اندیشهفلسفهخردگفتگوحکمتمعناپرسشفرهنگ
Ebrahim Sahafi explicates Javad Tabatabai's theoretical framework concerning Iran's transition from tradition to modernity and his formulation of the 'Problem of Iran'. This theory calls for a transformation of the scientific system to resolve crises and the development of an indigenous political philosophy.

Javad Tabatabai is recognized as a political philosopher of Iran for his theorizing in the realm of philosophy and political thought. One aspect of his thought is the inevitability of the transition from tradition to modernity in Iran. His theorizing in this area has various dimensions and levels, and it does not merely emphasize modernity; rather, by examining the history of thought in Iran and its developments, the intellectual, scientific, and philosophical conditions and roots in Iran are explored and analyzed. With this approach, he emphasizes the existence and formation of a specific political and philosophical thought that can be identified by the name of Iran. Relying on these discussions, he also speaks of national identity and Iranian nationality. Furthermore, he believes that what is called Iran must be subjected to more research, examination, and theorizing. In his view, Iran is still an unknown subject that has only been examined from the perspective of Western theorists, Orientalists, and European travelogue writers, and within Iran itself, little work has been done that can be considered valuable and worthy of attention. Therefore, in the proposed theory, a subject titled the “Problem of Iran” has been formulated, based on which a theory must be developed for Iran that examines it from various dimensions and can provide the grounds for resolving crises and the capacity to respond to Iran’s issues.
Thus, in the field of philosophy and social sciences, through his theory, new concepts have been introduced, based on which a revision of the manner and approach to viewing subjects in the social sciences and philosophy is necessary and essential. For this reason, the university and the country’s scientific system must also be transformed so that they can possess the capability and competence to confront and exercise independent judgment (ijtihad) on the subject matter titled the “Problem of Iran.” However, if the current conditions in Iran’s scientific system and universities are maintained, in addition to the waste of time and resources, the grounds and contexts for the expansion of new crises in Iran will be created, which will ultimately lead to an inability to respond to Iran’s issues, resulting in disappointing and, of course, dangerous consequences for the preservation of Iran and its existence. In addition to these discussions, his theoretical framework also pays attention to the course of political thought in Europe and its developments, so that by understanding modernity and Western thought, the necessary concepts and materials for exercising independent judgment (ijtihad) within Western modernity can be provided. For he believes that for the transition from tradition to modernity, one must, through understanding tradition and political thought in Iran and exercising independent judgment within Western modernity, create the grounds for transformation within tradition and the transition from tradition to modernity in Iran. Ultimately, his goal is to establish and explicate a philosophy of history and a political philosophy for Iran through these theorizations.
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About 500 years ago, profound transformations took place in Europe that affected not only Europe but the entire world. These transformations have been called modernity. The course of modernity's developments began around the year 1000 AD. In Christianity, the year 1000 had been proclaimed by the Church as the year of Christ's reappearance, but with the passing of the year 1000 and Christ not appearing, a crisis emerged within the Church and the Christian faith. With this crisis, the necessity for intellectual change and transformation within the Church was raised. Thus, with many ups and downs over several centuries, two renaissances occurred in Europe, creating the grounds for great transformations and the beginning of the modern era. Renaissance means return, and in the context of modernity, the Renaissance signifies a return to Greek philosophy and Roman law. In the light of this Renaissance, transformations in thought and ideas within the Church matured and created the grounds for modernity. After the second Renaissance, Francis Bacon and René Descartes laid the foundations of the scientific revolution, and the first signs of scientific transformation resulting from modernity became apparent. Descartes, with the statement "I think, therefore I am," created an uproar in the world of philosophy and science. The human being who, in the old world, was dependent and could not think independently, now, with these transformations, had gained freedom of thought, ideas, and action. A vast space lay before humanity, and modern man wanted to build a new world with his own reason and thought. It was in this way that science and technology expanded and grew, and humanity was able to achieve many accomplishments. However, these tremendous achievements in the era of modernity created the notion in humans that with their reason, they could destroy everything and rebuild it anew. The concept of Cartesian reason emphasizes this very point, and in contrast stands Kantian reason, which considers human reason and knowledge limited, such that it cannot have cognition and control over all phenomena and their components, and therefore will not succeed in the destruction and engineering of certain phenomena and institutions. Despite the unfortunate consequences of Cartesian reason, modernity progressed in any case, and a new world emerged in contrast to the old world. Marshall Berman, the American philosopher, says modernity is like a colossal whirlpool that swallows everything. Jürgen Habermas, the German philosopher, also believes that modernity is an unfinished project. Therefore, the developments of modernity continue and have not stopped.
The three concepts of modernity, modernization, and modernism appear similar and are mistakenly used interchangeably. But these three concepts are not identical, and one cannot consider these concepts equivalent to one another. Modernization and modernism are components of modernity and are, in fact, considered the results of the developments of the modern era. If we consider modernity as arising from transformations in thought and ideas that brought about a new world in contrast to the old world, and modern philosophy and science replaced pre-modern philosophy and science, then modernization must be considered among the components and results of modernity. Modernization is often physically tangible and observable. The facilities and technologies that have grown in the modern era and are used by humans fall under the concept of modernization. Some abstract institutions, such as law and legal systems, also fall under the concept of modernization. The concept of modernism also refers to the new transformations and works that have grown and developed in the modern era in the fields of art, music, painting, sculpture, and culture.
Modernity, in addition to Europe, also had an impact on the world and on Iran. The first serious encounter of Iranians with modernity occurred during the Russo-Persian Wars. When the Iranian army, with its outdated equipment and traditional command structure, faced the well-equipped Russian army, it was repeatedly defeated and, despite mobilizing the people with fatwas from religious authorities, achieved no success. So much so that the Russian army advanced as far as Qazvin. Abbas Mirza, who had become desperate, after meeting with a representative of the French government, heard from him that events had occurred in Europe and the world of which you Iranians are unaware, and that if you fight the Russian army many times, you will be defeated. In this way, for the first time, a group of Iranians encountered modernity and its effects. These events led to the first motivation for Iranians to understand Europe, and groups were dispatched to Europe to examine the conditions up close. What they saw in Europe (France and England) of the progress and achievements of the Europeans was unbelievable to them. What these dispatched delegations recounted or wrote about their European journey was mainly focused on the outward conditions of Europe. But their most valuable perception and understanding of Europe was limited to "one word," which they named "law." From their perspective, what had caused growth and development in Europe was this very "one word," that is, "law."
This was a good achievement, but the dispatched delegations were unable to become aware of and understand the intellectual and philosophical roots of these transformations, which was a significant shortcoming of the result of their trip to Europe. Later, as communications between Iranians and Europeans increased, many journeys were made between the two sides. Naser al-Din Shah also traveled to Europe several times. But for the representatives of tradition, modern phenomena were unbelievable. For example, when the camera first came to Iran, they wanted to take a photograph of Mulla Hadi Sabzevari, the philosopher of Iran at that time, but he did not believe in the photograph and did not consider taking a picture of the face to be possible, saying that qualities cannot be transferred! In this way, the encounter with modernity and its effects was accompanied by doubt and disbelief for those who represented tradition. In fact, within the conceptual apparatus of the intellectual and philosophical thought of these philosophers, such phenomena were not possible!! In the last half-century as well, various intellectual currents have emerged that held different views on the struggle between tradition and modernity. Seyyed Hossein Nasr believes that we must return to tradition by turning back from modernity and abandoning it. Jalal Al-e Ahmad, with the idea of "return to self," says we only need to import modernization, but we do not need to import thought and reflection because we have thoughts and ideas in our own culture. Ali Shariati also disseminates thoughts inspired by socialism, but to present it to Iranians, he adorns the appearance of his socialist thought with religious and Islamic concepts so that he can present it to Iranians with an Islamic appearance. Some theorists, such as Aramesh Doustdar, also call for the eradication of religiosity in Iran so that steps can be taken towards modernity, and for this reason, he believes that Iranians must abandon religion entirely for the conditions of transition to modernity to be provided!!
Javad Tabatabai, as a theorist and political philosopher, also believes in the transition from tradition to modernity. He believes that by understanding Iranian tradition and thought, and then understanding Western thought and modernity, which will be accompanied by ijtihad in Western modernity, the grounds for transformation in tradition must be created so that, by utilizing some elements of the transformed tradition, the transition to modernity for Iran can be theorized. In this way, Mr. Tabatabai does not believe in returning to the past, and in the transition from tradition to modernity, he does not consider becoming completely Westernized to be possible in any way. From his perspective, becoming completely Westernized, which is the product of Cartesian reason, has dangers and calamities for Iran that are irreparable.
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To gain a precise and deep understanding of Javad Tabatabai's intellectual apparatus, we must become acquainted with Cartesian reason and Kantian reason. With the transition from the pre-modern era to the modern era, the human being became a subject. Such a human being, armed with the tool of reason, seeks to change the world and transform the universe and humanity. But humanity fell under the illusion that it no longer needed the past, and that reason had reached a stage where it could fully comprehend everything that existed in the past and rebuild everything needed for the new world anew with its own reason. Based on this notion, humanity concludes that everything from the past is superstition and must be completely discarded. This is precisely Cartesian reason, which entirely disregards the past and traditions. Based on Cartesian reason, it is mistakenly imagined that laws and legal foundations can be formulated and enacted without regard for the past, and used to create a modern state and modern society. It must be noted that Cartesian reason is highly effective for engineering, manufacturing products, and inventing technologies; thus, it is entirely efficient in modernization. Even in the most backward countries, Cartesian reason is effective for developing infrastructure and applying technologies. Therefore, one should not imagine that Cartesian reason, also called organizational reason or instrumental reason, is entirely destructive. For many of the achievements of the modern era rely on this type of reason. But the problem arises when proponents of this reason, from Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes to other supporters of this type of reason, imagine that all societal affairs and human achievements that are not observable—such as the market, property, law, and abstract institutions, which play a more important role in modern human civilization—can be easily constructed or created without paying attention to that society's past. Countries that failed to transition to and develop modernity do not rely on these abstract institutions, or these institutions have not been established in those countries. Yet, based on Cartesian reason, the illusion of engineering society, law, rights, and ethics has emerged. So much so that, based on this illusion, humanity imagines it can engineer and change all of these and build a new, modern society. This illusion is a dangerous affliction that has beset humanity and continues.
Kantian reason stands in opposition to Cartesian reason. Witnessing the results of Cartesian reason, Immanuel Kant introduced reforms to modern-era reason. In addition to Kant, other philosophers and thinkers, seeing the catastrophes and crimes of the French Revolution, also pondered to discover the reasons for these catastrophes. Edmund Burke conducted a precise analysis of the French Revolution and pointed to the importance of tradition. In this way, Burke and a number of thinkers criticized Cartesian reason.
But the significance of Kant's perspective lies in the fact that he approached the subject from the field of epistemology. Kant proposed a theory that revolutionized philosophy, known in philosophy as the Copernican Revolution. In epistemology, he emphasized that human cognition has limitations and is therefore incapable of knowing all details. With this theory, the retrieval of tradition takes place once again, and in this way, common reason is introduced, according to which both reason and tradition are important. As a result, the concept of developmental reason takes shape. But all of this does not mean that tradition should not change or should not undergo transformation; rather, the logic of the transformation of tradition is based on a mechanism other than reliance on organizational reason and instrumental reason. In addition to Cartesian reason and Kantian reason, there is also the concept of practical reason and theoretical reason. Practical reason and theoretical reason belong to the ancient era. Based on practical reason in the ancient era, the engineering and construction of the infrastructure needed by humans were carried out. Theoretical reason was within the framework of the philosophical thoughts of the ancient era. But, unlike Cartesian reason, no contradiction arose because in the pre-modern era, unlike the modern era, humans and reason could not change the world and humanity, and for this reason, the problems and catastrophes of Cartesian reason did not occur in the pre-modern era. Tabatabai's intellectual system is incompatible with Cartesian reason. Those who think based on Cartesian reason cannot accept Tabatabai's intellectual system. Because their conception is that through modernization or importing the laws and legal foundations of developed countries, society can be guided towards modernity. The action that the United States took with its military invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan is an example of resorting to Cartesian reason, which has plunged these two countries into deep crises. Therefore, according to Javad Tabatabai, as long as rational reason does not undergo transformation, the possibility of transition to modernity does not exist. He believes in a reason that is rooted in traditions, and for this reason, he is opposed to Cartesian reason.
The knowledge of concepts is another dimension of Javad Tabatabai's theoretical apparatus. If scientific terms can be extracted from the language of any country or nation, concepts can be expressed in that language. These concepts are used in philosophy, social sciences, and empirical sciences. But the possibility of extracting scientific concepts from a language depends on the capacity of that language. Languages in India did not have this capacity, but the Persian language, with the transformation it underwent, became a scientific language. In countries whose language has scientific capacity and where concepts have been created within the framework of ancient science and philosophy, in confronting the modern world, they must be able to create new concepts through the transformation of concepts. This is called the transformation of the content of concepts. In Tabatabai's theory, the term "the new in the old" is used, which means the transformation of the content of concepts from the old to the new. The transformation of the content of concepts can occur in several stages. First, the transformation of concepts from the old to the new, and then the transformation within the modern world occurs gradually. The knowledge of the transformation of the content of concepts was introduced by Hegel in the 19th century, and after that, concepts acquired a history. Ideologies lack the transformation of the content of concepts. Because ideologies are packages of truth that are applicable throughout history and therefore have no history, consequently, concepts are not transformable in their case. For example, on the eve of the Constitutional Revolution, traditionalists said that divine laws are for all of history and there is no need for legislation by parliament. In this way, the knowledge of the transformation of the content of concepts is irrelevant in the case of ideologies. By raising these discussions, Tabatabai has introduced the knowledge of concepts and the knowledge of the transformation of the content of concepts into Iran and has a special role in this field.
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In the first and second sessions, the preliminaries and general framework of the topics related to Javad Tabatabai's theoretical apparatus were introduced, and it was clarified on which concepts the approach and initial concepts of his theory are founded and established. The discussions of the third session were laid out regarding the method of coherently understanding and comprehending Tabatabai's theoretical apparatus, and through this, the components of his theory that constitute the edifice of his theoretical apparatus were introduced in a general manner. In this regard, Tabatabai's examination of the history of thought in Iran and Europe holds a fundamental position and is the main pillar of his theory, which is designated and described in the text below as the "approach based on the examination of the history of thought." The other components of his theory are founded on this very approach, which include the "theory of the decline of thought," the "theory of degeneration," the "rigidity of tradition," the "impossibility of thought," the "quarrel between the new and the old," "new concepts within the old," the "Iranian Renaissance," and the "problem of Iran." In the following text, these theories and components are described in a general manner, and it is emphasized that in light of these theories, Tabatabai has explained the conditions for the possibility of a new renaissance in Iran and the establishment of a new philosophy for the transition to modernity.
To enter Tabatabai's intellectual apparatus and read his works, a specific approach and logic must be taken into account. If a reader chooses to read and cite a single article, a book, or a section of an article or a book, they will not be able to gain a coherent understanding of Javad Tabatabai's perspectives and theories. Furthermore, his prose is distinctive, and because a part of Iranian culture and thought is embedded in Iranian literature and poetry, Iranian poetry is intermittently referenced in his books. Therefore, reading Tabatabai's works in a scattered manner and not considering the logic of pursuing his writings causes his intellectual system to appear vague and illogical to the reader.
Moreover, his approach, owing to a belief in rational reason, is founded upon an examination of the history of thought and political thought in Iran from the establishment of the Achaemenid Empire before Islam, through the arrival of Islam in Iran, and up to the present day. In this way, according to Tabatabai's perspective, by gaining a precise understanding of the components of Iranian political thought, one can undertake theorizing for Iran. Consequently, Tabatabai's intellectual apparatus comprises various theories, especially since, in addition to examining the history of thought in Iran, he has also undertaken an examination of the history of thought in Europe. To understand Tabatabai's thought, the first book one should select for study is The History of Political Thought in Iran, and it is essential to study the book's introduction so that the logic of his works is elucidated for the reader. In reading all of his books, one must pay careful attention to an important point: his books are not historiography or a history of events in Iran; rather, they constitute a history of Iranian thought compiled by him. In particular, the numerous factors that brought about intellectual transformations in Iran have been examined by Tabatabai and theorized under the title of "the decline of political thought." From his perspective, the decline of political thought is the factor behind the end of Iran's golden cultural era. After the golden cultural era, historiography turned into the recording of events and was reduced merely to chronicling the deeds and daily lives of kings. Whereas during the golden cultural era, we encounter dozens and hundreds of philosophers, thinkers, and scholars who, in various branches of thought such as philosophy, medicine, astronomy, alchemy, mathematics, and diverse sciences, were agents of brilliance for Iranian thought and culture. But with the decline of thought, a descent in the arena of Iranian thought manifests itself. Tabatabai describes the decline of thought in a single sentence: "In the golden cultural era, prudence governed through rationalism; after the Mongol invasion, it turned into fatalism. Consequently, the result of the decline of thought is the transformation of prudence into fatalism." It should be noted that all these concepts have further details that will be elucidated and explained in subsequent sessions; here, merely to emphasize Tabatabai's approach to rational reason, a selection of his theory concerning the history of thought and the decline of thought has been presented. In addition to the "theory of the decline of thought," other components of his theory include the "theory of degeneration," the "theory of the rigidification of tradition," and the "theory of the impossibility of thought," which have been formulated based on the approach of examining the history of thought. The general outlines of these theories are explained in the continuation of the text, and the position of each within Tabatabai's theoretical apparatus is elucidated.
Javad Tabatabai, borrowing concepts from Hegel, explains his analysis and examination of the Achaemenid era and the history of thought of that time. He calls the Achaemenid Empire up to the end of the Sasanian period “unity in multiplicity” and emphasizes Hegel’s theory that named the Achaemenid the first state. The term “unity in multiplicity” is proposed because various peoples with different languages, religions, and cultures find unity with one another within a single culture and come under a single Achaemenid state. An important difference emphasized by Tabatabai, citing Hegel’s logic of “unity in multiplicity,” is the point that Iran, unlike other countries, did not come under the caliphate after Islam. Pointing to the political treatises written in Iran after Islam, he has emphasized the transmission of “Iranshahri thought” to the post-Islamic period in Iran, which had a significant effect on Iran not falling under the caliphate. With the arrival of the modern era and in light of the “knowledge of concepts” and the “knowledge of the transformation of the content of concepts,” new concepts arose from the Persian language and influenced political thought in Iran. Particularly, with the acquaintance with modernity, new concepts entered Iran, and in the Constitutional Revolution, the “new within the old” was realized. This means that in the Constitutional Revolution, Iran acquired law, and this law is “modern law.” The constitution, statutory laws, the supplement to the constitution, and the civil code are new and modern but are not imported; rather, they are the “new within the old.” All of this means that in the Constitutional Revolution, concepts were extracted from Iran’s threefold tradition and amalgamated with modern concepts. Through ijtihad and the transformation of traditions, a part of traditions transforms into the new, and a part of traditions that are incapable of transformation turn into superstitions and lose their importance. A major part of Tabatabai’s theorizing focuses on this very issue and emphasizes that the continuity of the transformation of traditions did not continue after the Constitutional Revolution. This part is one of the critical junctures of his theory, based on which it is explained that the path to continue what was achieved in the Constitutional Revolution was blocked. This issue opens up new discussions in which Tabatabai points to the lack of solidity in the theoretical foundations of the Constitutional Revolution. For, in his belief, the Constitutional Revolution occurred in practice and out of necessity, and was not founded on theoretical necessity. The result of this situation was the absence of serious transformations after the Constitutional Revolution and the non-realization of the “new within the old.” In Tabatabai’s intellectual system, this issue is explained by the theory of the “ossification of tradition,” which had occurred before the Constitutional Revolution, and thereafter by the theory of the “impossibility of thought.” These concepts and theories also require further elaboration in subsequent sessions.
In examining the history of European thought, Tabatabai's aim is to understand and analyze the “quarrel between the ancients and the moderns” and to explain the logic of extracting new concepts from tradition in Europe. The essential point in this context is the quarrel within thought, through which one can arrive at new concepts from old ones and elucidate the logic of the “quarrel between the ancients and the moderns.” Therefore, not every kind of quarrel can be considered significant in this regard; rather, it is the logic of the “quarrel between the ancients and the moderns” that is important and must be taken into consideration. Despite the fact that the history of European thought has been examined in Iranian universities and in various books by Iranian authors, Javad Tabatabai believes that the logic of the “quarrel between the ancients and the moderns” cannot be extracted from these works, which is why he has independently studied the history of European thought. In studying the history of thought, attention to the importance of the Christian tradition and the Reformation in the transformations of European thought is absolutely key. Some in Iran believe that transformation can be created and religious reform carried out in Iran exactly as in Europe, whereas during the Constitutional Revolution, a religious reform did occur. In a way that certain Islamic scholars and religious authorities demonstrated that Sharia laws pertain to religion, and alongside them, new laws could be formulated with regard to European laws, the most important of which is the Civil Code. In this context, imitation is the most significant pitfall in the transition from tradition to modernity. One cannot expect these transformations to occur in Iran exactly as they did in Europe. For such expectations signify a disregard for traditions and rational reason, and a neglect of the “quarrel between the ancients and the moderns.” Whereas, according to the theory of the “rigidity of tradition,” the old is dormant and incapable of quarrel. Quarrel within tradition occurs spontaneously and within a discourse that arises from the old tradition, which in Iran, due to the “rigidity of tradition,” has essentially become impossible. By possessing the historical materials of thought and the fourfold traditions in Iran, and by attending to the logic of the “quarrel between the ancients and the moderns” and the transformation of concepts in European thought, and then exercising independent reasoning (ijtihad) upon these, one can undertake the founding of a new thought in Iran, the result of which would be a philosophy of history, a philosophy of law, and a political philosophy.
According to the theory of Western thinkers, a Golden Age of Culture lasting approximately 300 years, from the 3rd to the 6th centuries AH, occurred in Iran, which they call the “Iranian Renaissance,” and Javad Tabatabai has also accepted this view. The initiator of the Golden Age of Culture was the founding of philosophy in Iran by Farabi, based on Greek philosophy. The importance of this matter lies in the fact that the founding of philosophy has occurred very rarely in the world. Therefore, the founding of philosophy by Farabi is considered a significant achievement for the realm of Iranian thought. In the Golden Age of Culture, as mentioned, a tremendous cultural brilliance and flourishing developed and grew in philosophy, various sciences, literature, and poetry. But afterward, Iranians, due to the decline of thought, surrendered to fate, and the Middle Ages prevailed in Iran after the Golden Age of Culture. It must be emphasized here that the decline of thought does not mean the destruction of thought; rather, what occurred during the Constitutional Movement indicates that rationalist thought in Iran, however decrepit and weakened, managed to continue its existence after the Golden Age of Culture and to manifest itself at a critical juncture such as the events of the Constitutional Revolution.
From Tabatabai’s perspective, a renaissance must occur again in Iran, but the renaissance in Iran cannot be the same as the European Renaissance. The Renaissance in Europe is a return to Greek philosophy and Roman law. In Iran, however, the renaissance does not merely mean a return to a golden cultural age. Rather, this event requires a new theorization that passes through the formulation and examination of the “theory of the decline of thought” and the “theory of degeneration,” along with other theories including the “ossification of tradition” and the “impossibility of thought.” From Tabatabai’s viewpoint, by relying on these theories, especially attention to historical degeneration (based on the theory of degeneration), the new renaissance in Iran must emerge once again through a return to the golden cultural age on the one hand, and ijtihad within Western modernity to establish a new philosophy (in continuation of what occurred during the Constitutional Revolution) on the other. Supported by the new renaissance, the grounds for the formation and emergence of a philosophy of history, political philosophy, and philosophy of law will be created in Iran, which will serve as a factor for laying a solid theoretical foundation for the transition to a new modernity in Iran. Javad Tabatabai emphasizes another important point here: these new developments require the improvement and advancement of the university in Iran. Because, due to the dominance and rule of ideologies that have governed Iran’s intellectual sphere since the 1940s and the sole reliance on Western social sciences and philosophical knowledge, the university has lost the capacity for ijtihad and theorization for Iran. This university, in Tabatabai’s terms, is not an Iranian university, and with this university, one cannot seek a remedy for the “problem of Iran.” Therefore, transformation in Iran’s university and scientific system is among the first requirements and prerequisites for the emergence of developments such as the new renaissance, the establishment of a new philosophy, and the transition to modernity in Iran.
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For the problem of Iran, philosophical theorization must be carried out based on a new philosophy. In contrast to the problem of Iran stand the issues of Iran, such as social and economic issues. But in Iran, these issues have remained unresolved, which goes back to the lack of theorization in relation to the problem of Iran.
The first point in this regard is that when Farabi established philosophy in Iran, the most important book of Aristotle's political philosophy, the Politics, was not available. It could have become available later, during the European Renaissance, but it took centuries for it to be translated in Iran. Meanwhile, the deep sleep of the Middle Ages, the rigidity of tradition, and the decline of thought had removed the possibility of using philosophical texts from Iran's intellectual sphere. Therefore, this important book, Aristotle's Politics, was not given attention. Farabi's philosophy was based on Platonic philosophy, which was designed on the foundation of happiness, and the important concept of public interest, which is raised in Aristotle's political philosophy, remained hidden from Farabi's view and unknown in Iran. Even the political philosophy within the Peripatetic wisdom founded by Farabi did not advance and was generally confined to pure philosophy. As a result, the possibility of expanding Greek philosophy was not provided, and therefore, in Iran, we do not encounter a coherent political philosophy that grew after Farabi.
The second point is that historical developments in Iran are intertwined and knotted with literature. Tocqueville also raised this issue regarding the French Revolution. Meaning that in France, the literati, due to their connection with the court, became the thinkers of the people and, in practice, during the French Revolution, turned into political theorists, and literature became mixed with political theory. But this phenomenon could have turned into a corrupting consequence, because the differing philosophical foundations of the two distinct fields meant that the foundations of a political philosophy capable of posing the question of problems and decline and providing the possibility for theorizing were not developed. In Iran, too, throughout history, due to the invasions of foreign tribes and the mixing of literature with historical chronicling, historical and philosophical theory has not taken shape.
The third point is that due to the refusal of thought and the spread of ideologies, the national understanding that emerged during the Constitutional Movement did not continue and did not lead to theorizing. On the other hand, Western sociology entered Iran directly and was used without independent reasoning (ijtihad), which could not be a solution for Iran's problem. What is important for Iran's problem is paying attention to the fact that theorizing for Iran's problem is a philosophical issue, and its theoretical and philosophical foundations have not been developed in Iran. This deficiency has resulted in even modern Western thought not being properly understood in Iran.
For the reasons stated in the previous section and the complexities and characteristics of Iran, and the difference in its historical developments compared to Europe, it is necessary to theorize for Iran. For example, the nation-state in Europe was formed differently from Iran. In Europe, the state and the nation were formed simultaneously over a short period after the collapse of the Germano-Christian Empire. But in Iran, the nation was formed first, which sometimes had its own state and was sometimes ruled by foreigners. Under these conditions, the concept of nation and state in Iran requires a different understanding and theory. On the other hand, nationalist historiography in Iran has been done in imitation of the West in the contemporary era, but has simultaneously been anti-Western and anti-foreign. Whereas it was necessary for the history of Iran to be written as a subject and to illuminate the complex truth of Iran. The anti-Westernism and anti-modernism of intellectuals and the dominance of ideology in Iran have ultimately driven the sphere of thought in Iran in a direction that has remained distant from scientific thinking and philosophical theorizing, and has caused the conflict between the old and the new that occurred during the Constitutional era not to continue. In this way, national consciousness did not continue thereafter and could not create a solid theoretical foundation for Iran's problem.
Decline does not mean destruction in a single moment but rather a gradual descent. The decline of thought and culture is likewise a condition of the gradual descent of thought, and it never leads to annihilation; rather, thought becomes weak and incapacitated. On the other hand, the decline of thought has both material and spiritual origins. That is, it does not occur solely for material reasons; rather, a combination of material and spiritual factors is effective in the decline of thought. One of the instances of the decline of thought in Iran is the gradual replacement of *siyāsat-nāmeh* writing (political counsel) with *shariʿat-nāmeh* writing (legalistic treatises), which was discussed in previous sessions as the replacement of prudence with predestination. Concurrent with these transformations, the Shariʿa itself also declines in Iran.
Just as the religious tradition, from Imam Mohammad Ghazali—who is a rationalist adherent of the Shariʿa and believes that one must use the Quran in the Shariʿa and demonstrative proof in thought to solve worldly problems—reaches a condition in which rationalist Shariʿa is marginalized, and as a result, a predestinarian, dogmatic Shariʿa replaces the rationalist Shariʿa. Whereas before that, reason and the philosophical tradition were dominant in the realm of thought during the Golden Cultural Age. In this course of the decline of thought, first the philosophical tradition, then the Iranshahri tradition, and finally the religious tradition undergo decline. This process causes the rebellion of the predestinarian Shariʿa against philosophical thought and increases the pressure on philosophers. The pressure on philosophers initially occurs in the theoretical field, but later the lives of philosophers are threatened; for example, Sheikh Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi, the founder of the philosophy and wisdom of Illumination, is killed. This decline gradually continued after the Golden Cultural Age, such that in the era of the decline of thought, after the brilliance of Suhrawardi and then his murder, we finally reach the ninth century AH, which is the time of the emergence of Mulla Sadra. Mulla Sadra is the last important philosopher of Peripatetic wisdom who theorizes in the field of philosophy after several centuries of the decline of thought. After Mulla Sadra, due to the effects of the decline of thought, no significant philosopher has been seen in the sphere of Iranian thought. In this way, in the long period after the Golden Cultural Age, apart from Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra, no important thinker emerges, which results in the wearing out of previous institutions and the expiration of the very breath of the great civilization that had been created in the Golden Cultural Age.
The gradual decline of political thought and the loss of the brilliance of the Golden Cultural Age have been effective in historical decadence. In the sense that deficiency in thought gradually destroys the coherence of thought and weakens and incapacitates established institutions. Under these conditions, disruption and withering arise in the existing civilization, and it suffers decadence. Foreign peoples and civilizations, observing this weakness in a long-standing civilization, cast covetous eyes upon it and, by attacking and invading its territorial domain, try to dominate that civilization or destroy it. Such invasions, in addition to the deficiency and decline of thought, act as a material effect of decadence in a civilization and thus bring about historical decadence for that civilization. In Iran, the Mongol invasion was one of the most important and horrific attacks that foreign peoples made on Iran's territorial domain, which was able, in addition to the effects of the decline of thought, to have a very great impact on historical decadence in Iran. The Mongol invasion and the killing and destruction they carried out were so savage that many of the civilizational works and institutions existing at that time were never restored and were completely destroyed. In this way, heavy blows were inflicted on Iran, which intensified the decline of thought and historical decadence. Such invasions and events, at the same time, also entailed the reciprocal effect of decline and decadence and further strengthened the descent in Iran. It is, of course, necessary to mention that Iranians were defeated in the military arena and in war, but they were gradually able to absorb the Mongol peoples into Iranian culture and thought, and in this way, made the continuity of Iran possible.
The theory of decline is important because if such a theory does not exist and the dimensions of historical decline are not described and explained, then the possibility of restoring territorial and cultural glory becomes impossible. As emphasized earlier, due to the decay of thought, theorizing and philosophical thought in Iran weakened, and chronicling of historical developments became the basis of intellectual activity; thus, a theory of decline was never formulated in Iran. In order to establish a philosophy of Iranian history, Javad Tabatabai has undertaken theorizing in the field of historical decline so that, together with other theories placed alongside one another, the foundations and necessary materials for theorizing about the problem of Iran are provided, and the ultimate goal in this field—the establishment of political philosophy and the philosophy of law—is realized.
To explain the theory of the rigidity of tradition, the concept of tradition must first be defined. Then, the role of tradition in social life must be elucidated. Furthermore, the characteristics of tradition in Iran must be described. According to Javad Tabatabai's belief, tradition in Iran is pluralistic. However, in Europe until the Renaissance, tradition was monolithic, and its scripture was the Bible. In the Islamic civilization surrounding Iran, it is also monolithic, and its scripture is the Quran. Under these conditions, where tradition is singular and scripture is singular, its analysis is not very complex. But in Iran, tradition and scripture are tripartite, and this tripartite tradition is intertwined, which makes its analysis highly complex.
On the other hand, these traditions evolve over time, and if they cannot evolve, they turn into rigid tradition or superstition. These complexities increase when, in the modern era—where the new emerges within the old—a new scripture also appears, making the need for research and theorizing more essential than ever.
In presenting the theory of the rigidity of tradition, Javad Tabatabai explains that Iranian tradition and thought, due to the decay of thought and subsequent historical decline, lose the rationalist elements in intellectual activity and cannot evolve; thus, the rigidity of tradition comes to dominate the realm of thought. So much so that when the works and radiance of modern Western thought arrive in Iran, tradition remains indifferent to such thought, and contrary to what occurred in the West, no questioning arises within such a tradition, and the quarrel between the old and the new does not emerge. This indifference continues still, due to the dominance of ideologies and the impossibility of thought. In describing the rigidity of tradition, Tabatabai says that tradition is an absent present. That is, tradition exists but cannot pose new questions or, through the quarrel between the old and the new, create transformation within itself; it is practically a force that has become an obstacle to transformation. In this context, he emphasizes that the rigidity of tradition has left in our hands a martyr named tradition, which had a constant presence but vacated the field in the face of the new waves of modern thought and could not actively react and evolve.
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To examine the refusal of thought in Iran, the roots of this issue must be explored. In previous sessions, it was said regarding the phenomenon of modernity in Europe that transformations in thought were the main factor in the emergence of modernity. These transformations occurred in the form of the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns in Europe. However, the intellectual and philosophical roots of this phenomenon were not heeded by Iranians. This was because the decline of thought, historical degeneration, and the medieval slumber in Iran had rendered it incapable of reacting appropriately in the face of modernity. On the other hand, the rigidity of tradition had caused, as Tabatabai puts it, tradition to be a present absence. It was present as an obstacle to understanding modern thought and absent in the possibility of transforming tradition and discarding superstitious traditions. But ultimately, after Iran's defeat by Russia in the wars that took place during the reign of Fath-Ali Shah, the necessity of reform became clear to Iranians. This necessity set in motion developments that eventually led to the victory of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran. Constitutionalism is the most important event of the modern era in Iran, by virtue of which a constitution was drafted and ratified in a modern form. In this way, the state was also established in a modern and new form in Iran, and along with it, the concept of the nation, which had previously been formed in Iran and had been transformed in the Constitutional era with new concepts within the old, organized the nation-state of Iran in the modern era.
However, certain forces that were influential in the victory of the Constitutional Revolution gradually became an obstacle to the continuation of its developments due to rootless thoughts and ideologies lacking philosophical foundations. From the 1940s onward, these forces and thoughts seriously opposed the achievements of the Constitutional Revolution. Political activists played a major role in this path, and because of their opposition to the Shah and the Pahlavi regime, they imagined that the Pahlavi regime was a continuation of the Constitutional Revolution, and consequently, opposition to the Shah became synonymous with opposition to constitutionalism. Following these developments, we arrive at the events of the 1960s, where various intellectual and political groups emerge whose approaches and goals are not aimed at reviving and strengthening the Iranian nation and state. Rather, their goals are the liberation of the proletariat worldwide or the felicity of the Islamic Ummah and the struggle against global arrogance. In addition to these political groups, certain intellectual currents such as Shariati, Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Shayegan, and Fardid were also active, harboring thoughts aimed at settling scores with the achievements of the Constitutional Revolution. The thoughts of these intellectuals led to Westoxification and anti-Americanism in Iran, which ultimately shaped the events of the Revolution. An important point that must be emphasized regarding ideologies is that ideologies are modern phenomena and appear in a modern form and package. However, in reality and in practice, they constitute a deviation from modernity. The refusal of thought and the rule of ideologies in Iran are prominent features of Iran's sphere of thought in recent decades, but signs and grounds for thinking and reflection have been forming like a slender sapling since the 1990s, providing some hope for the critique of ideologies and truth packages that contain absolute truth. In fact, thinking begins with the critique of ideologies and the rejection of absolute truth, and now, among the youth, intellectuals, and thinkers, conversations have begun that mark the starting point of attention to national interests and the critique of ideologies. For when national interests are discussed, the question arises as to what must happen to secure national interests, and from this very point, one can arrive at an understanding of the critique of ideologies and absolute truth, and provide the grounds for thinking and reflection based on deep thought with philosophical roots within Iran's sphere of thought.
In examining the text and tradition, one must first address tradition and understand what tradition is. In this regard, it must be emphasized that tradition, as a concept within the intellectual framework, holds fundamental importance, and the profound meaning of tradition must be grasped. Traditions reach modern humans from the past and are the tools and means of thought today. Traditions undergo transformation both in ancient times and in the modern era, taking on new forms. Traditions that cannot undergo transformation turn into superstition, while transformed traditions that have assumed new forms are utilized as instruments and tools for human life.
Traditions must be grounded in a text or texts. A text is a foundational document and core idea; if traditions are based on such a text, they can create robust conditions for a civilization. In Europe, the Christian and ecclesiastical tradition is grounded in a text, which is the Bible. In the Islamic Caliphate, too, we encounter only one text and one tradition. Its text is the Quran, and its tradition is Islamic. But in Iran, there are various traditions and texts.
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Traditions have always been a means of peaceful social life and are constantly undergoing transformation and change. The transformation of tradition occurs through the quarrel of the ancients and the moderns. If the transformation of tradition does not take place, traditions turn into superstitions, and the possibility of transformation in societies is lost. In Europe, too, traditions are perpetually in a state of transformation. The emergence and rise of modernity was also a kind of transformation within traditions that occurred in Europe. Of course, it must be emphasized that the quarrel of the ancients and the moderns in Europe that led to the emergence of modernity was far more profound than the ordinary, constant transformations in traditions that are always underway in all societies, including Europe. But modernity, along with the coordinates and characteristics that accompanied it, which emerged through the quarrel of the ancients and the moderns and the transformation of traditions, created many changes in Europe and the world.
In previous sessions it was said that the decline of thought, which began at the end of Iran's golden cultural era, gradually deepened and eventually tradition became rigidified. Under these conditions, new developments had taken place in Europe, the result of which was the emergence of modernity. The waves of these developments reached Iran at a time when tradition had become rigidified. But this rigidified tradition, in its encounter with modern Western thought, lacked the capacity to stage a quarrel between the old and the new and could not bring about a transformation in Iran. Thereafter, during the Constitutional era as well, the new-in-the-old merely assumed a political aspect and was not accompanied by philosophical depth. In this situation, due to the absence of a fourth text, the new-in-the-old turned into various ideological modes of thought and created obstacles to new developments. Thus it can be said that because no theorizing was done for the philosophy of history, political philosophy, and the philosophy of law during the Constitutional period, anti-constitutional ideologies grew within the Constitutional movement itself, which ultimately settled scores with constitutionalism in the form of the struggle against the Pahlavi regime.
But the advantage of the threefold tradition lies in the fact that it had created a culture of tolerance in Iran, expressed through the concept of unity in multiplicity. This unity in multiplicity meant that Iran became the first among Islamic countries where, through the reconstruction of unity in multiplicity, the new-in-the-old emerged. As a result, Iran was the first country among Islamic nations where the rule of law was being established. However, due to the intellectuals' and constitutionalists' lack of deep familiarity with Iran's threefold tradition, the possibility of theorizing was not provided so that, by recognizing the subtleties and differences between Iran's threefold tradition and Europe's single-foundation tradition, ijtihad could be carried out and the conditions for the possibility of transforming tradition and thought in Iran could be created. In this situation, the notion arose that what existed superficially in Europe could be imported and bring about transformation in Iran. But these events ultimately led to the growth of ideologies in Iran. Viewing Iran's text and tradition as having a single foundation, as done by various intellectual currents, was also a flaw that emerged in the century following the Constitutional Revolution. For example, some highlight the Iranshahri tradition and a return to the glorious era of Cyrus!! which is highly irrational. Or some consider only the tradition of Iranian Islam as the tradition of Iranians and seek to foreground it, an approach that is also mistaken. Such disregard for other Iranian texts and traditions is, in practice, to stand against the people and causes crisis, as it has done.
At the time when the transformations of the quarrel between old and new were slowly beginning and underway in Europe, Iran was in a medieval slumber. After the Enlightenment period, when a new philosophy had emerged in Europe and the first Industrial Revolution occurred in the early eighteenth century, Iranians encountered the manifestations of modernity and realized that events had taken place in the world of which they were unaware. By this time, more than 500 years had passed since the beginning of the transformations of thought in Europe and the first Renaissance. But as was said, at the time these transformations began in Europe, the decline of thought had commenced in Iran, which was intensified by the Mongol invasion. While the second Renaissance was taking place in Europe, thought and tradition in Iran had become rigidified and could not attach importance to the developments in Europe, remaining indifferent to this situation. Thus, the prudence born of the rationalist thought of the golden cultural era had given way to fatalism, and political thought no longer emerged to order affairs, the result of which was the ruin of the era of fatalism. But it was during the Qajar era that Iranians, in their encounter with the waves of the modern era, awoke from their slumber of neglect and, through the penetration of new concepts, were able to bring about the Constitutional Revolution, which is the most important event and historical transformation of Iran in the modern era.
Of course, as emphasized before, the Constitutional Revolution in Iran occurred out of necessity and in practice, and was not grounded in the deep philosophical thought arising from a quarrel between the old and the new, and therefore did not attain solid consistency and foundation.
The threefold Iranian tradition, on the threshold of the Constitutional Revolution and the arrival of the modern era, is called the system of the ancient tradition (nezam-e sonnat-e qadimi) in Javad Tabatabai's theoretical framework, because it pertains to Iran's ancient period. Therefore, when it is said that tradition has become rigidified, this means that all three pillars of the Iranian tradition—namely, Iranshahri thought, Iranian Islam, and the philosophical tradition—have become rigidified. In a situation where the system of the ancient tradition had become rigidified, the conflict between the old and the new was impossible within it. For this reason, the possibility of transformation and the emergence of the new within the old existed only in very limited areas of the system of the ancient tradition, and the victory of the Constitutional Revolution occurred superficially. In the century following the victory of the Constitutional Revolution, the proponents of various ideologies rose up to confront the achievements of the Constitutional Revolution and to settle accounts with the new-within-the-old that had emerged from it. However, despite the dominance of ideologies and the refusal of thought, there is reason for hope that in the last three decades, a breach and disruption has occurred in ideological thinking, and signs of new intellectual glimmers have appeared. The reason for this occurrence is the consequences that emerged in Iran after the 1960s and 1970s. This event drew the attention of various branches of thought to the fact that what they had expected from the revolution was not realized in practice, and the results are contrary to the ideals and goals they pursued at the time of the revolution. Thus, they began to reflect and raised questions about the reason for this situation and the roots of the problems. As a result, conditions for new studies and dialogue in the public sphere were gradually provided. The continuation of this path fosters hopes for overcoming the refusal of thought and moving away from ideological packages, and creates the necessary grounds for solving the problem of Iran.
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Examining the history of Iranian thought is one of the subjects of Javad Tabatabai's theoretical framework. This is because, according to his view, tradition is one of the foundations of transformation in a country, and therefore, one of the foundations of the Iranian tradition, which is the idea of Iranshahri, must be considered and researched. Hence, contrary to the view of some critics, the idea of Iranshahri is not the central signifier of Tabatabai's theoretical framework, but because after the advent of Islam, despite the fading of the idea of Iranshahri, the content of this idea remained and persisted within Iranian culture and literature, it must be considered in research on the history of thought. The position of the idea of Iranshahri within political thought, during the rule of the Arabs and Turkic tribes over the land of Iranshahr, also holds particular importance, as it helped preserve territorial unity by relying on the political idea of Iranshahri. One of the prominent representatives of the idea of Iranshahri is Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk, who, as a vizier, played a role both in the practical sphere—that is, administering the country—and in the theoretical sphere—that is, writing political treatises (siyasatnameh)—during the rule of the Turkic tribes over Iran. Considering these points, the Iranian tradition, as mentioned in previous sessions, rests on three pillars, one of which is the idea of Iranshahri. Whenever one of these pillars is highlighted and emphasized, a crisis emerges in the country. Therefore, the claim that a return to the idea of Iranshahri is emphasized in Tabatabai's thought is incorrect; rather, from his perspective, only attention to this pillar of the Iranian tradition, namely the idea of Iranshahri, alongside attention to other elements of Iranian thought and tradition, is important and necessary, and a return to this idea has no place in his theoretical framework.
In the idea of Iranshahri, the ideal kingship was an institution used as a coordinator of other institutions. During the revival of the idea of Iranshahri after the advent of Islam in Iran, the institution of the vizierate became prominent as the coordinator of other institutions. The revival of the idea of Iranshahri continued with the writing of political treatises (siyasatnameh), but the rationalistic weight of these treatises gradually diminished with the onset of the decline of thought. Even the writing of political treatises continued until the Qajar era, but due to the fading of the rationalistic weight of these treatises, by comparison, the element of prudence (tadbir) in the political treatises of Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk transformed into fate and submission to destiny in the political treatises written during the Qajar era.
Despite the fact that in the revival of the idea of Iranshahri by the dehqans and Ferdowsi, who was himself a dehqan, the element of rationalism plays a key role and position, the public interest, which is one of the main characteristics of the idea of Iranshahri before Islam and one of the rationalistic elements in this idea, was absent in this current of reviving the idea of Iranshahri. Therefore, in the political treatises written for the revival of the idea of Iranshahri after Islam, the element of public interest is not seen. Of course, the pre-Islamic rationalistic public interest in the idea of Iranshahri was not philosophical and is not recognized as political philosophy. In contrast, Farabi's philosophy, which is influenced by Plato and was introduced by Farabi after Islam, is political philosophy. It is also worth pondering that the public interest discussed in Aristotle's Politics was never known in Iran due to a lack of awareness of the existence of the book Politics, but this concept of public interest existed in the idea of Iranshahri before Islam, which demonstrates the weight and importance of the idea of Iranshahri before Islam.
Given that philosophical and social science concepts entered Iran from the West in the modern era, many concepts are applied to the history of Iran’s developments exactly as they are used in Europe. The European concept of the nation-state is in a similar situation; with the arrival of nationalist thought from the West, the same notion of the nation-state was formed in Iran, namely that this concept of the nation-state must also be applied to Iran. However, according to Tabatabai’s theorization, national consciousness in the pre-Islamic empires existed in the form of unity in multiplicity, which is a Hegelian concept. This unity in multiplicity, with all ethnic groups, languages, and religions existing comprehensively in the land of Iranshahr, was established under the name of Iran and the Iranian people. For this reason, in Iran’s ancient period, the name of the Iranian nation existed as Iran and Iranian, and they also had their own national state. Although at certain junctures, despite the Iranian nation being in the land of Iranshahr, the governments were not national states, and at other junctures the governments were national states. Of course, the state in the ancient period also differs in meaning from this concept in the modern era, a point that must also be noted.
Therefore, one must be aware of the difference between the developments and their logic in Iran and in Europe, which is of great importance in examining Iranian history. For this reason, the national consciousness of Iranians, which has a history of more than a millennium, is fundamentally different from the Western concept of nationalism. This ancient concept of the nation in Iran, when we reach the Constitutional era, crystallizes as the new in the old, and the Iranian nation-state takes shape in the modern era.
In various Iranian cities, the manifestation of unity in multiplicity is entirely observable. In a city like Tabriz and other cities, different religions, languages, and sects live alongside one another despite their differences. From Tabatabai’s perspective, it was this very culture of tolerance in Iran that enabled the Constitutional Revolution to succeed, such that various religions and sects had representatives in the National Consultative Assembly and their rights were equal to one another, at a time when less than two percent of the people in Iran were literate. However, this condition of unity in multiplicity of the Iranian nation is threatened from two directions. On the one hand, at certain times, some pressures are exerted on ethnic groups by the regime and governments, which is neither correct nor defensible, and these policies must be reformed. On the other hand, due to certain political and ideological issues, matters are raised by some under the title of ethnic demands that are not consistent with Iran’s historical and economic conditions. The most significant danger threatening us is the borrowing from other countries, especially developed countries, and the demand for the transfer of the same concepts and ideas, such as the issue of federalism and languages, that have been raised in those countries and the West. Hence, based on Tabatabai’s view, one cannot live without Western thought, but at the same time, by merely transferring Western thought and concepts to Iran, one cannot create new social conditions; rather, with regard to Iranian culture and thought and Iran’s historical past, the conditions for the transition to modernity and transformation in Iran must be provided through ijtihad.
Javad Tabatabai believes that the realm of thought is not a realm of dilettantism, nor is it a realm of specialization, but rather a realm of super-specialization. For this reason, if a person intends to enter the realm of thought, they must know what a terrifying space they are entering, and it is essential that they be aware that without attention to its subtleties, they may fall into dangerous abysses. With this preamble, it must be emphasized that enthusiasts who wish to understand Javad Tabatabai’s theoretical apparatus must study all angles of his thought and not focus solely on one part. Emphasizing one part of his thought may create many misunderstandings, as has indeed occurred for some researchers. Matters such as the return to Iranshahri thought or antagonism toward ethnic groups and languages are examples of these misunderstandings that have no place in Javad Tabatabai’s theoretical apparatus.
To become acquainted with Javad Tabatabai’s theoretical apparatus, one must note that this intellectual apparatus consists of two general parts. The first part pertains to the history of thought in Iran, and the second part pertains to the history of Western thought. It is therefore recommended that the history of the evolution of thought in Iran and Europe, as examined and analyzed by Javad Tabatabai, be thoroughly studied through a reading of his works. In his writings, which include various books, articles, and lectures, he has examined and expounded upon the course of development of political and philosophical thoughts and ideas in Iran, as well as the political and philosophical ideas of Western thinkers and philosophers. Studying and comprehending this entire interconnected system may perhaps require years of effort and endeavor. It may even be necessary, for a more precise examination of each part of Tabatabai’s writings, to study and research his works more than once, so that researchers in this field may attain a complete and accurate understanding of his views.
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Discussion1 comments
اگرمشگل ایران امری فلسفی است آیا به مانند یونانی ها وآلمان ها نمیباید ایرانی ها از چنان دستگاه فلسفی برخوردار باشند که فرم ومحتوا تناقض نداشته باشد؟ مثلا اگر دستگاه فلسفی یونانی ها را در نگاه مسلمانان که جهان از هیچ بوجود آمده بکار ببرم فلسفه به کلام تبدیل میشود. نظام فکری هگل دیالکتیک را درذهن ومفهوم میفهمد ماتریالیسم دیالکتیک مارکس نفهمیدن دیالکتیک است که اصلا ماتریالیستی نیست. این نص جهارم آقای جواد طباطبایی که نص خاص ما ایرانی هست داری چه خصوصیاتی باید باشد که با فلسفه کشورهایی که مشگلشان فلسفی بوده متفاوت باشد. طبیعتا آقای طباطبایی هم ادعای تاسیس چنین فلسفه ای را ندارد. سوال اینجاست که این فلسفه در چه شرایطی امکان دارد؟