Hossein Emami's Article 'Mostafa Malekian and the Call for the Separation of Ethics from Religion'

Mostafa Malekian and the Call for the Separation of Ethics from Religion

Hossein Emami; Friday, 28 March 2025

Professor Mostafa Malekian delivered a talk entitled “The Evolution of Ethics in Iran and the World” on 4 February 2025 at the Iranian Association for Ethics in Science and Technology, in which ethics is presented as the sole refuge for the growth and prosperity of society, and suggestions are offered towards the realization of this goal. This content is inherently significant and represents the quintessence of many of his sayings and writings; however, it also contains ambiguities that, without being unpacked and clarified, prevent the content from possessing the necessary soundness and rigor. Therefore, some observations on this matter are presented in this essay.

1- The idea that ethics is the sole refuge for the security, tranquility, and flourishing of individuals in a society, and that if we submit to grounding ethics in religions, denominations, and metaphysical beliefs and conceptually extract ethics from religions, schools, and isms, ethics becomes a plaything in the hands of the theological orientations of various schools and isms and is subject to misuse, is a logical and acceptable statement. He goes on to state that the universe, the natural world, and the human world are far too complex for any absolute statement to be made about them; for this reason, ethics should not be founded upon any corresponding understanding of the world, and there are mysteries about which reason can have no decisive say. Therefore, Mr. Malekian proposes that the umbilical cord of ethics must be severed from theology and mysteries, because otherwise, the ground is prepared for charlatans as spokespersons for mysteries, who then engage in seduction. However, it must be noted that ethics is a very general concept; hence, he should have clearly stated whether he means all types of ethics or only a part of it. Because if ethics is meant in an absolute sense—and his expression indicates absoluteness—it is certainly an incorrect statement; for there is no theological or metaphysical approach that does not demand its own specific ethical requirements. Can one accept that the lived ethics of a person who believes in an afterlife be equated with that of a materialist who reduces everything to a few days of worldly life? And has there ever been a belief in history that was neutral toward all parts of ethics and, using its own specific criteria, judged other believers and deprived them of their human rights? The answer is undoubtedly negative; therefore, severing the umbilical cord of ethics from beliefs is a baseless statement both logically and historically. Perhaps Mr. Malekian means social ethics, not individual ethics; that part of ethics which deals with regulating human relations with one another. In this realm of social ethics, if we seek the peaceful coexistence of humankind in such a way that a safe space is provided for the flourishing and perfection of the human species, we have no choice but to sever the umbilical cord of ethics from theological beliefs. Of course, this approach, in that it affirms the dignity of the human being qua human, has a cause-and-effect relationship with a belief in human rights, and it is the belief in inherent dignity that can institutionalize a form of ethics in society such that believers in no religion, denomination, or school can use their own specific criteria to evaluate and judge other believers and deprive them of their human rights. Therefore, Mr. Malekian's statement regarding social ethics, and that this type of ethics should not conceptually be derived from any particular school, is entirely justified; however, it is by no means true regarding individual ethics, and the truth is that religions and many schools have been very effective in realizing and institutionalizing ethics, and they can also play a role in the domain of individual ethics, both conceptually and in terms of instances. Another point that must be seriously considered is that Mr. Malekian states: We should not concern ourselves with beliefs; we should concern ourselves with functions! The question is: function in relation to what matter and what goal? Because no form of ethical living can be considered neutral and indifferent toward any belief. For example, he sees an unbreakable link between an individual's happiness and inner satisfaction, tranquility, and joy; nevertheless, what causes inner satisfaction, tranquility, and joy among human beings is not uniform, and there is an undeniable relationship between a person's way of looking at these fundamental categories and their beliefs. It is entirely possible that a form of ethical living may bring inner satisfaction, tranquility, and joy to some, and produce the opposite for others, and for some, due to differences in their foundational beliefs, produce the opposite. And if we set the criterion for the positive function of ethics as the growth of love, compassion, and benevolence among the members of a society, this too, as mentioned, is justifiable in connection with human rights and a certain form of belief. The conclusion is that severing the umbilical cord of ethics in an absolute sense from beliefs and focusing on the functions of ethics seems to be a superficially appealing but optimistic statement, and it conflicts with Mr. Malekian's own practical and theoretical approach; for he says: "I am not concerned about tradition, nor about modernity, nor about civilization, nor about culture, nor about any abstract matter of this kind.

من دلنگران انسان‌های گوشت و پوست و خون‌داری هستم که می‌آیند، رنج می‌برند و می‌روند.» و همچنین می‌گوید: «جز درد و رنج انسان هیچ چیزی نباید مطمع نظر ما باشد هر چیز دیگری مسئله‌نماست نه مسئله.» لذا اگر بخواهیم در یک چینش منطقی به استنتاج از سخنان آقای ملکیان بپردازیم چنین می‌شود: درد و رنج انسان مسئله‌ی اصلی ایشان است و برای رشد و کاستن درد و رنج بهترین پناهگاه اخلاق است و برای این‌که بتوانیم از صعوبت نهادینه کردن اخلاق بکاهیم، باید بند ناف اخلاق را از الهیات و ادیان و همه‌ی ایسم‌ها قطع کنیم و به باورهای مردم کاری نداشته باشیم در نتیجه‌ای که انتظار می‌رود، آقای ملکیان در تمرکز در کاربرد اخلاق و دعوت به آن در جهت رشد انسان و کاستن درد و رنج مردم در تلاش است و کاری به باورهای مردم ندارد؛ در حالی‌که به نظر می‌رسد ایشان امروز شاخص‌ترین منتقد عقائد، باورها و اعتقادات اسلامی است و در واقع تبیین بخشی از پروژه‌ی عقلانیت و معنویت وی با اثبات تعارض تعقل و تعبد گره خورده است؛ تعبدی که در فهم ایشان قوام و ستون اصلی دینداری پیروان ادیان ابراهیمی است. مدتی قبل[اوایل اسفندماه سال گذشته] در گفت‌وگویی که با استاد ملکیان داشتم، اصرار ایشان بر تخریب باور مؤمنان برای تمامی حضار در جلسه کاملاً آشکار بود؛ لذا انتظار از آقای ملکیان این بود که یا به مقوله‌ی باورها نپردازد یا اینکه تلاش کند تا جایی‌که ممکن است از باورها، تفسیر اخلاقی به‌دست دهند و بطون اخلاقی متون مقدس را نمایان سازد و در سطح ظاهر آنها و به قول خودشان دین نهادینه‌شده‌ی تاریخی توقف ننماید؛ اما صد البته ایشان به‌صورتی کاملاً ذات‌گرایانه و دگماتیک، در توجیه عدم توفیق میان دین و عقلانیت، ارتجاعی‌ترین خوانش را از دین برجسته می‌نماید تا دستاویزی برای متهم‌سازی و نامعقول‌سازی جلوه دادن دین و گزاره‌های آن، در دست داشته باشد!

2- Mr. Malekian states that because the world is complex and we cannot have theoretically precise knowledge that corresponds to reality, there are therefore many "mysteries" in the world—things about which we can say nothing, neither negatively nor affirmatively—and ethics must never be made dependent on the knowledge of mysteries; for this would result in nothing but the postponement and non-realization of ethics, and we must attend to the functions of ethics. A point that must be considered here is this: the world is very complex, and it is possible that there are infinite mysteries in this world that have never even crossed our minds, let alone allowed us to express anything about them. This is, of course, a true statement, but in the meantime, there are things about which human beings have spoken, such as God, God's speaking to humanity, revelation, and the afterlife; first, most human beings throughout history, although they did not claim that anything could theoretically be said about them, have nonetheless accepted the testimony of prophets and mystics, and the prophets and individuals of their kind claim to have undergone a process for speaking of things that are theoretically true, such that anyone who adopts their method and principles as a model can also, in some way, attain knowledge of these mysteries; second, speaking about mysteries is a matter of gradation; to hold that we must either obtain detailed and precise information about them or have no knowledge of them whatsoever is not a justified view; of course, some things may be a mystery for the analytical intellect, but neither is this intellect the sole instance of rationality, nor are the sources of knowledge confined to ratiocination alone. Third, this type of knowledge is persuasive, not argumentative, and in the court of reason's judgment, it tolerates no anti-rational speech; for the matters received from these special individuals are not such that they present us with a naked truth to which reason has no path but unconditional surrender; because, from our experience of the works of prophets and mystics, as soon as we encounter them, hermeneutics and repeated interpretations interpose and mediate. Fourth, the use of a sacred text is valid only for the followers of that religion; therefore, one can benefit from the achievements of prophets and mystics in individual and intra-group ethics, that is, among the followers of a specific religion, but in social ethics, which is formed on the basis of belief in human rights, only collective and intersubjective reason should serve as the foundation.

3- At the end of his talk, continuing his call for a separation between ethics and beliefs, Professor Malekian states that an individual can be religious and ethical, or anti-religious and ethical! The concept of "religion" in Malekian's statements is ambiguous; for if what is meant is historically institutionalized religion, this religion, in his view, suffers from internal and external contradictions and harsh, anti-ethical rulings, and its constitutive element is dogmatic submission, which is the antithesis of rationality; so how is it conceivable that an individual committed to such a religion could at the same time be ethical?! And if what is meant by religion is not historically institutionalized religion but a rationally acceptable and defensible approach whose constitution is not dogmatic submission but ratiocination, how is it possible for someone who is in conflict with such a religion to become adorned with morality?