Azam Pouya's Article “De-Occulting the World or De-Imaging God”

De-Occulting the World or De-Imaging God

A Critique of Fanaei's Critique of Abdolkarim Soroush's Theology

Azam Pouya (Associate Professor, University of Tehran, Quran and Hadith Sciences)

In an article titled “Naturalized Theology, Light Metaphysics and Heavy Physics: An Examination and Critique of Abdolkarim Soroush's Theology”[1] (hereafter Naturalized Theology), Abolqasem Fanaei critiques Soroush's theology, which, according to his explanation, encompasses Soroush's views on religion, theology, and religiosity (Naturalized Theology, 7). He calls this theology “naturalized theology.” In his view, the most appropriate and precise title to describe Soroush's project is “the naturalization of theology” (ibid., 8). But what does the descriptor “naturalized” in “naturalized theology” mean? He has used this descriptor as equivalent to “material” and “physical” (ibid., 17). That is, in his project, Soroush has sought to “materialize” theology. He adds, of course, that similar expressions such as secularizing, humanizing, scientizing, anthropologizing, and historicizing could also be used for “naturalizing” (ibid., 8). However, Fanaei writes, “for reasons that there is no room to elaborate here, I prefer the expression ‘naturalizing’” (ibid., 9). Thus, Fanaei does not provide the reader with the reasons for using the most important term employed in this article, upon which the entire burden of his writing rests, and leaves it ambiguous. Of course, as the article proceeds, the meaning of this term (not the reasons for preferring it) gradually becomes clearer to the reader, who realizes that this term stands in opposition to “supernaturalizing” and “supernaturalized theology.” And finally, in another explanation, Fanaei considers “naturalized theology” to be a theology that has diminished or eliminated the supernatural and occult dimension in explaining theological phenomena (ibid., 9). As he himself states, his aim in the said article is to show that “the core essence of his [Soroush's] project is the naturalization of religion, theology, and religiosity, which has been carried out through a gradual process of reducing, diminishing, neglecting, or eliminating as much as possible the supernatural, mysterious, divine, and occult dimension or dimensions of these three categories, and attempting to provide an excessively natural explanation of them” (ibid., 9). Fanaei states that he is not opposed to the naturalization of theology, but rather considers it necessary, albeit to the requisite degree. He posits degrees and types for the naturalization of theology (ibid., 9): pure supernaturalization, pure naturalization, and a combined explanation of the two (ibid., 13). In Fanaei's view, some have rendered theology purely supernatural, and in response to them, Soroush has rendered theology close to purely natural, and therefore his theology lies on the maximal side of “naturalization.” He believes that a desirable balance must be restored to the explanation of theological categories, and thus, he believes in a balanced naturalized theology (ibid., 10). So, as he explicitly states, Fanaei's critique concerns the requisite degree of naturalization, not naturalization itself: “The problem begins when we go to extremes in naturalizing theology and naturalize theology more than is necessary” (ibid., 10).

Fanaei then enters into a discussion of Soroush's theology and seeks to demonstrate that he has naturalized theology, and excessively so. In this piece, Fanaei sometimes delves into discussions within Soroush's views that have no direct relevance to the article's subject, and were it not for this, his article could have been shorter.[2] But I will endeavor to remain within the framework of this very subject of “naturalization and its requisite degree,” which is Fanaei's main claim, and show that this claim is not defensible regarding Soroush's project. This discussion is particularly important because Fanaei's critique and his approach do not only affect Soroush's theory; rather, it seems this explanation negates any kind of rational and philosophical explanation of religion that transcends literalism and presents a non-anthropomorphic and non-humanlike image of God, such as the explanation offered by Muslim philosophers.

The discussion in question is organized into several sections: the concept of the necessary limit of naturalization, naturalizing religious knowledge: the theoretical contraction and expansion of the Sharia, naturalizing religion: the expansion of prophetic experience, naturalizing revelation: the Word of Muhammad, the Dream of Muhammad (PBUH). The fourth section is more extensive than the others and has subsections: naturalizing God's speech, God's role in revelation, the unity of being or the metaphysics of union, and the validity of the Prophet's dream.

The Concept of the Necessary Limit of Naturalization

Fanaei's explanation of the concept of the "necessary limit of naturalization," which is the main criterion for his critique and analysis, is insufficient and open to criticism. Firstly, the vague and elastic terms necessary limit, beyond the necessary limit, balanced, and excessive in naturalization do not find a clear explanation in the article, and no correct criterion is provided to the reader so that they can discern how much naturalization is the "necessary limit" and how much is the "limit of excess." Secondly, it is unclear by what characteristics a balanced, naturalized theology can be achieved. Fanaei does not explain from which perspective this "necessary limit, beyond the necessary limit, balanced, and excessive" is defined and interpreted. Is there an objective criterion, and not a perspectival one, for this necessary limit? Of course, by noting that a quantitative criterion for the necessary limit of naturalization cannot be provided (ibid., 15), Fanaei in a way acknowledges the difficulty of attaining an objective criterion. However, he believes that based on the definition of "theology," this necessary limit can be determined (ibid., 12) and defines theology as "the knowledge/explanation of theological truths as they are" (ibid.). Based on this definition, "the naturalization of theology is necessary to the extent and degree that these truths themselves are natural, no more and no less" (ibid.). That is, theological truths have two aspects: a supernatural (transcendent) aspect and a natural aspect. The supernatural aspect must be given a supernatural explanation, and the natural aspect must be given a natural explanation. But it seems that even based on this definition of theology, a specific criterion for the necessary limit of naturalization cannot be easily provided. Firstly, where is the boundary between the natural and the supernatural in theology? And what determines it? Does the apparent meaning of the text (the Quran) determine it? Suppose there is a consensus on God not being material and natural; what can be said about God's attributes? And of course, any answer given to the second will also extend to the first. In Christianity, God puts on a bodily garment, enters nature, and intervenes fully in nature. Some Muslim sects, based on the verse "Looking at their Lord," believe in the vision of God. Conversely, many Muslims believe God does not have a hand, even though the Quran states, "The hand of God is above their hands," and the majority of Muslims do not believe in anthropomorphism, even though the Quran states, "The Most Merciful is established on the Throne." Fanaei does not tolerate considering God's speech as metaphorical and believes that considering the manner of God's speaking as metaphorical means its unjustified naturalization, of course, because it limits God's intervention in nature (ibid., 9). Yet, he apparently considers the metaphorical interpretation of God sitting on the Throne to be a correct explanation. In both cases, God is a supernatural and transcendent being, and in both cases, it can be said that God has intervened in nature, one in the form of speaking and the other in the form of sitting on the throne of sovereignty. That is, if the religious texts themselves are the criterion here, we are faced in advance with an important and serious problem, which is: what language should these texts be considered to be in, and how should they be interpreted? If we are entirely literalist, the matter is clearer and apparently leads to a kind of anthropomorphism and similitude. And if we hold that metaphor has occurred in the text and, therefore, we are faced with non-literal expressions, we apparently need a meta-textual criterion to distinguish these two and show, for example, why God sitting on the Throne is metaphorical but God's speech is not. Someone who interprets God sitting on the Throne non-literally does not, in their own view, deviate from the text but rather shows the correct meaning of the text. Therefore, from their perspective, God in "theology" is not a being sitting on a throne. Someone who considers God's speech metaphorical can also have this same interpretation of the text and believe they have not departed from the text and theological explanation.

    As an example of the extreme limit of naturalization, Fanaei says about revelation that if, in explaining revelation, one suffices with only the role of God in the formation of revelation and the human aspect of the Prophet, the context and era of revelation, and the culture of revelation ... are ignored, this explanation is not justified; but if, in explaining revelation, the human aspect of the Prophet is so highlighted that no fitting role remains for God in explaining revelation and determining its form and content, this explanation is again unjustified (ibid., 12), because belief in the unseen or the supernatural and supernatural beings, as well as their intervention in nature, is among the essentials of the Abrahamic religions (ibid., 9). We see that again the ambiguity in the "necessary limit of naturalization" and the "boundary between the natural and the supernatural" in Fanaei's theological categories causes a problem in this explanation and traps him in other vague words: "the highlighting of the human aspect of the Prophet," "leaving no fitting role for God." "Highlighting" and "fitting role" are no less ambiguous than "necessary limit." How must the human aspect of the Prophet be for it to be highlighted, or how must God's role be for it to be fitting? And even more ambiguous is the reasoning he offers for this statement: "because belief in the unseen or the supernatural and supernatural beings ... is among the essentials of the Abrahamic religions." That is, if the human aspect of the Prophet is highlighted by one degree, is belief in the unseen lost? Who or what determines that degree? Or must the intervention of the supernatural in nature necessarily take the form of disrupting the workings of nature and breaking its laws, or can it be explained in other ways and even consider the lawfulness of nature itself as the very effect of the supernatural in nature, like theologians who consider the laws of nature and its order as the very design of God? In which of these interpretations have we departed from the necessary limit of naturalization? And why? And what can "theology" itself tell us in this domain? There are other ambiguous points in Fanaei's explanation that are not the subject of discussion here, including the essentials of the Abrahamic religions, where it must be asked whether one can even posit an essence for the Abrahamic religions or not, and why should the items he mentions be considered the essentials of the Abrahamic religions? And other points of this kind.

   As mentioned, Fanaei does not provide us with a clear and indisputable criterion for distinguishing the natural from the supernatural, nor for the necessary limit of naturalization, but he introduces instances of the excessive/unjustified naturalization of the supernatural aspect of theological categories in Soroush's religious studies and, on this basis, considers his theology to be naturalized. Among these instances are the belief in the mere existence of an impersonal and formless God, reducing God's role in revelation to the creation of the Prophet, denying God's speech in explaining how God speaks, and naturalizing the interpretation of religion and religious knowledge: "I believe that the supernatural aspect of the theological categories we deal with in the Abrahamic religions is not summed up in the mere existence of an impersonal and formless God, and the mere creation of the Prophet by God, but is far more than this" (ibid., 12), "Also, he [Soroush], in the explanation he gives of how God speaks, in fact negates God's speech and considers the attribution of speech to God to be figurative" (ibid., 13), "As is evident, Soroush here tries to naturalize the method of interpreting religious texts" (ibid., 18), "The only element in Soroush's theology that has not yet been completely naturalized is the Creator God" (ibid., p. 9). Therefore, in Fanaei's view, all these characteristics of excessive naturalization are present in Soroush's project, and as a result, his project is placed wall-to-wall with atheism, skepticism, and agnosticism: "In my opinion, the natural and logical end of the project of naturalizing theology in Soroush's manner is atheism. Soroush's naturalized theology is wall-to-wall with the theology of the death of God or theology without God" (ibid., 49; also see pp. 9, 15, 16, 42).

In summary, from Fanaei's perspective, Soroush has excessively naturalized God, revelation, and the method of interpreting the religious text (the Quran). And the result of this naturalization is the de-occulting of the world. He tries to show that in Soroush's project, from The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sharia, The Expansion of the Prophetic Experience to The Word of Muhammad, the Dream of Muhammad, these characteristics of "excessive naturalization of theology" have gradually become more and more prominent. I will critique these claims in turn.

  Naturalizing Religious Knowledge: The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sharia

What Fanaei has presented in the section criticizing The Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of the Sharia lacks thematic coherence and connection, much like other parts of this article. For instance, the critique of the criterion for distinguishing religion from religious knowledge in Contraction and Expansion and demonstrating (in his own view) its contradictions and inconsistencies has essentially nothing to do with naturalization, nor does raising the issue of “naturalizing religious hermeneutics or religious interpretation” relate to Contraction and Expansion. Even Fanaei’s own quotation in this section is from Pious Conduct (unpublished lectures) and The Word of Muhammad, the Dream of Muhammad, and it is a quotation severed from its context. In any case, he says that Soroush, in interpreting verses of the Quran that attribute natural phenomena such as wind, rain, floods, etc., to God and regard them as acts of God, has eliminated God, and he cites this quotation:

Read the Quran in this way as well, as I tell you. When God says: “I send the winds,” read it as “the winds are sent.” Set aside this agency of God there for a moment. Look at the event itself. When it says “We sent a flood upon such-and-such a people,” read it like this: “A flood came and swept such-and-such a people away”... That is, you can temporarily eliminate God and establish a cause-and-effect relationship between two events. A very reasonable and acceptable cause-and-effect relationship.

Firstly, Fanaei contents himself with saying that Soroush, in interpreting these verses, has eliminated God. It is as if he has paid no attention to the phrases “set aside this agency of God for a moment” and “temporarily eliminate God.” Moreover, he has overlooked the context of the discussion. By referring to The Word of Muhammad, the Dream of Muhammad, we see that this subject is situated within the context of the language of dreams and its understanding and interpretation. Let us look at the passages from that book:

...Two relations must be distinguished from one another: one is our relation to the Quran, and the other is the Messenger’s relation to the Quran. In the prophetic experience, everything flows directly and without mediation from the source of divinity: God sends the winds, He pours down the rain, He drowns Pharaoh in the sea... The Prophet, peace be upon him, with the collyrium of monotheism upon his eyes, sees in his experience the role-playing hands of God in these events unveiled and without mediation, and reports on it. But we, who receive the cup of revelation not from the eternal cupbearer but from the cupbearer of the age, that is, Muhammad Mustafa, have a different relation to those phenomena. He was a commander, and we are captives of causes and means; what the “cause-piercing eye” of Muhammad (PBUH) saw without veil, we see through the veil of causes and veils... The language of dreams is the language of the direct prophetic experience, but in the understanding and interpretation of the dream, means and instruments come into play... If the growing of trees and the falling of rain in a dream is the direct act of the Creator, in the waking world and in the position of interpretation, that same act of the Creator passes through the channels of causes and means to reach its effects. The wise and discerning interpreter, when reading Surah Saba: “So We sent upon them the flood of the dam...” ... does not hastily conclude that a flood suddenly flowed without obeying the laws of nature and became a calamity for the people of Saba. He reads and understands this verse as follows: “A flood flowed and destroyed the flourishing gardens...” (263-265).

We see that here the role of God is not eliminated, but rather placed along the chain of natural causes, and it is merely explained that it should not be seen as parallel to the laws of nature—an explanation that rationalist Quranic commentators had also provided before. Fanaei does not explain what this naturalized hermeneutics is as a method. Is it a recognized interpretive method? What is its lineage? And what does this description “naturalized” mean for a method of interpreting religious text? And does a method even have natural and supernatural forms? It is evident that this term is Fanaei’s own coinage, and because Soroush says that in verses concerning natural phenomena directly attributed to God, one should eliminate God for a moment and read the verse in the passive voice, Fanaei considers not directly attributing natural phenomena to God as the elimination of supernatural and unseen factors in explaining natural phenomena, and deems this way of understanding the verse as natural. But does Fanaei himself believe that God sends rain directly or through causes and means? Soroush explicitly states that this way of understanding allows us to see God’s hand along the chain of natural causes, not parallel to it. Does seeing God along the chain of natural causes mean eliminating God and setting aside the unseen?

Another point that Fanaei raises in this section, which is indeed connected to The Contraction and Expansion and Fanaei's claim in this article but lacks clear meaning, is that Soroush has also naturalized religious knowledge. However, it is unclear what naturalized religious knowledge means, whether we even have non-naturalized religious knowledge, and whether Soroush has naturalized religious knowledge excessively or just to the right measure in The Contraction and Expansion. If he were to naturalize it but to the right measure, how would he have interpreted it? In Fanaei's text, none of these questions receive an answer. What he brings up in the discussion of constancy and change is also irrelevant to these issues. These very ambiguities show that using the expression "naturalizing theology" for Soroush's entire project is an incorrect usage, since it does not cover all the components of his theology.

Naturalizing Religion: The Expansion of Prophetic Experience

Fanaei deals with The Expansion of Prophetic Experience very briefly. He merely wants to show the point of connection between The Expansion of Prophetic Experience and The Word of Muhammad, the Dream of Muhammad, and that it is with this book that the naturalization of religion itself begins, in such a way that the four characteristics attributed to religion in The Contraction and Expansion—such as being true, constant, infallible, and perfect—are stripped from religion in The Expansion of Prophetic Experience. (Ibid., 22) He considers the reason for stripping away these characteristics to be that Soroush wants to say religion is a construct of the Prophet, not of God: "The later Soroush, in order to prove that religion is a construct of the Prophet and not a construct of God, tries to show that religion lacks the very characteristics he had previously attributed to religion itself in The Contraction and Expansion..." (Ibid., 23) Fanaei explains the meaning of this expression—that Soroush considers religion to be a construct of the Prophet, not God—by stating that he considers religion to be a construct of the creative imagination of the Prophet as a human being. (Ibid., 25) However, Fanaei does not refer to the process of the involvement of the Prophet's creative imagination in the emergence of revelation, nor does he show how the role of this faculty in the formation of religion completely sets aside God's role or reduces it to the creation of the Prophet, and ultimately naturalizes religion more than necessary. We know that the precedent of using the prophet's imaginative faculty to explain God's speech goes back to Muslim philosophers. From Fanaei's perspective, do all such explanations naturalize religion more than necessary? If yes, why? And if no, what is the difference between Soroush's view and theirs? (For information on the views of Muslim philosophers on this matter, see the book Dream, Metaphor, Language of Religion by Amir Maziar)

   Another noteworthy point here is that Fanaei, in a quotation he cites from Soroush in this regard—“I do not claim that religion is not God-made; rather, I say that if God wants to make a religion, the way is to create a prophet and that prophet makes a religion, and that religion is considered God-made, exactly as if God wants to create a cherry, the way is not to create a cherry directly…” (ibid., 25)—has, on the one hand, not taken the word “the way” in the phrase “the way is to create a prophet” seriously and has reduced that phrase to the meaning that Soroush considers God’s only role in the emergence of religion to be the creation of the prophet, something that a careful study of Muhammad’s Word, Muhammad’s Dream refutes, and which we will address in the section examining Muhammad’s Word, Muhammad’s Dream. But on the other hand, he has taken it more seriously than necessary, reading it as “the only way.” Fanaei (in the context of discussing the possibility of God’s speech) refers to another passage from Soroush’s statements: “I do not know what analysis the critics have regarding phenomena such as death and rain… Does the natural explanation of rainfall tie God’s hands? … Does it not mean that He is the Origin of origins and lies along the chain of natural causes, and everything occurs by His permission and design? If so, why does the natural and material explanation of revelation and God’s word, and highlighting the prophet’s role in it, sever its connection to God and render God’s speech and the descent of revelation meaningless? Does not everything that occurs in nature have natural causes? So why should the revelation sent down to the prophet be exempt from this rule and be attributed to the supernatural without the mediation of nature?” (quoted from p. 26 of Fanaei’s article). In criticizing this statement, he says there is an error in Soroush’s analysis, namely that he has determined the instance without any reason (ibid., 26), “because from the premise that God cannot speak to someone directly and without the mediation of a natural thing, one cannot conclude that the ‘only’ way for God to speak is to create a prophet and for that prophet to speak to the people and for it to be considered God’s speech. There are other hypotheses and possibilities here, and one cannot arbitrarily choose among them.” (ibid.)

   Of course, we saw that the phrase “the only way” did not appear in Soroush’s words, but it is quite clear that the clearest, most understandable, and most reasonable way currently available to us is that one. Consider the way proposed by Fanaei, which is one of the possibilities and hypotheses he has in mind: creating a bush and God speaking with it, and it speaking with the prophet. Fanaei, in criticizing Soroush’s statement, says: “One of these possibilities is that God creates a bush and speaks to the prophet through that bush; that is, from the general principle that God’s speech with humans depends on the mediation and involvement of natural causes, one cannot conclude that no other natural cause besides the prophet can or does intervene in this process.” (ibid., 27) Attributing the aforementioned error to Soroush’s analysis leads Fanaei into a greater error, such that the main issue is fundamentally forgotten. The issue was whether speech, which is a human act and a natural phenomenon, can be attributed to God—who is a non-human and immaterial being—directly and without the mediation of a natural thing. If God is to speak with a bush and then the bush speaks with the prophet, as Fanaei says, it must first be proven that the bush can speak, that the bush possesses a mental apparatus and a vocal apparatus, and that the bush can hear and understand God’s speech, which is analogous to human speech. Is the bush’s speaking a natural process? Moreover, the one who claims that God spoke to him is the prophet, not the bush. If the bush had claimed that God spoke to it and sent it to the bushes of its people to convey His speech to them, the discussion of revelation would revolve around the bush. So Soroush has not arbitrarily determined the instance; rather, the discussion was fundamentally about the existing instance and the manner of explaining it.

 Naturalizing Revelation: Muhammad’s Word, Muhammad’s Dream

     In this section, Fanaei seeks to show that Soroush, after naturalizing religious knowledge, religious hermeneutics, and religion itself, has also naturalized revelation and God. He has naturalized revelation by reducing it to a dream, considering it a construct of the Prophet, and severing its connection with God. The only connection he maintains for it with God is that the Prophet is a creation of God—nothing more. He has also naturalized God by naturalizing His attributes, retaining only the attribute of Creator, which is not needed for the explanation Soroush offers of revelation and can easily be eliminated. “Thus, from Soroush’s naturalized theology to atheism is but a single step; a step that, within the framework of Soroush’s assumptions, it is illogical not to take.” (ibid., 49) The attribute on whose naturalization in Soroush’s project Fanaei invests the most in his article is the attribute of God as Speaker, which, in his view, plays an important role in both the naturalization of revelation and the naturalization of God.

Naturalizing God’s Speech

  Fanaei believes that “providing a purely and exclusively natural explanation of religious and theological categories contradicts the essence of religion and religiosity and is, in fact, an instance of atheism, agnosticism, or religious skepticism, because belief in the unseen or supernatural realm, in supernatural beings, and in their intervention in nature is essential to the Abrahamic religions” (ibid., 9). Continuing these same statements, he says, “The only element in Soroush’s theology that has not yet been fully naturalized is God the Creator. God’s other attributes, apart from the attribute of creatorship, as well as His actions, including His speech, have already been naturalized by Soroush—that is, he has provided a wholly natural explanation of them” (ibid.). Elsewhere, he equates this method of naturalization with considering something metaphorical: “In the explanation he provides of how God speaks, he [Soroush] in fact denies God’s speech and considers the attribution of speech to God to be metaphorical” (ibid., 28); “Reducing revelation to the speech of the Prophet... as we shall see, this reduction is in truth not a reduction, but precisely means that God does not speak at all, and the attribution of speech to Him is a metaphorical attribution” (ibid., 28). With this statement, Fanaei is in fact trying to say that Soroush has naturalized the attribute of God’s speech by stripping it from God, and thus has naturalized God more than necessary. The problem here is that it is unclear why Fanaei distinguishes this attribute of God from His other attributes, such as God who sits upon the Throne (Taha:5), God whose Throne is carried by eight angels (Al-Haqqah:17), God who sees and hears (Ash-Shura:11), God who takes vengeance (Ibrahim:47), God who schemes (Al Imran:54), God who becomes wrathful (Al-Mumtahanah:13, etc.), God whose hand is above their hands (Al-Fath:10), and God’s other human-like attributes. Why are all of God’s human-like attributes (attributes that resemble those of humans) considered metaphorical, except for His speech? Why do we shy away from conceiving of God as having a body like a human so that He can sit on a throne, but do not fear conceiving of Him as having a body equipped with the capacity to produce sound so that He can speak? Moreover, Fanaei has not resolved the philosophical problem of God’s real speech. How can God, who is purely immaterial and lacks the material requirements of speech, speak? Muslim philosophers faced metaphysical difficulties in directly attributing uttered speech to God, including the fact that God is an immaterial, non-physical being and therefore lacks material organs and limbs; God possesses complete actuality and undergoes no change, whereas speaking entails change; and other such problems. (For a detailed account of these metaphysical problems, see the book Dream, Metaphor, and the Language of Religion by Amir Maziar, pp. 15–18). The question Fanaei must answer is: why should we not call the natural explanation of God’s speech a rational explanation, so that we do not fall into the problem that the supernatural dimension of the explanation of God’s attributes has been diminished or eliminated, and consequently face the problem of the criterion for determining the necessary limit of naturalization?

   In this part of his article, Fanāʾī levels a criticism at Soroush’s phenomenological view of revelation, arguing that Soroush has distorted the phenomenon under discussion: “… and he analyzes only a part of the phenomenon in question, namely the Prophet’s recitation of the Quranic verses, and this amounts to a distortion of the phenomenon we are faced with” (p. 28). His analysis consists in the claim that “Soroush completely ignores the Prophet’s claim that he received a message from God and is now conveying it to us” (ibid.). Fanāʾī’s criticism is not entirely clear, but it seems he means that Soroush has phenomenologized one part of revelation—the Prophet’s words—and ignored another part, namely the Prophet’s claim that he received a message from God and proclaimed it to the people. In response to Fanāʾī, it must be said that any aspect of the event of revelation to the Prophet can be phenomenologized. The question is which aspect of this event Soroush has phenomenologized, what conclusion he has drawn from it, and whether there has been proportionality and balance between that aspect and that conclusion. Soroush considers the revealed text to be the phenomenon under discussion. He says that if we bracket, or perform a phenomenological epoché on, the various discussions about how revelation came about, and if the phenomenon we attend to is solely the text itself and the nature of its language and expression, we arrive at the conclusion that the language of this text is dream-like. The claim of receiving revelation from God is not set aside in this text, nor is any conclusion drawn about it from this perspective, because Soroush emphasizes that in this analysis he does not wish to explain the ontological aspect of revelation, that is, how revelation occurs. Soroush seeks a phenomenological examination of what the Prophet claims was revealed to him. The Prophet said, “wa ūḥiya ilayya hādhā al-qurʾān” (Al-Anʿām: 19)—“This Quran has been revealed to me.” The primary phenomenon here is the Quran and its language. It is the Quran that is the product of revelation to the Prophet, and the theory of the prophetic dream is a theory about the language of the Quran, that its language is the language of dreams or dream-vision. If this theory occasionally addresses other discussions, these are secondary and derivative, intended for a better understanding of this linguistic theory: “The audio-visual theory of the Quran and the dream-like nature of the Messenger’s experience put forward a new presupposition about the language of the Quran, which is obligatory for understanding the Quran” (Kalām-i Muḥammad, Ruʾyā-yi Muḥammad, 231). Therefore, in that phenomenological discussion, the claim of the prophetic dream is not an examination of the Prophet’s claim of receiving words from God. The discussion concerning the explanation of how revelation was received has its own independent reasons in the text of the articles on the prophetic dream and the discussion of Kalām-i Muḥammad, and has nothing to do with this phenomenological discussion.

    In another critique, whose main axis is his understanding that Soroush assigns God no role in revelation other than the creation of the Prophet, Fanaei says that Soroush’s explanation of Muhammad’s dreams is overreaching (Naturalized Theology, 29) and explains that “if God’s mere creation of Muhammad suffices for us to regard Muhammad’s speech as the speech of God, and also if God’s mere creation of Muhammad suffices for us to consider his dream as having a divine origin and source, then God’s mere creation of other people who dream must also suffice for attributing the content of their dreams to God” (ibid.), and concludes that in Soroush’s theory no difference can be posited between the Prophet’s dream and the ordinary, trivial dreams of others (ibid.). Fanaei believes that to solve this problem—that is, to distinguish between the Prophet’s dream and those of others—Soroush grants epistemological authority to revelation and considers it a discloser of the Unseen, whereas he cannot solve the problem in this way, because, first, in both dreams God is the creator of the dreamer and their dreams equally trace back to the Origin of origins (ibid., 29), and second, if Soroush considers the Prophet’s dream a discloser of the Unseen, he brings God into the picture, and this is neither a natural explanation nor a phenomenological explanation of revelation. “To put it more clearly, a natural explanation is one in which God and God’s intervention in the creation of the phenomenon under explanation are placed behind a veil or in parentheses. Soroush’s aim in the phenomenology of revelation is to provide such an explanation of revelation” (ibid., 30). Continuing his critique regarding the lack of difference between the dreams of the Prophet and others, Fanaei refers to one of Soroush’s responses to a similar criticism—that the difference between Muhammad and others is the difference between gold and copper—and criticizes that response, saying: “The difference between copper and gold can be explained with a completely natural explanation, but the difference between Muhammad and others cannot be explained with a natural explanation; second, the difference between copper and gold in terms of value is a conventional difference arising from the scarcity of gold and the abundance of copper in nature, not from gold’s greater attribution and proximity to God. Gold and copper are equal in their attribution to God, whereas the Qur’an and other books are not equal in their attribution to God” (p. 30). [3]

   Many weaknesses and flaws are evident in these statements, but Fanaei’s critique is built on two main points, and I too will focus on them: one, that the only role Soroush assigns to God in revelation is the creation of the Prophet, and the other, the lack of epistemological authority or validity of the Prophet’s dream.

And as for God’s role in revelation

     First, Fanaei has not noticed that the mission of the articles in The Prophet’s Dream is not to determine God’s role in revelation, but to explain the language of revelation; and in these articles God is certainly not absent, as Soroush says: “He was not told, ‘Go and tell the people that God is One’; rather, he beheld God in His attribute of oneness and recounts his narration of this observation to us in his own language,” “... it is as though divinity entered the human skin [of the Prophet] and became human, and the supernatural clothed itself in the garment of nature and became natural” (Kalām-i Muḥammad, Rūyā-yi Muḥammad, 86). “Not only was God in the Prophet, but the Prophet was in God, and whatever he thought was His thought, and this is for no reason other than that the God of the monotheists is present in all beings and contingents without distance or veil, and all contingents and beings are also in Him. The world is divine, and this was Muhammad’s (pbuh) most important discovery, that he saw the winds at His command... it is as though it is God who blows” (ibid., 110). And referring to the view of Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn in confirmation of his own words on the relationship between nature and the supernatural, he says: “Incarnation entails duality, but in unity there is no place for duality” (ibid., 111). These pieces of evidence, and many others in The Prophet’s Dream, show that in Soroush’s view, the mere existence of Muhammad is not sufficient for the revelatory nature of Muhammad’s (pbuh) experience; rather, the unity of Muhammad and God is also necessary. It seems that Fanaei, who is himself not unaware of this discussion of unity and its importance in Soroush’s theory, sometimes completely ignores it and sometimes states that Soroush’s theory on this matter is incorrect or insufficient. It is clear that a part of a theory not being fully adequate to its purpose (assuming the validity of the critic’s reasons) is not a reason to be able to eliminate or downplay it in the thought of the theory’s author. It is with the existence of that assumption that Soroush’s theory is exonerated from the accusation of emptying the world of God and the unseen, or of excessive naturalization. Now, the discussion of whether that assumption is strong or not is a different discussion. Apparently, Fanaei thinks that for God to be present in revelation, God must necessarily be outside of Muhammad and speak to him with words, whereas in Soroush’s view, for God to be present in revelation, Muhammad must be united with God. It is then that Muhammad’s speech is God’s speech, and of course, this same God is the creator of this same Muhammad. In this way, Soroush, in a somewhat rationally acceptable manner, places nature and the supernatural side by side in balance. In Fanaei’s view, downplaying the supernatural aspect of revelation means downplaying or eliminating God’s involvement in revelation, but we see that in Soroush’s view, the supernatural aspect is seriously present in revelation, even more so than in the traditional explanation of revelation, which considers God only as the speaker of revelation, and that at a distance and outside of Muhammad. It should not be forgotten that in Soroush’s theory, the Prophet had these kinds of observations and unveilings as a result of connection with God and the supernatural, and his dream, from Soroush’s perspective, is not pure illusion.

    Truly, why should one imagine that God has intervened in nature or played an extensive role in revelation only when He speaks a word to the Prophet in a material and external form? And is this very image not a materialization and naturalization of God? The unseen is fully present in Soroush’s explanation, and of course, its presence is not of the kind of speaking or material and corporeal matters.

The Unity of Existence and the Metaphysics of Union

As we said, Fanaei himself sometimes refers to this discussion of unity and the metaphysics of union, but considers it incomplete and unjustified. Fanaei raises several objections in this regard: first, that according to the unity of existence, Muhammad’s speech must be considered God’s speech, and not vice versa. Second, that the theory of the unity of existence does not suffice to create a difference between the speech and dream of Muhammad and the speech and dream of others. And third, that resorting to the metaphysics of union and the unity of existence itself is an affirmation of a terrifying and weighty metaphysics and conflicts with Soroush’s project.

  First, Fanaei writes:

In the mystical explanation, God-existence is the absolutely unconditioned that is the source of division. In the view of mystics, God is not an existent but is existence itself. And because He is existence itself, He is free from every limitation, even the limitation of necessity and absoluteness. Such an existence, because it is free from every limitation, can be combined with any limitation; that is, it can descend from its station of the Hidden of the Hidden, in which it has no limitation, and any limitation and determination, including material and natural limitations and determinations, can befall it... (Naturalized Theology, 32)

The upshot of Fanā’ī’s argument is that, according to the mystical explanation, the attribution of the Word to Muhammad is figurative, and in reality the Word is truly the Word of God (ibid., 44). This statement is, in fact, the very core of Soroush’s claim. Soroush says that attributing the Word to Muhammad does not preclude its attribution to God, because according to the mystical explanation, Muhammad’s speech is God’s speech. But the issue lies precisely in the correct understanding of this point. In this explanation, Muhammad’s speech, with the very constraints and characteristics of its Muhammadan nature, is the Word of God; that is, divinity—according to the very statement of Fanā’ī quoted above—accepts this constraint here, and this matter has no contradiction with being divine. In the prevailing view, this statement is a denial of God’s speaking and its attribution to Muhammad, whereas from the mystic’s perspective, such a thing in no way negates its attribution to God. This Word, while being entirely Muhammadan, is entirely divine. If Fanā’ī’s problem is resolved by changing the phrasing, this discussion can be written as follows: God’s speaking in such a way that this speech is Muhammad’s speech, with the same human, historical, and linguistic constraints, is, from a mystical perspective, a real attribution and not a figurative one. Naturally, from a non-mystical viewpoint, this very explanation is a figurative attribution of speech to God. The main issue is how God’s speaking is to be explained. The entirety of Soroush’s argument is precisely this: considering revelation as Muhammadan does not sever its “real” relation with God, and for this relation, we do not need to materialize God in order for Him to speak.

Second, Fanā’ī says that the theory of the Unity of Being and, according to it, the unity and union of Muhammad with God cannot explain the distinction of Muhammad’s speech from that of other human beings, because in that theory, all human beings are united with God.

“And even if Soroush were to say that the difference between the Prophet and others is that the Prophet has become annihilated in God while others have not—which is, in one sense, a correct statement—this statement does not solve the problem here. Because annihilation (fanā) in mystical literature has two meanings: one metaphysical and the other epistemological. In the metaphysical sense, all are annihilated in God. If there is a difference, it is in the degrees of manifestation in the arc of descent, not in the principle of being annihilated in God (= the Unity of Being). But from the epistemological perspective, the manifestations and theophanies of God are divided into two categories: one, those manifestations and theophanies that, through spiritual wayfaring, are freed from the illusion of duality and multiplicity and witness, with their inner sense, their own annihilation and that of other manifestations and theophanies in God (= the Unity of Witness or the Witnessed); and the other, those manifestations and theophanies that do not witness their own annihilation and that of others in God, but rather posit an existence for themselves and others alongside or in parallel with God (= the multiplicity of witness or the witnessed, which is, in truth, an illusion that, according to mystics, arises from duality of vision). But if Soroush’s intent is ‘annihilation’ in the epistemological sense of the word, the meaning of this type of annihilation is that the Prophet, through traversing the stages of mystical wayfaring, witnesses his own annihilation and that of others in God, but others do not enjoy such a witnessing. However, the fact that the Prophet witnesses his own annihilation and that of others in God is not a good reason for us to consider his speech as the Word of God and the speech of others as their own speech. Especially considering that when we speak of the speech of two persons, namely the speech of God and the speech of the Prophet, we have in fact presupposed the multiplicity of existence; that is, separating the speech of God from the speech of the Prophet means that we do not see the Prophet’s annihilation in God, because if we had witnessed the Prophet’s annihilation in God, we would have seen only God and heard only His speech” (ibid., pp. 44-45)

    Fanaei's argument here is neither precise nor clear. The meaning of the Prophet's annihilation (fanā) in God is that the Prophet, through an existential journey along the ascending arc, has risen and attained a different existential and intuitive rank. All are annihilated in God at some level, but true knowledge of this annihilation is achieved through the journey in existence and proximity to the Real. Thus, the Prophet's existential rank, according to the mystical explanation, is not the same as the existential rank of other human beings. (On this, see the discussion of "The Human Species and the Perfect Human" in Theoretical Mysticism, Yadollah Yazdanpanah, 579-591). The distinction of the Prophet's epistemic rank is attained in the same way. The perception of truth from the Prophet's existential perspective differs from the perception of truth from other existential perspectives. The one who is closer to the Real, and, according to the mystics, has ascended the ascending arc, has speech and action that are more divine and more Godly. All sayings and actions are, in a sense, the saying and action of God, but this is a gradational matter, admitting of degrees. It is possible for a human being on this journey to reach a point where their action and speech become so divine that they are the very action and speech of God. This is the basis for why the Prophet's action and speech in religion are the foundation for the believers' practice; otherwise, in the Prophet's ordinary actions and sayings, "revelation" (waḥy) does not occur. Through the mystical journey and attaining unity with God, the Prophet had acquired a status different from others, a status that distinguished his speech and action from others, and of course, there was also a difference among his own sayings, some being revelatory and some non-revelatory. If we do not accept this distinct existential status of the Prophet resulting from unity and annihilation in the Real, we must always see the exemplary nature of the Prophet's action and speech as stemming from an external intervention, as if something from outside is always telling the Prophet what to say and what to do. As if the Prophet himself was no different from others, and this external matter, external voice, and external angel made him a Prophet. But the Prophet is not like all human beings, because he is in a different existential and intuitive station. When we speak of the existential station, its result is not summarized in a single word like "annihilation" (fanā) or the witnessing of annihilation; rather, it permeates the Prophet's entire being, making his whole existence divine and annihilated, and distinguishing his speech and action from others. This is, in fact, an explanation of that account in which the Prophet's being was described as gold, and it was said that whatever emanated from him was golden, not that the Prophet was a human being of the same rank as all humans and sometimes a message came to him, or that prophethood was an accidental, external matter that entered him from outside. Fanaei's conception of the unity of existence, like his conception of God, theology, and revelation, appears very simplistic and materialized.

Third, Fanaei says the metaphysics of union (wiṣāl) is itself a dreadful matter. Yes, on this point it must be said that the metaphysics of union, which is the assertion of the unity of existence in an almost Sadrian account, is a metaphysical theory and certainly has its own difficulties, but the whole point is that, in Soroush's view, the metaphysics of union is far lighter, more digestible, and more coherent than the metaphysics of separation (firāq). In the metaphysics of separation and in non-unity-of-existence explanations, one must posit many immaterial beings and complex mechanisms for natural and supernatural communication, and overcome the various kinds of problems arising from dualism, or rather, fundamental pluralisms. But in the metaphysics of union, all of these sit together more coherently, lightly, and easily in the assertion of a divinity united with the world.

"What has always concerned me was to present a minimal metaphysics, because we live in a post-Kantian era where metaphysics in its prior sense has been greatly discredited, and it is very difficult to defend the metaphysical positions of the ancients. … The minimal metaphysics I had in mind consisted of the idea that God's relationship with the world is a relationship of infusion (indikāk), a relationship in which the effect is dissolved in the cause. The contingent is truly filled with the Necessary. All contingents are filled with God, but the Prophet is more filled, and this is the very concept of the perfection of proximity. … The conception of a God separate from nature does not fit in my mind" (Muhammad's Word, Muhammad's Dream: 344).

The assertion of a metaphysics of union in Soroush’s theory is the principal obstacle to and negation of Fanaei’s entire claim; that is, if Fanaei claims that Soroush naturalizes theology to such an extent that no room remains for the unseen or for God, the metaphysics of union is a complete negation of this assertion. The metaphysics of union is not a negation of the supernatural in favor of the natural, but rather a complete reconciliation and coexistence of the two. To what extent this theory itself holds strength and what difficulties it may pose for the views of Mulla Sadra and others—which Fanaei also addresses in his article—is a different discussion and, of course, lies outside Fanaei’s claim concerning the naturalization and unnecessary naturalization of theology in Soroush’s thought.

And as for the validity of the Prophet’s dream

In his critique of the prophetic dream, Fanaei believes that in Soroush’s theory, no difference remains between the dream of the Prophet and the dreams of ordinary people, and therefore, the Prophet’s dream lacks epistemological validity and authority, since in both cases God is the creator of the dreamer, and Soroush considers God’s sole role in revelation to be the creation of the Prophet. However, Fanaei’s statement can be critiqued from several angles. Firstly, the subject of Soroush’s discussion, as he himself states, is fundamentally not the explanation of the epistemological authority of revelation. But if the intention is that by calling revelation a dream, revelation is stripped of its validity, it must be said that this is not the case. Soroush does not consider the Prophet’s dreams to lack validity, just as believers consider them valid, including himself: “Believers who consider the Prophet (PBUH) a prophet (such as the author of these lines) certainly hold his symbolic and dreamlike revelations to be precious and noble” (Kalam-e Muhammad, Roya-ye Muhammad, 204). “Yes, we have confused dreams, just as we have weak and empty poetry. But we also have transcendent dreams, and the prophetic dreams are of this kind” (ibid., 114). “This dream and vision, though entirely sacred, was colored by the hues of nature and…” (ibid., 113). How this validity is explained is another discussion that Kalam-e Muhammad, Roya-ye Muhammad does not undertake. If we formulate Fanaei’s critique as: if revelation is a dream, it is necessarily a dream like the dreams of all humans, and there will be no difference between the revelatory dream and other dreams, then again, Fanaei’s statement is not a sound one, for one can consider revelation a dream and still posit differences, gradations, and types among dreams. One can differentiate based on who the dreamer is and under what circumstances the act of dreaming occurred—in a divine or non-divine person, or in relation to the unseen or without such relation. The difference lies in the content of the dreams and their structure. Instead of focusing on this content, which is the central axis of the prophetic dreams, Fanaei seeks validity in the attribution or non-attribution of the dreams to God. For this reason, he critiques Soroush’s analogy of gold and copper regarding the difference between the Prophet’s dream and the dreams of others, by way of their attribution to God. As it happens, the very passage where the analogy of copper and gold appears contains the answer to Fanaei’s critique: “The Quran itself must show that it is divine gold, not divine copper” (Kalam-e Muhammad, Roya-ye Muhammad, 323). “God has created some people who are like gold or have the potential for gold, and some people who are like copper. And therefore, their products differ” (ibid.), and he emphasizes, “The fact that every act is God’s act does not make all acts equal or give them the same value and content” (ibid.). He continues, “When we say the Quran is the composition of the Prophet and the Masnavi is the composition of Rumi, and both are compositions of God, this does not make the Masnavi the same as the Quran” (ibid.). And most importantly, in the discussion of epistemological authority, there is no difference between considering revelation a dream or not considering it a dream. If revelation were not a dream, would it inherently possess authority and validity? Soroush’s point here is precise: “It has been said that a dream is not a proof, and the corollary of considering revelation a dream is the negation of the authority of the Prophet’s teachings and doctrines, and beyond that, the impossibility of prophethood. Very well, but is the claim of revelation itself a proof? By whatever reason believers consider prophetic revelation authoritative, they must also consider the Prophet’s dream, which is identical to his revelation, as authoritative” (ibid., 162).

   As mentioned in the previous critique, the statement that God's sole role in revelation is the creation of the Prophet is incorrect. The phrase “God is the creator of Muhammad and Muhammad is the creator of the Quran” and other expressions with this theme in Kalam-e Muhammad, Roya-ye Muhammad, with the explanations given in the previous critique, find their true meaning: God is the creator of a Muhammad who has become divine and is united with Him. God is also the creator of other human beings, but He is the creator of human beings who have not become divine or have not become as divine as Muhammad. And this path of becoming divine, or journeying in divinity, is itself the very presence of divinity in the world and the divine rule and law of the world.

    A point also needs to be mentioned regarding the Creator God. Fanai says that Soroush's God is only the Creator God, and that he has naturalized and eliminated all other attributes of God, and that God is not actually present in the world. It seems that Fanai's major problem in understanding Soroush lies precisely here. Fanai has equated Soroush's God with the Demiurge of the Deists. However, Soroush's God is not a Demiurge. Fundamentally, belief in a pantheistic God who fills the world, and belief in the metaphysics of union, is precisely a negation of Deism. The numerous pieces of evidence presented in this article show that Soroush's God fills the world, is present everywhere, and is the inner essence of the world, not a Creator God who sits in a corner and has withdrawn from the world.

In explaining his proposed synthetic account of revelation, which is neither a complete naturalization nor a complete supernaturalization, Fanai states: “But in the synthetic account of revelation, God is the agent and originator of revelation, and the Prophet is its perceiver; a perceiver who, like any other perceiver, is active in the position of cognition, is present on the scene with his entire personality and identity, and plays an ineliminable role in shaping the theme and content of revelation... This account can provide a reasonable basis and framework for an appropriate hermeneutics for interpreting the sacred text” (Naturalized Theology, 43). Very well, but how? And by what mechanism? The entire debate is about explaining the mechanism of revelation; otherwise, saying neither extremism nor negligence, but a middle way, does not solve the problem. In this middle way, how does God speak? How does the Prophet receive? And how does he convey? And what are the characteristics of the result of this dialogue (the Quran)? And what is its language? How do God's attributes other than creatorship operate in this middle account? It is only after answering these questions that it becomes clear whether such a path is possible or not, whether it is truly a middle way or not, and whether other paths have excessively naturalized revelation or not.

   In conclusion, the summary of the matter is that one can acknowledge that aspects of naturalization have occurred in Soroush's theology, but the claim that this naturalization has been excessive is an assertion without clear evidence. And if the argument is that the role of God and the Unseen has been eliminated or reduced to an insignificant role, as stated and with the evidence shown, it is incorrect. Ultimately, Soroush's God has not been naturalized, nor has the world been emptied of Him; on the contrary, He has become united with the world and found an all-encompassing presence within it. Everything in the universe has a natural aspect and a divine aspect, and these two are not in competition with each other, but are alongside and together with one another. Revelation is both divine and human; it is human because it is the speech of Muhammad and his observations, and it is divine because Muhammad is united with God, is in relation to the Unseen, and his observations and dreams, which are all imaginal, have been formed as a result of this unity and connection. As it happens, it seems that the God, Gabriel, and revelation that Fanai is searching for are the very same naturalized and corporealized God that he considers the correct description of theology and the sacred text. A God, angel, and revelation that it is unclear how one can reasonably accept and gather into a coherent theory about God, religion, and the world without falling into anthropomorphism and corporealism. De-anthropomorphizing and de-corporealizing God is not removing Him from the world and shortening His hand from history, but rather a different understanding of the relationship between God and the world. Removing the human and corporeal conception of God cannot and should not be called de-occulting the world.

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Bibliography

Naturalized Theology, Light Metaphysics and Heavy Physics: A Review and Critique of Abdolkarim Soroush's Religious Studies, “Religion and the Contemporary World”, Year 8, No. 1, Spring and Summer 2021, Serial No. 14, pp. 7 – 56

Kalam-e Muhammad, Roya-ye Muhammad, Abdolkarim Soroush, Socrates Publications, 2018

Dream, Metaphor and the Language of Religion; The Religious Text as Artistic Text, Amir Maziar, Kargadan Publishing, 2021

Foundations and Principles of Theoretical Mysticism, Yadollah Yazdanpanah, Imam Khomeini Institute Publications, 2012

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[1] Published in the Journal of Religion and the Contemporary World, Year 8, No. 1, Spring and Summer 2021, Serial No. 14, pp. 7–56

[2] For instance, in the section concerning the theoretical contraction and expansion of Sharia, the discussions related to the separation of religion from religious knowledge, stability and change, the evolution of religious knowledge, and the contradiction in which the author of Contraction and Expansion has, in the writer's opinion, become entangled. The naturalization of religious knowledge could have been proposed without addressing these issues in detail. Similarly, the discussion of phenomenology in the section on Muhammad's Theology of Muhammad's Dream. In addition, some of the footnotes, including the footnote on page 8 of the article, where the author speaks about new-thinking and religious intellectualism and their differences, and warns the audience against attributing Soroush's anomalous, ambiguous, and contradictory opinions to all religious new-thinkers.

[3] Fanaei's references are sometimes not very precise; for example, in this very critique, he refers a very brief point to 27 pages of Muhammad's Theology of Muhammad's Dream "(Soroush 2018: 209-237)" where only one phrase, "How excellent are the ranks of a dream that is better than wakefulness," clearly appears on page 9, and the rest must apparently be considered his interpretation. Even if this interpretation is correct, it confronts the reader with difficulty in verifying the article's references. Likewise, his reference regarding putting God in parentheses and His intervention, which is referred to page 205 of Muhammad's Theology of Muhammad's Dream, whereas there the reference is to the veiling of the metaphysics intended by Mohammad Hossein Tabatabai regarding the Ascension, and even if the result is ultimately the same, such a discussion has not taken place there.

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PDF file of Azam Pouya's article entitled "De-Occulting the World or De-Imaging God"