Abolghasem Fanai: “Hussein, the School of Justice and Dignity” – Session One

In the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Hussein, the School of Justice and Dignity (1)[1]

Abolghasem Fanai

So mourn for yourselves, O you who slumber,

For this heavy sleep is an evil death.

Greetings to dear sisters and brothers. I offer my condolences to you on the Arbaeen of the Master of Martyrs, Hussein ibn Ali. The occasion calls for us to speak a little about the philosophy of Imam Hussein's uprising. The history of Karbala has two pages: one green and luminous, the other black and dark. From one perspective, Karbala is an

This point holds true for natural phenomena as well as for human phenomena. Natural phenomena are events that occur in the natural world, and human phenomena are events that occur in human society. But there is an important difference here, which is that human phenomena—that is, events in whose emergence and creation human beings play a role—are the effect of their voluntary and free action, and this action can be individual or collective. Therefore, when we explain a human phenomenon, we are dealing with a free and autonomous agent or agents who make decisions based on their beliefs and values and act upon those decisions. Hence, in explaining human phenomena, the principles of human voluntary action inevitably come into play. The events in whose creation human beings are involved are indebted to numerous causes and factors, but perhaps these factors can be subsumed under three general headings:

(1) The first factor is the “environment” in the broadest sense of the word. Human action is, in truth, a reaction to the environment. We have no behavior that is ab initio and devoid of “context.” Every behavior takes shape and is carried out in specific circumstances that necessitate that behavior, and therefore a correct explanation of that behavior depends on a comprehensive understanding of the environment and the circumstances in which that behavior arose. For example, a correct explanation of the event of Karbala is impossible without attention to the cultural and political contexts of its emergence.

(2) The second factor consists of the “beliefs” and “convictions” held by the acting human being or human beings. For instance, deep faith and conviction in the existence of God and life after death cause a person not to fear death and, if necessary, to sacrifice their life and submit to martyrdom, because such a person knows that they lose nothing by dying and, as Rumi says, are not diminished by death. For such a person, dying is the very essence of life and a rebirth. Such a death is the liberation of the spirit from the prison of the body and nature, and freedom from prison is something pleasant and agreeable.

(3) And finally, the third factor is the system of “values” and “norms” that the person or persons involved in the creation of that event follow. The accepted values and the oughts and ought-nots of any individual tell them what to do and what not to do in specific circumstances, and what reaction to show when confronted with a particular environment and context.

In relation to the event of Karbala, all three of these factors are important in their own right, but what we are seeking here is to discover the “logic” governing the behavior of Imam Hussein. That is, we want to see what system of values and norms Imam Hussein, who played the pivotal role in this event, followed, and based on what principles he made decisions and acted. If those principles are “universalizable,” it would mean that we too are obliged to follow those principles and exhibit similar behavior in similar circumstances. And if those principles are “ethical,” it means that Imam Hussein is an ethical school. When he says, “I am a model and exemplar for you,”[5] this statement means nothing other than that in my behavior I follow a logic whose principles are not exclusive to my person and apply to others as well.

But if the event of Karbala is to hold such a lesson and such a message for us, we must be able to provide a “scientific,” “natural,” “human,” and “worldly” explanation of it and justify the Imam’s behavior based on the common reason that exists in all human beings. Supra-scientific, supernatural, and supra-human explanations will not have this property. By supra-scientific and supra-human explanations, I mean explanations that attempt to explain this event by referring to unseen and supernatural causes and the exclusive, non-universalizable characteristics of the Imam, such as infallibility and knowledge of the unseen. Let us call these explanations “metaphysical explanations.”

Until a few decades ago, the prevailing view among Shia thinkers was that Imam Hussein's movement does not admit of scientific and rational analysis and explanation, and therefore cannot be emulated or taken as a model.[6] The traditional and orthodox view on this matter says that Imam Hussein's uprising is a sealed secret and follows no discoverable or imitable rational logic. We only know this much: that Imam Hussein was killed in accordance with the divine will, and we cannot claim that there was any rational calculation involved or that he stepped onto this path with his own will, choice, and decision. The role of the Imam's knowledge of the unseen and divine destiny is prominent and key in this theory.

In the contemporary era, the late Dr. Shariati is apparently the first person who tried to offer an earthly and human explanation of this event. Dr. Shariati believed that gold, force, and fraud have joined hands and turned Hussein's blood into opium. Blood is the symbol of movement and uprising against oppression, injustice, and life, while opium is the emblem of silence, drowsiness, inertia, and submission to oppression and force. How can someone turn blood into opium? By offering a supernatural or metaphysical explanation of this event, that is, explaining this event by referring it to God's will and unseen, supernatural causes, and claiming that this event has no other explanation and that Imam Hussein's martyrdom was a divine destiny; a destiny that was known from the beginning of creation and of which the Prophet, Fatima, and Imam Ali were aware before that Imam's birth, and Imam Hussein himself was also aware of it beforehand. Therefore, Imam Hussein acted according to his knowledge of the unseen and was the executor of the divine will.

As you can see, this explanation is the same one that was common among Shias before Shariati and still has many proponents. If we accept this explanation, the only thing we can do in response to this event is to weep and mourn. That is, this event is only useful to us insofar as it provides a suitable ground for reciting elegies, lamentations, chest-beating, chain-beating, blade-beating, and ceremonies of this kind. According to this explanation, the event of Karbala completely loses its instructive, awakening, motivating, and salvific properties, because within the framework of such an explanation, the event of Karbala turns into a unique incident in which the Imam's behavior follows no logic, or follows a logic that is unknown to us and therefore cannot be emulated or followed, since other human beings can only follow Imam Hussein if his decision-making and behavior are based on conventional and recognizable principles, not on unconventional and unseen ones. Therefore, replacing "metaphysical explanation" with "scientific explanation" is what Dr. Shariati calls turning blood into opium.

This explanation is, of course, not one hundred percent incorrect and possesses a share of the truth, and there is also evidence in its favor in the narrations; such as the narration that says: "Inna Allah sha'a an yaraka qatilan" meaning "God has willed to see you killed."[7] But the problem with this explanation is that, firstly, in one sense it is not an explanation, because the relation of God's will to all natural phenomena is the same. That is, even if Imam Hussein had not been martyred, it would still have been by God's will and providence. In other words, this is a philosophical and theological explanation, whereas every event that occurs in the natural world, in addition to a philosophical and theological explanation—whose relation to the occurrence or non-occurrence of that event is equal—also has a natural and scientific explanation, whose relation to the occurrence or non-occurrence of that event is not equal.

Secondly, one cannot conclude from this explanation that Imam Hussein was compelled and overpowered by God's will in this event and did not make his decision based on his own reason and the information available to him through ordinary, human channels of knowledge. For if such a conclusion were correct, it would mean that neither the conduct of Imam Hussein and his companions is worthy of praise and commendation, nor is the conduct of Yazid and his army deserving of blame and reproach. Because, in this assumption, both sides of the event were merely executing God's will and bore no responsibility or free will of their own. Moreover, this explanation is inconsistent with certain historical documents and evidence, including the Imam's repeated admonitions to deter Yazid's army from committing this crime and his decision to return to Medina (or go to Yemen) after hearing the news of Muslim ibn Aqil's martyrdom. In other words, this explanation is more compatible with the deterministic foundations of the Umayyads than with the free-will foundations of Shi'ism.

In any case, when an event occurs, the simplest approach is to say that God willed it to be so, and that the only thing one can and must do in the face of God's will is to submit. This is the best way to flee from moral responsibility. In such metaphysical explanations, the role of human will, free choice, reason, intellect, and responsibility, as well as other environmental factors that played a part in the genesis of that event, is reduced to zero, because all these factors are overpowered by God's will. Therefore, no lesson can be drawn from this event, and the only reaction one can have to it is to weep and mourn.

It seems that the role and status some Shi'as attribute to Imam Hussein in the Shi'a faith is similar to the role and status Christians attribute to Jesus Christ. According to the belief of this group, Imam Hussein was killed by God's will so that we might weep for him and, through this, have our sins forgiven. This explanation is, in truth, not an explanation but a distortion—a distortion that, in the words of the late Shariati, turns blood into opium. This explanation, of course, pleases the taste of tyrannical and despotic governments, as it keeps people occupied and lulls them to sleep, narcotizing and suspending their reason and intellect.

Another explanation, which in terms of practical effect and outcome does not differ much from this metaphysical one, is to say that Imam Hussein acted based on a command that was private, personal, and not generalizable to other human beings.

As I mentioned, among Shi'a thinkers, Dr. Shariati was perhaps the first to attempt to provide a rational, earthly, and natural explanation of this event, according to which Imam Hussein's uprising could be emulated and others could draw a lesson from it. The explanation that Dr. Shariati himself proposes as an alternative is, in brief, as follows: With the precise knowledge he had of the political and social circumstances and conditions of his time, Imam Hussein knew that an uprising and rebellion against the Umayyad government would not yield direct results—that is, it would not immediately lead to the fall of that government. Therefore, the only thing he could do was to expose the vile and corrupt face of this government through martyrdom. The Imam's goal was solely to expose, and he succeeded in achieving this goal. This exposure, of course, later bore fruit and ultimately led to the fall of the Umayyads.

According to Dr. Shariati, the moral principle that Imam Hussein followed was this: "If you can, kill; and if you cannot, die." That is, if you can fight a tyrannical and despotic regime and overthrow it, your duty is to fight that regime and eliminate it. But if you cannot, and your uprising is futile, your obligation is not entirely lifted from your shoulders; rather, you have another duty, which is to expose through martyrdom.

In Dr. Shariati's view, due to the particular political and social circumstances of the time, no struggle against the Umayyad regime had any chance of success or victory, and the only thing Imam Hussein could do was to disgrace the Umayyad system and awaken the dormant consciences of Muslims through martyrdom. Of course, once the masses awaken from their slumber of neglect, they will rise up and ultimately the tyrannical and despotic regime will be overthrown, but the fall of this regime will occur gradually and depends on the martyrdom of those who themselves cannot embrace the sight of victory. Therefore, the Imam's goal from the very beginning of his departure from Medina was martyrdom and nothing else. Dr. Shariati concludes that in similar circumstances, including in the face of the Shah's autocratic regime, we have a similar duty. If we cannot kill the oppressors, we can die and thereby disgrace them.

Dr. Shariati's explanation has merits and demerits. Among its merits is that it is consistent with some historical data and accommodates and justifies them well. For instance, this explanation provides a good answer to the question of why Imam Hussein took the women and children of the Ahl al-Bayt, including his sister Lady Zainab, on this perilous journey. Other explanations do not offer a convincing answer to this question. But the answer Dr. Shariati gives to this question is that the mission Imam Hussein felt upon his shoulders had two parts: the first part was upon the shoulders of Imam Hussein and the other martyrs, and the second part was upon the shoulders of the captives, headed by Lady Zainab. Shariati believed that martyrdom alone was not sufficient to expose the hideous face of the autocratic regime, and after martyrdom, there must be those who convey the message of the martyrs' blood to the masses. For this reason, Shariati would say: "Those who went, performed a Husseini act, and those who remained must perform a Zainabi act, otherwise they are Yazidi."

However, this explanation also has demerits. Firstly, it does not align with some historical data, for example, why Imam Hussein left Medina and went to Mecca, then set out towards Kufa, and why he sent Muslim ibn Aqil to Kufa to secure allegiance from its people and gain close knowledge of the city's conditions. These are examples of questions for which Dr. Shariati's explanation lacks a convincing answer, because someone whose goal is martyrdom has no need to move towards Kufa for this purpose and respond positively to the invitation of the people of Kufa.

Secondly, as Dr. Soroush states: one cannot derive the desired conclusion from Dr. Shariati's explanation. That is, one cannot conclude from this explanation that, therefore, everyone's duty is to "die if they cannot kill," because not every martyrdom has the effect and property of Imam Hussein's martyrdom. Imam Hussein is an exceptional figure, the grandson of the Prophet, and people are aware of the extent of the Prophet's affection and love for him; he enjoys high social standing in society, and as Ibn Abbas said: "People's hearts are with him, even if their swords are against him." The martyrdom of such a personality can shake society and awaken dormant consciences, but the martyrdom of ordinary individuals does not have such a property or effect. Therefore, if we accept Dr. Shariati's explanation, the maximum conclusion we can draw from it is that if your personality and social standing are such that through your martyrdom people awaken from their slumber of neglect, then your duty will be to expose the truth. But it is possible that hundreds of thousands of individuals who are not at this level may be martyred without causing a ripple.

The second scholarly explanation of the Karbala event was presented by one of the reformist jurists of the seminary, the late Ayatollah Salehi Najafabadi. He authored a book titled *Shahid-e Javid* (The Eternal Martyr), which is unparalleled or nearly unparalleled in its kind. This book is a distinguished work of research, and even if one disagrees with the conclusions the author draws from his research, one cannot help but admire his method of analyzing and explaining historical data. Mr. Salehi's presupposition is that Imam Hussein's uprising can be analyzed and explained based on the calculations of ordinary human reason and relying on information that reached him through conventional channels. In his view, Imam Hussein rose up to form an Islamic government; that is, his goal was to overthrow Yazid's rule and establish an Islamic government. According to him, given the numerous letters and invitations that reached the Imam from the people of Kufa, the probability of this uprising's success was very high. However, circumstances did not unfold as desired, the Imam's prediction did not come true, and against his inner wish, he submitted to an imposed war and was ultimately martyred.

This explanation also has its merits and drawbacks. Its merit is that it covers and justifies some of the historical data well. This includes the Imam's departure from Medina and his movement toward Kufa, and the Imam's conversations with the commanders of Yazid's army, in which he cites the letters of the people of Kufa, saying, 'You invited me with these letters to come to Kufa.' It also covers the Imam's statements expressing his motivation, in which he refers to enjoining good and forbidding evil and questions the legitimacy of Yazid's rule.

The flaw or weakness of this explanation is that it is inconsistent with some other historical data, or fails to provide an explanation for them. For instance, this explanation does not offer a clear and convincing answer to the question of why Imam Hussein, after learning of Muslim's martyrdom and the treachery and desertion of the people of Kufa, did not surrender and preferred martyrdom over pledging allegiance. Furthermore, within the framework of this explanation, it is made to appear as if establishing an Islamic government and implementing jurisprudential rulings is the ultimate goal; that is, it is portrayed as if implementing enjoining good and forbidding evil in society and among the masses is contingent upon seizing government power. This perception is precisely what exists in the back of the minds of many Islamists. According to this perception, Islamic society becomes corrupt, and that corruption consists of violating religious laws. To reform this corruption, one must enjoin good and forbid evil, but enjoining good and forbidding evil is impossible without holding government power. That is, government is a tool and a means for enjoining good and forbidding evil and implementing jurisprudential rulings, and Imam Hussein also rose up for this purpose.

Whereas the first thing that becomes corrupt in any society, including a religious society, and requires reform is the government itself, and fundamentally, enjoining good and forbidding evil exists to prevent the government from becoming corrupt. It is a naive understanding of political power and its exigencies to think that because one is knowledgeable in jurisprudential rulings and performs jurisprudential obligations and avoids prohibitions, one is therefore not susceptible to corruption, decay, and the temptation of power and wealth, and thus has no need for public oversight and control, and that it is only the masses who may become corrupt, and the duty of statesmen is to prevent the people's corruption through enjoining good and forbidding evil. The truth is that the opposite of this relationship is correct. Rulers are of the same kind as the ruled, and 'power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.' Government corruption is also the most important evil that must be fought, and statesmen, more than any other class, need public oversight and control, because they are both more exposed to corruption and the danger and harm of their corruption is greater than the danger and harm of the masses' corruption. Incidentally, in the narrations related to enjoining good and forbidding evil, there are references to this important point. For example, in some narrations, it is stated that if you abandon enjoining good and forbidding evil, the wicked will dominate society, meaning they will take over the guidance, control, and management of society. In any case, the most important evil that Imam Hussein faced was the government itself. And when he says, 'Indeed, I have risen only to seek reform in the community of my grandfather,' his intention is not that the 'community' of my grandfather has become corrupt and I must seize government power to reform the community of my grandfather and reform it through that power. The community here is the 'locus' of reform, not its 'object' or 'subject.' The subject of reform is the autocratic political system.

The late Ayatollah Motahhari offers a third explanation of the Karbala incident. In his view, three main factors were involved in Imam Hussein's uprising: (1) Yazid's demand for allegiance, (2) the invitation of the people of Kufa, and (3) enjoining good and forbidding evil. According to him, the factor of enjoining good and forbidding evil is the primary factor, and the other two play a complementary and reinforcing role; that is, even if those other two factors had not been present, Imam Hussein would still have risen up for the sake of enjoining good and forbidding evil.

This explanation has advantages, including that, unlike other explanations, it does not assume a priori that Imam Hussein's justification, motivation, and impetus consisted of only one factor. At the same time, this explanation is not without weaknesses. First, it is not sufficiently deep; that is, it does not tell us why Imam Hussein was unwilling to pledge allegiance to Yazid at any cost. Second, when critiquing the view of Shahid-e Javid that Imam Hussein's motive was to form a government, the late Mr. Motahhari says that Imam Hussein knew in advance that the destruction of the Umayyad government and the formation of an Islamic government was impossible under those circumstances, and therefore his primary motive was not to form a government. Yet, on the other hand, he claims that if Imam Hussein had not responded to the invitation of the people of Kufa, he would have been accountable before history, and others could have objected to him, asking why he did not accept their invitation. In the author's view, this claim contains a contradiction. For if the Imam knew in advance that an uprising against the Umayyad government would not achieve the desired result, he had a valid excuse for not responding positively to the people of Kufa's invitation and would not have been accountable before history. He could have given the same answer to objectors that Imam Sadiq later gave. That answer was that the uprising would not succeed.

Another problem with Mr. Motahhari's theory is that he seeks to discover a "jurisprudential" justification for the Imam's movement and behavior; that is, his view of the category of enjoining good and forbidding evil is a jurisprudential one. However, Imam Hussein's movement cannot be justified with a jurisprudential conception of enjoining good and forbidding evil, because jurisprudential enjoining good and forbidding evil has conditions, some of which are absent in this case: one of those conditions is the probability of effectiveness, whereas Yazid and his entourage and representatives were not people who would be influenced by the Imam's protest. The second condition for the obligation of enjoining good and forbidding evil, from a jurisprudential perspective, is that the act must not entail significant danger or harm, and the greatest danger and harm is death. Here, some have said that this condition is specific to cases where the very foundation of Islam is not in danger, and at that time, the foundation of Islam was in danger because the caliph was a man who played with dogs and monkeys, drank wine, and committed adultery with his close relatives. But these justifications are not convincing, because the danger Mu'awiya posed to Islam was far greater than the danger posed by Yazid, and if the endangerment of the foundation of Islam were the basis for the Imam's movement, he should, as a rule, have risen up during Mu'awiya's time.

The next problem is that, fundamentally, the decisions Imam Hussein made and acted upon after learning of Muslim's martyrdom and the people of Kufa's change of heart cannot be justified based on the principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil. Furthermore, this theory does not align with some historical data. When Imam Hussein says to Yazid's army, "I came here at your invitation; now that you have withdrawn your invitation, go about your business, and I will return to Medina," his meaning is that from this point on, I have no justification for an uprising—not that you go about your business, and I will go and then rise up again. Neither would Imam Hussein make such an unreasonable request, nor would Yazid's army have accepted it.

However, three common and positive points can be observed in these three explanations: first, that Imam Hussein's movement was carried out based on rational calculation and was grounded in ordinary human reason. Second, that Imam Hussein's impetus in this uprising was a "sense of duty." And third, that the duty for which the Imam rose up was a general and universal duty, not a personal and exclusive command. Therefore, others also bear such a duty under similar circumstances.

In other words, the explanation these thinkers offer for Imam Hussein's uprising has three characteristics: first, it is a "scientific" explanation; second, it is a "value-based" and "normative" explanation. All these explanations assume that Imam Hussein, in his uprising, followed one or more specific values or rules of conduct, and they seek to discover the logic governing Imam Hussein's behavior; and third, that norm or those norms are "general" and "universal," and if they do not encompass all human beings, they at least encompass all Muslims and are not specific to someone like Imam Hussein.

To put it more clearly, the presupposition of all these explanations—which is also a correct presupposition—is that a free and autonomous agent, in their voluntary and willful behavior, needs a reason that both justifies that action for them and motivates and incites them to perform it. And if we assume that Imam Hussein's movement was a voluntary and willful act, we must inevitably accept that Imam Hussein, in complete freedom and autonomy, weighed the various options and possibilities before him, consulted with sympathetic wise men and benevolent advisors, then made a decision and acted according to that decision. Therefore, we must accept that Imam Hussein had a reason or reasons acceptable to reason for his action, which both justified this action for him and motivated him to act.

But the significant objection that, in my view, can be raised against all these theories is that these theories try to show that the justification the Imam had for his uprising was an "intra-religious" and "jurisprudential" justification, whereas it seems the Imam's justification was a "moral" and "extra-religious" one, and therefore Imam Hussein is not only a role model for Muslims or Shiites, but a role model for all human beings, because morality is an extra-religious category. When Imam Hussein, addressing the enemy army, says: "If you have no religion, [at least] be free men," this precisely means that the logic governing my behavior is an extra-religious logic, and the logic governing your behavior is also an extra-religious logic. And for you to understand that I am right and my behavior is correct, and your treatment of me is incorrect and unjustifiable, you do not need to be a Muslim or a Shiite; it is enough to be a human being. That is, my action is justified and reasonable based on moral criteria that are general and universal and originate from human identity, and your action is unjustified and incorrect based on those same criteria. What those justifications were is the subject of our discussion in the next session.

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[1] . Edited and revised transcript of a lecture at Kanoun-e Tawhid, London, 1/5/2008.

[2]. Motahhari, M. Hamaseh-ye Hosseini, Vol. 1, p. 121.

[3]. In this regard, Ayatollah Motahhari writes: "Why must we always study the Karbala incident from the perspective of its dark page? And why must the crimes of Karbala always be recounted? Why must Hussein ibn Ali always be the subject of our study from the perspective of being a victim of criminals? Why are the slogans we chant and write in the name of Hussein ibn Ali taken from the dark page of Ashura?..." (Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 121-125 and Vol. 3, p. 73). The reason why Shiites are more interested in reading the black and dark page of Karbala has numerous cultural, social, and political causes, the investigation of which requires sociological studies.

[4]. Rumi is one of the few who invites us to view the Karbala incident from this angle. On this, see: Soroush, A. (2000) "Hussein ibn Ali and Jalal al-Din Rumi," Ghomar-e Asheghaneh, (Tehran: Serat Publications), pp. 139-165.

[5]. "Wa lakum fiyya uswa": "I am a role model for you."

[6]. Of course, some researchers believe that this view also became prevalent in Shiite culture from the time of Sayyid Ibn Tawus onwards.

[7]. According to some researchers, this narration lacks credibility because it has no chain of transmission.

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