Arash Naraghi's essay 'Sexual Assault or Violation of Bodily Dignity'

Sexual Assault or Violation of Bodily Dignity

Arash Naraghi | 19 August 2009 | Moravian College, Pennsylvania

Violation of bodily dignity is a form of violence in the realm of sexual relations, and can, like other forms of violence (especially in patriarchal systems), become a tool for imposing domination. In this essay, I wish to briefly examine some aspects of the phenomenon of "violation of bodily dignity" or "sexual assault," particularly from the perspective of ethics and the philosophy of right. My discussion will primarily focus on the following four questions:

First question: What is the phenomenon of "violation of bodily dignity"?

Second question: Why is the phenomenon of "violation of bodily dignity" morally wrong?

Third question: How should one confront the phenomenon of "violation of bodily dignity" as a tool for humiliation and the imposition of domination?

What is the phenomenon of "violation of bodily dignity" or "sexual assault"? There are at least four important views regarding the nature of this phenomenon:

According to the first view, sexual assault should be considered a "forcible sexual act," that is, a sexual act carried out through the use of physical force. In other words, the assailant intimidates and overpowers their victim through physical force or the threat of force, breaks their resistance, and imposes themselves upon them. According to this view, sexual assault entails violence or the threat of violence against the victim.

But this conception is not comprehensive and does not encompass all instances of sexual assault. For example, suppose a man takes a woman's child hostage and threatens the woman that if she does not comply with his sexual demands, he will kill her child. If the woman, under these circumstances, submits to the man's sexual demands to save her child's life, she is still a victim of sexual assault, even though she was not directly a victim of violence or the threat of violence herself. Therefore, although in most cases, sexual assault is accompanied by the use of force against the victim, this type of force is not a necessary condition for the occurrence of sexual assault.

The second view attempts to remedy the deficiency of the first view. According to the second view, sexual assault should be considered a "coerced sexual act," that is, a sexual act in which the victim is compelled under certain conditions to submit to a sexual relationship. Here, the assailant does not necessarily resort to force and violence against their victim, nor do they directly threaten them with force or violence, but they expose their victim to serious threats in other ways, for example (as in the example above), placing their loved ones in such a perilous situation that the victim is compelled to submit to their sexual demands. Under these conditions, if the individual's resistance against these threats is broken and they inevitably submit to those sexual demands, sexual assault has occurred. Therefore, according to this view, sexual assault occurs when the assailant creates conditions in which the victim finds themselves faced with only two options: either expect the risk of serious violence against themselves or their loved ones, or inevitably submit to the assailant's sexual demands. According to this view, the assailant can sexually assault their victim without necessarily having exerted overt physical violence or force against the victim's person. Thus, all instances of "forcible sexual act" can be considered "coerced sexual act," but not all instances of "coerced sexual act" can be considered instances of "forcible sexual act."

اما تلقی دوّم  (یعنی "عمل جنسی اجباری") نیز تمام مصادیق تجاوز جنسی را دربرنمی گیرد.  برای مثال، فرض کنید که زنی برای گذران زندگی خود و فرزندانش سخت در تنگنای مالی است، و تنها روزنه امیدش آن است که در اداره ای کاری بیابد.  اگر در این شرایط، کارفرما استخدام آن زن را منوط به انجام خدمات جنسی نماید، و آن زن از سر استیصال لاجرم به تقاضاهای جنسی آن کارفرما تن دهد، باید او را قربانی تجاوز جنسی بشمار آورد.  در این شرایط، زن و نزدیکان او از جانب کارفرما در معرض خطر یا خشونت فیزیکی قرار ندارند.  اما فشار شرایط (در اینجا شرایط اقتصادی) چنان است که آن زن ناچار می شود برخلاف میل خود به تقاضاهای جنسی کارفرما تن دهد. یا به عنوان مثال دیگر، فرض کنید که راننده ای در بیابانی دورافتاده در میانه ناکجاآباد یکباره زنی را مجروح در کناره جاده می یابد.  زن از او تقاضای کمک می کند، اما راننده کمک خود را مشروط به آن می کند که زن به تقاضاهای جنسی او تسلیم شود.  در اینجا راننده دو گزینه را در پیش روی زن می نهد: یا در آن گوشه دورافتاده با تن رنجور ساعتهای متمادی زیر آفتاب سوزان بماند و بمیرد یا به تقاضاهای جنسی او تن دهد.  در این قبیل موارد، برقراری رابطه جنسی بر مبنای "زور" یا "اجبار" (به معنایی مفروض در دیدگاه دوّم) نیست، اما فرد در شرایطی قرار می گیرد که گاه ناچار است برغم میل خود به مناسبات جنسی تن دردهد.  این نوع مناسبات جنسی را هم باید مصداق تجاوز جنسی بشمار آورد.  بنابراین، اگرچه در غالب موارد، تجاوز جنسی با نوعی اجبار توأم است، اما اجبار(به معنای مفروض در دیدگاه دوّم) شرط لازم وقوع تجاوز جنسی نیست.

دیدگاه سوّم می کوشد موارد نقض دیدگاه دوّم را چاره کند.  مطابق دیدگاه سوّم، تجاوز جنسی را باید "عمل جنسی نامختارانه" تلقی کرد، یعنی عمل جنسی ای که قربانی برخلاف میل و اراده خود یا به نحو غیرداوطلبانه لاجرم به آن تن می دهد. بنابراین، هرگاه فرد ناچار شود تحت فشار و به رغم میل خود به مناسبات جنسی تن دهد، تجاوز جنسی رخ داده است.   در اینجا، "فشار" اعم از "زور" و "اجبار" است، و هرگونه شرایط دیگری را هم که تحت آن فرد قربانی وادار می شود برخلاف میل خود به تقاضاهای جنسی دیگری تسلیم شود، دربرمی گیرد. برای مثال، مطابق این تلقی، استادی که دانشجوی خود را میان رابطه جنسی یا اخراج از دانشگاه مخیّر می کند، اگر بتواند تحت این فشار با دانشجویش رابطه جنسی برقرار کند در واقع مرتکب تجاوز جنسی شده است. بنابراین، تمام مصادیق"عمل جنسی زوری" و "عمل جنسی اجباری" مصداق "عمل جنسی نامختارانه" اند، اما هر "عمل جنسی نامختارانه" ای لزوماً از جنس "عمل جنسی زوری" یا "عمل جنسی اجباری" نیست.

اما دیدگاه سوّم نیز خالی از اشکالاتی نیست.  برای مثال، فرض کنید که مردی کودکی را می فریبد و با او عمل جنسی انجام می دهد.  می توان فرض کرد که در این شرایط زور و اجباری در کار نباشد و کودک به میل خود به چنان رابطه ای تن داده باشد.  اما به نظر می رسد که حتّی تحت آن شرایط فرضی هم رفتار آن مرد را باید مصداق تجاوز جنسی بشمار آورد ولو آنکه کودک به میل خود به چنان رابطه ای وارد شده باشد.   به عنوان مثال دیگر، فرض کنید که مردی به زنی داروهای روان گردان بخوراند، و زن بی آنکه به خود باشد کاملاً پذیرا و چه بسا مشتاقانه به تقاضاهای جنسی مرد تن دهد.  در این شرایط البته زور و اجباری در کار نیست، و زن ظاهراً "بنا به میل خود" درگیر مناسبات جنسی است.  اما بدون تردید، این نوع مناسبات جنسی را نیز باید مصداق تجاوز جنسی بشمار آورد. بنابراین، اگرچه در غالب موارد، تجاوز جنسی برغم میل قربانی انجام می پذیرد، اما میل و رغبت قربانی به برقراری رابطه جنسی لزوماً منافی با وقوع تجاوز جنسی نیست.

و سرانجام دیدگاه چهارم می کوشد بر دشواری‌های دیدگاه سوّم نیز غلبه کند. مطابق دیدگاه چهارم، تجاوز جنسی را باید "عمل جنسی بدون رضایت" دانست، یعنی عمل جنسی ای که قربانی بدون رضایت و توافق مختارانه و آگاهانه به انجام آن وادار می شود. انجام یک فعل بر مبنای رضایت و توافق با انجام آن فعل از سر میل و رغبت متفاوت است.  "رضایت" و "توافق" (به معنایی که در اینجا مورد نظر است) مستلزم حدّی از بلوغ فکری، مجال تأمل، آگاهی، و اختیار در مقام تصمیم گیری است.  فردی که برای مثال تحت تأثیر داروهای روان گردان از سر میل و رغبت فعلی را انجام می دهد، لزوماً به انجام آن فعل رضایت نداده است.

Among the important consequences of the fourth view is that, according to it, the following must be considered instances of sexual assault:

(a) Sexual acts with children, even if the child has willingly consented to the sexual relationship;

(b) Sexual acts with those whose mental faculties are temporarily or permanently impaired, such as a person under the influence of psychoactive drugs or someone with intellectual disabilities (persons with disabilities may, under specific conditions, including with the permission of their guardian, consent to a sexual relationship.);

(c) Sexual acts with those who have been exposed to false information and have consented to sexual relations based on deception (such as when, for example, a doctor engages in sexual relations with their patient under the guise of a medical examination).

In all these cases, even if no force or coercion is involved, and the individual willingly consents to sexual relations, the sexual act must be considered an instance of sexual assault, because the victim is absolutely not in a position to knowingly and voluntarily declare agreement and consent to engaging in sexual relations.

All types of "forced sexual act," "coerced sexual act," and "non-voluntary sexual act" are instances of "sexual act without consent," but the converse is not true. Therefore, it seems that the fourth view is more comprehensive and can more accurately explain the nature of "sexual assault."

But why is the phenomenon of "sexual assault" morally wrong? The moral wrongness of sexual assault stems from the harms imposed on the victim as a result of this act. These harms can be divided into two categories: intrinsic harms and extrinsic harms.

(a) By "intrinsic harms" is meant those harms of sexual assault that are intrinsic to that act, meaning that as soon as sexual assault occurs, those harms are necessarily and inevitably produced. The most important intrinsic harm resulting from sexual assault is the violation of the victim's bodily sanctity and dignity. A human being owns their body, and therefore one of the most fundamental instances of human rights is the right to one's own body. In other words, a human being has the right to decide for themselves what happens in and on their body. Let me give an example to clarify this meaning. Suppose I am sitting in a library and feel deeply bored. Suddenly, in a corner of the library, I see a person engrossed in study who has a long, beautiful neck. I get up from my seat, approach them, and gently kiss their neck. Suppose here I have no ill intention, and my action causes no physical or psychological harm to that person. But is my action morally appropriate and permissible? It seems we all believe that action is morally wrong, because I have trespassed upon that person's bodily privacy without their permission and consent—just as if I had entered someone's house without their permission. The individual's right to their own body is sometimes also called the "right to bodily dignity." In sexual assault, this right is violated, because the assailant makes physical contact with the victim's body without their consent and trespasses upon their bodily privacy without their permission.

The individual's right to their body is also the source of another right: since sexual relations are inevitably accompanied by a form of bodily contact, and since every human being has the right to decide whom and to what extent they allow into their bodily privacy, therefore, every human being has the right to determine their own sexual partner and the type and level of their sexual relations with them. The assailant, in fact, violates the victim's right to decide in the realm of their sexual relations.

On the other hand, the perpetrator, through their action (consciously or unconsciously), also targets the autonomy or independence of the victim, because an individual's autonomy or independence is not secured unless they can deliberate and make decisions about their own destiny based on their own rational judgment, and also carry out those decisions (as long as they do not infringe upon the rights of others). In this case, it is clear that if an individual's right to their body is denied, that individual will find it difficult to realize their rational deliberations in practice. In other words, the individual's right to their own body must be considered a precondition for their autonomy and independence, and if this right is not respected, the individual's independence and autonomy will face a serious threat. Sexual assault violates the victim's right to their own body, and therefore violates their autonomy and independence of will.

And finally, the perpetrator, through their action, alienates their victim from their human identity. In fact, the perpetrator first sees their victim as a purely sexual being, that is, reduces their entire identity to their sexual aspect, and then attacks them as an entirely sexual being. In the eyes of the perpetrator, the victim is nothing but a means to satisfy their sexual desires. In this way, the perpetrator transforms their victim from a person into an object, and also compels them (at least temporarily) to see their own identity through the lens of the perpetrator's eyes. This process is the essence of "alienation"; sexual assault leads (even if temporarily) to the victim's alienation.

(b) We called the second category of harms resulting from sexual assault "contingent harms." By "contingent harms," I mean harms that are not necessarily and essentially concomitant with the act of sexual assault, although in most cases they practically occur as a result of sexual assault. As far as the victims of sexual assault are concerned, the contingent harms of sexual assault can be mainly divided into two types:

(1) Physical harms, such as damage or tearing of sexual organs, bone fractures, bruising and injury to non-sexual organs, various infections, including sexually transmitted infections, and (in the case of women) pregnancy, and the like.

(2) Psychological and mental harms, such as feelings of constant fear and insecurity, feelings of anxiety, personality disorders, identity crisis, and the like.

As noted, in most cases, sexual assault is accompanied by very acute and devastating physical and psychological injuries. But even if the victims did not suffer from any of these physical and psychological complications, the act of sexual assault would still be considered a morally heinous and unjust act by virtue of violating some of the fundamental rights of the victim and the undermining of their autonomy.

But how should we confront the phenomenon of "sexual assault" as a tool for humiliation and the imposition of domination?

The first point is that, the issue of sexual assault can, in a very general and simple sense, clearly be considered a matter within the realm of law: as we saw, sexual assault is, first and foremost, a violation of some of the fundamental rights of the victim. Therefore, one of the most important duties of the government is to prevent the violation of citizens' rights, including the violation of their rights through sexual assault, by enacting appropriate laws and committing to their enforcement.

But here we must distinguish between two types of violations of civil rights: in any society, ordinary citizens sometimes, under certain conditions, violate their duties toward others and infringe upon their rights, whether intentionally or inadvertently. This type of violation of civil rights should be considered a "crime." However, in some cases, those in power or agents of the government, openly or covertly, themselves violate citizens' rights, or support the violation of their rights, or ignore the violation of those rights by specific groups. In such cases, the planned and organized violation of citizens' rights by the government cannot be considered merely the commission of a "crime" (however egregious), but must be regarded as an instance of "human rights violation." Unfortunately, for centuries, some states have used sexual assault as a weapon in the theater of civil and foreign wars to break the morale of their enemies. Today, the systematic rape of women in civil or international wars is considered an instance of crimes against humanity. For example, the systematic sexual assault of Muslim women in the Kosovo tragedy by Serbian soldiers must be seen as a clear instance of human rights violation and a war crime. [1]

But what is the difference between a "crime" and a "human rights violation"? An ordinary citizen who merely commits a "crime" in fact breaks the law and violates another's rights independently of the government and often in an unorganized manner. Here, firstly, the number of people harmed by that individual's action is, in most cases, very limited; secondly, the individual's transgression and error does not undermine the very idea of right and justice, which is the foundation of the social contract in society. But when the government or its agents, directly or indirectly, in a planned and organized manner, violate citizens' rights, their action goes far beyond violating a specific law and depriving one or a few citizens of their rights. Here, firstly, the number of people harmed by the government's or its agents' violation of civil rights is often far greater; and secondly, and more importantly, in such cases, the very principle of the concept of right and justice, which is the legitimizing foundation of the government and an implicit or explicit condition of the social contract, is violated. On this basis, if, for example, the neighborhood greengrocer kills his wife in a family dispute, he has merely committed a crime, but if a government engages in killing citizens or leaves its agents' hands free in killing opponents, it has not only committed a crime, but beyond that, its action must be considered an instance of human rights violation.

On this basis, we can distinguish between two types of sexual assault: "sexual assault as a crime," and "sexual assault as an instance of human rights violation." If, for example, a man, under the influence of a momentary passion, assaults a woman, he has merely committed a crime (however egregious). But if a government permits its agents or soldiers to sexually assault its opponents or enemies, or ignores this action by its agents, then this type of sexual assault can no longer be considered merely a crime alongside other conventional transgressions in the legal system. Here, sexual assault is a clear instance of human rights violation. "Sexual assault as a human rights violation" is, in fact, a tool that some governments use to suppress opponents and impose their dominance, and therefore should not be considered on par with other legal violations committed by ordinary citizens.

The second point is that governments that use sexual assault as a tool for suppression and imposing dominance often try to frame the phenomenon of sexual assault not on the basis of "violation of civil rights" but as "dishonoring the victim."

Here, there are at least two important differences between "assault as a violation of a citizen's right" and "assault as dishonoring a victim":

The first difference is that if we formulate our understanding of “sexual assault” based on the concept of “right,” then it is the perpetrator who, above and before anyone else, will be deserving of blame and disgrace. In a rights-based view, there is no reason to blame the victim or for the victim to feel disgrace. It is the perpetrator who has violated their duty and infringed upon another’s right, and therefore all the disgrace and blame belong to them.

But if we formulate our understanding of “sexual assault” based on the concept of “namoos” (honor) (a matter particularly prevalent in patriarchal societies), then (regardless of all the theoretical problems with this formulation) we have practically paved the way for the victim’s disgrace and humiliation. According to the honor-based view, after enduring the horrific experience of sexual assault, the victim becomes a “stained” and “dishonored” individual, and after that painful experience, must also bear the burden of the stigma of dishonor. In most cases, the suffering of “dishonor” is far more agonizing for the victim than the experience of the assault itself. The honor-based view victimizes the assaulted individual twice.

But why does the honor-based view equate sexual assault with “dishonor”? This view particularly thrives within the context of a patriarchal society. A patriarchal society has at least two important characteristics that provide the ground for the formation and spread of the honor-based view:

The first characteristic is that in patriarchal societies, men hold the upper hand in the pyramid of power, and therefore, “being a man” is considered a very significant and important matter. It is for this reason that the central concept of patriarchal ethics—that is, the concept that encompasses all “lofty” moral virtues—is “murovvat” (from the Arabic root “mar’” meaning “manliness”) or “virtue” (from the Latin root, “virtus,” meaning “manliness”). In the context of this patriarchal ethics, most of what is considered a “vice” is categorized under “feminine” traits. Therefore, in these societies, the sexual matter is deeply linked with the power structure, and the role individuals play in sexual relations largely determines their identity and their value and status in the eyes of others.

The second characteristic is that in these societies, a deep link is established between individuals’ identities and their role in sexual relations. Within this framework, the masculine role is concomitant with the concept of power and dominance, and the feminine role signifies weakness and subjugation. The language of sexual relations largely resembles the language of war (which is the language of power relations): in this language, the man “captures” his sexual opponent and compels them to “surrender.” It is for this reason that within the framework of patriarchal societies, the sexual act can find overt political functions and be used to exert dominance and humiliation.

It is in this context that the honor-based view of sexual assault is born. According to this view, sexual assault involving sexual penetration targets the core of the victim’s identity, and through this, seeks to debase them as an individual who has been “captured” and “subjugated.” It is within the framework of this view that the assaulted individual is led to believe they have lost their “namoos,” or “honor,” or “dignity.”

اما تفاوت دوّم میان تلقی حق مدار و تلقی ناموس مدار از این قرار است: در تلقی حق مدار از تجاوز جنسی، نقض حق قربانی مصداق بی‌عدالتی است، و از منظر اخلاقی، مهمترین واکنش عاطفی متناسب با این وضعیت خشم است. "خشم اخلاقاً روا" واکنش عاطفی فعّالی است که از سر شناخت در برابر زیانها و آسیب‌های ناعادلانه برانگیخته می شود. یکی از مهمترین ویژگی‌های شهروندان یک جامعه آسیب‌پذیری آنها در برابر زیان‌هایی است که دیگران بر ایشان تحمیل می کنند. "خشم اخلاقاً روا"  آحاد جامعه را در برابر این گونه تعرض‌ها هوشیار و در حالت آماده باش نگه می دارد، و به ایشان انگیزه و شور دفاع از خود و دفع شرور را می بخشد. به این معنا "خشم اخلاقاً روا" را باید نیروی عاطفی فعّالی دانست که اگر با بینش کافی همراه باشد، می تواند به عنوان نیرویی سازنده و تصحیح کننده در حفظ کرامت، عزّت نفس، استکمال شخصیت، و نیز آزادی عمل شهروندان عمل کند. در مدل حق مدار، قربانی تجاوز جنسی آن واقعه را تضییع حق انسانی خود تلقی می کند، و در نتیجه شعله خشم سازنده در وجودش زبانه می کشد.  این خشم برای انتقام جویی و اعمال خشونت متقابل نیست، این خشم نشانه حس و حساسیت عاطفی مثبت او نسبت به عدالت است، و او را در مقام جبران آن بی عدالتی و اعاده حقوق پایمال شده‌اش گرم پوی نگه می دارد.

اما در چارچوب تلقی ناموس مدار، واکنش عاطفی قربانی نسبت به تجربه تجاوز جنسی پیش و بیش از هر چیز احساس "شرم" و "سرافکندگی" است. نگاه ناموس مدار قربانی را وامی‌دارد که خود را از چشم تجاوزگر ببیند، یعنی خود را انسانی ببیند که هویتش یکسره در وجه جنسی او خلاصه شده است، و عمل دخول جنسی کرامت و حیثیت او را لکه دار کرده و او را به مرتبه انسانی فروتری تنزل داده است.  نگاه ناموس مدار قربانی تجاوز را وامی‌دارد که آبرو یا ناموس خود را از دست رفته ببیند، و در نتیجه  تصویری از خود بیابد که از تصویر آرمانی او و جامعه اش از یک انسان پاکیزه و فضیلت مند فاصله دارد. درک این فاصله احساس شرم یا سرافکندگی را در روح و روان قربانی برمی انگیزد. "شرم" واکنش عاطفی منفی فرد نسبت به مشاهده نقصان‌های خویشتن (یا دست کم آنچه او نقصان‌های خویشتن می‌پندارد) است- عاطفه منفی‌ای که روح قربانی را فلج می‌کند و وحدت شخصیت او را به مخاطره می افکند. حکومتی که از تجاوز جنسی به عنوان ابزاری برای سرکوب و تحمیل سلطه بهره می جوید در واقع می‌کوشد تا این احساس شرم و سرافکندگی ویرانگر را در روان قربانی بنشاند. این احساس ویرانگر به طور خودکار و بدون دخالت فرد تجاوزگر رفته رفته خوره وار روح و شخصیت قربانی را به مرز فروپاشی می برد.

به نظر می رسد تلقی حق مدار هم از حیث نظری و هم از حیث عملی بر تلقی ناموس مدار برتری دارد، و مبنای اخلاقاً دفاع پذیرتر و سازنده تری را برای فهم و رویارویی با مقوله تجاوز جنسی فراهم می آورد.

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پینوشت‌ها (تصاویر و پینوشت‌ها توسط صدانت اضافه شده است):

[1] تخمین زده می‌شود که بین ۲۰٬۰۰۰–۵۰٬۰۰۰ زن و دختر که اکثر آن‌ها از مسلمانان بوسنیایی بودند، در جریان جنگ مورد تجاوز قرار گرفتند. این کار یک «تجاوز جمعی» خوانده شده‌است که نیروهای صرب بوسنی از آن به عنوان یک سلاح در جنگ استفاده می‌کردند. برای اولین بار در تاریخ حقوق قضایی دادگاه بین‌المللی کیفری یوگسلاوی سابق اعلام کرد که «تجاوز سیستماتیک» و «بردگی جنسی» در زمان جنگ از موارد جنایت علیه بشریت بوده‌است. تجاوزهای جمعی بیشتر در شرق بوسنی اتفاق افتاده‌است (از جمله در جریان کشتارهای فوچا و کشتارهای ویشه‌گراد). زنان و دختران در بازداشتگاه‌های مختلف در شرایط غیرقابل‌تحمل و غیربهداشتی نگه‌داشته می‌شدند و به اشکال مختلف با آنان بدرفتاری می‌شد. چندین اردوگاه تجاوز در فوچا وجود داشت. «خانه کارامان» یکی از مشهورترین این اردوگاه‌ها بود.

[2] The Salesman is a film written and directed by Asghar Farhadi. It was submitted to the Academy Awards as Iran's representative for the 2017 Oscars and, in February 2017, won the award for Best Foreign Language Film. In the film's story, a stranger enters an apartment—where Rana and her husband Emad have been living—and attempts to assault Rana (Taraneh Alidoosti). An important dialogue takes place between Rana and Emad (Shahab Hosseini) after the stranger flees:

- Rana: If I had picked up that intercom and just asked, "Who is it?", this wouldn't have happened.

Emad: If it's that simple, go tell the neighbors the same thing. Knock on their doors one by one and say, "Sorry, I should have picked up the intercom and asked, 'Who is it?'"

- Rana: Why are you dragging the neighbors into this?

Emad: They already knew what happened in this house.

- Rana: If they didn't know, you wouldn't have a problem?!

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