Abolghasem Fanai: “Hussein, the School of Justice and Dignity” – Session Two

In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Hussein, the School of Justice and Dignity (2)[1]

Abolghasem Fanai

Greetings to dear brothers and sisters. In the previous session, we spoke about the philosophy of Ashura and critically examined some of the explanations that have been offered for this event. We said that for a historical event to hold a lesson and a message for us, we must first and foremost strive to attain a correct understanding of that event, and understanding an event is nothing other than explaining it. We are compelled to examine the collection of historical documents and evidence related to that event and to provide an explanation of it that, compared to alternative and rival explanations, is more consistent with the documents and evidence and for which stronger reasons exist. In addition to greater consistency with the relevant evidence, the internal coherence of an explanation and its compatibility with our other accepted beliefs are also among the criteria for the superiority of one explanation over rival explanations. A metaphysical explanation of this event, even if correct, offers no practical benefit, because it relies on the role of God and unseen causes and factors in the occurrence of the event in question, rather than on the role of rational, free, and autonomous human beings. The explanation that holds practical benefit for us is the natural, human, and earthly explanation, that is, an explanation that relies on the role of the environment in the broadest sense of the word and the role of human will and voluntary, free action in response to what transpires in their surrounding environment.

In the previous session, we critically examined a total of five different explanations, and tonight we will examine another explanation that appears to be better and more defensible than the others. But before addressing the main topic, it is worth noting two points. The first point is that the list of explanations critically examined here is not exhaustive. There are, or can be, other explanations of the Ashura event, the examination of all of which is beyond the capacity of our session. The second point is that just as Imam Hussein decided and acted according to a specific logic, Yazid and his supporters and helpers also followed a specific logic in their behavior. And since this event was the product of the action and reaction of two groups, a comprehensive explanation of this event also requires uncovering the logic governing the behavior of both groups. However, due to time constraints, we are compelled to postpone the examination of the principles governing the behavior of Yazid and the Yazidis to another time. Here, I will suffice by saying that two of the principles governing their behavior—which are, in fact, among the principles of the Umayyad political philosophy and, indeed, among the foundations of the political philosophy of all despots—are, one, the principle of "the necessity of preserving the government at any cost," and the other, the "theory of al-nasr bil-ru'b" (victory through terror and intimidation).

In Umayyad political philosophy, the government is the principle, and any action is permissible to preserve it. According to this political view, the ruler has the right, if necessary, to trample all moral values, including the principle of justice, and violate the rights of citizens in order to preserve his rule. Whereas in Alavid political philosophy, the government has no intrinsic value and is merely a tool and a means for realizing justice; that is, its value is purely instrumental, and if its preservation depends on oppression, it is worth nothing. Ibn Abbas, in a story narrated from him in Nahj al-Balagha, says: During the Battle of the Camel, I went to Imam Ali's tent and saw him repairing and patching his shoe. He says: The Imam asked me, "What is the value of this shoe?" I said, "Nothing." The Imam said, "By God, the value of ruling over you is, in my eyes, less than this shoe, unless I can thereby uphold a right and suppress a falsehood." Upholding a right here means realizing justice. Therefore, in Alavid political philosophy, the primary and foundational value is justice, and government becomes valuable in the shadow of justice; that is, it derives its value from justice and is inherently worthless, and it only has value so long as justice can be implemented in society through it. Whereas in Umayyad political philosophy, government has intrinsic value and is desired for its own sake, and preserving it at any cost is obligatory.

On the other hand, if you examine the history of Karbala, you will see that many of the atrocities and acts of savagery committed there were unnecessary, especially the crimes perpetrated after the event concluded and Imam Hussein and his companions were martyred, such as trampling the bodies of the martyrs with horses, placing their heads on spears and parading them through cities, as well as taking the women and children captive and parading them through various towns. It seems these atrocities have no justification other than the theory of al-nasr bil-ru'b (victory through terror). Yazid and his army sought to strike terror into the hearts of others and practically make the people understand that if this is how we treat the grandson of the Prophet and the Prophet's household, then others' fates are self-evident. Other principles can also be enumerated for the Umayyad political philosophy, including the principle of 'al-haqqu liman ghalab,' meaning 'right belongs to the one who has more power.' However, elaborating on these principles and other principles they followed requires another occasion.

Now let us turn to the logic governing Imam Hussein's conduct. The theory I wish to share with friends tonight states, in brief: 'The tragedy of Karbala was the result of the separation of religion from ethics.' If religion departs from its ethical framework, and if a religious government and those who rule people in the name of religion violate ethical principles and disregard moral values, then it can be said that an evil has occurred in the religious society that must be fought against. This appears to be the greatest and most dangerous corruption that a religious society can suffer. Of course, such corruption can also arise in non-religious societies, but the difference is that when such a moral evil occurs in a religious society, it is done in the name of religion and a religious justification is concocted for it. What did Yazid's army say? Their argument was that Yazid is the Caliph and successor of the Messenger of God, and obedience to him is obligatory upon all Muslims. Opposing him is opposing the Messenger of God, and one who rises against the Caliph of the Messenger of God has left the religion and deserves the severest punishment.

But the justification that Imam Hussein gave for his conduct was not that you are not the Caliph of the Messenger of God and I am the Caliph of the Messenger of God, and if I were in your place, anything I did would be permissible. In my view, those who, in order to justify Imam Hussein's jihad, point to Yazid's personal traits, such as his fondness for dogs and monkeys, do an injustice to Imam Hussein. In his speeches, Imam Hussein clearly stated his goals for this movement. In the will he wrote before departing Medina and entrusted to his brother Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyya to be recorded in history, he clearly expresses his goals. He begins by bearing witness to the oneness of God and the prophethood of the Messenger. And this is probably for two reasons: first, he anticipated that the Umayyad propaganda apparatus would accuse him of apostasy and enmity toward the Prophet. Second, he anticipated that some ignorant devotees would elevate him to divine status. The same people who today say: "We are Hussein-Allahis, and Karbala is our Kaaba." Imam Hussein then says: "I did not rise out of pride, insolence, corruption, or injustice. I rose only to seek reform in the community of my grandfather, the Messenger of God (PBUH). I intend to enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong, and to follow the conduct of my grandfather and my father." That is: "I have not risen motivated by selfishness, revelry, corruption, and oppression, and my motivation is nothing other than reform in the community of my grandfather, the Messenger of God. My intention is to enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong, and to follow the tradition of my grandfather and my father." As I mentioned in the previous session, the phrase "community of my grandfather" here is the "context" of the reforms, not their "subject" or "object." The conjunction of the sentence "and to follow the conduct of my grandfather and my father" with the sentence "enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong" is an explanatory and interpretive conjunction, meaning this sentence shows what Imam Hussein meant by enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong. "Conduct" means the method of governance, and his point is that the autocratic governance of Yazid bears no resemblance whatsoever to the governance of the Messenger of God or the governance of Imam Ali. They treated the people with justice, but this government's treatment of the people is oppressive, and this is the greatest wrong, indeed the only wrong that must be fought against. The wrong that Imam Hussein faced at that time, and which it was obligatory to oppose, was the political and social oppression of the government, not the Caliph playing with dogs and monkeys. Likewise, the Imam's goal was not to attain power for himself. His dispute was not over power. Elsewhere, the Imam says: "O God, You Yourself know that my goal is not rivalry for power." Imam Hussein contemplated changing methods and structures, not changing individuals.

"Justice" and "dignity" are two of the most important and pivotal moral values, and in my view, a brief review of Imam Hussein's words and deeds shows that from beginning to end, His Holiness decided and acted based on these two great moral values. In the last year of his life, that is, after the death of Mu'awiya and the succession of Yazid in his place, Imam Hussein made two great and fateful decisions, and these two decisions can only be justified based on the principle of justice and the principle of dignity, both of which are moral principles. Imam Hussein's movement was not a blind movement based on emotion and feelings, but followed a strong, rational, measured, and calculated logic.

The first decision Imam Hussein made, based on which he left Medina, was the decision to rise against the oppressive and autocratic government of Yazid and to strive to form a just government with the help of the people of Kufa, and this action can only be justified based on the principle of justice, which is the most important value of social and political ethics. Up to this point, Imam Hussein's slogan was: "Be an enemy of the oppressor and a helper to the oppressed." The second decision Imam Hussein made was the decision he took after learning of the martyrdom of Muslim ibn Aqil and the turning away of the people of Kufa, and he acted upon it until Karbala. When the enemy forced His Holiness to choose between surrendering and pledging allegiance or being killed, he preferred a dignified death to a life of humiliation. His Holiness's slogan at this stage was: "Far be it from us, humiliation!" And this decision and action can only be justified based on the principle of human dignity.

The principle of justice states: all of us human beings, by virtue of our humanity, are morally obligated to struggle against oppression and strive for the realization of justice. However, the struggle against widespread social oppression and the effort to achieve social justice on a macro level has conditions and stages, the observance of which is morally necessary. Oppression also has various types and forms, all of which fall under the heading of depriving rights or violating and ignoring the rights of others. Wherever there is oppression, there must antecedently be a right that the oppressive person, group, or government ignores and tramples upon, thereby committing oppression. Therefore, if there is no right at stake, there will be no oppression.[2] When Imam Hussein says he wants to act according to the way of his grandfather and his father, he also means that he has not risen to claim a personal right. This is part of the conduct of Imam Ali. When the people or the six-member council appointed by Umar decided to pledge allegiance to Uthman, Imam Ali says: 'You certainly know that I am more entitled to the caliphate than anyone else. By God, I will submit as long as the affairs of the Muslims remain sound and there is no oppression in it except upon myself, seeking the reward and virtue of that, and out of renunciation of the finery and ornament of this world over which you compete' (Nahj al-Balagha, Sermon 74).

Social justice, in the words of John Rawls, is the first virtue of social institutions. In a just society, social institutions are formed based on the rights of individuals and are administered based on these rights, and in the interaction of these institutions with individuals, their rights are respected and not violated. Social justice is not limited to economic justice; it also includes political justice. Political justice is the fair distribution of power, responsibility, freedom, and other collective goods. Therefore, freedom is not a rival to justice and does not stand in opposition to it; that is, people are not forced to choose between justice and freedom and sacrifice one for the other. Rather, justice is the standard according to which the distribution of freedom and other collective goods and resources must take place. Depriving freedoms or the unequal distribution of freedom is considered an instance of oppression. The public sphere is the common property of citizens, and everyone's share in this regard is equal to others. If someone appropriates this sphere without the presence of the general citizenry or their real and elected representatives and without their consent, their appropriation will be usurpatory and oppressive, and it is the moral duty of every individual to struggle against such oppression.

But as I mentioned, this duty has conditions, prerequisites, and also stages that must be observed. The first stage of the struggle against social oppression is 'cultural activity.' At this stage, those who see and feel the existence of such oppression in society are obligated to make others aware of the existence of this oppression and the necessity of struggling against it through cultural activity, and to remind everyone of this moral duty. At this stage, individual rebellion and uprising against oppression, especially of the armed variety, is not the right or rational thing to do. However, although cultural activity for social reform is a general and universal duty, the responsibility of the elites, scholars, and thinkers in this regard is greater and heavier. The goal of cultural activity is to sensitize the collective conscience to oppression and for justice to become a public demand. And at this stage, the struggle against oppression is more an individual endeavor than a collective one.

Cultural activity aimed at realizing social justice also includes theorizing about social justice, because without having a clear and refined theory of social justice, one can neither identify instances of social oppression nor strive for the realization of social justice. Theory is the guide to action, and those who act without a well-considered theory get nowhere, if we do not say that the harm of their action is greater than its benefit.

It should not go unsaid that the historical experience of humanity shows that replacing individuals does not turn an unjust society into a just one, nor does it replace unjust relations with just ones. This very issue is one of the important differences between revolution and reform. Revolutionary movements are aimed at replacing individuals and usually stop at that. Revolutionaries mistakenly think that the main cause of social problems is specific individuals, and that by removing or eliminating them the problem will be solved, whereas social problems have social and cultural roots, originating from and being nourished by the structure and culture of society. As long as the culture and social structure are not reformed, replacing individuals will not cure the pain, and after a while, the same previous relations will be re-established under new titles and in new garb. The new individuals who come to power, whether they want to or not, cannot stop or change such a process; rather, power causes their personality, character, way of thinking, and way of behaving to change. This is what the Quran says: "Indeed, Allah will not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves." Until the people change, the social and political relations and structures of society will not change. And the change of the people is only possible through cultural work and the struggle against ignorance and superstition. Therefore, intellectual and cultural reform takes precedence over political and economic reform. Social justice, which is the primary virtue of social institutions, differs from individual justice, which is the virtue of individuals; these two justices should not be considered identical, nor should one be reduced to the other.

After individuals become aware and their collective conscience awakens and becomes sensitized, the time for peaceful social struggles arrives. Entering this stage has two important conditions. The first condition is the presence and readiness of a sufficient number of individuals in society. If the number of people willing to participate in a collective struggle against social oppression is not sufficient, the duty of peaceful social struggle is lifted from the shoulders of the society's intellectual leaders, and their task will be limited solely to that cultural activity. For, on the one hand, every duty is conditional upon power and capability, and on the other hand, social struggles are aimed at results, and the desired result from this struggle is only achieved if the members of society are willing to participate in this struggle to the necessary extent and pay the required cost. The second condition for entering this stage concerns the method of struggle. In this stage, one must only use peaceful ways, means, and methods (i.e., civil disobedience), because if the goal can be achieved through peaceful means without resorting to force and violence, resorting to force and violence will not be morally permissible. Violence, war, and the use of force are always the last resort and should only be turned to when all other paths are closed. From a moral standpoint, violence is divided into two types: legitimate and illegitimate, or permissible and impermissible. One of the constraints of morally legitimate violence is that the person who is to be treated with violence deserves such violence, and another is that the application of that violence does not result in an outcome that is morally worse. If treating an illness is possible through medicine, no rational person would suggest surgery and amputation. "Cauterization is the last remedy." And in this regard, there is no difference between individual illnesses and social illnesses. Social oppression is a social illness, and if it can be fought through peaceful means, violence and force should not be used. If an unjust and autocratic government peacefully submits to the demands of justice-seekers, they have no moral right and are not permitted to resort to force. For this reason, when God commands Prophet Moses and his brother Aaron to go and struggle against Pharaoh, who had rebelled, He says to them: "Go, both of you, to Pharaoh. Indeed, he has transgressed. And speak to him with gentle speech; perhaps he may take heed or fear" (Ta-Ha, 43-44), meaning speak to Pharaoh with soft and pleasant words; perhaps he will take heed and fear, and cease his oppression and rebellion. Later, I will speak about the application of this important moral principle to the movement of Imam Hussein, and we will see what an important consequence observing this principle has for our current duties.

Imam Hussein was by no means seeking violence, and until the very last moment, he tried to prevent the outbreak of war. War was imposed upon him. Of course, this statement is difficult for some to digest, but this reality is so clear in his conduct and speech that it cannot be denied.

In the modern world and in modern political culture, this type of struggle is called “civil disobedience.” Civil disobedience means expressing opposition to an unjust law or the unjust conduct of a government without resorting to violence. Civil disobedience is, in fact, one of the rights of human beings. Imam Hussein’s action, as long as he understood that the people of Kufa had broken their covenant and were not willing to support him, was in reality a form of civil disobedience. The reasoning and justification Imam Hussein had for such an action was that the people of Kufa had invited me to come to them and, with their help, reform the political structure of Islamic society, and it is my right and their right to do so.

But if the oppressive government resists the legitimate demand of the people and is not willing to abandon its oppression without resorting to force, and to reform unjust laws, relations, and arrangements, then the people have the right to resort to force and violence within the framework of justice to realize justice, and this is the third stage of the struggle against oppression and the effort to achieve social justice. However, this stage also has conditions, and one of its conditions is that a sufficient number of people are willing to cooperate, sacrifice, and pay the necessary costs in this regard, and in the absence of a sufficient number of people, the responsibility of jihad and armed struggle is lifted from the shoulders of the leaders of social struggles.

For this reason, after Imam Hussein learned of the martyrdom of Muslim ibn Aqil and the turning away of the people of Kufa, he changed his reasoning and justification and, on numerous occasions, both in public addresses and in private negotiations with Yazid’s troops, who were mainly from Kufa, he would say to them: O people of Kufa, you invited me to come to Kufa. Now that you have withdrawn your invitation, leave me to myself and go back to your lives, and I will return to Medina or go to a corner and continue my own life (Ibn Abbas had suggested to the Imam that he go to Yemen). But the Yazidis would say: We will not leave you to yourself; you must either pledge allegiance to Yazid or be killed. As I said, the decision Imam Hussein makes at this time, based on which he resists to the last drop of his blood and is ultimately martyred, can be justified based on the moral principle of human dignity and the moral obligation to preserve this dignity.

According to some moral philosophers, human dignity is the foundation of ethics. In very simple terms, the principle of human dignity says: A human being is not a thing and should not be treated like a thing. If someone treats other human beings like a thing, that is, uses them as a tool for the benefit of some end, they have trampled upon their human dignity, whatever that end may be. Therefore, cheating in elections and disregarding the votes of citizens, in addition to its other moral defects, also violates their human dignity. Likewise, if someone treats themselves like a thing, they have disregarded and violated their own human dignity. Thus, the principle of human dignity says that the human being possesses intrinsic, non-instrumental value and asks all human beings to view themselves and others as ends and goals, not as means and tools for another end or goal. Ethics asks us to respect human dignity, not to violate the human dignity of others, and not to allow others to violate and disregard our own human dignity.

Human dignity is the source of human rights, the source of human duties, and the basis of individuality, independence, autonomy, and moral responsibility. All the rights that human beings have and all the duties that human beings have towards themselves and others originate from their human dignity. Human dignity is the specific moral status of the human being and the distinguishing feature of humans from animals and inanimate objects. We have the right to treat animals and inanimate objects like things, meaning we can own them, buy and sell them, and use them for the benefit of our own ends. But we are not morally permitted to treat ourselves and other human beings in this way.

The principle of human dignity is also greatly emphasized in Islamic ethics. Both in the Qur’an and in the traditions we are enjoined not to sell ourselves for anything less than paradise, and paradise is nothing other than the moral virtues we cultivate within ourselves and the character that is the sum of those virtues. We have an inner paradise and an outer paradise, and the outer paradise is in truth the manifestation and reflection of the inner paradise. In our traditions it is stated: “Indeed, Allah, Blessed and Exalted, has delegated to the believer everything except the humiliation of his own self”[3] and also “The most intelligent of people is the one furthest removed from every baseness.”[4] The principle of dignity says that the worth of a human being is greater than the world and all that is in it, and therefore one who respects his own human dignity and perceives its value and worth will not exchange or barter himself for any worldly thing. One who can be bought with money, position, rank, or other things, and one who, out of fear or greed, remains silent in the face of injustice and submits to abasement and degradation, does not know his own worth and sells himself cheaply. Likewise, one whose character changes under the influence of power or wealth has, in truth, sold his human dignity cheaply.

The principle of dignity says that a person’s life has value and significance only so long as it is accompanied by dignity, and a human being has no right to disregard his dignity for the price of staying alive, or to allow others to disregard it. In other words, if we are compelled to choose between “a life accompanied by abasement” and “a death accompanied by honor,” the principle of dignity says we must choose the latter, and this is the situation that Imam Hussein faced at Karbala and in which he made a great choice. Had the Yazidis not demanded allegiance from Imam Hussein, his human dignity would not have been violated, and he would not have been morally obligated to prefer death over life. But when they placed him at the crossroads of death and allegiance, he chose death of his own free will in order to preserve his human dignity and not submit to humiliation. What the Imam did here was not an uprising or a struggle, but a defense—a defense of human dignity. And it is the right of every human being to defend his human dignity and not submit to humiliation. Here, rebellion and uprising were no longer at issue, because, due to the turning away of the people of Kufa, the Imam was not morally obligated to rise up. Had the Yazidis left him alone and not demanded his allegiance, the Imam would have gone to a corner, continued his life, and contented himself with cultural activity and awakening the people. For in that case, his dignity would have been preserved, and regarding social justice, he would have had no duty beyond cultural activity.

That is, in that case, fighting and defending would not have been morally justifiable. Fighting would not have been justifiable because war is not an “end” but a “means,” and this means has value only so long as it can achieve a legitimate goal, which in this case is the realization of social justice and the establishment of a just government. And as I said, given the turning away of the people of Kufa, the realization of such a goal was impossible. But defending would not have been justifiable, because the only thing that could have been defended by dying in that particular situation was human dignity, and this dignity would only have been endangered and in need of defense if the Yazidis had forced the Imam into allegiance. Martyrdom, too, in the school of Islam, is not an end but a means, for a person’s life is very precious, and he has the right to sacrifice his life only when something of greater value is in danger, making the sacrifice of life necessary to preserve it. Therefore, sacrificing one’s life is not morally permissible in two cases: one is sacrificing oneself for things whose moral value is less than that of a human being, and the other is sacrificing oneself for things whose moral value is greater than that of a human being, but those more valuable things can be preserved through other means, at a lower cost, and by sacrificing less valuable things.

Thus, the most important moral lessons that can be learned from the school of Imam Hussein are two: one is the struggle against oppression and the effort to realize social justice, and the other is the preservation of human dignity and respect for it. Before hearing the news of Muslim ibn Aqil's martyrdom and the turning away of the people of Kufa, Imam Hussein's moral duty was to engage in practical struggle against the oppressive and despotic Umayyad regime. But after that, due to the change in circumstances, the Imam's moral duty changed, and a new duty was placed upon his shoulders, which was to preserve his own human dignity. Therefore, Imam Hussein's movement, from beginning to end, is based on calculation and deliberation, has a rational justification, and follows a brilliant moral logic. The Imam's conduct is entirely in accordance with moral standards. And for this reason, he can be a model and exemplar for us. Imam Hussein says: "Wa lakum fīya uswa," meaning "I am a model and exemplar for you." The Imam's intention is that you can learn from me the lesson of duty-consciousness and responsibility-consciousness, and the lesson of living morally and dying morally. He also says: "Kūnū li-ẓ-ẓālimi khaṣman wa li-l-maẓlūmi ʿawnā," meaning "Be an enemy to the oppressor and a helper to the oppressed." In this saying, the Imam points to our duty regarding the struggle against oppression and the effort to realize social justice. But in Karbala, his slogan is: "Hayhāt minnā adh-dhilla," meaning "Away with abasement and humiliation from us," or "Far be it from us." In this saying, the Imam reminds us of our duty to preserve human dignity and not to submit to humiliation. These two moral duties are completely universal, meaning they encompass all human beings. Therefore, Imam Hussein's movement was not based on a private command that could not be generalized to others. Nor was Imam Hussein's movement based on a jurisprudential and intra-religious justification that would, at most, include Shiites and Muslims.

Imam Hussein is a moral school in which all human beings can learn the lessons of courage, liberality, struggle against oppression, and refusal to submit to force and humiliation. But unfortunately, we Shiites, instead of learning from this school, merely mourn for him. Mere mourning, devoid of insight, benefits neither us nor his Holiness much. Imam Hussein was not martyred so that we would mourn for him,[5] but rather he was martyred to tell us how to live and how to die, and based on what values and principles to make decisions and how to behave. Yet we live and die as if Imam Hussein is not our model; that is, our life and death are organized according to other models, because we both submit to humiliation and remain silent in the face of oppression. Regrettably, it must be confessed that our condition is even worse than this, and we also suffer from a kind of moral hypocrisy. Someone who remains silent in the face of oppression for three hundred and fifty-five days of the year and prefers a life of abasement and humiliation to a death with dignity and honor is more akin to the followers of Yazid than to the followers of Imam Hussein, even if they mourn and shed tears for Imam Hussein for ten days each year. Love for Imam Hussein, if not accompanied by a correct understanding of his Holiness and the recognition and practical following of the logic he followed, will not cure much of our pain.

As you know, when the captives of Karbala were taken to the caliphal court in Kufa and then to Yazid's court, Ibn Ziyad and Yazid humiliated and reproached them, pointing to the calamities and afflictions they themselves had brought upon them and attributing them to God. Lady Zainab, in response to them, said: "I see nothing in God's work but beauty." But we have become so focused solely on the story of the Imam's killing and his loyal companions and the other painful atrocities and crimes that took place in Karbala that we pay little attention to the Imam himself and the beauty, value, and importance of what he did and the lessons that can be learned from him, and we are heedless of it. In most of our mourning ceremonies, Imam Hussein and his character and conduct are marginalized, while the crimes committed by the Yazidis are centered. The scenes are so bloody and harrowing, and the emotional and sentimental weight of the event has become so heavy and intense that it has deprived us of the possibility of rational analysis and the possibility of educational and pedagogical use of this event. We must bring Imam Hussein to the center and also see the brilliant and unparalleled beauties of the Imam's moral conduct in this bitter and bloody tragedy.[6]

Now let us see what the moral lesson and message of Imam Hussein is for our time; that is, what would his Holiness do if he lived in this era and in the world in which we live.

Imam Hussein's goal was to combat moral evils, and the government's oppression of the people is the greatest moral evil. As noted, oppression has meaning only where a right is at stake. But as we have seen, combating social oppression or forbidding evil has stages and conditions, and its method may change depending on the situation. If the people are not ready to cooperate and sacrifice, the struggle is limited to cultural and propagational activities and, at most, civil disobedience. And if correcting corruptions is possible through peaceful means, the use of force and violence is not permissible. And if human dignity can coexist with staying alive, killing oneself is not permissible. Martyrdom is different from suicide. Martyrdom is the free and conscious preference of death over life, and it is valuable where a value more important than life is at risk and the only way to preserve that value is death. That value, as I said, is human dignity.

The late Allameh Tabatabai says in one of his books: In Nahj al-Balagha, there are passages whose meanings Muslim philosophers were unable to grasp for a thousand years, because they lacked the necessary philosophical foundations to explain and interpret those words. After a thousand years, Sadr al-Muta'allehin emerged and established new foundations in philosophy, and then the meaning of Imam Ali's words regarding monotheism became clear and comprehensible.

In my view, the very same claim holds true regarding Imam Hussein's movement. The logic and philosophy of Imam Hussein's uprising are better understood and justified based on the advances made in moral philosophy since Kant. The norms that Imam Hussein followed and based his decisions and actions upon are universal, extra-religious moral norms, not jurisprudential and intra-religious norms. From the perspective of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein, who follows Imam Ali, government is not the goal; it is a means. The goal is justice, and the criterion for a government's legitimacy is the justness of its method of governance, not its Islamic character. From this perspective, governments are divided into just and unjust, not Islamic and non-Islamic. Justice is an extra-religious category, and for religion to be justified, it must align itself with this criterion. There is no Islamic or non-Islamic justice, but Islam can be interpreted in two ways: a just interpretation (= Alavi Islam) and an unjust interpretation (= Umayyad Islam).

Imam Hussein did not rise up to form an Islamic government and secure his personal right; his goal was to establish an extra-religious and ethical (= just) government, not a change of personnel. The talk is of reviving the "method of governance" of the Prophet and Ali, and enjoining good and forbidding evil is not a jurisprudential and intra-religious duty, but an ethical and extra-religious one. Jurisprudential derivatives, which are subject to disagreement, cannot be the criterion for good and evil.

A correct explanation of the Ashura event tells us: The entire movement of Imam Hussein can be justified based on two fundamental ethical principles. One is the principle of social justice, and the other is the principle of human dignity. Every individual human being has moral rights, and the observance of those rights by social institutions, headed by the institution of the state and government, is called social justice. If a government violates human rights, it is everyone's moral duty to combat this evil, but this struggle has stages and degrees. On the other hand, every individual human being has the right to live with honor and dignity, and a life with honor and dignity is a lifestyle in which individuals have independence, autonomy, freedom, and responsibility, and nothing is imposed on them from outside. And if, in a particular case and under specific conditions, an individual's continued existence is not accompanied by honor and dignity, from an ethical perspective, dying is preferable to staying alive under those conditions. These two principles are the very justifications that Imam Hussein relied upon in his words and slogans.

These two principles are among the eternal ethical principles, although the method of struggle and the weapon of struggle against political oppression and other types of oppression are subject to time and place, and the instances of these two principles may change from one era to another. In the modern era and in modern societies, the duty of uncovering and preventing political injustices is mainly the responsibility of the media and parties, or more precisely, the responsibility of "civil society." And forbidding evil is carried out through public oversight of the government. Therefore, those who speak of justice will be sincere in their claim only if they strive for the expansion of freedom, democracy, and the formation of civil society.

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[1]. Edited and revised transcript of a lecture at the Kanun-e Tawhid in London, 8/8/2008

[2]. By "right" here I mean right as opposed to duty, not right as opposed to falsehood. As you know, the word "right" has multiple meanings, but two of these meanings, which are more important and more common than the other meanings of this word, are (1) right as opposed to duty and (2) right as opposed to falsehood. Right as opposed to falsehood is a philosophical and logical concept. But right as opposed to duty is a moral and legal concept.

[3]. Al-Kafi, vol. 5, p. 63, hadith 3.

[4]. Ghurar al-Hikam, p. 52, hadith 388.

[5]. And never think of those who have been killed in the cause of Allah as dead. Rather, they are alive with their Lord, receiving provision (3:169), Rejoicing in what Allah has bestowed upon them of His bounty, and they receive good tidings about those [to be martyred] after them who have not yet joined them—that there will be no fear concerning them, nor will they grieve (3:170). They receive good tidings of favor from Allah and bounty and [of the fact] that Allah does not allow the reward of believers to be lost (3:171).

[6] Rumi is one of those who has paid attention to the beautiful dimensions of this story.

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PDF File of "Hussein, the School of Justice and Dignity" – Session Two

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