Corona and the “Problem of Evil” in Conversation with Yaser Mirdamadi; The Absence of God Is Possible

Corona (Covid-19) emerged in Iran from Qom, linking this natural disaster more than ever in Iran to the sacred and bringing the “argument from evil” into play for denying God and challenging religion. To pose a question on this matter, I draw on your formulation of this argument in your writings (here) and first turn to the “Omniscient”.  Did the creator of Corona “not know” that this virus would one day cause such suffering and pain to human beings?

– Before answering your question, let me formulate the problem of evil here as well and, subsequently, suggest an outline for its solution from my own perspective. One formulation of the problem of evil, or the argument from evil against theism, is as follows:

The Argument from “Evil” against Theism:

1_ In the world, there exist moral evils (such as murder, tyranny, and plunder) and natural evils (such as floods, earthquakes, and volcanoes).

2_ These evils appear pointless.

3_ If God is omnipotent, He can eliminate pointless evils; if God is omniscient, He knows pointless evils exist; and if God is purely benevolent, He wants to eliminate pointless evils.

4_ Since there are pointless evils in the world, God does not exist (the deductive version of the problem of evil), or the probability of God’s existence is very low (the probabilistic version of the problem of evil).

I think the problem of evil can be solved, but a serious solution to this problem entails paying a theoretical cost; meaning that one cannot solve the problem of evil while leaving the classical conception of theism entirely untouched.

Now the question is, how much cost must be paid to solve the problem of evil? In what follows, I will show how much cost I think is necessary for revising the classical conception of God in order to solve the problem of evil. Let me say by way of introduction that even within the tradition of monotheistic religions (let alone outside it), there exist different and even contradictory conceptions of God. I do not intend to provide even a list of these diverse conceptions. For a comprehensive and relatively recent account of various models of theism, see the important book “Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities” (Springer, 2013).

One of the models of theism relevant to your question is “open theism” or, more generally, “open theology.” Open theists believe that the contingent free actions of human beings in the future are such that even God cannot do both of these things simultaneously: 1. give human beings free will, and at the same time 2. know in advance what contingent action a human being will perform with their free will. Therefore, if God has given human beings free will, He cannot have prior knowledge of the contingent free actions of human beings in the future. Of course, God could choose not to give human beings free will, but if He does give free will, epistemically He cannot have prior knowledge of the contingent free actions of human beings in the future.

این نتوانستن از آن رو است که اگر خدا از پیش بداند که، مثلا، من امروز با شما گفت‌وگو خواهم کرد (که کنشی امکانی است) از آن‌جا که علم خدا ضرورتاً صادق و در نتیجه تخلّف‌ناپذیر (ضروری) است، آن‌گاه من راهی ندارم جز این‌که با شما مصاحبه کنم. اما اگر من راهی ندارم جز این‌که با شما مصاحبه کنم دیگر این کار را از سر اراده و اختیار خود انجام نداده‌ام بلکه کار من جبری خواهد شد، زیرا گزینه‌ی دیگری پیش روی من نبوده است. به تعبیر فنّی کار من «از نظر عِلّی بسته» (causally close)، یعنی از پیش مقدّر و متعیّن، خواهد شد. پس خدا برای این‌که من اختیار داشته باشم و یا، به تعبیر فنّی، کارم «از نظر عِلّی گشوده» (causally open) باشد، یا به تعبیر دیگر از پیش مقدّر و متعیّن نباشد، از علم به افعال اختیاری امکانی من در آینده چشم می‌پوشد تا اختیار من را ممکن سازد. مشابه این را در مورد تمام افعال ارادی و اختیاری امکانی آتی تمام انسان‌ها می‌توان گفت.

حال ببینیم که خداباوری گشوده چگونه مسأله‌ی شرّ را حلّ خواهد کرد. بگذارید این حلّ را با تمرکز بر بحران کرونا نشان دهم: فرض کنید منشاء بحران کرونا همان‌طوری باشد که در رسانه‌ها گزارش شد: ویروس کرونا از خفاش به گونه‌ی نادری از مورچه‌خوار پولک‌دار منتقل شده و کسی/کسانی با اراده و اختیار خود گوشتِ مورچه‌خوار پولک‌دار را خورده و از این طریق مبتلا به ویروس کرونا شده و این ویروس پخش شد و موجب بحران بهداشتی عالم‌گستر کنونی شده است.

با این حساب، منشاء این بحران، کنش ارادی آدم‌ها است و از این رو این بحرانی سراسر طبیعی مثل سیل و زلزله نیست. پس بر اساس مدل خداباوری گشوده، تا جایی که شکل‌گیری این بحران به کنش ارادی و اختیاری آدم‌ها بازمی‌گردد خدا از پیش به این بحران علم نداشته است زیرا برای ممکن‌سازی آزادی اراده و اختیار آدم‌ها در کنش‌های امکانی‌شان خدا نخواسته به آن از پیش علم پیدا کند. بدین شیوه مسأله‌ی شرّ اخلاقی حلّ می‌شود؛ یعنی مسؤولیّت شروری که پای اراده و اختیار انسان در تولید آن‌ها در میان است، با خدا نخواهد بود. در این باب از جمله بنگرید به این مقاله‌ی مختصر: «دفاع فلسفی از خداباوری گشوده» (فیلوسوفیا: ۲۰۰۷.)

همین «خدایِ کوچک‌شده»‌ی خداباوری گشوده نیز به صدق و کذب گزاره‌ها «علمِ مطلق» دارد. گیریم که خدا به انتخاب این فرد آگاه نبود (خداباوری گشوده) آیا حتی بعد از ورود ویروس کوید ۱۹ به بدن او، خدا «نمی‌دانست» که چنین شری در پیش است؟ اگر بناست دانستنی‌های خدا پابه‌پای دانش بشری افزایش یابد و یا رفتار او تا این اندازه متاثر از رفتار انسان‌ها باشد، چنین «خدایی» آیا شایسته پرستش است؟

– خداباوری گشوده به «قادریّت مطلق» خداوند خدشه وارد نمی‌کند. زیرا خدا تنها به گزاره‌هایی علم دارد که علم به آن‌ها اساساً ممکن است. اما علم پیشینی خدا به افعال ارادی و اختیاری امکانی آدم‌ها در آینده اساساً ممکن نیست. مضافاً خدا می‌تواند آدمیان مختار نیافریند اما اراده کرده که آدمیان مختار بیافریند احتمالا از آن رو که رسیدن به مراتب والای سعادت جز با اعطای اختیار وسیع به انسان‌ها ممکن نیست. پس خدا مختارانه خودش را محدود کرده و این با قاهریّت خدا ناسازگار نیست. البته که این اختیار وسیع انسان شرّآفرین است. اما گویا در طرح الهی در نهایت خیر این اختیار به شرّ آن می‌چربد. البته در مدل خداباوری گشوده، که آن را تقریر کردم، خداوند با آفریدن انسان‌های مختار و اعطای اختیار به آن‌ها تا حدودی خطر کرده است زیرا حتی خدا هم تمام جزئیات‌ کنش ارادی و اختیاری امکانی انسان‌ها را از پیش نمی‌داند. خداباوری گشوده تنها در «عالِمیّت مطلق» خدا و نیز «مشیّت مطلق» الهی و همچنین «قاهریّت مطلق» الهی تجدیدنظر حداقلّی می‌کند.

It is true that in the open theism model, God took a risk in creating human beings, but is this risk so great that, so to speak, the course of existence slips from God’s hands and God is no longer omnipotent, omnipotent, sovereign, and the possessor of the will of existence, and consequently not worthy of worship? I do not think so. First, God can intervene in the world at any moment He wills, although the divine custom, as evidenced by Islamic traditions, is not to intervene in the world’s affairs at every moment; rather, He has established a law over the world, and divine intervention is exceptional, though, as evidenced by the holy books, this intervention has sometimes occurred in the past in the form of punishment, revelation, or other forms, and may still occur in the future. Second, the divine plan, especially the ultimate triumph of good over evil—despite the unpredictable free will of human beings in its details—can still remain intact.

Moreover, this divine risk-taking shows that the creation of free human beings and God’s establishing a relationship with them was so central to the divine plan that God was willing to accept the risk of the evil-creating potential of human free will and create a free being similar to Himself. Such an act demonstrates the importance of human freedom in the divine plan. This theological understanding helps believers, in their own political theology, to hold nothing in higher esteem than human freedom; for God, too, so valued human freedom that He was willing to risk creating free human beings and freely limit Himself.

A God who so honors freedom that He freely limits Himself and accepts the risk of creating free human beings not only does not fall from worthiness of worship, but on the contrary, is a freedom-loving God who is worthy of special worship. This is one of the possible interpretations of those Quranic verses where, when the angels objected to God (note: the angels considered themselves entitled to object to God!) asking why He was creating an evil-creating human, God did not reply that it was not befitting for them to object, but merely told the angels that He, in His divine station, knows something that the angels, with their limited knowledge, do not know (Al-Baqarah: 30-32). Perhaps that which God—according to the Quran—knew was precisely this supreme value of human freedom, whose good ultimately outweighs its evil.

I accept that the image of God in open theism is somewhat different from the classical image of theism in the tradition of the Abrahamic religions, but the cost paid for solving the problem of evil in this image is small, and the distance we take from the common image of theism is not great; and if this image solves the problem of evil and there is no better way to solve it, paying this cost seems rational.

I did not get an answer to my question. After the coronavirus entered the body of that person who ate anteater meat, did God have knowledge of the lethality and suffering-causing nature of this virus? Because knowledge of the truth or falsity of the proposition “COVID-19 is a lethal and suffering-causing virus for humans” is possible.

– According to open theism, God can guess an event before it occurs, if it is the result of a possible free action of a human in the future, and He also knows it at the time of its occurrence (and not before). But why does God not prevent the evil-laden free actions of people? Because God, as evidenced by Islamic traditions, is not in the habit of intervening maximally in the world’s affairs; probably because God’s maximal intervention in the world’s affairs would remove this world from being an “abode of trial.” A world in which God constantly intervenes to remedy human wrongdoing would leave no room for people to learn lessons and be tested. The valuable experiences that the human race has learned over the centuries have been the result of grappling with difficulties; as the saying attributed to Khayyam goes, “Through suffering, a person becomes free.” If difficulties were constantly removed from humanity’s path by God’s intervention, learning from experience would not occur, humanity would not reach maturity, and would not become responsible.

Your answer seems to pertain to God’s ability or will, but the question pertains to God’s knowledge, or omniscience. The question is whether that same open God was aware of the empirical and obtainable proposition “COVID-19 is lethal and suffering-causing for humans”?

– Yes, He was aware. But God also respects the consequences of human free will. If we accept that the origin of the coronavirus outbreak was the trafficking of rare animals (such as the pangolin) and the consumption of their meat, then this catastrophe is the result of humanity’s misuse of its God-given will and freedom. God can, of course, intervene and correct it wherever human free will goes astray. The result of this, however, would be to coddle humanity, and the world would no longer be a place of trial, testing, and error. Historical and collective learning occurs when humanity can err, grapple with the consequences of its errors, ultimately overcome these errors, learn from its mistakes, and mature.

So if God was aware of the deadly and suffering-inducing effects of the coronavirus and stood by to let this virus spread, then it seems we must forget about God’s “absolute benevolence.” Because, firstly, it is not clear that the individual who ate that pangolin truly “misused” his free will. Even assuming he was a Muslim, he could be exonerated under the rule of necessity (idtirar). Secondly, even supposing that individual did misuse his free will, why should the evil of this virus afflict an innocent child/person somewhere else? (The suffering that person endures is “evil,” and it was possible for that evil not to exist or to be less!)

– God’s benevolence does not require Him to create a paradisiacal world from the very beginning and place humans in it without trial and error, bestowing bliss upon them. Our current world, with all its passion and evil, is certainly not hell, nor is it lacking in goodness and beauty, but it also has much hardship and many ups and downs, so that, in the Qur’anic expression, “li-yabluwakum ayyukum ahsanu ‘amala”: that He might test you as to which of you is best in deed (Al-Mulk: 2). Let us not forget that in the open God model I spoke of, even God does not know in full detail what the outcome of this test will be for free human beings. God has only guaranteed that good will achieve final victory over evil. The details of this plan are not disclosed even to God, because the possible will and freedom of human beings are involved.

The analogy that theologians who espouse open theism use to depict the relationship between God and humans possessing will and freedom in future actions is that God is like the conductor of an orchestra who has written a piece of music and entrusted its performance to a group of skilled musicians. However, the precision and skill with which this piece is performed depends on the musicians’ execution. If, during the performance, a musician plays a wrong note—so to speak—the conductor uses his skill and ability to move the performance forward so that no disruption occurs. Nevertheless, since the performance is with the musicians, there is no guarantee that all the predetermined details will be executed flawlessly. But the skill and mastery of the conductor ensure that even if a minor disruption occurs, the performance will ultimately proceed honorably (I have taken this analogy from this article: “An Examination and Critique of the Doctrine of ‘Openness’ in Resolving the Conflict between Divine Knowledge and Human Free Will,” Jostarha-ye Falsafe-ye Din: 1397. It is worth noting that this article is one of the few works written in Persian on open theism, and in the second half of the article, the authors have tried to find similarities between the Shi‘i doctrine of “bada’” and open theism.)

But regarding your point that eating the meat was out of necessity, it seems the pangolin is considered a luxury food in China and commands a high price because it is trafficked. Therefore, its consumption is specific to China’s wealthy class, and eating it was not out of necessity. If the common narrative about the origin of the coronavirus is correct, then it can be said that we fell victim to the luxury-seeking greed of China’s wealthy class. However, concerning the evils that befall the innocent, especially children, the answer given particularly by some Muslim theologians is that God will compensate for these evils in the afterlife and will grant abundant good to that innocent adult or child. If this is the case, God’s benevolence is preserved.

But compensation does not diminish anything of God’s responsibility for creating evil—evil that could have not existed and in which humans play no role. On the other hand, perhaps a certain disabled child, beyond compensation, also desires the execution of justice and wants to place God in a suffering and powerless situation similar to his own.

- Yes, evil could have not existed, but in that case, free-willed humans would also not have existed. The mere existence of evil does not necessarily strip the one who directly or indirectly created evil of benevolence. Consider, for example, a successful surgeon who, inevitably, imposes a long and arduous convalescence on the patient. This long and arduous convalescence is evil, but because it is unavoidable and a prelude to the great good of the patient’s recovery, the physician does not lose his benevolence in the face of this evil. Although the physician himself inadvertently brought about this evil, he did not will it; rather, he willed only the patient’s recovery.

But “crime” is inherently bad and “evil,” regardless of its consequences and results. If, in defense of God’s will and decision, and according to your statement, “historical and collective learning occurs only if humanity can err”; did humanity not also learn from Hitler’s crimes? With this reasoning, is evil not also removed from Hitler and the very act of “crime,” and might it not even become “necessary” from time to time?

– People are responsible for the misuse of their free will, and the possibly good consequences of their bad deeds do not exonerate them for their bad deeds; because people are judged primarily and essentially by their intentions. So if someone intended a bad deed, even if their action inadvertently had a good consequence, they are still deserving of blame, and if someone intended a good deed, but the consequence of their action inadvertently turned out bad and they were not culpably ignorant, they are not deserving of blame.

True! But the question here is: why is God not subject to this rule?

– God is benevolent and, out of His all-encompassing mercy, created humanity and gave them free will. The intrinsic requirement of this free will, of course, is that humans are also capable of creating evil. But God did not will this evil-creation; rather, this evil is merely the—unwanted but inevitable—consequence of good. In the divine plan, the good of human freedom outweighs its evil. Today, when liberal ideas in social governance have rightly become prevalent (by liberal ideas, I mean political liberalism, not necessarily economic liberalism), we sympathize with the idea that although freedom also generates evils and is not entirely good, its good outweighs its evil. Thus, the divine plan aligns with the liberal understanding of freedom, and God, for His love of freedom, is deserving of praise, not blame.

If God is aware of the deadly and suffering-causing effects of the coronavirus, then even God’s “absolute power” is called into question. Could God not, for example, have punished or penalized only the sinful individual for the potential misuse of their choice, or ended the matter with less evil (to date, over a hundred thousand people have died)?

– We have two types of limiting divine power: external limitation and internal limitation. In external limitation, something independent of the divine will limits God. This type of limitation does not apply to God because God is omnipotent, meaning He can do everything except intrinsically impossible things. In other words, divine omnipotence means that God can do all intrinsically possible things. But doing intrinsically impossible things is impossible even for God, because it is impossible in itself. For example, God cannot create a square circle, or create a being like Himself, or He cannot give humans will and free choice and at the same time know in advance what humans will freely do, because in that case, humans would no longer have will and free choice and would be compelled in their actions. These are intrinsically impossible things that even God cannot accomplish, without this being a defect in divine omnipotence, because divine omnipotence operates within the realm of possibilities, not impossibilities.

But another type of limitation is internal limitation; meaning that God has willed to impose a limitation upon Himself, in the Qurʾanic expression “kataba ʿalā nafsihi al-raḥmah”: “[God] has prescribed mercy for Himself” (al-Anʿām: 2). The creation of humankind is a divine mercy, but God could have chosen not to create free human beings; yet He willed to create them because He has prescribed mercy for Himself. Hence He has also freely accepted the inherent limitations of this particular kind of creation. If God were compelled to create free human beings, then a limitation would have been imposed on divine omnipotence from without. But God Himself freely willed to create free human beings and accepted the inherent requisites of this particular kind of creation, and freely limited His own knowledge in order to make room for human free will.

But why did God not give human beings a more limited free will so that they could not create vast evil but only limited evil? Probably because limited free will brings about limited salvation. In order to bring human beings to vast salvation, God must give them vast free will, and vast free will inevitably brings about vast misuse of free will in its wake. But God did not will human beings’ misuse of their free will; rather, He willed only their felicity and acquiesced to the requisites of that felicity. On this basis, despite the evils that have occurred in the world, God has willed only good.

This account of the various ways of limiting divine power can be criticized separately, and one can ask when this limitation began and what God was like before it (before He limited Himself and created free human beings). But here the subject of the question is not intrinsically impossible matters. The question concerns matters that (if one were informed) even a human being would be capable of handling. That is, if, as you said, God was aware of the matter, why did He not do something so that at least fewer human beings would suffer from this coronavirus?

– Because, as Islamic traditions attest, God does not intend to intervene directly and maximally in the affairs of the world. This ḥadīth from Imam al-Ṣādiq is well-known: “abā Allāh an yujriya al-ashyāʾ illā bi-l-asbāb”—God refuses to bring about matters except through [secondary] causes (this ḥadīth appears both in al-Ṣaffār’s Baṣāʾir al-Darajāt and in al-Kulaynī’s al-Kāfī). Except in exceptional cases, God does not intervene directly in the affairs of the world, and the world’s affairs proceed according to their own laws. Nevertheless, God has guaranteed that the course of the world will proceed in such a way that, ultimately, good will triumph over evil.

Let us return to another part of your response. You say, “God could intervene and correct it wherever human free will goes astray. This, however, would be coddling human beings, and the world would no longer be a place of trial, testing, and error.” This argument (which is also common in classical theism and attempts to defend the existence of evil in the world in a “relative” manner) draws on an unknown or possible (probable) future to justify the existence of evil, but it seems to carry a kind or kinds of fallacy. The question is: what reason is there that human beings should learn from the present, existing evil, be tested by it, or that this present evil will lead to good and a better world? Does the mere possibility (the fallacy of Appeal to Probability) or the fact that we are not in that future situation (the fallacy of Argumentum ad lapidem) or that we are unaware of it (the fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantiam) prove the existence of a good such that we should accept the present evil—for example, the coronavirus—from God?

– There is no guarantee (not even a divine guarantee) that the contingent voluntary actions of human beings will, in all their details, result in good. According to open theism, even God takes a certain risk in the face of the details of human voluntary actions. Creating a world containing free and volitional human beings is a kind of risk-taking for God, and God has taken this risk upon Himself. But from the perspective of faith, God has guaranteed the ultimate and macro triumph of good over evil. Although future-oriented arguments are always probabilistic and one cannot speak of certainty, faith in God means faith in the ultimate and macro triumph of good over evil at the hands of God.

The mere possibility (probability) of a future in which good triumphs over evil does not permit us to take it for granted, argue on its basis, and justify existing evils (the fallacy of appeal to possibility). On the other hand, by explaining that good will triumph over evil in some future, we merely close off the path of reasoning about the evils that have actually occurred (blocking the path of reasoning). Moreover, risk-taking in itself expresses a situation in which there is no complete mastery over affairs. Can a God who takes risks be omnipotent? How do we know that the “ultimate triumph of good over evil” does not itself fall under this risk? Even if good ultimately triumphs over evil, what becomes of the evils that have actually occurred and the responsibility (or, in other words, the absolute benevolence) of God?

– Let us apply an argument similar to yours to the subject of evaluating types of government, and from this comparison gain some insight for our discussion. In defense of the liberal model of government, it is said that, on the whole, the good of human freedom outweighs its evil; therefore, a government that respects the freedom of its citizens is better (meaning more efficient and more ethical) than a totalitarian government. But someone might, in criticizing liberal government and defending totalitarian government, say, as you put it, “the mere possibility of a future in which good triumphs over evil does not permit us to take it for granted, argue on its basis, and justify existing evils.”

It seems to me that your criticism is valid only if we adopt a dark anthropology and, based on it, believe that the inclination toward evil is inherently greater in human beings than the inclination toward good. If we hold such a dark anthropology, perhaps totalitarian government would be preferable to liberal government, and the angels’ objection to God for creating bloodthirsty humans would be a valid objection. But if we do not hold such a dark anthropology—and I do not—then granting freedom to human beings is defensible both in the cosmic realm (which is our current discussion) and in the political realm (which we used as an analogy for our current discussion).

But regarding risk-taking and its relation to divine perfection: mere risk-taking does not diminish God’s perfection. God has willed, out of His all-encompassing mercy, to enter into an interpersonal relationship with human beings. A necessary condition of such a relationship is human freedom, and God submits to the requirements of this freedom, which is the voluntary self-limitation of divine omniscience. This is exactly like a lover who surrenders their will to love. Such an act does not detract from divine omnipotence, because God has done it voluntarily; rather, it demonstrates divine perfection, which has consented to draw near to humanity for the sake of love for humanity.

But regarding the third part of your question: faith in God entails, among other things, faith in the notion that, ultimately, the good of human freedom outweighs its evil. This is not a strange faith, because it is exactly like the faith that lies behind our contemporary belief in the superiority of open political systems over closed political systems. If the good of human freedom outweighs its evil, then the evils of the world will not impugn God’s benevolence.

Mr. Mirdamadi! But it seems that equating these two arguments is incorrect because there is a fundamental and glaring difference. When, in defense of a liberal government, it is said, “On balance, the good of freedom outweighs its evil,” we are dealing with a scientific, empirically tested, falsifiable proposition whose validity has been scientifically demonstrated by political science (even if it later turns out to be false). This is not a “possibility,” and therefore we are not dealing with a fallacy. You know better than I that if we one day arrive at the opposite of this proposition, we will still have done something scientific and will still be dealing with a scientific, empirical proposition, and no harm will have been done to political science or the foundations of our reasoning and decision-making; rather, they will have been strengthened. But the proposition you claim regarding God’s goodness is both unscientific, merely “a possibility” and fallacy-generating, and if we were to arrive at its opposite, our entire apparatus of faith and religion would collapse! (And since the argument is based on a “possibility,” it presumably falls prey to the same fallacy of appealing to a possibility!)

– The proposition “On balance, the good of human freedom outweighs its evil,” contrary to your understanding, is ultimately not a proposition belonging to the natural-empirical sciences but a philosophical one, and it particularly relates to philosophical anthropology. Even if empirical evidence can be adduced in favor of this anthropological view, this view is still not based solely on empirical evidence but is, ultimately, a philosophical view. Accordingly, this philosophical anthropological view, which holds an optimistic view of human nature, is not merely a “possibility”; rather, reasons (philosophical-theological and possibly empirical) are adduced in its favor, and it also critiques alternative anthropologies that hold a dark view of human nature. This is not the place to discuss this philosophical anthropological view, but I emphasize that we are dealing with a philosophical anthropological view, not a mere possibility, and if we are not dealing with a mere possibility—and we are not—then the fallacy of “mere appeal to possibility” has not occurred.

Dr. Mirdamadi, up to this point, most of your references in defense of open theism have pertained to human evils. Let us grant that this theism, and in its broader form, Open Theology, can be used to justify the existence of moral-human evil. What answer does this theology have for natural evils, in which humans play no role? (As it seems the coronavirus pandemic has also become such, after a point) . Another question is that it seems open theism has banked so heavily on human free will and freedom of the will as if “the world, with free will and all its evils, is the best of all possible worlds.” Where does this presupposition come from?

– A world in which humans are to engage in trial and error, learn from their mistakes, be tested for their deeds, and accept responsibility cannot be perfect. In a perfect world, we would be dealing with perfect humans, and perfect humans do not make mistakes, nor do they learn from their mistakes. Our world is not “the best of all possible worlds,” and God is not obligated to create “the best of all possible worlds”—even if creating “the best of all possible worlds” is possible, which is a matter of dispute, and I will address it in response to the next question. Moreover, creating “the best of all possible worlds” (assuming its possibility) is not equivalent to creating a perfect and flawless world, because creating a perfect and flawless world is, in principle, not feasible even for God, for only God Himself is perfect and flawless, and God cannot create something like Himself; this is the meaning of tawhid (monotheism).

Tawhid imposes an inherent limitation on God, but this limitation is not a deficiency in God but rather His perfection, like a mathematical genius who cannot not solve a complex mathematical equation quickly. This inability is not his deficiency but his perfection. So, regarding God, it can also be said that whatever God creates is imperfect because creation, although it is “from” God—and to the extent that it is “from” God, it is good—is not identical to God, and for this very reason, it has inherent imperfection, and the inherent imperfection of the material world brings about natural evils such as floods, earthquakes, and contagious diseases.

Another point: yes, your understanding is correct that in the open theism model, great value is placed on human will and free choice. But attributing such great value to human freedom is not only not strange, but justifying it is also not very difficult: no action, no matter how intrinsically positive or negative, is worthy of praise or blame without assuming will and choice for the agent. For example, a person's heartbeat is involuntary, and consequently, under normal circumstances, the owner of the heart is not worthy of praise or blame for its natural beating. But if a doctor prevents a patient's cardiac arrest and restores their regular heartbeat, this doctor is worthy of praise, whereas if a murderer shoots an innocent person in the heart and stops its beating, they are worthy of blame.

If by the perfect human we mean a being who is "perfectly human" (I borrow Khorramshahi's expression), then the perfect human can also become hungry and make mistakes because they are "human." The one who cannot make mistakes is "God," because He is perfect in all His aspects. By the same expression, the perfect world (or perfect nature) is not necessarily a world that is perfect in everything. For example, the perfection of an elephant does not mean it can fly or that it will not step on an anthill. Therefore, it seems that the concepts of a perfect world or perfect human, by virtue of merely being natural and human, do not stand in opposition to a perfect God, and their creation by a perfect God has no logical impediment. But the concept of God, at least in Islamic theology, is such that it contains every kind of perfection, and logically, one expects Him to create a world without evil, just as He has promised it in another world. The question that arises here is: why wasn't this "other world" created from the very beginning?

– The expression you cited from Mr. Khorramshahi is in description of Hafez. He says Hafez is not a "perfect human" but is "perfectly human." It is an apt and beautiful expression describing Hafez. But what can be said about the "perfect human" in its mystical sense? According to this meaning, the "perfect human" is a human who has no deficiency and possesses all perfections to the highest degree. This question, from the perspective of philosophical anthropology, is open: is such a being even still human? In other words, is the "perfect human" possible? I doubt that it is possible. But I will not now enter into an argument in favor of my view.

A similar question can be posed regarding the "perfect world." Is a "perfect world," meaning a world in which no deficiency exists and it is impossible to conceive of a more perfect one in all respects, even possible? In other words, is the "best of all possible worlds" possible? If such a world is not possible, then God cannot create it either, because God's power pertains only to possibilities.

It seems that by assuming the possibility of the "best of all possible worlds," you have implicitly presented another argument against the existence of God, which is different from the problem of evil. In the problem of evil, reference is made to the evils of the world, and through this, an argument is made against theism. But in this new argument, reference is only made to the fact that our world is not the "best of all possible worlds" and that the "best of all possible worlds" is possible, and through this, an argument is made against the existence of God. Given the importance of this new argument, let me first formulate it and then critique it.

The "Best of All Possible Worlds" Argument Against Theism:

1_ A world better than the actual world is possible.

2_ If a world better than the actual world is possible, then the actual world will not be the best of all possible worlds.

3_ But if the actual world is the creation of God (the omnipotent), it will be the best of all possible worlds.

4_ Therefore, the actual world is not the creation of God.

5_ But if God exists, the actual world will be the creation of God.

6_ Therefore, God does not exist.

(In formulating the bulk of this argument, I have drawn on this article: “The Best of All Possible Worlds,” Synthese: 2005). Propositions 1 and 2 appear to be true, and proposition 5 is merely a true report of the implications of God’s hypothetical existence. Propositions 4 and 6 are also derived from the other propositions. Therefore, if this argument is not sound, the suspect proposition within it will be proposition 3. I will argue further that proposition 3 is false. If this is the case, then this argument, although formally valid, will not be sound because one of its premises is false.

Premise 3 is false because it is based on the possibility of “the best of all possible worlds.” But “the best of all possible worlds” is not possible, so premise 3 is false, and consequently, the argument does not reach its desired conclusion, which is the non-existence of God. The idea of “the best of all possible worlds” can be understood as follows: “the best of all possible worlds” is the best world among all possible worlds. That is, if we have N number of possible worlds, “the best of all possible worlds” is better than all of them. But such a world is impossible because, just as “the highest integer” is impossible, “the best of all possible worlds” is also impossible.

The impossibility of “the highest integer” can be demonstrated by assuming its possibility and then refuting it. Suppose L is the highest integer, but L+1 is possible, meaning it is enough to add one to “the highest integer” to obtain a higher number. However, L+1 is also not “the highest integer” because we can again have L+1+1, but once more, this is not the highest integer, for we can again add a number to it, and this addition can be continued ad infinitum without ever arriving at “the highest integer.” Thus, “the highest integer” is a contradiction in terms, and the existence of such a number is not possible.

Now, a similar argument can be conceived regarding “the best of all possible worlds.” Suppose L is the best of all possible worlds, but one can still conceive of a better world. Suppose one of the good things about “the best of all possible worlds” is that it contains many or infinite stars, but one can always conceive of a better world that contains more stars. So we would have L+1, but this is also not “the best of all possible worlds” because one can again conceive of a world better than it, and this can be continued ad infinitum without ever reaching “the best of all possible worlds.” On this basis, “the best of all possible worlds” is a contradiction in terms, and the existence of such a world is not possible. And if “the best of all possible worlds” is not possible, God is not obligated to create it, because even God cannot create something that is not possible, and no one, not even God, is obligated to do the impossible.

In one of your writings, you have pointed to the “absence of the problem of evil in Islam.” Is the global tragedy of Corona not an opportunity for Islamic theology to address the problem of evil? Furthermore, could this pandemic accelerate the process of secularism in the Islamic world, and especially in Iran?

– In several of my writings, I have addressed the absence of the problem of evil in Islam, especially in contemporary Islamic theology. For instance, in the entirety of this article and also in the second part of this article. I do not intend to repeat the points I have previously made in these articles now. Suffice it to say that, in my view, if contemporary Islamic theology takes the problem of evil seriously, it is unlikely to conclude that this problem can be solved without a theoretical cost, that is, without a partial or total revision of the classical picture of the God of the Abrahamic religions. The extent of the theoretical cost that must be paid and precisely at which point revision is needed can, of course, be a matter of discussion and debate.

In this conversation, I argued that solving the problem of evil requires a theoretical cost, and that cost, in my view, is that at least the common understanding of God's absolute omniscience and absolute will must be reconsidered. Unfortunately, contemporary Islamic theology is still more or less in the mindset of a cost-free solution to the problem of evil and is largely unaware of the developments, especially in the last half-century, in philosophical theology and philosophy of religion (analytic or continental) concerning the problem of evil. Of course, articles are published, particularly in Persian and Arabic, on the problem of evil from the perspective of Western philosophers and theologians, but most of them are merely reports of these philosophers' views, and when it comes to critique and solutions, they have nothing novel to offer. I think the coronavirus crisis is an opportunity for contemporary Islamic theology to seriously address the problem of evil.

But regarding the coronavirus and secularism; the coronavirus has, in a way, already established a temporary objective secularism: all religious places have been closed and ritual ceremonies have been suspended. This will, of course, be temporary, but if the faithful become accustomed to performing rituals individually during this period, their return to religious congregations and sacred sites will no longer be as easy as before. But leaving aside objective secularism, will the coronavirus also spread subjective secularism, that is, atheism, agnosticism, or religious skepticism? Answering this question requires surveys and statistics. But even through personal observation of the virtual space, one can see that the coronavirus has already raised fundamental questions, some of which were reflected in your own questions. Nevertheless, the coronavirus may also have a positive effect on religiosity. The coronavirus has brought us into a state of death-awareness, and seeking meaning for the death of loved ones or our own probable death is something that may draw many towards religiosity or at least towards taking the principles of religious metaphysics seriously. However, it is still too early to judge the long-term positive or negative effects of the coronavirus on religiosity (if such an effect exists at all).

As a final question; I want to ask about your personal God, Dr.! In previous conversations I had on this topic with Mr. Soroush and Mr. Kadivar, each spoke of a God they recognize in the time of natural evils. Dr. Soroush said he expects nothing from his God, and Dr. Kadivar spoke of a law-bound God who does not violate divine traditions. Where is Yaser Mirdamadi's God, and what does He do, at the time of the manifestation of natural evils?

– If the owner of this keyboard has a God in his heart, the side of his head will reach the sun, but "one cannot easily become [a believer]" or, in Rumi's words, "When You hide from me, I am all darkness and unbelief / When You appear to me, I am a Muslim, by Your life."

But leaving aside the personal aspect of the issue and returning to our understanding of the God of Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad, let me advance your question and take it to its ultimate conclusion: let us suppose that in the midst of a crisis like the Holocaust or the coronavirus, God's presence is absolutely not felt. Is this necessarily a reason against the very existence of God, or at least against God's benevolence? I think not necessarily; for the reason that other explanations for God's silence or absence are possible, and as long as these explanations have not been refuted, one cannot conclude God's non-existence or unkindness from God's absence.

For example, Martin Buber (1878–1965), the Austrian-born Jewish philosopher and theologian, who was engaged with the divine silence and absence during the Holocaust crisis, believed that God had already spoken His words to humanity and now sits in waiting to observe human action; or Kalonymus Shapira (1889–1943), the Grand Rabbi of the Warsaw Ghetto, who was himself ultimately executed by the Nazis in a death camp, believed, based on an interpretation of parts of Talmudic literature, that God also suffers from humanity's self-inflicted calamities, but we see no trace of divine tears and suffering because God hides it from existence, for existence cannot bear even a particle of divine suffering, and if even a corner of God's suffering were revealed to existence, the world would fall apart (I have explained more about Shapira's view in this article.)

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Corona and the “Problem of Evil”

In Conversation with Yaser Mirdamadi

“The Absence of God” Is Possible

Interview by Taha Parsa

Source: Zeitoon

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