Essay by Zohair Mirakarimi: 'Expert Opinion or Believer Bias: An Account of One Description and Two Explanations'

Expert Opinion or Believer Bias: An Account of One Description and Two Explanations

On the Occasion of World Philosophy Day

Dedicated to philosophers and thinkers, the gadflies who rouse the sluggish horse of society!

Zohair Mirakarimi

In 2009, the PhilPapers website[1], whose chief editors are David Bourget[2] and David Chalmers[3], conducted a survey[4] in which over 3,200 academic and professional philosophers and philosophy students participated and answered the survey questions. The aim of that survey was to ascertain the "beliefs of philosophers" regarding the most important and fundamental philosophical questions and problems, albeit "statistically." The survey included 30 questions in various fields of philosophy, including logic, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics. Questions such as:

A priori knowledge: yes or no?

Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?

Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?

Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?

Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?

External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?

Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?

God: theism or atheism?

Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?

Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?

Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?

Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?

Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?

Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?

Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?

Time: A-theory or B-theory?

Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?

The questions are more numerous than this, but this amount suffices to become familiar with the scope of the questions and their degree of specialization (and at the same time, their generality).

David Bourget and David Chalmers published the results of this survey, along with an initial analysis, in a 2013 article titled "What Do Philosophers Believe?[5]" This article sparked various discussions and opinions among scientific circles and philosophers, because it was the first extensive survey that statistically showed which theories, among different (and sometimes rival or contradictory) theories, philosophers themselves are more inclined toward, or what their personal beliefs are about fundamental philosophical problems. Also, from a social and history-of-philosophy perspective, it is interesting for both philosophers and the general public to know which theories are statistically (and not necessarily epistemically) dominant in this time period. This statistical approach might perhaps add to the "prestige" of certain philosophical answers, or even turn them into obvious matters in a specific context and era, or at least elevate them to the status of default assumptions that are less questioned.

This survey was repeated in 2020, this time not with 30 questions but with 100: 30 questions from the first survey to enable longitudinal studies over time, and 70 questions elaborating on the main questions or addressing new topics in philosophy. The results of this survey were published in November 2021 in another article by David Bourget and David Chalmers titled “Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey[6].” Both of these surveys and their associated articles are full of noteworthy and insightful data about the current state of the analytic, English-speaking philosophical community in America, Europe, and Asia/Australia; I recommend their study to philosophy enthusiasts. On the “PhilPapers” website, in addition to the results, you can see the responses of each participant[7] to each of the questions, which is in itself an exciting endeavor for those interested. For example, you can see the responses of Ebrahim Azadegan, professor of philosophy at Sharif University of Technology, here[8].

But the main discussion of this note begins after these preliminaries. In the next few posts, I will write a noteworthy account of one of the important questions of this survey and the explanations related to its results.

God: Theism or Atheism?

One of the questions in this survey was: “God: theism or atheism?”

The philosophers' response to this question indicated a decisive tendency of the philosophical community participating in these surveys toward “atheism.” The results were as follows:

Acceptance of or leaning toward atheism (among all philosophers): 72.8 percent

Acceptance of or leaning toward theism (among all philosophers): 14.6 percent

Agnosticism/other responses (among all philosophers): 12.6 percent

The results indicated the predominance of atheism among the philosophers participating in this survey, meaning that atheism is the view that most thinkers in the current period and among the academic community of the group participating in the survey believe in. The implicit implication of this result was that philosophers, who presumably and hypothetically possess better critical abilities and skills and more trained minds, have largely arrived at or lean toward “atheism.” In other words, the leaning of “expert opinion” is statistically that “atheism” is more reasonable and acceptable than “theism.” Let us call this explanation “Explanation One.”

But this explanation and account was not the end of the matter, because “expert opinion” is a concept that lacks sufficient clarity, and therefore some critics of this explanation raised another issue: “The opinion of philosophers in general about God does not count as ‘expert opinion,’ because not all philosophers are experts on ‘God’; rather, ‘philosophers of religion’ are the philosophical experts in this field, so one must refer to their opinion and results.” Thus, it became necessary to look at the views of the philosophers of religion who had participated in this survey. Fortunately, specifying the area of philosophical activity of the participants was among the background questions, and it was possible to determine the results based on the philosophers' specialty. The results were as follows:

Acceptance of or leaning toward atheism (among philosophers of religion): 19.1 percent

Acceptance of or leaning toward theism (among philosophers of religion): 72.3 percent

Agnosticism/other responses (among philosophers of religion): 8.5 percent

The matter had become interesting. Philosophers of religion, unlike philosophers in general, had mostly accepted or leaned toward theism. So, according to the critics who claimed that the opinion of philosophers in general about God is not “expert opinion” and that one should refer to the opinion of philosophers of religion, “theism” is what constitutes “expert opinion.” In other words, the critics of the first explanation claimed that since philosophers of religion are more familiar with the arguments and proofs for and against theism, they know better which ones are stronger, and since they mostly lean toward theism, they conclude that “theism” is both “expert opinion” and, philosophically and statistically speaking, more reasonable and acceptable. Let us call this explanation the “second explanation.”

But the story did not end here, for another group raised the issue that the stark difference between the results of “philosophers in general” and “philosophers of religion” regarding “God” must be explained in some way. That is, why is there a dramatic (and almost contradictory, in terms of statistical results) difference between the opinion of thinkers in general and the opinion of a specific group of philosophers about theism?

Two hypotheses were proposed to answer this question:

First Hypothesis: Expert Opinion

This hypothesis claims that the group whose opinion can be considered “expert opinion” is indeed “philosophers of religion,” because they have greater awareness of the arguments for and against theism, and the opinion of philosophers in general on this matter is not considered “expert opinion.” The result of accepting this hypothesis would be that, statistically speaking, “expert opinion” holds that “theism” is a more reasonable and acceptable view than “atheism.”

Second Hypothesis: Believer Bias

This hypothesis claims that the “philosophers of religion” who participated in this survey suffer from “selection bias.” Selection bias occurs when the participants in a survey lack sufficient diversity and are not representative of the population to which the results of the analysis are to be generalized. That is, in this specific case, “philosophers of religion” chose this field for their philosophical studies because they were already “theists” and “religious.” In other words, most philosophers of religion are “theists” not through examining the arguments for and against theism, but because of their own prior choices, and therefore, in this respect, their opinion is not more specialized and expert than the opinion of philosophers in general. The result of accepting this hypothesis would be that the opinion of philosophers of religion (if they suffer from “selection bias” in this survey) is not considered “expert opinion,” but rather “believer opinion.” And consequently, according to the opinion of philosophers in general, statistically speaking, “atheism” is a more reasonable and acceptable view than “theism.”

But how could one choose between these two hypotheses or give one more weight? The answer could not be obtained from within this survey and required other data; data that could confirm or refute the claim of “selection bias” among philosophers of religion. This is where another survey [9] conducted by Helen De Cruz came into play. In a qualitative survey of philosophers of religion, De Cruz addressed, among other things, the “motivations” of philosophers of religion for entering this philosophical field, and what “effects” philosophical engagement with religion had on the personal beliefs of philosophers of religion. Some of the questions and results are as follows:

What is your motivation for working in the field of philosophy of religion? (Answers in order of frequency)

- Deepening religious beliefs through activity in philosophy of religion and finding arguments in favor of theism

- Performing a necessary act in line with religiosity: rational examination of religious beliefs

- Interest in religion as a cultural and experiential phenomenon

What has been the effect of working in the field of philosophy of religion on you? (Answers in order of frequency)

- Reconsidering previous beliefs and modifying beliefs

- Moving from belief/theism toward atheism

- Polarization of beliefs: stronger belief

The results of the qualitative survey by Helen De Cruz, professor of philosophy at Saint Louis University, carried implications that could, with certain considerations, strengthen one of the proposed hypotheses. De Cruz's survey showed that most philosophers of religion were already believers and theists before joining the ranks of "philosophers of religion," and one of their most prominent motivations for working in the field of philosophy of religion was to deepen their religious beliefs and find arguments in favor of theism. However, in addition to these motivations (which indicate a "selection bias" among philosophers of religion), overall and on average, working in the field of philosophy of religion has led to a revision of prior beliefs and even to joining the ranks of atheists. In other words, those who entered philosophy of religion with religious motivations have, on average, moved further away from theism and closer to atheism over time. One consequence of this might be that the evidence and arguments available in the philosophy of religion favor the reasonableness and acceptability of "atheism" more, even for those who initially entered this field with religious intentions.

If the results and the explanation provided for this survey can be accepted, then the second hypothesis gains strength: the philosophers of religion in this survey suffer from selection bias, and their opinion cannot be considered an "expert opinion." De Cruz's survey, with certain considerations, can justify the stark difference between the views of philosophers in general and philosophers of religion regarding God. And from this point, the first explanation still appears plausible: philosophers in general, as "experts," statistically consider "atheism" to be more reasonable and acceptable.

But the matter does not end here. There are considerations and critiques [10] that prevent one from comfortably generalizing the results of these surveys. Among them:

The very act of surveying philosophical issues is a non-philosophical endeavor.

The question of theism or atheism is very general. The various types of theism or atheism are not taken into account.

The survey leans towards the analytic philosophy tradition and has not considered other traditions, including the continental tradition or non-Western traditions.

The statistical population participating in the survey by David Bourget and David Chalmers is limited to philosophers who are either English-speaking or have published philosophical articles in English.

The statistical population of philosophers is limited to American, European, and Asian/Australasian philosophers.

The religious backgrounds of most participants in the survey, due to their place of residence and cultural origins, are Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity, Islam.

The statistical population of Helen De Cruz's survey does not perfectly match the statistical population of the survey by David Bourget and David Chalmers, and the results of these two surveys cannot be compared with each other.

Other limitations can be added to the list above, which will be a matter of reflection for any meticulous and discerning researcher. However, despite all these methodological and survey limitations, the results of these three surveys (the first and second surveys by David Bourget and David Chalmers, and the survey by Helen De Cruz) can indicate a serious trend among the philosophical elite of the global community:

A revision of prior religious beliefs, a tendency towards atheism, and the acceptance of atheism as a reasonable and acceptable view among philosophers, and even among philosophers of religion.

Introduction of Sources:

A review of the PhilPapers surveys and related articles titled "What Do Philosophers Believe?" and "Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey"

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[1] https://philpapers.org/

[2] http://www.dbourget.com/

[3] http://consc.net/

[4] https://philpapers.org/surveys/

[5] https://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP.pdf

[6] https://philarchive.org/archive/BOUPOP-3

[7] https://philpapers.org/surveys/public_respondents.html

[8] https://philpapers.org/profile/9510/myview.html

[9] Results of my qualitative study of religious attitudes and motivations of philosophers of religion

[10] https://philpapers.org/surveys/designthoughts.html

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