Assessing the Legacy of John Rawls in the Effort to Reconcile Liberalism and Social Justice: A Conversation with Mousa Akrami on the Centenary of John Rawls's Birth

As you would likely agree, John Rawls's (February 21, 1921 – November 24, 2002) place in twentieth-century political philosophy and moral philosophy is virtually unparalleled. He is a towering name in the realm of political liberalism, where he even stands shoulder to shoulder with John Stuart Mill. For the first question, it seems appropriate to refer to the foundations and origins of Rawls's intellectual framework. In your view, what traces have the triad of Hobbes/Locke/Rousseau, followed by Immanuel Kant, and finally John Stuart Mill, left on John Rawls's system of thought?

Mousa Akrami: All four philosophers you mentioned have, directly or indirectly, played a role in founding and advancing liberalism in the modern era of Western political philosophy. Of course, we note that if we judge based on the title of liberalism and its central subject, namely "freedom," and its most important elements—individualism, belief in the right to life, the right to property, and various economic, social, political, and civil liberties—then Hobbes, with his particular and important theory of the state, cannot and should not be considered a liberal, even though he offers a very important analysis and explanation of "citizenship," and the foundational theses for establishing liberalism, namely the "state of nature" and the "social contract," have their roots in his political philosophy. On the one hand, Hobbes believes in the reality of natural rights in the state of nature for all human beings, but on the other hand, he considers such a state to be a "war of all against all" in which "man is a wolf to man." From this fundamental, all-encompassing state of nature, he moves toward the thesis of the "social contract" to show, by resorting to it, how human beings created a civil law that makes the compromise and union of individuals possible through the formation of a powerful state.

Leaving Hobbes aside, the beginning of what we specifically call liberalism as a relatively coherent, broad system in political philosophy must be found in the philosophy of John Locke. Without wanting to get involved in a discussion of the details of liberal doctrines and the differences among its founders and proponents, I will only name the most prominent liberals in the history of political thought: John Locke, Spinoza, Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the leaders of the American Revolution (from George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison to Thomas Paine), many leaders of the French Revolution, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville, T. H. Green, as well as influential figures in the twentieth century such as John Maynard Keynes, Friedrich von Hayek, and Isaiah Berlin, and many others, until we finally arrive at John Rawls as the pinnacle of theoretical liberalism. All his liberal critics, from libertarians like Nozick to communitarians like Sandel, acknowledging his greatness and aiming to remedy the shortcomings of his liberalism (rightly or wrongly), engaged in thought and theorizing, and his non-liberal opponents also could not ignore his prominence in political philosophy and moral philosophy.

We know that liberal doctrines, in their quality and quantity, have differences among the great figures of liberalism, such that one can speak of a broad spectrum or spectra within liberalism concerning the following pillars:

1) The elements of liberalism,

2) The degree of weight given to those elements,

3) The degree of weight given to the role of the state in expanding liberalism and deepening it,

4) The degree of attention to the doctrine of equality and its various domains, and

5) The degree of attention to the doctrine of justice, its quality and quantity, its connection with freedom and other dimensions of equality, and the manner of its realization.

Now, allow me to say that whatever stance we take toward the achievements of liberalism, we truly find it to be a great legacy of political thought. Theoretical liberalism, in the continuation of a tradition spanning over three hundred years that emerged as a school of thought with the ideas of John Locke, with John Rawls in the twentieth century both confessed to its serious shortcomings and tried to find a way to remedy and elevate them. Rawls, as a political philosopher and also an academic moral philosopher and theorist who arose from the liberal tradition and largely lived within that same tradition, is, more than anyone in the twentieth century, influenced by the entire legacy of liberalism in its colorful spectrum.

Without entering into a detailed discussion of justice, I will only emphasize that the main Achilles' heel of liberalism in general is the issue of "justice." Justice, which has always been one of the fundamental subjects throughout the history of political philosophy and moral philosophy, and the lost ideal of almost all human beings in all times and places, takes precedence over liberty in the history of political philosophy. Plato and Aristotle, as two great philosophers who have cast a shadow over nearly all of Western philosophy, consider politics to be the pinnacle of philosophy, the highest part of philosophy, and the crown of philosophy; and in the philosophy of both, "justice" is virtually the axis of politics. The duty of the government and the individual is precisely to establish justice in society, the family, and personal relations, just as the main factor in realizing individual and social happiness is, in practice, the exercise of justice—a justice linked to knowledge of all aspects of human life.

Plato, Aristotle, and other philosophers who spoke of justice before the modern era say virtually nothing, in practice, about liberty. In the modern era, against the backdrop of the Renaissance, the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions, the Enlightenment movement, and a new view of humanity, individualism and the desire for liberty gained importance, forming, alongside explicit or implicit demands for justice, the intellectual driving force of revolutionary movements in places like England, America, and France.

Although liberalism has always considered "egalitarianism" an important element of its doctrines, this egalitarianism has not been able to rise to the level of a demand for justice. Now, allow me to use this demand for justice as an element whose presence or absence drives liberalism toward the left or right of the broad liberal spectrum. Rousseau and Kant, more than other classical liberals, had noticed the absence of a demand for justice in liberalism. Kant, in particular, was aware that justice could not be achieved through a social contract theory based on the theory of the state of nature.

We note that in the nineteenth century, justice-seeking currents emerged, such that the broad spectrum of socialism can be considered the justice-seeking current opposed to the liberty-seeking current of liberalism. By placing justice at its center, this spectrum proposed ways to achieve it which, in their most radical manifestation, seemed to pay no attention to liberty, did not consider it their first priority, or believed the realization of true liberty depended on the realization of justice. Marxism, regardless of Marx's personal views on liberty, gained fame as a current that placed a radically strong emphasis on the realization of justice, in whatever acceptable or unacceptable manner.

It was with the sense of a lack of the element of justice in liberalism on the one hand, and against the backdrop of Marxist struggles on the other, that renowned liberals such as John Stuart Mill and Thomas Hill Green tried to somehow introduce justice into the doctrine of liberalism. Of course, they did not achieve much success theoretically. It was against the backdrop of this heritage, an awareness of it, and a concern for justice that Rawls stepped into such an arena of theorizing, created enduring works in this field, and attained a status in theoretical liberalism on the one hand, and in the effort to combine liberalism with a demand for justice on the other, that even surpassed John Stuart Mill and Thomas Hill Green. Here, it is not amiss to mention that whenever I think of Thomas Hill Green, I deeply regret that he died at the age of forty-five. I think if he had lived as long as Rawls, he could have achieved the same status as Rawls, and even a higher status, in combining the demand for justice with liberalism much earlier than Rawls.

In summarizing my answer to your question, I would say that Rawls mainly borrowed from Thomas Hobbes the doctrines of the state of nature and the social contract, from John Locke the fundamental principles of liberalism, from Rousseau the belief in the innate goodness of humans and their cooperation in the state of nature (as opposed to Hobbes's thesis of the "war of all against all"), and from Kant important doctrines such as human autonomy, the golden rule of morality, the status of humans as ends in themselves, and the necessity of avoiding any instrumental use of human beings (the two moral rules or categorical imperatives), as well as the inability of Lockean liberalism to combine with a demand for justice. After becoming acquainted with the works of Jeremy Bentham and understanding the weaknesses of his utilitarianism, through the relevant works of John Stuart Mill he increasingly realized the shortcomings of liberalism in connection with the element of justice. In addition to drawing upon the legacy of these philosophers, it must be said that Rawls, by utilizing the achievements of the leaders of the American Revolution (reflected in their own works and the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution), the legacy of the French Revolution (reflected in the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen" and the French Constitution), Hegel's "Philosophy of Right," the ideas of Marx, American pragmatism, and the experiences of theory and practice in the fields of economics and politics after the Second World War, sought to eliminate the shortcomings of liberalism and to build from it a political philosophy in the form of his own justice-seeking liberalism capable of addressing the problem of justice.

■ It seems that John Rawls cannot be understood without careful consideration of the Anglo-Saxon world and American philosophy. Can one venture to say that understanding Rawls is closely tied to understanding English legal and moral traditions as well as American pragmatist thought? If the answer is yes, where is Rawls's own place and standing within this Anglo-American sphere? Perhaps if we note that John Rawls was honored twenty-two years ago by the then-President of the United States for his efforts to revive faith in democracy in the United States, it becomes easier to answer this question.

Mousa Akrami: As I mentioned in my answer to the previous question, liberalism, regardless of traces of some of its doctrines in the pre-modern era, is primarily an English philosophy that was also carried to America by the leaders of the American Revolution and Independence, and has crystallized its general outlines in the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution and the American socio-economic-political-cultural way of life, such that American democracy is a kind of manifestation of it, a good account of which we see in Alexis de Tocqueville's important book, "Democracy in America." Although John Locke also paid attention to movements such as the Lutheran and Protestant Reformation and the ideas of Erasmus, he formulated liberalism under the influence of the views and critiques of figures like Thomas More, the revolutionary movements of England, the social contract thesis in Thomas Hobbes's detailed analysis of the state, as well as empiricist epistemology and methodology (of which he was one of the consolidators).

The founders of the Scottish Enlightenment, such as Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, Thomas Reid, and Adam Ferguson, were also influenced by John Locke, and each in their own way strove to consolidate and advance liberalism. The utilitarian current, especially in the figure of John Stuart Mill, as well as figures like Thomas Hill Green, who were both great liberals and attentive to its shortcomings, and many others belonged to the Anglo-Saxon tradition of liberalism. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the cradle of the birth, nurturing, and growth of liberalism is primarily England. Even Montesquieu and his important work "The Spirit of the Laws" are influenced by English liberalism and the constitutional monarchy of England, just as the influence of English-Scottish liberalism on Kant is also evident.

The subsequent proponents of the liberal tradition are also predominantly English, such that figures like John Maynard Keynes, Isaiah Berlin, and Herbert Hart (professor of law at Oxford University) were the great English standard-bearers of liberalism in economics, politics, and law in the twentieth century. Thus, naturally and as a rule, any English or American liberal researcher and thinker is primarily indebted to this great tradition of English liberalism. Of course, someone or a movement in America might, from a right-wing or left-wing position, consider themselves distant from liberalism or from the dominant current of liberalism. In any case, Rawls is no exception to this rule of indebtedness of American academic and intellectual liberals to English liberalism.

But regarding American pragmatism, I must say that this attitude seems to run in the blood of every American, such that everyone accepts that this school is first and foremost an American school, and it must be taken as a principle that every American born after the early nineteenth century was practically born a pragmatist, unless proven otherwise! That is, one could say that this pragmatism existed, more or less, in the way of life and outlook of American citizens before it was formulated by great figures like Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. Hence, it must be said that Rawls, as an American, was practically born and raised as a pragmatist. However, regarding Rawls as a university professor, researcher, and thinker, his particular reverence for John Dewey must be noted. He repeatedly taught the philosophy of John Dewey at Harvard University and, over time, grew increasingly closer to him.

In the first period of his intellectual development, which lasted until a few years after the publication of A Theory of Justice, Rawls consciously distanced himself from pragmatism, although with his article "Justice as Fairness," published in 1958, he demonstrated his pragmatist outlook in both title and content. But in any case, during those years, both in moral philosophy and political philosophy, for the ideal of saving liberalism and achieving an acceptable social order for free and equal individuals possessing various comprehensive doctrines, he was in search of broad, deep, and universal philosophical foundations, a comprehensive doctrine, transhistorical concepts possessing absolute validity, and metaphysical foundations that were not seen in pragmatism.

Rawls found these to some extent in Kant's transcendental idealism and even elements of Hegel's philosophy. The rationalism of the Enlightenment had spoken of freedom and justice as absolute values, whereas such a view had no place in pragmatism. Everyone knows that pragmatism never accepted metaphysics and the correspondence theory of truth. For it, metaphysics possessed no truth and did not correspond to the reality of the world and life. In pragmatist semantics, it must also be said that the theory of truth was based not on a kind of correspondence between proposition and fact, but on the utility of the theory. What mattered in the pragmatist outlook was the optimal functioning of society's affairs and the utility of the proposition and theory for such a goal. There was no trace of "universal reason" or any comprehensive moral, philosophical, or religious doctrine in it.

But the search for a comprehensive doctrine or the articulation of non-pragmatist principles was difficult for Rawls, who had grown up in the intellectual and lived cradle of liberalism and pragmatism, and in the face of criticisms that were mostly liberal, he retreated and openly turned to pragmatism, especially as pragmatism, through the intellectual efforts of a philosopher like Richard Rorty, had found new life and increasing acceptance in American and European philosophy.

In 1985, in his article "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Rawls published his explicitly pragmatist articulation of "justice as fairness," so that finally, with the book Political Liberalism, he would attempt to present a political conception of justice that was based on a pragmatist understanding of political and moral values. Furthermore, Rawls adopted a pragmatist path not only in semantics but also in methodology, just as Dewey considered problem-solving the most important goal in thinking.

Thus, in his later works, Rawls explicitly turned to pragmatist epistemology, semantics, and methodology. I should add, of course, that Rawls neither completely abandoned pragmatism in his early period, nor did he relinquish metaphysics and certain kinds of comprehensive doctrines in his later period. And in connection with the last part of your question, I must say that, in any case, Rawls's accounts of liberalism in both the early and later periods draw upon both a more or less comprehensive philosophical attitude and a political attitude based on pragmatism. However, in the first period, the former attitude dominates, and in the second period, the latter attitude.

Regarding the dominance of the pragmatist attitude in the second period of Rawls's thought, in addition to the role of liberals in criticizing the presence of metaphysical elements in the book A Theory of Justice and Rawls's feeling that he truly lacked the ability to provide rational philosophical foundations for his quest for justice, I would like to mention three other reasons or causes for this turn by Rawls to pragmatism, the elaboration of which I will leave for another occasion:

1) The dominance of neoliberalism in the America and England of the Reagan and Thatcher era under the influence of Hayek's neoliberal ideas, which, of course, in its historical analysis and social explanation, lacked a principled basis within the framework of a grand narrative;

2) The growing crisis in a grand narrative such as Marxism, as recounted by various so-called socialist states, which ultimately led to the collapse of the Eastern European regimes and the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991;

3) The acceptability of various postmodern tendencies and the relativism prevalent in Continental European philosophy.

Rawls, who was deeply concerned with remaining faithful to his long-standing commitment to the defense of justice and reconciling liberalism with the quest for justice, ultimately laid down his theoretical arms and turned to pragmatism.

In closing, it is necessary to offer an explanation regarding President Clinton's commendation of Rawls for his effort to revive faith in democracy in America. Firstly, Rawls truly deserved this commendation and more. If we set aside the three great American pragmatist philosophers, America has not had a theorist philosopher of Rawls's stature, fame, and influence since its independence. Of course, America has had and continues to have great philosophers in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, such as Leo Strauss, Richard Rorty, Quine, Putnam, Plantinga, Van Fraassen, Ayn Rand, Nancy Cartwright, Sandel, and Nozick. One can also name dual-nationality philosophers such as Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Reichenbach, and Carnap. Yet none of them has left a theoretical legacy as grand as Rawls's, especially in political philosophy and moral philosophy. In political philosophy and moral philosophy, Rawls can be considered the greatest philosopher of the twentieth century. Therefore, it is not a great thing that a president like Clinton, who belonged to the somewhat left-leaning centrist wing of the Democratic Party, should commend Rawls. Let alone the title 'effort to revive faith in democracy in America,' which is a more political than philosophical title. I should also point out that American Republicans, especially far-right or right-wing Republicans, are not willing to commend Rawls, even though they too belong to the broad front or spectrum of liberalism.

■ On the centenary of John Rawls's birth, it is an opportune moment to once again refer to the unparalleled status of the book A Theory of Justice, whose publication was one of the important events in the humanities of the twentieth century. In this book, Rawls grapples with philosophical subjects and metaphysical problems, lending his work a thoroughly classical and serious character. Subsequently, by presenting a political conception of justice in the books Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness, he gives justice a pragmatist concept, far removed from controversial philosophical foundations. What is your view on Rawls's analysis in the book A Theory of Justice and, beyond that, on the conceptualization of justice in the body of Rawls's work?

Mousa Akrami: First of all, I must say that Rawls's body of work represents the crystallization of the greatest human effort to date in elucidating the concept of justice and presenting a narrative of it in order to make it acceptable within a liberal theoretical framework—an effort that has no rival in its grandeur even among the body of socialist works related to justice. In the great tradition of Western philosophy, Plato also began his masterpiece, the book commonly known as the Republic, with the question of justice, and since then this concept has played a very important role in political philosophy. However, the three-hundred-year tradition of liberalism was unable to give a significant place to justice, and it was the non-liberal and social strands and currents of Western philosophy that paid attention to it.

Rawls, this great philosopher nurtured in the Anglo-Saxon American liberal intellectual and political climate, who began his academic career with an ethical concern, placed the elucidation of the concept of justice in order to fit it into the mold of liberalism on the agenda of his lifelong intellectual endeavor. In addition to a large number of articles, he has four major books in political philosophy concerning justice, which fortunately have all been translated into Persian: A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism, The Law of Peoples, and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.

If we set aside The Law of Peoples (which is the application of Rawls's theory of justice to international relations), the other three books are directly about justice and its application in a well-ordered society arising from the voluntary or willful cooperation of free and equal, rational persons possessing a fair understanding of justice and Rawlsian principles of justice. As many have read or heard, in the first book, published in 1971, Rawls attempts to draw upon metaphysical foundations and comprehensive philosophical doctrines to establish his philosophy of justice. The publication of this book appeared as a very important event in political philosophy and moral philosophy, but just as it had supporters from liberal and more or less non-liberal or even anti-liberal fronts, it also faced opponents within the liberal front itself, until finally, as you mentioned, with the books Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness, Rawls attempts, without resorting to metaphysical foundations and comprehensive philosophical doctrines, to offer a narrative that is ever more political and presumably more acceptable to common sense in advanced capitalist society.

But in any case, as a liberal, he preserves the most important elements of liberalism—namely individualism, the principle of respect for private property, and the totality of the capitalist socio-economic formation—and willy-nilly gives a secondary, subordinate, and ancillary place to justice, and is unable in practice to play a role even on the level of the right wing of the social democratic spectrum, although he has undoubtedly influenced the thinking of supporters of the Democratic Party and moderate elements of the Republican Party.

■ As you have noted in the eighteenth chapter of the readable book Philosophy: From the Interpretation of the World to the Change of the World, the characteristics of the "original position" and the "initial situation" that Rawls presents as a substitute for the "state of nature" of social contract theorists are very interesting. The specific question is: what possibly unique characteristics do the principles presented by John Rawls, as a preliminary step for theorizing the concept of justice, contain?

Mousa Akrami: As I mentioned earlier, the state of nature, in the account and formulation of which Hobbes played the main role, does not in itself guarantee that humans will necessarily arrive at a desirable social contract for establishing a state that protects everyone's interests. Hobbes himself is very pessimistic about the state of nature and supposes that in this condition, humans tear each other apart like wolves. Now it must be said:

First, it is not clear whether the state of nature has ever actually existed in history or not?

Second, it is not known whether anywhere in the world, for example, among remote primitive tribes in Africa or Latin America or anywhere else, a number of humans live in such a state of nature as Hobbes envisions or not?

Third, it is not certain that in the state of nature humans are wolves to one another, just as Rousseau believes that humans in the state of nature are benevolent and cooperative toward each other.

Fourth, given the differences among human beings in physical ability and intelligence, based on the principle of self-preservation—which, according to Hobbes, is the foundation of every movement and endeavor of any being, including humans—it is not certain that a social contract and government will necessarily emerge from the state of nature that equally preserves the various rights of the members of society and is free from all forms of discrimination.

Rawls, both directly from Rousseau's own ideas and through Kant, believed in the inherent or instinctive benevolence and fellow-feeling of human beings, especially in the state of nature, but he could not find the necessary guarantee that, in any case, a desirable social contract and government would emerge from a state of nature in which physical, psychological, and gender differences exist.

Of course, let me say here that Rawls's intention in employing the theses of the state of nature and the social contract was not to deduce government, or to explain how it came into being, or to deduce the desirability of the government arising from that state. In fact, Rawls was inspired by these theses to deduce his principles of justice and the agreement upon them in a society where everyone intends to cooperate for the reasonable natural conduct of affairs.

Instead of the state of nature, Rawls posits a situation in which human beings, as members receptive to the cooperation of a society, have come together to agree upon principles that Rawls considers the principles of justice. Rawls calls this situation the "original position." Of course, he borrowed this term "original position" from Harsanyi, the Hungarian economist. This situation, in Rawls's interpretation, is essentially a hypothetical situation prior to the formation of society, which naturally has not occurred in history. Rawls proposes this situation as a thought experiment. For this situation to be realized, human beings must set aside everything that could bias them toward unfair behavior. To do this, they must be placed in a state of ignorance, or behind a veil of ignorance, or in a kind of disregard for all elements involved in violating fairness, so that by deliberately or inadvertently ignoring all the facts pertaining to themselves (including natural physical and psychological abilities, class base or position, psychological inclinations toward various matters involved in judgment or decision-making, and even their conception of the good), they select principles that are impartial and fair.

Therefore, they must not only be ignorant of their physical and psychological conditions, class position, and social and political standing, but they must also have no position regarding the good, because any position in this regard is based on a worldview, or better to say, on a comprehensive moral, philosophical, or religious doctrine that, in a society characterized by doctrinal pluralism, is not usually accepted by everyone, and whenever someone brings their own conception of the good into judgment and decision-making about fair principles of cooperation and collective life, not only is their own impartial judgment compromised, but it may also adversely affect the judgment of others.

In this original position, prior to the formation of a just society, while human beings are behind the aforementioned threefold veils of ignorance,

1) they are free, in such a way that no political, economic, moral, or any inhibiting or compelling factor plays a role in their decision-making;

2) they are equal, in such a way that no factor places one in a position above or below others in judgment and decision-making; being behind the veil of ignorance regarding the particulars of their individual and social existence ensures this condition;

3) they possess the necessary instrumental rationality to discern the relationship between ends and means; and

4) they are self-interested by instinct, meaning that, based on the principle of self-preservation and instinctive individual self-interest, they choose options or things that bring them the greatest benefit.

With the famous example of one of two beneficiaries cutting the cake, Rawls shows how this act, based on self-interest, leads to the observance of fairness. In any case, in the original position, the contracting parties or participants in the formation of society choose two principles that are known as Rawls's

How can one speak of the two parts of Rawls's second principle of justice in a socio-economic formation manipulated by a right-wing liberalist outlook? Without accepting elements of socialism and moving toward social democracy, the realization of the second principle in both its parts is impossible. We can witness a not-so-complete realization of this only in the Scandinavian countries, and a fainter realization in European countries and in the America of the Democratic Party under the presidency of figures like Sanders (regardless of whether someone like him can come to power or not) and at least figures like Obama or Biden.

■ Unlike the particularist philosophers of the twentieth century and akin to the ancient philosophers of the Western philosophical tradition, John Rawls made a grand and universal matter the subject of his theorizing and employed a comprehensive perspective in this endeavor. The question now is: what criticisms has he faced, and fundamentally, how should one confront Rawls's theorizations from a pathological standpoint? To put it better, from your perspective, what are the flaws and critiques that can be leveled against Rawls's theory of justice?

Mousa Akrami: Before answering your question, I want to pause briefly on the first part of your statement and emphasize Rawls's attention to a kind of grand narrative. The reality is that I myself, with all my attachment to analytic philosophy, consider part of philosophy's work—which must both interpret the world and change it—to be the presentation of a grand narrative, especially in connection with the ontological and axiological dimensions of a subject like justice. Rawls, despite his attachment and belonging to the analytic tradition, in addressing the issue of justice, distances himself from the tradition of analytic philosophy and the positivist approach and theorizes about a matter that is entirely normative within a more or less macro-perspective framework, although he follows the analytic method in his approach and, especially in A Theory of Justice, like a meticulous miniaturist or jeweler, has a responsible mastery over the overall design of his work, its chapters, the sections of each chapter, the paragraphs of each chapter, the sentences of each paragraph, and every single word of each sentence.

However, although elements of a pragmatist outlook exist in the period before the writing of A Theory of Justice and within the book itself, after its publication, Rawls acquiesces to moving away from metaphysical foundations and increasingly incorporating pragmatist elements or a political conception of justice, crystallizing this view in the book Political Liberalism. Given my own interest in grand narrative in philosophy and my belief in the limited capacity of the positivist and empiricist outlook to carry such a narrative, I prefer A Theory of Justice over Political Liberalism, even though I myself have translated Political Liberalism.

In my preface to the translation of Political Liberalism, I have pointed to several reasons and causes for undertaking its translation (and not A Theory of Justice). Here, I want to speak of another reason as well. With all the respect I have for Rawls, and, as I have written and said many times and also mentioned in this conversation, I consider his contribution to the theory of justice the most important lasting contribution in the history of the philosophy of justice to date, yet I do not consider his overall project very successful. At most, I see its role, besides fueling good theoretical discussion in intellectual and academic arenas, as being in the planning of centrist and left-liberal parties to pay attention to certain freedoms and a minimum of rights for the deprived of society. I believe that in a society based on a capitalist socio-economic formation, with Rawls's explanation and prescription, one can never achieve a fitting justice.

This belief of mine was instrumental in choosing to translate a work by Rawls that, on the one hand, he and his supporters considered to contain the final version of the theory of justice and to be more successful than A Theory of Justice, and on the other hand, for me, is a more prominent manifestation of the inability of theoretical liberalism to explain an acceptable level of justice and the inability of practical liberalism to deliver that level of justice.

With this explanation and my previous remarks regarding Rawls's reliance on the original position to derive the two principles of justice, the problems of their priority, and the flaws in the second principle, I have stated the core of my critique of Rawls. I only emphasize that with a socio-economic formulation based on capitalism, which itself rests on liberalism, Rawls's desired justice cannot be achieved. If I may go a little further, I must say that even if Rawls's theory of justice could be formulated in a more practical and implementable manner that Rawls and all his moderate and left-liberal supporters would accept, then that justice, even if fully and completely implemented, would still be by no means sufficient to meet the needs related to justice, just as all observers consider the level of justice in the Scandinavian countries and even England (with the influence of the Labour Party, which has elements of the left leaning toward socialism present in its liberalism) to be far, far superior to its level in even the most left-leaning liberal government in America.

■ If you agree, as a final question, let us turn to a typology of the opponents and proponents of John Rawls and their works and views. In other words, in contemporary Western history, which philosophers and with what ideas have aligned themselves in the camp of agreement or disagreement with John Rawls? I would be most grateful if you would highlight the most important ones.

Mousa Akrami: In the time I have, I will briefly say that Rawls's critics primarily belong to two camps: 1) Liberalism, and 2) Socialism (or even Communism and Marxism, depending on the intensity of the critical radicalism employed). After that, one can also mention other critiques, such as the feminist critique.

A. The most important liberal critics of Rawls:

1-1) Robert Nozick, Rawls's university colleague, who is to date Rawls's most important liberal critic. Within the broad spectrum of liberalism, he is a libertarian and neoliberal who, from an anti-statist position or a belief in the minimal state, opposes Rawls's belief in state intervention in planning for the realization and safeguarding of the principles of justice. His important book is Anarchy, State, and Utopia, which has been translated into Persian.

Nozick considers Rawls's book A Theory of Justice to be a work in moral and political philosophy so precise, profound, systematic, and full of enlightening ideas in an integrated whole that he believes it has been unmatched since the books of John Stuart Mill. He then writes this important point: from now on, political philosophers must either theorize and explicate within the framework of Rawls's theory, or if they do not, they must have the necessary reasons and explain to others why they have chosen not Rawls's theoretical framework but another. Years ago, I myself wrote in the preface to the book Kant and Metaphysics: "After Kant's posing of the question of the possibility of metaphysics, as well as his inquiries into understanding metaphysics and providing an answer to this question, no researcher in the field of metaphysics can be indifferent to Kant's question and his inquiries, and is compelled to somehow clarify their position regarding his inquiries and his answer to this question." When I read Nozick's writing, I understood how he had grasped that Rawls holds such a position in theorizing about justice that every philosopher of justice must either be a Rawlsian or a non-Rawlsian, and for being a non-Rawlsian, they must clarify their position regarding Rawls's theory and explain the reasons for their non-Rawlsianism to themselves and others. Nozick himself is someone who, despite declaring his belief in the greatness of Rawls's work, stands against Rawls. I do not have the opportunity to explain his critique and whether he has been able to justify his criticism or not. In any case, he is Rawls's most important liberal critic to date and vehemently rejects not only the dominant role of the state and state planning but also Rawls's egalitarianism.

1-2) The communitarian critique: Communitarians such as Sandel (in the book Liberalism and the Limits of Justice), Michael Walzer (in the book Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality), and Charles Taylor (in several books) seek, by emphasizing the role of the community—in which members have organic and more complex relationships than those within society (such as ethnic, tribal, or ideological communities possessing a shared way of life)—and the importance of the shared understanding of its members, to critique and negate both Rawls's individualism and his universalism through various context-oriented, pluralistic, and relativistic perspectives.

1-3) Other critics within the liberal camp, from the left to the center and right of the spectrum, who have tried, while accepting the overall analysis and explanation of Rawls, to show the shortcomings of his philosophy of justice and even to eliminate them: Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum, Gerald Dworkin, and Thomas Nagel. I also place Hayek within this group, although he, on the one hand, belongs to the extreme right of liberalism (neoliberalism) and, on the other hand, lacks the understanding and respect for Rawls's important work that Nozick has for it.

2) Feminist critique: Based on the position of women and gender in the history and reality of various societies, the feminist critique of Rawls begins with the critique of the original position and extends to current societies and the various forms of discrimination and oppression against women and Rawls's disregard for this reality. Perhaps the most radical and comprehensive feminist critique can be found in the work of Kimberly Yuracko, a law professor at Northwestern University, who, especially in her doctoral thesis at Stanford University, offers radical and relatively comprehensive critiques of Rawls.

3) Critique from the standpoint of people of color: One of the most prominent critics of Rawls from among people of color is Charles Mills, a distinguished professor of philosophy at the City University of New York, who is originally Jamaican. His important book critiquing racial liberalism was published by Oxford University Press three or four years ago.

4) Socialist/Marxist critics: Discussing the position of communist parties in so-called socialist countries requires a suitable opportunity and a more precise examination of documents and evidence, and I will not engage in it. Here, I will merely refer to a few socialist/Marxist critics in America itself or some Europeans.

First, I refer to Robert Wolff's book "Understanding Rawls: A Reconstruction and Critique of A Theory of Justice," which was published by Princeton University Press five or six years after A Theory of Justice itself. While considering the book important, Wolff generally views it as a defense of the status quo in capitalist America, where the market and social relations are based on exploitation and injustice. In 1995, Habermas published an article titled "Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism," in which he generally praises Rawls's thought, political philosophy, and moral philosophy, but above all considers Rawls's "political constructivism" to have shortcomings in connection with rationality and also epistemic truth. A number of other left-wing socialist/Marxist critics include Gerald Doppelt, Norman Daniels, Benjamin Barber, Elizabeth Rapaport, Harsanyi, Gerald Cohen, and especially Kai Nielsen, who has important critiques of Rawls. He passed away in April of this year.

B. The most important defenders of Rawls: Rawls's defenders can also be categorized into two groups: 1) liberal and 2) socialist.

Rawls's liberal defenders may also have criticisms of him in some cases. In any case, his most important liberal defenders include Gerald Dworkin, Will Kymlicka, Gerald Gaus, and Jonathan Quong.

Perhaps the most important socialist defender of Rawls is William Edmundson, a professor of law and professor of philosophy at Georgia State University, whose book "John Rawls: Reticent Socialist" was published by Cambridge University Press three or four years ago. In it, Edmundson, as a socialist and proponent of "socialist constitutionalism," praises Rawls and tries to show that Rawls himself, in fact, does not consider his desired justice to be realizable in a capitalist society but rather believes in the necessity of a "liberal democratic socialism."

.

---

.

Assessing the Legacy of John Rawls in the Effort to Reconcile Liberalism and Social Justice

A Conversation between New Consciousness Magazine and Mousa Akrami

On the Occasion of the Centenary of John Rawls's Birth

Original Source: New Consciousness, Year One, Issue 3, 1400, pp. 144-152

.

---

.