread beliefs. Moral skeptics differ in the kinds of doubts they raise» (Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy, “Moral skepticism”). There are two main traditions in epistemological skepticism. One tradition claims that no one ever knows or can know anything. We call this type of skepticism dogmatic skepticism. Dogmatists also believe that no one is ever justified in holding any true moral belief. In contrast, Pyrrhonian skeptics have numerous doubts that lead them to avoid adopting a one-sided theory—whether someone has or does not have knowledge, or can or cannot have knowledge. They even doubt the impossibility of moral knowledge. The scope of their doubts is so vast and extensive that they make no one-sided claims (Fanaei, 2003: 15). In fact, the claim of Pyrrhonian skepticism, whether regarding moral knowledge or justified moral belief, is “non-assertion.” Therefore, a necessary consequence of such a view is genuine silence. Another consequence of this theory is that it also ties the hands of the audience, as if compelling the audience into silence; for any speech offered in support or refutation of this type of skepticism is, by the Pyrrhonian skeptical claim, subjected to the absurd agnosticism of epistemic nihilism and forces the audience into silence and non-assertion as well. In dogmatic skepticism, however, regarding moral knowledge, the discussion concerns the denial of the very principle of moral knowledge in the sense of having justified true belief. Since the pillars and constituents of knowledge in general, and moral knowledge in particular, include the three elements of justified true belief, dogmatic skepticism regarding moral knowledge targets the element of “truth” in knowledge and denies it. In this view, we are devoid of having true, veridical beliefs. But if someone denies moral knowledge, they are inevitably compelled to adopt skepticism regarding having justified moral belief as well; because in epistemological justification, evidence, indications, and reasons are supposed to be provided in favor of truth. Now, if we are devoid of the element of truth, we will consequently have no justification that could lead us to or bring us closer to the truth (Kashmiri, 1394: 55).

Now, considering the above points, it is clear that drawing a comparison between Pyrrhonian skepticism, whether regarding moral knowledge or having justified moral belief, and the two theories of error and constructed perceptions is misguided, because both theories under our examination hold a position and make claims. However, regarding dogmatic skepticism, it must be said that both the theory of constructed perceptions and the error theory are in agreement with dogmatic skepticism concerning the truth of moral judgments and the justification of moral beliefs.

As previously mentioned, Mackie believed in a version of morality based on utility and consequentialism. Allameh also defines the meaning of being constructed as realization within the context of action; realization within the context of action means being useful and aligned with the purposes and goals of those who construct them. Such perceptions are created for individual and social goals along the path of life (Tabatabai, 1374, b: 172). Therefore, within the very act of construction, the discussion is of benefit and harm, and of interests and corruptions, which seems to align with Mackie’s claim regarding pragmatic justification based on instrumental rationality.

Conclusion

In this article, we have attempted to show the thought-provoking affinities between the error theory and the theory of constructed perceptions (iʿtibāriyyāt). The theory of constructed perceptions comprises certain constitutive elements. Constructed perceptions are a class of consciousness that has no corresponding reality (muṭābaq nafs al-amrī) outside of imagination. We have placed this theory under anti-realist theories in moral ontology. Another feature of this theory was that constructed instances persist as long as human feelings and motivations exist. The third feature is their "mode of perception." Constructed perceptions fall under the category of non-veridical/constructed (iʿtibārī) acquired knowledge. The very epistemic nature of these judgments entails two logical implications: first, in moral epistemology, they attempt to convey a truth about the moral world, and second, moral propositions are also of the nature of propositions (qaḍiyya). Allameh Tabatabai considers constructed perceptions to be of the nature of propositions, although these propositions are not true and are constructed/metaphorical. Of course, while he acknowledges a fluidity (variable constructed perceptions) for morality, by attending to fixed constructed perceptions, he leaves no room for moral relativism (unlike Mackie's view, who does not conceive of a theoretical groundwork for this relativity; or to put it better, due to his epistemological and ontological foundations and assumptions, he cannot conceive of it).

The principle of moral rationality also has its roots in the typical and personal needs of humanity, which are for attracting individual and collective benefits and repelling harms. John Mackie, in his error theory, is more or less in agreement with the theory of constructed perceptions in the aforementioned areas. Through a set of arguments based on queerness and an argument from the best explanation of disagreement, he attempts to reject the existence of moral properties. While being an anti-realist, he believes in the "possibility" of truth and falsity of moral propositions, although the reason for the falsity of these propositions is the absence of moral data. He also believes in moral rationality. With the distinction he makes between two meanings of morality, he believes that due to human needs, we are entitled, and indeed obliged, to follow self-made moral rules and principles. Therefore, he considers the erroneous moral propositions that result from objectification to be valid. In the realm of moral knowledge, he also distinguishes valid from invalid moral judgments by resorting to and invoking the benefits of self-made moral rules.

The conclusion is that the theory of constructed perceptions and the error theory have thought-provoking affinities in moral language, moral metaphysics, moral knowledge, and moral rationality, and of course, this affinity is more striking in metaphysics and moral language compared to other aspects.

.

---

.

References

.

English References

Fanaei, A. (2003). The ethics of moral thinking: An Inquiry into the Problem Of Justification in Moral Epistemology. United Kingdom: University of Sheffield.

Lossau, Tammo. (2022). Mackie and the Meaning of Moral Terms. JHAP: Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy. Volume 10, Number 1.

Mackie, J. (1982). The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the existence of God. New York: Oxford University Press Inc.

Mackie, J. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin Books.

McCord, G. (2010). Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.

Miller, A. (2003). An introduction to contemporary Metaethics. United Kingdom: Blackwell.

Olson, J. (2014). Moral Error Theory; History, critique, defence. United Kingdom: Oxford University press.

Risberg, Olle; Folke Tersman. (2020). Moral Realism and the Argument from Skepticism. Brill (10): 283-303.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Moral Skepticism”.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Moral Anti-Realism”.

.

---

.

Persian Sources

Akhavan, Mehdi; et al. (1395). The Errors of John Mackie's Error Theory. Ta'ammolāt-e Falsafi. 6 (16): 145–171.

Olyaei, Mansoureh. (1389). Social Reality and Constructed Perceptions. Tehran: Publications of the Research Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought.

Tavakoli, Gholamhossein. (1391). Error Theory in Moral Philosophy; Explanation and Critique. Hekmat va Falsafeh, (3), 7-28.

Javadi, Mohsen. (1374). The Eternity of Moral Principles and the Theory of Constructed Perceptions. Ma'refat (15), 22 – 26.

Javadi, Mohsen. (1375). The Problem of Ought and Is. Qom: Publishing Center of the Islamic Propagation Office of the Qom Seminary.

Haeri Yazdi, Mehdi. (1384). Inquiries in Practical Reason (Second Edition). Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy.

Hosseini Ghaleh Bahman, Akbar. (1383). Moral Realism in the Twentieth Century. Qom: Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute.

Hosseini Ghaleh Bahman, Seyed Akbar. (1391). A Critique and Examination of J.L. Mackie's Error Theory in Metaethics Based on the Principles of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli. Esra', 5 (2), 27-52.

Dabbagh, Soroush. (1391). Realism, Anti-Realism, and Kant's Moral Position. Andisheh-ye Dini (42), 37-56.

Dabbagh, Soroush. (1399). Lectures on Moral Philosophy (Second Edition). Tehran: Serat.

Ramezani, Reza. (1387). The Ethical Views of Allameh Tabatabai. Tehran: Research Institute for Islamic Culture and Thought.

Sobhani, Jafar. (1370). Rational Good and Evil, or the Foundations of Eternal Ethics (Second Edition). (A. Rabbani Golpayegani, Ed.) Tehran: Elmi Farhangi Publications.

Saraei, Nahid. (1391). Allameh Tabatabai: Value and Ethics. Tehran: Basirat.

Soroush, Abdolkarim. (1358). Knowledge and Value; An Inquiry into the Relationship between Science and Ethics (Second Edition). Tehran: Yaran.

Soroush, Abdolkarim. (1370). Contemplating Creation; Discourses on Ethics, Industry, and the Humanities (Second Edition). Tehran: Soroush.

Shariati Sabzevari, Mohammad Bagher. (n.d.). A Commentary on the Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism. N.p.: n.p.

Shariati Najafabadi, Rahmatollah. (1390). Sublime Wisdom: A Translation and Comparative Commentary on Bidāyat al-Ḥikmah. Qom: Bustan-e Ketab.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1362). Seven Treatises. Qom: The Scientific and Intellectual Foundation of Master Allameh Seyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabai. Hekmat Printing.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1370). A Collection of Treatises (Third Edition). (S. Khosroshahi, Ed.) N.p.: Office for the Publication of Islamic Culture.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1374). Translation of Tafsir al-Mizan (Vol. 2). Qom: Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1374). Translation of Tafsir al-Mizan (Fifth Edition, Vol. 7). (S. Mousavi Hamedani, Trans.) Qom: Islamic Publications Office of the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1374). Nihāyat al-Ḥikmah (Second Edition, Vol. 1). (A. Shirvani, Ed.) Tehran: Al-Zahra.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1385). The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism (Vol. 1). (M. Shariati Sabzevari, Ed.) Qom: Bustan-e Ketab.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1388). Man from Beginning to End. Qom: Bustan-e Ketab.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1390) a. The Principles of Realist Philosophy (Vol. 2). Qom: Bustan-e Ketab.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1390) b. Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an (Vol. 2). Beirut: Al-A'lami Institute for Publications.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1390) c. Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an (Vol. 8). Beirut: Al-A'lami Institute for Publications.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1390) d. Translation and Commentary of Nihayat al-Hikmah. Qom: Bustan-e Ketab.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1390) e. Hashiyat al-Kifayah. Qom: Allameh Tabatabai Scientific and Intellectual Foundation.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1390) f. Tariq-e Erfan (Translation of Risalat al-Wilayah). Qom: Bakhshayesh.

Tabatabai, Mohammad Hossein. (1393). The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism (24th ed., Vol. 2). (M. Motahhari, Ed.) Tehran: Sadra.

Fanai, Abolqasem. (1384). Religion in the Scales of Ethics: A Study on the Relationship Between Religious Ethics and Secular Ethics. Tehran: Serat.

Fanai, Abolqasem. (1389). The Ethics of Religious Studies: A Study in the Epistemological and Ethical Foundations of Jurisprudence. Tehran: Negah-e Mo'aser.

Copp, David Ross. (1375). Meta-ethics (Analytic Ethics). (Mohsen Javadi, Ed.) Ma'refat (17), 70-75.

Kashmiri, Mehdi. (1394). A Comparative-Analytical Study of John Mackie's Error Theory and Allameh Tabatabai's Theory of Constructed Perceptions, Master's thesis in the field of Moral Philosophy, University of Qom.

Cultural Congress on the Occasion of the Anniversary of the Passing of Allameh Tabatabai. (1363). The Second Commemorative Volume of Allameh Tabatabai. Institute for Cultural Studies and Research, Islamic Association of Wisdom and Philosophy of Iran.

Misbah Yazdi, Mohammad Taqi. (1386). Philosophy of Ethics. (Ahmad Hossein Sharifi, Ed.) Tehran: International.

McNaughton, David. (1383). Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics. (Hassan Miandari, Ed.) Tehran: SAMT.

Mackie, John. (1379). The Subjectivity of Values. (M. Farhadpour, Ed.) Arghanun, 193-226.

Miandari, Hassan. (1390). A Refutation of the Error Theory in Moral Philosophy Based on Biological Evolution. Hikmat va Falsafeh, (1), 67-86.

Nabavian, Mahmoud. (1390). The Nature of 'I'tibar' According to Allameh Tabatabai. Ma'refat-e Falsafi, (34), 115-146.

.

---

.

[1]- Naturalism.

[2]- Mackie has a book refuting supernaturalism entitled "The Miracle of Theism". By this ironic title, he means that if the concept of "miracle" has any determinate meaning, it is belief in God itself; for, in his view, despite strong arguments for the irrationality of belief in God, religiosity and belief in the existence of God is a strange thing or something akin to a miracle. In the introduction to his book, while referring to the dual classification of "miracle", he places faith in the second category and writes:

"its continuing hold on the minds of many reasonable people is surprising enough to count as a miracle in at least the original sense." (Mackie, 1982: 15)

[3]- Super naturalistic.

[4]- Extrem anti realism.

[5] -Moral sckepticism.

[6] -Non-cognitivism.

[7] -Cognitivist.

[8] -Instrumental rationalism.

[9] -Prposition.

[10] -Truth appnes.

[11] -Truth value.

[12]- Cognitivis.

[13]- Truth-aptness.

[14]- Moral property.

[15]- Moral subjectivism.

[16]- Practical justification.

[17]- Conceptual analysis.

[18]- Objective analysis.

[19]- Moral language.

[20]- Non realism.

[21]- Ontology.

[22]- The Queerness arguments.

[23]- The argument from Queerness.

[24]- The argument from Queerness of knowledge.

[25]- The argument from Queerness of supervenience.

[26]- The argument from motivational force.

[27]- Moral perception.

[28]- Intuition.

[29]- The argument from the explanatory test

[30]- Moral disagreement

[31]- Projectin

[32]- Objectification

[33]- Practical justification

[34]- Theoretical moral realism/antirealism

[35]- Practical moral realism/antirealism

[36]- Moral cognitivim

[37]- For one can be a cognitivist and consistently deny realism. This is precisely the position that Mackie holds in his error theory (as explained in the previous section) and, we suspect, is also presupposed in the theory of constructed perceptions due to the metaphorical nature of constructed perceptions. In short, the relationship between moral realism and moral cognitivism can be considered, in the fourfold relations among concepts, as one of absolute generality and specificity.

[38]. Occam's razor is a principle attributed to William of Ockham, an English logician and philosopher. In the 14th century, William of Ockham proposed a principle that became known as "Occam's razor," the "principle of parsimony," or the "principle of explanatory economy." According to this principle, whenever two different explanations are offered for the cause of a phenomenon, the more complex explanation is more likely to contain an error, and therefore, all else being equal, the simpler explanation is more likely to be correct.

[39] -Moral relativism

[40] -Rule utilitarianism

[41]- Pistemic Agent

[42] -Close question

[43]- Internalism

[44]- Externalism

[45]- Objectification

[46]- Truth appnes

[47]- Truth value

[48]- Success theory

[49]- Error theory

.

---

.