A Conversation with Mostafa Malekian on “Spirituality and Rationality”

The present conversation proceeds with the aim of clarifying the claim that the relationship between spirituality and rationality is a cause-and-effect one. This means that stepping onto the path of spirituality will certainly lead a person to rationality, and, conversely, in the light of rationality, spirituality will inevitably be attained. The combination of rationality and spirituality is always a combination of the necessary and the concomitant. If rationality is the concomitant, spirituality is its necessary corollary, and if spirituality is the concomitant, rationality is its necessary corollary; and regardless of which one a person chooses at the outset, they will most certainly and definitely possess the other as well. In philosophical terms, the combination of rationality and spirituality is the combination of cause and effect. Spirituality is a cause for rationality, and rationality is also a cause for spirituality, but in reality, this cause-and-effect relationship is a two-way or dialectical one, the very relationship that the ancients called essential causality[1].

• At the beginning of our discussion, I would like to start the conversation with this question: In your view, can we begin the discussion from the pole of spirituality and ultimately arrive at the other pole, namely rationality?

Yes, the goal of my current discussion is to arrive at precisely this point. For this reason, I deem it necessary, before beginning the main discussion, to offer an introduction concerning the candidates for ethical value judgments, or the things subject to ethical value judgments.

Among the commonalities of all the definitions of spirituality presented so far, one can point to the fact that a spiritual person is inevitably an ethical person, without the reverse being true. That is, the possibility of an individual being ethical without stepping into the realm of meaning is a feasible possibility. Therefore, ethics can be extracted from spirituality, and for this reason, a person who considers themselves spiritual is always expected to be ethical as well.

But what do ethical value judgments evaluate? In other words, what do the rulings, rules, and recommendations of ethics subject to value judgment? What do the ten important ethical concepts (good or bad, right or wrong, ought or ought not, virtue or vice, duty or responsibility)—which serve as predicates in ethical value judgments—describe? Undoubtedly, these ten ethical predicates describe external voluntary actions that are subject to ethical rulings, or, in the parlance of the ancients, actions performed with the bodily limbs. Actions such as telling the truth, not lying, stealing, and so on. This series of actions is certainly subject to the positive or negative pole of ethical rulings. However, the majority of moral philosophers consider internal voluntary actions—those performed not with the limbs but within the human being—to also be subject to ethical rulings. In other words, according to the opinion of moral philosophers, actions such as feeling gratitude and love toward someone who has done a service to a person, even if they find no external manifestation, are ethically right and carry a positive ethical ruling; and feeling enmity and ingratitude toward them, even if it occurs only within the person, will have a negative ethical ruling.

But apart from external voluntary actions and internal voluntary actions, there is also a third type of action, which, in the view of some, falls under ethical actions. Thinkers like Aristotle hold the opinion that even involuntary internal matters are subject to ethical rulings. In his view, although the two acts of courage and cowardice are by no means voluntary—courageous people are created courageous, and cowardly and timid people are born cowardly and timid—nevertheless, it can be said that courage is ethically a positive matter and cowardice has a negative value.

Others hold that even a human being themselves—not their outward or inward actions, nor what occurs within them that is not of the category of the voluntary (passions, feelings, emotions, and excitements)—can also be subject to moral judgments. For example, Gandhi is considered a morally good human being and Hitler a morally bad human being. In other words, a whole human being can be the object of moral evaluation. Some even make social and political institutions the object of moral evaluation. That is, they attribute good and bad, right and wrong, and the like to these institutions as well. For instance, the institution of marriage in this form (monogamy of a man and a woman) is morally right, but in another form (for example, monogamy for the woman and polygamy for the man) is morally wrong. The same approach can be taken regarding politics; for example, democracy can be morally praised and tyranny considered morally wrong. In other words, various forms of social, political... institutions also possess the capacity to be the subject of moral praise and blame. Some have gone even further and considered social conditions as also subject to moral evaluation. For example, a class divide, the widening of the gap between the poorest of the poor and the richest of the rich beyond a certain limit, is deemed reprehensible in a society.

But what concerns us here is that not only voluntary outward actions but also voluntary inward actions fall under the purview of moral action. One of the inward or internal actions is the "way of believing" an opinion. Ethics also has a ruling regarding the "way of believing" opinions. One manner of "believing" a conviction is morally right, and other manners that exist for believing a conviction are called morally wrong. This issue is the origin of a branch of ethics called the ethics of belief. Therefore, although coming to believe or not is an internal matter, ethics also has a ruling on a human being's coming to believe or not.

The origin of the emergence of the ethics of belief goes back to the debates of two philosophers in the late nineteenth century. The debates of William Kingdon Clifford, the English philosopher, mathematician, and logician, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century with William James, the American philosopher and psychologist, led to the formation of this branch of ethics. As was said, this branch of ethics, that is, the "ethics of belief," claims that regardless of the type of belief and what we believe in, some instances of coming to believe are ethical and some instances of coming to believe are unethical. In other words, what is considered in the ethics of belief is the manner of coming to believe, not the belief itself. For example, imagine two human beings who both adhere to the same conviction, namely "belief in God," but a moral philosopher considers the manner of conviction-holding of one to be morally right and the manner of conviction-holding of the other regarding this same proposition of "belief in God" to be morally wrong. According to the ethics of belief, if someone comes to believe a proposition through imitation, dogmatic adherence, suggestibility, susceptibility to indoctrination, or through conformity with the crowd, following the spirit of the age, or following the intellectual fashions of the time, their belief is considered morally wrong, and the belief of another person in that same single proposition, if it has been obtained through reasoning, is considered right. On this basis, the "ethics of belief" was founded by these two prominent philosophers, and especially William James, who specified the ways according to which a human being "has the right" to believe a proposition or does not have this "right."

• Therefore, based on what has been said, in what can the core of the ethics of belief be summarized?

The principle that belief must be subordinate to reasoning, in the sense that the process of belief-formation must be a process accompanied by reasoning, means that all non-reasoning processes of belief-formation are considered ethically incorrect. From this ruling, it follows that as the strength of the evidence supporting a belief increases, the degree of attachment (in the realm of theory) and commitment (in the realm of practice) to that belief must also increase, and vice versa. Hence, there must be a direct proportionality between the strength of the evidence, proofs, and indications that support a belief and the degree of our attachment and commitment to it. This is what is meant by evidentialism. What is meant by rationality is precisely this evidentialism, that is, adherence to reasoning. Living rationally means being committed to reasoning: choosing silence where reasoning is unavailable, and commitment to belief (theoretically and practically) wherever reasoning exists. It is worth noting that this discussion, i.e., the "method of belief-formation," encompasses not only the domain of belief but all domains that are in any way related to our doxastic realm. Therefore, doubting, being certain, supposing, guessing, estimating, and approximating—all of which pertain to the doxastic-epistemic dimension of our existence—each have their own ethics.

In short, benefiting from the spiritual life will not be possible except with the aid of ethics, and the ethical human being, just as they cannot violate other parts of ethics, will not be able to fail to adhere to the ethics of belief, and adherence to the ethics of belief will not be possible except through complete submission to reasoning, and submission to reasoning is what is termed rationality.

• But where is the raw material for this reasoning supplied from? In other words, what are our sources of knowledge?

Those sources of knowledge which, according to the consensus of all epistemologists, connect human beings to realities, not to error, ignorance, delusional fantasies, etc., are six in number:

1. Sensation

2. Introspection

3. Memory

4. Testimony

5. Intuition

6. Reasoning

1. Sensory Perception

Sensory perception; the sense that can be attained through the five senses, which the ancients termed the external sense, is, according to the general consensus of epistemologists, truly introduced as a source of knowledge. In this way, the eye, ear, nose, taste buds, and the sense of touch are truly capable of making a series of the world's realities known to the human being.

2. Introspection

The human being's awareness of their own inner states is called introspection. It is only through introspection that one can become aware of one's inner states such as sorrow and grief, joy, love, pleasure, enmity, pain and suffering, despair, and fatigue, and because these inner states are not tangible or visible, etc., the external senses have no access to them. The important point is that, as can be observed, feelings, emotions, and affects also occupy a part of introspection, and thus it is clearly observed that in a rational argument, human emotions, feelings, and affects also play their role.

3. Memory

By recalling events and occurrences, one can also find a path to the world of external realities. Memory is responsible for recalling our sensory perceptions or introspections. Therefore, it can be said that although memory is one of the sources of knowledge, since it requires the two sources prior to it to function, it is considered a second-order source of knowledge.

4. Testimony

Sometimes knowledge is not obtained through sensory perception, introspection, or even through recollection, but rather the human being attains knowledge through the testimony and witness of others. For example, a person who has never been to Japan in their life can confidently claim that Tokyo is the capital of Japan.

5. Intuition

If a proposition is presented to a human being in such a way that, no matter how much they think and induce in their mind, they cannot but affirm it—in other words, they are incapable of not affirming it—that proposition is called an intuitive proposition. Propositions such as: everything that has color also has shape, or a ball that is entirely white has no black spot, or again, every person is younger than their father, everyone is the same age as themselves, and so on.

6. Argument

The difference between this source and the sixth source is that the previous five sources provide the raw materials so that this sixth source, i.e., argument, can combine these raw materials and arrive at new things. This source of argument is sometimes referred to as reason. The art of reason lies in putting the raw materials of the five previous sources together, using them, and reaching conclusions that cannot, by themselves, be obtained from any of the previous sources, and it can accomplish this in three ways:

1. Deductive argument

2. Inductive argument

3. Abductive argument (inference to the best explanation)

• Can it be concluded from everything you have said so far that by stepping into the realm of meaning, a human being involuntarily falls into the lap of the sovereignty of reason as well?

Yes, that is exactly the case; by stepping into the realm of meaning, a human being cannot envision any end other than the leadership of reason before their eyes, and on this path, as arguments increase, the degree of their attachment and commitment to this realm will grow more and more, and conversely, a deficiency of argument will diminish the degree of this attachment and commitment to it, and this is what is referred to as rationality. But as to whether "the converse of this proposition is also true," in other words, "does rationality lead to spirituality" or not, is a subject we will now address.

• But here the question arises: "Is the converse of this proposition also true?" In other words, does rationality likewise lead to spirituality or not?

Yes, to answer this question, it is necessary to return again to the discussion of rationality and describe the types of propositions from the perspective of rationality. As was explained, rationality means following argument, meaning that to accept any belief, we must seek to demand a reason. The stronger the reasons presented, the greater the acceptance, and the weaker the reasons, the thinner the acceptance. Consider the proposition "A is B." If acceptance of this proposition is demanded of a human being, the human being must, in return, demand a reason. In this case, a proposition can take on various forms depending on the strength of the reasons, which we will now describe.

1. Rational propositions

In the first case, the totality of the human being's own perceptual faculties, or reasoning power, can prove the truth of this proposition "A is B." According to epistemology, if a judgment or proposition is rational, it must be accepted.

1. Antirational propositions

In the second case, the totality of the human being's own perceptual faculties, or reasoning power, can prove the falsehood of this proposition "A is B." In this case, the judgment or proposition is called antirational. According to epistemology, an antirational proposition must be rejected.

1. Non-rational propositions

In the third and final case, the totality of the human being's own perceptual faculties, or reasoning power, has neither the power to prove the truth of the proposition "A is B" nor the ability to prove its falsehood. In this case, the judgment or proposition is called non-rational.

• Well then, what is the human being's duty when faced with such judgments?

In fact, the dispute between James and Clifford also occurred over these very non-rational propositions. And ultimately, William James provided a strong reason that even now, after about a century and a half, epistemologists cite. William James envisioned three states for non-rational options:

1. The first state is when reason has the power to prove neither the truth nor the falsity, but the evidence it brings for proving the truth is slightly weightier than the evidence it has for proving falsity. Yet, it is still not strong enough to prove the truth. In this case, this reason-evading proposition joins the reason-accepting ones, and therefore it must be accepted.

2. In the second state, we again have the power to prove neither its truth nor its falsity, but this time the evidence brought for proving its falsity is slightly weightier, and thus it will annex the reason-evading proposition to the reason-opposing propositions, so the proposition or judgment in question will be rejected.

• But in the third state, we encounter propositions and judgments where we have the power to prove neither their truth nor their falsity, and neither of these two groups of evidence is even a hair's breadth stronger or weaker than the other; in other words, the evidence for proving truth or falsity is exactly equal.

Here, that is, regarding the third category of reason-evading propositions, human reason has no choice but to remain silent. That is, when faced with it, reason adopts agnosticism. At this stage, the theoretical faculty falls silent. Such propositions are called mysteries. According to this definition, mysteries are propositions whose truth or falsity reason has no power to prove, where the power to prove their truth is no greater, nor the power to prove their falsity any greater. Kant called such propositions and judgments antinomies. But today, epistemologists have chosen the word mystery for them. There is no specific consensus among epistemologists on the number of mysteries existing in the world, but I believe the existence of God, life after death, free will and determinism, and the morality or immorality of the world's moral order are the mysteries of the world.

• The situation seems very complicated; what is the manner of a human being's encounter with such situations, that is to say, the mysteries of life? How can one come to terms with these mysteries?

In such circumstances, it is said that since the theoretical faculty has halted, one must enter the practical realm. This is a position where the realistic view no longer applies, and one must step into a pragmatistic view. In this position, by referring to one's inner self, a person finds out which belief provides more of their psychological desiderata. The main psychological desiderata are peace versus anxiety, worry, and concern; happiness versus depression and sorrow; hope versus despair; inner contentment versus inner conflict; and meaningfulness of life versus the absurdity of life. One must see which choice yields these five psychological desiderata for the human being. Which one gives a person more inner contentment and peace, or more happiness, hope, and meaningfulness.

But there are two important points here:

The first point is that reason must truly reach such a point. At any point before this stage, we have no right to speak of our psychological peace. Psychological desiderata do not come into play in reason-accepting matters, they do not come into play in reason-opposing matters, nor do they come into play in preponderant reason-evading matters that become reason-accepting, or outweighed reason-evading matters that join the reason-opposing ones. Short of the point where reason is completely silent, one cannot bring psychological desiderata into the discussion.

And the second point is that if we wish to act based on psychological desiderata when reason is silent, we must always remember that we have not arrived at this specific case with the aid of reason, and as Wittgenstein said, we live as if we have free will, as if the world's system is moral, as if...

با قبول اینکه گزاره‌های معنوی جهان، که انسان را به معنویت سوق می‌دهند، در این مقام قرار می‌گیرند، می‌توان باور داشت که اعتقاد به این گزاره‌ها نه‌تنها خلاف عقل نیست، بلکه عمل کردن خلاف این، خلاف مقتضای عقل است. درست است که دو شق موجود در پیشِ‌رو از عقلانیت یکسانی برخوردارند، اما باید توجه کرد که انسان‌ها گرچه هریک دارای دنیایی منحصر به فرد هستند، وجود ویژگی‌های مشترک جسمانی، ذهنی و روانی آنها را نمی‌توان انکار کرد. باتوجه‌به آمار و مشاهدۀ زندگی انسان‌ها در طول اعصار می‌توان دید که این ویژگی های مشترک او را بیشتر به‌سوی معنویت و معنوی بودن سوق می‌دهد نه به سوی دیگر. به‌عبارتیدیگر آدمی بهگونه‌ای است که مطلوب‌های روان‌شناختی و آرامش در مقام عمل او با معنوی بودن، با وجود داشتن خداوند، با وجود زندگی پس از مرگ بیشتر برایش حاصل میآید.  مثلا انسان‌ها اگر معتقد باشند که مختارند بسیار بهتر نظام زندگی خود را سامان می‌دهند تا اینکه به جبر قائل باشند. بنابراین آنچه اینجا مطمع است آرامش در مقام عمل است.

نتیجه: همانطورکه مشاهده می‌شود بحث حاضر که از دیدگاهی رئالیستیک آغاز شد به دیدگاهی پراگماتیستیک منتهی شد و دیدگاه اخیر انسان را بدان سو سوق می دهد که به گزارههای معنوی قائل باشد.

• به‌نظر شما آیا ممکن روزی فرا رسد که یافته‌های روان‌شناختی بتوانند گزاره‌های خردگریز را به گزاره‌های خردپذیر مبدل کند؟

پیشرفت علوم، فیزیک، شیمی، زیست‌شناسی، حتی فلسفه و روان‌شناسی در این است که گزاره‌های خردگریز آنها به خردپذیر مبدل شده است و یا خردستیز بوده و حالا اقلا خرد گریز شده است و یا حتی برعکس خردپذیر بوده و حالا خردستیز یا خردگریز شده است. مثلا برهان حرکت ارسطو که از طریق آن به محرک بلا تحرکی می‌رسید که آن را خدا می نامید، تا زمان نیوتن خرد پذیر بود. ولی نیوتن اصلی را در فیزیک کشف کرد که باتوجه‌به آن اصل برهان ارسطو از خرد‌پذیری به خرد‌ستیزی افتاد. اما ما در هر زمانی موظف‌ایم که باتوجه‌به آخرین دستاوردهای علمی زمان خود خردپذیر یا خردستیز یا خردگریز بودن یک موضوع را بپذیریم. همان‌گونه که از آخرین دستآوردهای پزشکی و دارویی استفاده می کنیم و هرگز نمی‌توانیم مثلا 100 سال برای کشف یک داروی جدید صبر کنیم، اخلاق از هر انسانی می‌خواهد که به آنچه التزام بورزد که در لحظۀ وقوع زندگیاش خردپذیر، خردستیز یا خردگریز است ولو بدانیم ممکن است فرزندان ما در آینده ملزم به آن باشند که به این گزینه ها به طریق دیگری نگاه کنند. ما موظف به آنیم که به آن چیزی عمل کنیم که مجموع قوای ادراکی ما در لحظۀ تصمیم به ما می گوید.

مانند اتکاء ذو خشت به یکدیگر که نمی توان گفت که کدام‌یک دیگری را نگه داشته است، و چنین می نمایاند که گویی هریک دیگری را نگاه داشته‌اند. ^[1]

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گفت‌وگو با مصطفی ملکیان در باب «معنویت و عقلانیت»

مصاحبه کننده: نغمه پروان

ماهنامۀ علمی‌تخصصی اطلاعات حکمت و معرفت، اردیبهشت 1393، سال نهم - شماره 2 (4 صفحه - از 5 تا 8)