A Trilogy of Unethical Conduct in the Arena of Intellectual Inquiry

Mehdi Abdollahi: Page 8 of the Shargh newspaper on Saturday, February 24 (No. 3093) was adorned with the title “Thought,” but in reality, it was an “arena of unethical conduct in confrontation with intellectual inquiry.” Under the name of “Thought,” a trilogy penned by three figures from the field of philosophy was embellished for publication: “Do Not Hold Speech So Cheap” by Dr. Nasrollah Mousavian, “The Accusation of Philosophizing” by Mr. Kasra Panahi, and “We and the Philosophical Windmills” by Dr. Amir Saemi. The aforementioned trilogy, citing certain positions from three works by the esteemed Hojjat al-Islam wal-Muslimin Khosropanah, blended scholarly criticism with unethical and impolite behavior, going so far as to verge on mockery. It is clear that no Muslim or non-Muslim thinker has been without criticism, but is it not the ethics of critique to also highlight the positive points of ideas?! Truly, if we read Dr. Khosropanah’s works with a free-thinking and dispassionate perspective, do we find no positive or outstanding points in them?! Some of what the authors of these texts have placed under their microscope as obvious scholarly errors and incorrect understanding of philosophical terms and issues are of the type of typographical mistakes to which every author is susceptible, but undoubtedly, scouring a scholarly work to find such points is neither the mission of the learned and knowledgeable, nor a license for unbridled pens in the realm of accusing others! In the opinion of the writer of these lines, a modicum of fairness and conscience suffices to understand the clear difference between scholarly criticism and overstepping the boundaries of ethics and courtesy. On the other hand, the words that have sullied the realm of scholarly ethics in this trilogy are so numerous that there is no need to recall or recount them, and the wound of unfairness is so evident on the body of these three that the seeing eye of no fair-minded person can fail to see it. Therefore, the writer of these lines does not intend to point out the numerous instances of unethical conduct in the aforementioned writings, but rather aims for a scholarly dispute with the respected authors. The purpose is to shed light on some—I emphasize, only some—of the scholarly claims of the respected authors, based on which they have dared to transgress the boundaries of ethics.

1) Mr. Dr. Mousavian, at the outset of his speech, took issue with the “Secretariat of the Board for the Support of Theory-Chairs.” Under the mistaken impression that in this board, contrary to the rest of the world, “a governmental board whose members are determined not by the scholars of a discipline, but through the mechanisms of appointing individuals to governmental positions, accepts or declares a viewpoint as an ‘innovation’ or ‘theory,’” he spoke of the flaws in this process. However, this assumption is incorrect, and it would have sufficed for him to refer to the regulations section on the very website he cited in his writing for it to become clear to him that the process of confirming or rejecting an innovation or theory is carried out by the thinkers of the relevant discipline.

2) According to Dr. Mousavian, “Firstly, in the first thirty pages of the book, the author does not even once try to say what he means by ‘rationality’ . . . It would have been appropriate to explain what this rationality he has in mind, which has eight or nine different models, is like.” The answer to him is two sentences: 1) What he called “several irrelevant pages of the book,” raising five objections to it, is not part of the main discussions of the book and is presented merely as an introduction to the discussion. Therefore, brevity was necessary in it. 2) Look again at the diagram on page 28 to observe the definition of rationality. “The model of rationality (methodology of knowledge and fundamental thoughts)

3) Mr. Mousavian, by way of raising an objection to the two types—a priori and a posteriori—of appended philosophy, has stated: “Someone might say on the spot that I have ‘discovered’ two principal types of jurisprudence: a jurisprudence based on an a posteriori approach and a jurisprudence based on an a priori approach. And similarly in other cases.” This objection indicates that he has not grasped the intent behind these two types of appended philosophy. What is meant by the a priori and a posteriori of appended philosophy is a second-order look at the subject-matter after its realization and a second-order look at the subject-matter before its realization. A priori and a posteriori are merely descriptions of a meta-perspective on a subject. On this basis, an a posteriori and a priori approach in sciences like jurisprudence, which are first-order sciences, is entirely meaningless.

4) He has stated: “The ‘founding’ of this ‘theory’ appears so magnificent to Khosropanah that he describes it thus: The surveillance theory should not be considered merely a classification of the sciences . . . besides the fact that the classification of sciences is not a simple discussion, given that great figures such as Farabi, Ghazali, Khajeh Nasir al-Din Tusi, Ibn Khaldun, Ampère, and dozens of others have offered differing opinions on this matter . . .”

Then, proceeding to criticize, he has stated as follows: “Whether Khosropanah’s work has been a classification of the sciences or not, whether his ‘theory’ is a ‘simple discussion’ or not, and why no one but him has succeeded in ‘discovering’ and ‘founding’ these ‘appended philosophies’ may be worthy of discussion, but I do not know what the hapless ‘Ampère’ is doing in this context. Surely there was a wisdom to it, ‘important, foundational, and firm.’” But the matter is not so difficult; as Mr. Khosropanah has said, Ampère is among the thinkers who have undertaken the classification of sciences. For further information, you may refer to the book Opinions and Theories in the Human Sciences, by Julien Freund, pp. 21-22.

A critique of the article “We and the Philosophical Windmills” by Dr. Amir Saemi, published on page 8 of the Shargh newspaper on Saturday, 5 Esfand (No. 3093)

In his writing, Dr. Amir Saemi, citing Professor Khosropanah’s article titled “The Semantics of Religious Propositions” published in the scientific-research quarterly “Islamic Theology,” has found fault with him.

1) Dr. Saemi’s basic claim in criticizing Professor Khosropanah is the accusation of an incorrect understanding of contemporary philosophy. Dr. Saemi says:

“Khosropanah continues by writing: ‘The fourth category) Analytic Philosophy or Linguistic Analysis: Analytic philosophy or linguistic philosophy is one of the Western philosophies introduced by Wittgenstein and others in opposition to logical positivism.’” He then, by way of criticism, states as follows: “Analytic philosophy is one of the most important parts of contemporary philosophy, which itself has numerous sub-branches such as philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology, etc. Therefore, a basic familiarity with one of the most important parts of contemporary philosophy, namely analytic philosophy, is sufficient to prevent us from thinking that philosophy of language and analytic philosophy are on the same level. Philosophy of language is a sub-branch of analytic philosophy. Also, analytic philosophy is not linguistic analysis . . . Here, Khosropanah confuses a broad philosophical discipline with a specific theory.”

Even supposing that Professor Khosropanah does not know analytic philosophy, why should Dr. Saemi, who is a specialist in analytic philosophy, fail to distinguish between “philosophy of language” and “linguistic philosophy”? The professor of Islamic philosophy has equated analytic philosophy with linguistic analysis and “linguistic philosophy,” and the professor of analytic philosophy criticizes him for 1) “philosophy of language” being a sub-branch of analytic philosophy, not on the same level as it! and 2) “Analytic philosophy is not linguistic analysis.”

Dear Doctor, are philosophy of language and linguistic philosophy the same thing?! Linguistic philosophy, unlike philosophy of language, is not a branch of philosophy, but rather a method for solving specific philosophical problems. Analytic philosophers proposed this method for examining and studying philosophical problems, and they consider it applicable across all domains and branches of philosophy. According to this method, in order to solve philosophical problems, instead of examining mental essences and delving into the depths of the mind, one must investigate the uses of words in ordinary language. The meaning of a word is the sum total of its uses in ordinary language. As John Searle puts it: “Linguistic philosophy is the attempt to solve particular philosophical problems by attending to the ordinary use of particular words or other elements of a particular language.” (John Searle, Speech Acts, p. 86)

Regarding his second objection, I must also point out that in the first period of the emergence of analytic philosophy, the task of philosophy was nothing other than the analysis of concepts. Positivist and post-positivist philosophers considered the analysis of concepts to be their responsibility. In early analytic philosophy, philosophy was fundamentally transformed into a linguistic or conceptual activity. However, from the 1950s onward, a new conception of analytic philosophy emerged, which has been expanding up to the present day. (see: John R. Searle, “Contemporary Philosophy in the United States”, p.4-5.)

2) Another of Dr. Saemi’s scholarly claims is the severance of science from philosophy. In his words: “The need of science for philosophy — a doctrine that is extremely dubious — has been accepted by whom?”

a) I doubt he is unaware of the book The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science by Edwin Arthur Burtt. b) I leave the answer to him to Roger Trigg: “No one can comment on human societies or human activities without having some understanding of what kind of being a human is. Unfortunately, in most cases, the presence of such assumptions in the practice of various intellectual disciplines is only implicit and unapparent. Only great thinkers can make this assumption explicit . . . Philosophical assumptions about human nature lie at the foundation of every scientific discipline concerned with human behavior. For this reason . . . some thinkers have written in this field from the perspective of other scientific disciplines . . . Darwin is a biologist, Marx a political economist, Freud a psychologist, but since their ideas are directed precisely at the core of human existence, they must inevitably be philosophical. Views concerning human nature are philosophical in character, that is, these views are not the results of empirical scientific research, but rather general opinions arrived at through rational arguments.” (Roger Trigg, Ideas of Human Nature: An Historical Introduction, p.6)

A critique of the article “The Accusation of Philosophizing” by Kasra Panahi, published on page 8 of the Shargh newspaper on Saturday, 5 Esfand (No. 3093)

“The Accusation of Philosophizing” or an accusation against the “Philosopher”!?

Mr. Kasra Panahi, the author of “The Accusation of Philosophizing,” has leveled the charge of “the author’s unfamiliarity with philosophical terms and concepts” against Professor Khosropanah, claiming that he was unaware of obvious points that “are not such as may be permitted to remain hidden even from first- and second-semester undergraduate philosophy students.” According to Mr. Panahi’s account, Professor Khosropanah “has repeatedly and on numerous occasions considered relativism in ethics to be the result of mistaken epistemology or skepticism.” But Mr. Panahi believes that “relativism in ethics is a doctrine about the truth conditions of ethical claims . . . This semantic doctrine is, of course, indifferent to the correctness or falsity of epistemological theories, including skepticism about the external world, and even skepticism about ethics. Someone who is skeptical in the domain of ethics rejects the possibility of knowledge/justified belief in ethical judgments. Such a person can be a relativist or an absolutist in the semantics of ethical judgments.” As is evident, in the esteemed author’s view, ethical relativism — whose subject is the truth and falsity of ethical claims — is a semantic issue! If only he had provided some evidence for this claim of his — which is the basis of his accusation against Mr. Khosropanah.

Moral relativism has several types, the most important of which are: descriptive relativism, meta-ethical relativism, and normative relativism. Descriptive relativism merely describes the differences in the moral principles of various individuals and societies, meta-ethical relativism speaks of the validity of different and conflicting moral judgments and systems, and normative relativism issues a normative ruling stating that individuals and societies should not insist on adhering to their own moral principles and should not judge the moral values of others based on their own standards. (William Frankena, pp. 227-230, David B. Wong, Moral Relativism, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 6, p. 539) Which one of these three types of relativism is semantic?! None of them! Meanwhile, it would be good for the officials of Shargh newspaper to also clarify the identity of Mr. Kasra Panahi! — who is this philosophy graduate of whom there is no mention anywhere? Is Kasra Panahi a false identity for someone else?!

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A Trilogy of Unethical Conduct in the Arena of Intellectual Inquiry

Author: Mehdi Abdollahi

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