Gratuitous Giving: The Beginning of Ethics or Its End?

Mostafa Malekian says that gratuitous giving is the beginning of the path to living ethically and its foundation, and that living ethically means reducing the inequalities of existence; therefore, justice has nothing to do with living ethically, but is solely related to the domain of "law" and being a good citizen. By observing justice, he means that an individual should not trample upon anyone's rights, nor allow anyone to trample upon their own rights. Thus, "helping the poor is a moral act; but paying a debt is not a moral act." This article, by examining the words of this valuable thinker of our time, articulates some doubts that can be raised, and proposes three new hypotheses for further investigation.

Gratuitous Giving: The Beginning of Ethics or Its End?

Morteza Tabatabaei[1]

Mostafa Malekian says that gratuitous giving is the beginning of the path to living ethically and its foundation, and that living ethically means reducing the inequalities of existence; therefore, justice has nothing to do with living ethically, but is solely related to the domain of "law" and being a good citizen. By observing justice, he means that an individual should not trample upon anyone's rights, nor allow anyone to trample upon their own rights. Thus, "helping the poor is a moral act; but paying a debt is not a moral act." This article, by examining the words of this valuable thinker of our time, articulates some doubts that can be raised, and proposes three new hypotheses for further investigation:

1. Living justly, and in other words, not committing injustice, is not only a part of ethics, but the most important part of living ethically;

2. If a higher level of living ethically is intended, its foundation is "concern for human beings," not gratuitous giving;

3. Gratuitous giving, as a task both simple and impossible, is the final stage of living ethically and belongs to the supererogatory aspects of ethics.

1_ Oughts and Ought-Nots

To know from the very beginning what "ethics" is, and how one can discuss Professor Malekian's statement that gratuitous giving, and not justice, is the foundation of living ethically, we must turn to the definition of ethics itself. Ethics, by definition, is a set of oughts and ought-nots for correct conduct towards others (Palmer, 2006: 19). Oughts such as helping the fallen and being cheerful with those around you, and ought-nots such as not lying and not committing injustice. In religious language, oughts are referred to as obligations (and also recommendations), and ought-nots as prohibitions (and also disapproved acts). What must be emphasized at the outset, as a necessary and less-stated premise, is the difference between oughts and ought-nots. Are oughts and ought-nots necessarily two different things? Can oughts not be reduced to ought-nots, and vice versa? If they are two separate things, which is more important and takes priority? Let us examine this more closely.

One might say that "oughts" in ethics are the positive aspect of the same "ought-nots," and the difference between the two is merely a verbal game; that is, if we say "you ought to be truthful," it means "you ought not to be a liar"; and if we say "you ought to be benevolent," the meaning is that "you ought not to be an oppressor." Likewise, if it is said "adultery is forbidden," this means that "abstaining from adultery is obligatory." Therefore, all propositions expressed with "ought" or "is obligatory" can also be expressed with "ought not" or "is forbidden."

اما دقت بیشتر نشان می‎دهد که چنین نیست، و اتفاقاً بسیاری از مشکلات اخلاقی، ناشی از عدم توجه به این تمایز حقیقی و غیرلفظی، و در عین حال بی‎توجهی به لوازم و نتایج این تمایز حقیقی است. بایدهای اخلاقی، اموری هستند ایجابی؛ یعنی وقتی می‎گوییم کاری باید انجام داد، منظورمان این است که یا به لحاظ فیزیکی (با اندام‎های عضلانی و به صورت دیدنی و شنیدنی)، و یا با قوای ذهنی و درونی، یک عمل واقعی لازم‎الاجراست؛ بدین‎معناکه تحقق خارجی یک «باید»، منوط به انجامگرفتن یک کار خاص است. اما «نباید»، بدین معناست که اتفاقاً یک کار خاص، که ممکن است فیزیکی یا ذهنی باشد، لازم‎الترک است؛ یعنی تحقق هر «نباید» اخلاقی، به این است که کاری خاص انجام نشود. بنابراین تفاوت میان باید و نباید، از حیث متعلقشان، تفاوت موجود و معدوم است؛ یعنی «باید» زمانی رعایت شده است که متعلَقش در رفتار ظاهری یا باطنی شخص، وجود یافته باشد؛ اما «نباید» هنگامی مراعات گشته که یک رفتار، به عرصۀ وجود نرسیده باشد.[2] روشن است که تفاوت میان موجود و معدوم نیز بالاترین حد تمایز، یعنی «تناقض» است؛ یعنی همانگونه که هستی با نیستی تناقض دارد و هیچ هستی‌ای با هیچ نیستی‌ای جمع نمی‌شود، هیچ بایدی نیز با هیچ نبایدی جمع نمی‎شود و در واقع نهایت تمایز و تقابل میان «بایدها» و «نبایدها» وجود دارد.

حال بیایید به مثال‎ها باز گردیم. کسی که دروغگو نیست، لزوماً راستگو نیست؛ زیرا ممکن است شخصی که دروغگو نیست، لال باشد یا حتی عمداً همیشه سکوت کند و هیچ نگوید؛ اما به چنین کسی نمی‎توان گفت راستگو؛ زیرا اساساً چیزی نمی‎گوید که راست باشد! همچنین کسی که ظالم نیست، لزوماً نیکوکار نیست؛ زیرا نیکوکار کسی است که به دیگران نیکی می‎کند، ولی غیرظالم، کسی است که صرفاً ظلم نمی‎کند. به همین خاطر هم هست که می‎توانیم بگوییم فلان درخت، ظالم نیست، ولی هرگز نمی‎توانیم بگوییم این درخت، نیکوکار است؛ زیرا برای نیکوکاری، که صفتی ایجابی و اخلاقی‎ است، اولاً باید کاری انجام شود و ثانیاً آن کار باید ارادی باشد. درخت البته کارهایی انجام می‎دهد و منافعی می‎رساند، ولی هیچ‎یک از آنها ارادی  نیست. بنابراین نیکی کردن، همان ظلم نکردن نیست.[3]

2_ اولویت اخلاقی نبایدها بر بایدها

حال که روشن شد بایدها به‎کلی با نبایدها متفاوت‎اند، چه‎بسا لازم باشد که دربارۀ احکام و مصادیق امر و نهی اخلاقی نیز تدقیقی کنیم و ببینیم آیا از حیث اخلاقی، امر و نهی، در یک سطح‎اند یا یکی بر دیگری اولویت دارد. در ادامۀ این نوشتار، با چهار دلیل نشان داده خواهد شد که مراعات نبایدها، به مراتب مهم‎تر از رعایت بایدهاست. این چهار دلیل عبارت‎اند از: 1. قوت قاعدۀ سیمین نسبت به قاعدۀ زرین؛ 2. اولویت نبایدها در وضع طبیعی؛ 3. مقایسۀ مصداقی؛ 4. مشروط بودن بایدها.

1-2_ قوت قاعدۀ سیمین نسبت به قاعدۀ زرین

روش اول، بررسی این مطلب در قاعدۀ زرین است. قاعدۀ زرین، از حیث مطلوبیت و محبوبیت، چه در میان ادیان گوناگون و چه در میان مکاتب مختلف اخلاقی، در صدر همۀ قواعد قرار دارد. اتفاقاً این قاعده دو صورت‎بندی متفاوت دارد، که یکی مربوط به بایدهاست و دیگری مربوط به نبایدها. صورت‎بندی معروف‎تر، که مربوط به بایدهاست، بدین شرح است:

«با دیگران چنان رفتار کن، که دوست می‎داری آنان در شرایط مشابه با تو آن‎گونه رفتار کنند» (به تعبیر مناسب‎تر برای این مقاله: «باید با دیگران به گونه‎ای رفتار کنی، که دوست می‎داری آنان در شرایط مشابه، با تو آن‎گونه رفتار کنند»).

و صورت‎بندی دیگر:

«با دیگران چنان رفتار نکن که نمی‌پسندی آنان با تو آن‎گونه رفتار کنند» («نباید با دیگران چنان رفتار کنی که نمی‎پسندی با تو آن‎گونه رفتار کنند»).

Henceforth in this article, whenever we say the Golden Rule, we mean the first formulation of the rule, and whenever we say the Silver Rule, we mean the second formulation. At first glance, in terms of application, generalizability, and influence, both rules appear equally effective and sound; but upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the first rule has a more limited application and less generalizability, and the weakness of the Golden Rule compared to the Silver Rule has been noted in ethical schools (Eslami, 1386: 25). Incidentally, Master Malekian also acknowledges that it is the negative aspect of this rule that enjoys maximal consensus, and he himself emphasizes this very aspect (Malekian, 1393: 10).

One of the reasons for the weakness of the Golden Rule is that sometimes a person desires others to treat them in specific ways that cannot be generalized in reverse. For example, someone might have no desire to live and seek someone through whom they can kill themselves (the emerging issue of euthanasia or mercy killing). Now, if such a person measures killing others against the Golden Rule, they would easily obtain a license to murder others; for they would say to themselves, I would like another to kill me without my deserving death; therefore, there is no obstacle to my killing another without them deserving death. Similarly, someone might have been accustomed since childhood to being spoken to harshly and with insults and have no problem with this. This person, by applying the Golden Rule, would also obtain a license to curse others.

If we consider such a situation in the worst-case scenario for the Silver Rule, it would be as follows: I do not like anyone to help me, so I do not help others. I do not like anyone to pity me, so I do not pity others, and it is clear that none of these entail injustice to others.

Of course, it might be said that in some cases, counterexamples and ethical violations can also be found for the negative rule. For example, it might be said, I do not like anyone to tell me the truth, therefore I do not tell the truth to anyone. In this case, aside from the fact that finding such individuals is truly difficult to imagine, the rule still has not recommended an unethical act; because in this rule, the utmost action recommended is not telling the truth, and not lying; that is, what the rule recommends is: do not tell the truth to others; but it does not specify "what to say," and as we said earlier, silence is also "not telling the truth," and silence is not an unethical act.

But the counterexample might be more serious than this; that is, someone might say, I do not like anyone to fulfill their promise to me, therefore I do not fulfill my promises to others. What about here? Here, there is no conceivable third option between keeping a promise and breaking it. The answer is that fundamentally, a person who enters into a covenant with such a preference makes a mistake in making the covenant from the very beginning, and their covenant is void; because the principle in a covenant is that I have liked the other party to fulfill their promise to me, and if this is not the case, I cannot fundamentally make a covenant. Therefore, in contracts and covenants, there is no need for the Silver Rule; because the covenant and condition themselves ethically oblige me to loyalty, and there is no need for another rule.

With these descriptions, if we are to recommend one of the Golden Rule or the Silver Rule absolutely, the Silver Rule will certainly have more merit, and the Silver Rule also pertains to ought-nots. Therefore, ought-nots, logically speaking, have greater absoluteness than oughts, and this greater absoluteness gives them priority over oughts.

2-2_ The Priority of Ought-nots in the State of Nature

But the second reason for the priority of ought-nots over oughts is the conditions and the state of nature of us humans in this world; such that in the state of nature after our entry into this world, the expectation of observing ought-nots is far more reasonable than the expectation of performing oughts. To clarify the point, consider this hypothetical example:

Suppose that I, as a moral human being, have been taken, without my knowledge and while asleep, by someone to a garden, and now that I have regained consciousness in that garden, he tells me that from today I must water the flowers and plants of this garden, prune the trees, regularly monitor changes in air temperature, and in due season, fertilize the trees and spray pesticides. Undoubtedly, my first reaction would be: why should I do such a thing, and where does this “must” come from? Have I promised anyone that I would tend the plants of a garden that is not mine, that I do not know, and to which I have been brought without my knowledge or consent?

In any case, after much grumbling, I might ultimately refuse to accept these commands, or, after that person apologizes and makes promises and offers inducements to spare my embarrassment, and after I set a condition or conditions for him, I might accept his request. In either case, I have committed no immoral act, because I had made no commitment to him to do these things. But if, after hearing that person’s requests, in addition to protesting to him, I start trampling the garden’s flowers, take an axe to the trees, and also beat up two or three of the garden’s workers, I have certainly done something immoral and am deserving of blame; for even if anyone deserves protest and physical assault, it is solely and exclusively the person who brought me to this garden, not the mute plants and the workers whose spirits knew nothing of the affair, or who perhaps have themselves been caught in this situation in the same way.

Now let us apply this example to the natural condition of the human being. If our assumption is that the human being has been brought into this world without his own volition (which appears to be the case), and let us also assume that this human being, even after reaching maturity, has not adhered to any religion, creed, or school of thought, what necessity is there for him to submit to actions that are not to his liking (or at least, that his inclination does not compel him toward)? Why should he give his wealth to others, spend his time serving people or worshipping, and sacrifice his sweet life for the sake of others? If he does not do so, who has the right to morally reproach him?

Yes, if he adheres to one of the religions or ethical schools, and makes a covenant with himself, or his God, or the custodians of religions or ethical schools, to respect the “musts” of that religion or ethical school, then to the extent that he deviates from these covenants, he has committed an immoral act; but in the natural state, free from these covenants, this is not the case. Nevertheless, it is clear that if this same individual begins to commit murder, plunder, and crimes, using the excuse that “I was brought into the world without my knowledge or consent,” his words and behavior are not morally acceptable; for even if he is to take revenge, he must take it from the cause of this situation, not from those who themselves suffer from the same situation and had no role in creating this situation for him or for themselves. At the same time, such an individual has the power and possibility to wrong others in pursuit of his own interests, and if he does not wrong them, he is morally worthy of praise. Therefore, observing the “must-nots,” while being the duty of every moral human being, is also worthy of praise and reward; for he has struggled against his natural inclination to obtain his own interests at any cost. In other words, it is true that such an individual has merely refrained from performing certain actions, but in order to refrain from performing these actions, he has endured many pressures and imposed many austerities upon himself.

3-2_ Comparison of Instances

Another reason for proving the priority of “must-nots” over “musts” is the comparison of two persons, each of whom adheres solely and exclusively to one of these sets of moral rules; that is, on one side, we have someone who believes that only “musts” are valid, and for the realization of these “musts,” no “must-nots” exist; on the other side, someone who considers himself bound by no “musts,” yet at the same time, observes all “must-nots.”

To better picture these two individuals, let us try to clarify their instances more vividly: the first person strives all his life to help people, to give of his wealth to others, to use his time to console and comfort people, to think about expanding justice in the world, to risk his health to save the lives of others, and to warn people about the dangers of this world and the hereafter; yet at the same time, on this path, he neither refrains from lying and fabricating falsehoods, nor from harming some individuals to help others, nor from slandering and defaming those he thinks obstruct his way, nor even from murder and violating the lives and honor of those who oppose his aspirations. Of such individuals, of course, our world is not lacking.

On the other side is a person who neither gives disinterested help to anyone, nor dedicates his time freely to the teaching and training of others, nor chats and laughs with those around him and speaks sweetly to them, nor is willing to sacrifice his life for his compatriots, nor even takes a single step toward establishing justice in the world and awakening people. He is the most reclusive of recluses, and sometimes, selfishly and heedless of the suffering of others, he heads into the wilderness, and if his interests and needs do not compel him, he will have no presence whatsoever in society. At the same time, he is very much bound not to lie to anyone, not to commit injustice against anyone, not even against animals and plants, not to set others against one another with his words, and in short, not to transgress against anyone's rights.

It is clear that by no ethical standard can the first person be deemed superior to the second; for someone who readily commits injustice against others cannot claim to be just, and at the same time, his service to others is also a kind of injustice to himself and even to those who are the recipients of his service. It is an injustice to himself because he has devoted all or most of his time to the alleged service of some, and to injustice against some others, and has neglected himself and his own needs; whereas ethics pertains first and foremost to the self, and one must attend to one's own needs, problems, and issues before turning to others. He has also committed an injustice against those he serves, because he has made them a pretext and a means for injustice against others, and has rendered those served hated and envied in the eyes of the wronged, without the served themselves being aware of this situation or consenting to it. For example, if a ruler, in order to appear benevolent and generous before his kin, lavishes his own wealth without reckoning upon his children and kin, then the children and kin, without desiring it and solely because of the ruler's unwarranted favor and generosity, become hated by the subjects.

This is while the second person, who observes all the prohibitions and is indifferent to the obligations, has at least served one person, and that is himself. If a person has spent his entire life gathering knowledge for himself and has not dedicated even an hour to teaching and instruction, despite being accused of intellectual miserliness, he has at least benefited his own soul with the amount of knowledge he desired, and has at least shown a silent, unconditional kindness to one person. This is while no one can morally have expectations of him, because he has committed no injustice against anyone in return for which he would be obliged to show favor and generosity.

Now that the moral superiority of the second person over the first has become clear, we must seek the cause of this superiority, and the cause of this superiority is nothing other than the priority and preference of prohibitions over obligations.

4-2- The Conditionality of Obligations

We said that 'oughts' are realized and implemented when an action is performed, and every action necessarily has consequences. Of course, the expectation is that ethical actions will have good consequences; for the intention in them is good, they render a service to people, and they lift a burden from others' shoulders. Nevertheless, since these ethical actions usually run counter to the natural course of things and entail making changes to the existing state of affairs, in most cases they disrupt the natural state, and not only does the original problem remain unsolved, but new problems are added to the first. For example, giving even a small amount of help to street beggars not only fails to address their permanent need but also increases their numbers. It might be said that beggars do not fundamentally need help, and this assistance is not ethically permissible; but Garrett Hardin, one of the greatest ecologists of our time, demonstrated in his article "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor" that sending food aid to famine-stricken Africans (whose need for help is certainly real) merely causes a population of one million famine victims to become two million the following year, and this manipulation of nature is detrimental to the famine victims themselves, to other creatures on Earth, and even to the Earth itself (see: Hardin, 1974). In fact, when we engage in benevolence, aid, and all affirmative ethical actions, we are often, unintentionally and inevitably, focused on the part rather than the whole, and what is good for a part may well be evil for the whole, and what is beneficial in the short term may be harmful in the long term. A holistic perspective deems many of the changes that the ethical human considers necessary for nature to be unnecessary and even harmful.

It is for this reason that conditions, or in other words, 'ought-nots,' are established for every ethical 'ought.' For example, they say that if one is to give something to someone, this help must not make them dependent; it must not have a competitive aspect; it must not be such that the recipient feels ashamed; one must not expect anything in return (see: Malekian, lecture Ethics of Social Relief). This discussion is separate from the fact that in some cases, one fundamentally ought not to help and scratch where it does not itch; for this 'ought-not' nullifies the 'ought' itself and is not considered a condition or stipulation for that ethical matter. Similarly, if one is to tell the truth, it must not cause unnecessary suffering; it must not be in an inappropriate tone or stem from vengefulness or envy, and of course, as with the previous case, fundamentally "not every truth ought to be told."

This is while no 'ought-not' is contingent upon one or more 'oughts'; for the realization of an 'ought-not' fundamentally depends on an action not being performed, and an action that is not performed has no consequence that could have a negative part. For example, if it is said that one ought not to commit injustice, it is not the case that it is said, "One ought not to commit injustice, and before this not-committing-injustice, one must first do several other things or ensure the fulfillment of several conditions." Of course, it is true that in some cases, we are compelled to choose the lesser of two evils and, in fact, disregard one 'ought-not' to observe another; but this is in cases where we are forced to uphold one of two 'ought-nots,' which is a separate discussion; meaning, if it were just us and a single 'ought-not,' and no other 'ought-not' conflicted with it, there would be no need to consider any 'ought'; this is while in every independent and solitary 'ought,' observing one or more 'ought-nots' is ethically necessary.

By this account, observing all 'ought-nots' can be recommended to all people without any concern, without them being obliged to think, assess conditions, or conduct research before observing them; but to recommend any ethical 'ought' to people, one must also be concerned about its conditions and consequences and advise them to be mindful of the conditions before performing any ethical action; although one cannot be certain that the moral agent, even with attention to and consideration of all conditions, will not still create an undesirable change in the favorable natural state.

3_ Examining Malekian's Theory

With the picture of oughts and ought-nots that has been presented, let us turn to two of Malekian’s claims. He says, firstly, that refraining from violating the rights of others and not allowing others to violate one’s own rights is not part of ethics, but rather pertains to being a good citizen; secondly, that ethics begins with gratuitous giving (Malekian, 1394). In terms appropriate to this article’s expression, Professor Malekian says that ethical ought-nots are not part of ethics; rather, ethics begins with ethical oughts.

This statement of Malekian’s conflicts with his own earlier interpretations and views on the nature of ethics, and it is evident that it represents one of his transformations in the field of ethics; for he previously said that ethics is a set of inner oughts and ought-nots (Malekian, 1380, p. 290) and that an ethical human being is one whose circle of the permitted is, even if only slightly, smaller than their circle of the possible (Malekian, 1387, p. 373). That the criterion for being ethical is the circle of the permitted being smaller than the circle of the possible precisely confirms this article’s claim that ethics is, primarily and essentially, the observance of ought-nots.

Of course, it is evident that in his new theory, Professor Malekian also considers being a good citizen a prerequisite for being an ethical human being, and in this respect, he precisely confirms the priority of ought-nots over oughts, as claimed by this article; yet in another way, he is implying that the ethical importance of oughts is far greater than that of ought-nots; because no one enters the realm of ethics merely by observing ought-nots, but this same person, as soon as they perform one ethical ought, which consists of gratuitous giving, becomes an ethical human being to the extent of that ethical ought.

In the continuation of the article, we will examine Malekian’s two main claims in light of the preceding discussion.

1-3_ Observing justice has nothing to do with ethics

Malekian says that observing justice, or in other words refraining from violating the rights of others and not allowing others to violate one’s own rights, or in a third formulation, observing ethical ought-nots, has nothing whatsoever to do with ethics; rather, it pertains solely to the regulations of citizenship and the domain of law, where the realm of law is the realm of equal exchange (Malekian, 1394); that is, anyone who upholds an ought-not does so merely for the sake of observing citizenship regulations, and if they do not observe them, the government or law enforcer will punish them; therefore, it seems that a person who upholds ought-nots behaves solely out of fear of external punishment and is engaged in a transaction; that is, they commit no crime in order not to be punished. It is certain that transactional and purely profit-oriented behavior, at least in deontological and virtue ethics schools, does not merit the title of ethical behavior.

But is this really the case? Are all ought-nots and acts of non-violation like this? Has a person who refrains from eating meat, despite its pleasure and for the sake of not being cruel to animals, behaved transactionally, even though neither religious law nor secular law has any ruling or opinion prohibiting it, and indeed promotes the opposite? Have they not struggled against their own pleasure-seeking desire? Is someone who never lies, even for their own certain interests, or who, for the sake of other citizens and future generations, refrains from bathing in a full tub and washing their car and doorstep with abundant water, and thus fights against their natural sense of pleasure-seeking and comfort-seeking, not worthy of the ethical title? What difference is there between someone who forgoes their own property for others, and someone who forgoes their own time and inconveniences their body so as not to pollute the air with their private car, and uses public transport or a bicycle for commuting? Is such a person, who has upheld an important ought-not—namely, not polluting the air—and has expended their own time and effort to avoid violating the rights of others, less worthy of admiration and praise than the gratuitous givers whose gratuitous giving, in Malekian’s terms, usually wells up from middle age onward?

Even if all instances of non-aggression against the rights of others were merely transactional, it would still not justify Malekian’s claim that these are not ethical and that gratuitous giving is ethical; for it has been said many times, and psychologically proven, that gratuitous giving also benefits the agent first, and only then others. That is, if I give money to a poor person, it is more to quell my inner suffering or for my own spiritual elevation than to meet that person’s need—if we do not say that this giving, unwittingly and unknowingly, stems from hypocrisy or keeping up appearances, childhood habit and upbringing, or social pressure and embarrassment. Therefore, Professor Malekian must clearly state the reason why observing justice (or, in the terms of this article, safeguarding the “ought nots”) has nothing to do with ethics, while gratuitous giving does, and is essentially the beginning of ethics.

2-3_ Gratuitous Giving as the Basis of Ethical Living

Even if we accept that observing the “ought nots” has nothing to do with living ethically, gratuitous giving cannot be considered the basis of ethical living; for even if our perspective is entirely anthropocentric, rather than being creature-centered, nature-oriented, or, to put it better, holistic (and there are many objections to this presupposition), the criterion for ethical living must be “concern for human beings” or, loosely speaking, “helping human beings,” not gratuitous giving. Concern is certainly different from gratuitous giving and broader than it; for it sometimes requires taking something from people, sometimes necessitates inflicting suffering upon them, and sometimes involves warning them—none of which fit within the common understanding of gratuitous giving. If I see a one-year-old child playing with a very sharp knife and consider myself bound by a moral “ought,” I must take the knife from their hand. If, while mountaineering on a snowy, extremely cold peak, my companion has fallen asleep from sheer exhaustion and is at risk of death, I must keep them awake by slapping them, and if I see someone heading toward the summit via a dangerous route, I must warn them. All of these are among the “oughts” whose inclusion under the title of gratuitous giving is, at the very least, strained. Moreover, each of the aforementioned cases has far fewer unintended consequences than gratuitous giving, and in this respect, they take precedence over it. Therefore, gratuitous giving is merely a part of my concern for others, and that too its final stage; that is, a kindness I can do for others, and if I do not do it, I have not fallen outside the circle of ethical human beings. It is also a kindness that, if performed without considering all its conditions and requirements, not only fails to be an ethical act, but becomes an unethical one.

In other words, the concern of an ethical human being, before being directed at reducing the inequalities of existence, must be the safeguarding of the existing situation and preventing the creation of further inequalities, and prior to that, it must be directed at not adding to inequalities. If I myself have not added to the world’s inequalities, in the next stage I must strive to prevent others from adding to these inequalities, and if I succeed in that as well, I must, by observing very difficult conditions and with a godlike holism, endeavor to eliminate the world’s inequalities. Of course, if I do not fulfill this final “ought,” I am morally deserving of no blame whatsoever; for performing this arduous task requires a competence that I may not see in myself, and inaction for this reason is the very essence of observing ethics.

Summary and Conclusion

In this article, the two main components of ethics, namely oughts and ought-nots, were first discussed, and it was then shown that ought-nots take priority over oughts. Justice, according to Malekian's definition, is more concerned with observing ought-nots, and in this respect, if he says that justice has nothing to do with the ethical life, he is in fact expelling ought-nots from the realm of ethics, which seems to contradict both his own previous views and what reason requires. Observing ought-nots, and in fact not violating the rights of others, is firstly an ethical priority, and secondly, because it involves self-discipline and forgoing one's own interests for the benefit of others, it is entirely worthy of the title of ethical life. Furthermore, gratuitous giving as an ethical act requires the observance of many ought-nots, and sometimes, due to its numerous conditions and requirements, its performance becomes impossible. Finally, it was shown that even if we consider living justly to be unrelated to living ethically, we still cannot say that the basis of living ethically is gratuitous giving; rather, living ethically sometimes requires actions contrary to gratuitous giving and sometimes requires actions completely opposed to it. Therefore, if we wish to separate living justly from the ethical life and introduce a higher-order ethics, the suggestion of this article is to consider "concernedness" as the criterion and basis of living ethically, not gratuitous giving, which is a simple yet impossible matter.

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