How French “Intellectuals” Ruined the West: Postmodernism and Its Consequences

How French “Intellectuals” Ruined the West: Postmodernism and Its Consequences

Helen Pluckrose

Postmodernism poses a threat not only to democracy but to modernity itself. This may seem like a bold or exaggerated claim, but the reality is that the set of beliefs and values lying at the heart of postmodernism have broken through the boundaries of the academic environment and gained considerable power in Western society. Although the irrational and identitarian “symptoms” of postmodernism are easily recognizable and have been heavily criticized, the traits and characteristics latent within them are not well understood. Part of the problem lies with the postmodernists themselves, who rarely explain their positions explicitly, and another part stems from the internal contradictions and inconsistencies of a mindset that denies the existence of stable reality or reliable knowledge. Nevertheless, coherent ideas are rooted deep within postmodernism, and understanding them is essential if we intend to confront them. These beliefs underpin the problems we witness today at the heart of social justice activism; beliefs that, behind the delegitimization of leftist movements, have placed us at risk of regressing into a kind of pre-modern, irrational, and tribalistic culture.

Postmodernism, simply put, is an artistic and philosophical movement that began in France in the 1960s and resulted in the production of strange artworks and even stranger “theories.” This movement, on the one hand, saw itself in the lineage of avant-garde and surrealist art, and on the other, felt an affinity for earlier philosophical beliefs, particularly the ideas of Nietzsche and Heidegger, due to their anti-realist nature and their skepticism towards the existence of a single, coherent concept of selfhood. The movement reacted negatively against the liberal humanism seen in modernist artistic and intellectual movements; movements that, from the postmodernists' perspective, naively attempt to impose the Western, male, middle-class experience as a universal reality.

Building on these accusations, postmodernism rejected philosophy that celebrates ethics, reason, and clarity. The “structuralist” movement, which (often with excessive recklessness) attempted to analyze human culture and psychology based on unified structures of connections and kinships, came under attack. The Marxist school and its interpretation of society and class and economic structures were considered equally rigid and simplistic. Above all, science and the scientific approach, whose goal is to attain objective knowledge about the existence of a reality independent of human sensory perceptions, did not escape the postmodernist assault; they viewed science as merely another form of fabricated ideology dominated by bourgeois and Western assumptions. Postmodernism possessed both nihilistic sentiments and revolutionary characteristics, and as an undeniably leftist movement, it resonated with the post-war and post-imperial spirit of the Western world. As postmodernism expanded and diversified, its destructive, nihilistic aspect, which was initially stronger, fell behind its revolutionary “identity politics” aspect and (though still holding a foundational position) was relegated to second place.

The question of whether postmodernism constitutes a reaction to modernity has long been contentious. The modern era is a historical period that witnessed events such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Scientific Revolution, and the evolution of liberal values and human rights; a period in which Western societies gradually recognized the value of reason and science as paths to acquiring knowledge, as opposed to faith and superstition, and cultivated a concept of the human being and their individuality as a unique member of the human race, endowed with rights and freedoms, rather than being defined within the framework of various groups and subservient to rigid hierarchical roles in society.

Although, according to the Encyclopædia Britannica, postmodernism is “largely a reaction to the philosophical assumptions and values of the modern period in the history of the West (especially in Europe),” the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, rejecting this theory, acknowledges that “its incongruities are rooted in modernity itself, and postmodernism is a continuation of modern thought in a different method and style.” In my view, however, the differences lie in whether we interpret modernity in light of its products, or by relying on what it has destroyed. If we consider the essence of modernity to be the evolutionary course of science and rationality, alongside humanism and universal liberalism, this is precisely what postmodernists oppose. At the opposite point, however, if we regard modernity as the destructive force of power structures, including feudalism, the institution of religion, patriarchy, and absolute rule, postmodernists insist on continuing this path; yet their target of attack and victim today is science, rationality, humanism, and liberalism. Consequently, the roots of postmodernism are inherently political and revolutionary, although its mechanism is destructive, or, in their own words, deconstructive.

The term “postmodern” was coined by Jean-François Lyotard in 1979 in the book The Postmodern Condition. The postmodern condition, by his definition, is a kind of “incredulity toward metanarratives.” A metanarrative is a type of comprehensive and coherent explanation of large-scale phenomena. Religion and other overarching ideologies that strive to explain the meaning of life and all the harmful aspects of society fall into the category of metanarratives. Lyotard emphasized replacing these with “small narratives” in order to achieve smaller, more personal “truths.” He defined not only Christianity and Marxism but also science within such a framework.

In his view, “there is a strong link between the language of science and the language of ethics and politics” (p. 8). By tying science and its epistemic outcomes to government and power, he denies the neutrality and objectivity [of science]. Lyotard considers this skeptical stance of postmodernism a general issue and argues that since the end of the nineteenth century, “a kind of internal erosion in the principle of the legitimacy of knowledge” emerged, which led to a transformation in the situation and status of knowledge (p. 39). In the 1960s, the “doubt” and “demoralization” of scientists [which arose from that internal erosion] “affected the fundamental problem of legitimation” (p. 8). It is unlikely that any scientist’s statements—that the results of scientific methods are always provisional; that hypotheses are never “proven”; and that none of this causes demoralization or doubt among scientists regarding the pursuit of scientific work—could dissuade Lyotard from such judgments.

In Lyotard’s thought, we witness a kind of epistemological relativism (i.e., belief in personal or culturally specific truths and facts) and a defense of the advantage of “lived experience” over empirical evidence. We also witness the promotion of a version of pluralism that prefers the views of minority groups over the general consensus of scientists, or over the principles of liberal-democratic ethics, which [by postmodernists] are recognized as dogmatic phenomena. These are fixed principles in postmodern thought.

The works of Michel Foucault are also centered on language and relativism, although he extended these discussions to the domains of history and culture. He called this tendency “archaeology” because he saw himself as “uncovering” aspects of human historical culture that are recorded in the form of discourses (speeches that promote or advocate a particular viewpoint). In Foucault’s thought, discourses control everything that is “knowable,” and in different eras and lands, the responsibility for inspecting and regulating discourses falls upon various networks of the power institution. Hence, knowledge is the direct product of the power institution. “In every culture and at every point in history, there is always only one ‘episteme’ that defines the possible conditions for all knowledge, whether expressed in a theoretical form or in a creeping, practical manner.”[1]

Moreover, people themselves are constructs and products of culture. “The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces.”[2] On this basis, virtually no room remains for individual will or autonomy. According to Christopher Butler [Professor of English Literature at the University of Oxford], Foucault “relies on beliefs that attribute an inherent evil to the class position or professional situation of individuals—beliefs called ‘discourse’—and in doing so, ignores the quality of morality in individual conduct.”[3] In his view, medieval feudalism and liberal democracy are equally repressive; hence, he advocates criticizing and attacking them in order to expose “that political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them.”[4]

In Foucault’s thought, we witness the most extreme form of cultural relativism, interpreted within the matrix of power structures; a school of thought almost entirely devoid of common humanity and individuality. Instead, the identity of individuals in society is shaped and defined by their views and judgments regarding dominant cultural beliefs; judgments that place them in the ranks of the oppressors or among the subjugated. Judith Butler’s [American philosopher and feminist critic] fundamental role in articulating and developing queer theory, which emphasizes the culturally constructed nature of gender, is indebted to Foucault’s ideas; Edward Said [Palestinian-American literary theorist and cultural critic] in articulating postcolonial discourse and “Orientalism,” and Kimberlé Crenshaw [American theorist, lawyer, and civil rights activist] in developing intersectionality theory and advocating for identity politics, have also been influenced by Foucault’s works and views. Here, on the one hand, we witness the equation of the phenomenon of language with elements of violence and threat, and on the other, a perspective that considers universal reason and liberalism as coeval with suffering and repression.

Jacques Derrida, who first introduced the concept of “deconstruction,” also acknowledged cultural constructionism and cultural and personal relativism. He had an even greater and clearer focus on the subject of language. Derrida’s very famous statement that “there is nothing outside the text” illuminates his skepticism regarding the impossibility of words signifying a precise and straightforward concept. In other words, “presence is only a determination of the trace, apart from any absolute center.”

Therefore, the author of a text is not the final authority for understanding its meaning. The reader or listener arrives at an interpretation of the text's meaning that is correct in its own right, and every text "leads to the production of an infinite number of new interpretive contexts that manifest themselves in an insatiable manner." Derrida coined a term, différance, derived from the verb differer; a verb meaning both "to defer" and "to differ." The point was that not only does meaning never reach its finality, but its existence is constituted by distinctions, especially opposing forces. The word "young" only gains meaning through its relationship with the word "old"; following Saussure [the Swiss linguist and semiotician], Derrida argues that meaning is constituted by the clash of these opposing elements, and in his view, it is these very oppositions that always lead to the formation of positive and negative interpretations. "Man" is a positive concept and "woman" is negative. "West" is positive and "East" is negative. He emphasized that "we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of two opposing terms, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other (axiologically, logically, etc.) or has the upper hand. To deconstruct the opposition, first of all, one must overthrow the hierarchy itself."[5] Hence, deconstruction involves inverting such a perception of hierarchy, that is, transforming "woman" and "East" into positive concepts and "man" and "West" into negative ones. This must be done ironically to reveal the culturally-constructed and conventional nature of these supposed oppositions engaged in an unequal struggle.

In Derrida's works, we encounter a more advanced form of relativism, both from a cultural and epistemological perspective and in the direction of a more robust justification for identity politics. In his view, the notion that the reason for differences is anything other than the opposition of terms and concepts is explicitly rejected; this is why we see the liberal values of the Enlightenment—such as overcoming differences, focusing on universal human rights, personal freedoms, and the empowerment of human individuality—explicitly denied. Here we witness the formation of the basis for the "ironic hatred of men," the slogan "reverse racism is not real," and the emphasis on the intellectual position that a person's identity and who they are is the rule and arbiter of everything that is comprehensible. We also see the rejection of any need for clarity in speech and reasoning, for correctly understanding the theories of others, and for avoiding misinterpretations. The speaker's intention is irrelevant. What matters is how the speech has an impact. Such a view, alongside Foucauldian ideas, underpins current beliefs about the highly destructive nature of "microaggressions" and the misuse of terms related to gender, race, or sexual orientation.

Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida are only three of the “founding fathers” of postmodernism, but traces of their beliefs can be seen in the positions and themes of other renowned and influential “theorists,” and have been followed by later postmodernists who have applied the ideas of these three in a highly diverse range of disciplines across the social sciences and humanities. In this context, we witness an acute sensitivity to language at the level of lexical analysis, as well as a vague and fluid conception holding that the speaker’s intended meaning is less important than how that speech is understood by others—regardless of how much excess has been employed in interpretation. Shared humanity and individuality are, in principle, nothing more than an illusion, and different individuals, according to their social position, are either counted among the promoters of discourses or among their victims; a situation that is more dependent on identity than on their individual interaction with society. Morality, like reality itself, is a culturally relative concept. Empirical evidence is suspect, and any dominant cultural ideas such as science, rationality, and universal liberalism must be viewed with skepticism. The values derived from the Enlightenment are all naive, totalitarian, and oppressive, and shattering them is a moral imperative. What matters far more is the lived experience, narratives, and beliefs of “marginalized” groups, all of which are not only equally “valid” but must also be granted a special immunity and right against Enlightenment values; an immunity with whose help they can overturn the oppressive, unjust, and entirely arbitrary social structure based on reality, morality, and knowledge.

The desire to “shatter” the status quo, to challenge long-standing values and institutions, and to defend the rights of the marginalized are thoroughly liberal characteristics. Opposing this is an undeniably conservative act. This is a historical fact, but we are at a very peculiar juncture in history where the status quo is predominantly and consistently liberal; a liberalism that upholds the values of freedom, rights, and equal opportunities for all human beings, regardless of their gender, race, and sexual orientation. It is a bewildering and astonishing situation that liberals who spent a lifetime wishing to protect this kind of liberal condition find themselves in the position of conservatives, and those who wanted to distance themselves from conservatism at any cost find themselves in the position of defending irrationality and opposing liberalism. Although the early postmodernists largely sought to challenge discourse with discourse, the activists influenced by their ideas are increasingly becoming authoritarian figures and follow those ideas only insofar as they aid their conclusions. Freedom of speech is under threat because speech itself is now considered a dangerous phenomenon. Speaking has become such a dangerous phenomenon that those who call themselves liberals can nowadays justify resorting to violence in response to it. These days, frequent references to identity and appeals to sheer anger have often replaced the use of rational arguments to convincingly defend an opinion or issue.

Contrary to all available evidence that racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, and misogyny are at their lowest levels in history, leftist university professors and militant social justice activists have become the portraitists of a deterministic and inescapable pessimism arising from a kind of postmodern interpretive “reading”; a reading that valorizes confirmation bias. The authoritarian power of postmodern professors and activists seems to be hidden from their own eyes, while its existence is certain and obvious to others. As Andrew Sullivan [the British-American author, journalist, and political commentator] says on the subject of intersectionality:

[Intersectionality] presupposes a kind of classical orthodoxy by which all human experience is explained—and all discourse must be sifted and purified through it... Like the Puritan school once famous in New England [America], intersectionality polices language and holds all terms of discourse under its control.

Postmodernism has become a kind of Lyotardian metanarrative; a kind of Foucauldian power-centered system of obscure and diffuse discourse, and a kind of Derridean repressive hierarchy.

The logical problem of self-reference has been pointed out to postmodernists by philosophers almost continuously, yet it is an issue they have still not addressed convincingly. As Christopher Butler notes, "the validity of Lyotard's claim concerning the decline of metanarratives in the late twentieth century ultimately appeals to the cultural situation of a minority of intellectuals." In other words, Lyotard's claim is rooted directly in the discourses surrounding him within the bourgeois academic bubble, and in fact, this claim itself is a metanarrative in whose truth he harbors no doubt. To the same extent, Foucault's argument that "knowledge" is historically conditioned in nature by individual will and desire must itself be an argument arising from personal interpretation. Similarly, one wonders why Derrida takes the trouble to explain the unlimited malleability of texts at such length, when I can read his entire oeuvre and then, with the same degree of personal and theoretical competence, claim that it is all a story about rabbits.

Of course, this is not the only criticism generally leveled at postmodernism. Philosophers and scientists have emphasized the most glaring problem of cultural/epistemological relativism. In the book Challenging Postmodernism, David Detmer [Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University] says:

Consider this example, posed by Erazim Kohák [Czech writer and philosopher]: "When I try to fit a tennis ball into a wine bottle and fail, I do not need to try several wine bottles or several tennis balls before using J. S. Mill's [nineteenth-century English philosopher] inductive laws and subsequently arriving at the hypothesis that a tennis ball does not fit into a wine bottle"... We are now in a position to reject postmodernist claims of cultural relativism outright and ask, "If, in my judgment, tennis balls do not fit into wine bottles, can you show precisely how my gender, historical and spatial location, social class, ethnicity, and other characteristics pertaining to my person are capable of calling the objectivity of my judgment and discernment into question?"[6]

Nevertheless, he has not found postmodernists to be individuals committed to explaining their reasons and arguments, and in this regard, he points to his bewildering conversation with Lori Calhoun, a postmodernist philosopher: "When an opportunity arose to ask her whether there was any doubt that giraffes are taller than ants, her response was that such a thing is not a certainty, but rather among the firmly held beliefs in our culture."

Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, two American and Belgian physicists, also point to the same problem from the perspective of science in their book Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science: "Who, now, can really question the 'grand narrative' of evolution, except someone captive to a far more improbable personal and cultural narrative such as 'creationism'? And who would want to deny the reality of basic physics? The answer was: 'Some postmodernists.'"

And

It is truly very strange that [from the postmodernist perspective] the activities of scientists who, for example, search for causal laws or a unified theory, or ask whether atoms really obey the laws of quantum mechanics, are all considered activities that are in principle somehow “bourgeois,” or “Eurocentric,” or “patriarchal,” or even “pro-military development.”

To what extent does postmodernism threaten science? Some of these attacks are clearly visible. In the recent protests against a speech by Charles Murray [American political scientist] in the town of Middlebury, protesters chanted in unison: “Science has always been used as a tool to justify racism, sexism, classism, queerphobia, ableism, and homophobia; a tool supported by states and governments in the name of rationality and facts. In today’s world, the likelihood of something truly being ‘factual’ is very slim.”

When the organizers of the “March for Science” tweeted that “colonization, racism, immigration, native rights, sexism, ableism, queerphobia, transphobia, intersexphobia, and economic justice are scientific issues,” many scientists immediately criticized the politicization of the category of science, warning against deviating from the path of science and moving toward the ideology of intersectionality. In South Africa, progressive student movements, behind the hashtags #ScienceMustFall and #DecolonizeScience, declared that science is only one recommended way of acquiring knowledge. In their view, witchcraft and magic can be considered alternative ways to science.

Despite these positions, scientific methodology is not a reed that trembles with these winds. Science cannot be “adjusted” to accommodate epistemological relativism or to entail “alternative ways of knowing.” At the same time, it is possible for public trust in science to be lost and for government funding to be cut subsequently; this is a threat that should not be underestimated. Moreover, in an era when world leaders do not believe in the phenomenon of global warming, and there are families who believe in false claims such as the role of vaccines in causing autism, and there are those who turn to homeopaths and naturopaths for the treatment of dangerous diseases, the continued damage to public trust in the empirical sciences is a danger that threatens the very existence of humanity.

The danger of becoming meaningless and losing currency also lurks for the social sciences and humanities. Some branches of the social sciences have already fallen into this trap. For example, disciplines such as cultural anthropology, sociology, cultural studies, and gender studies have not only almost completely surrendered to moral relativism but have also succumbed to epistemological relativism. Based on my own experience, in the discipline of English literature, we also witness the teaching of a deep form of postmodern orthodoxy. As we have seen, there is no consensus in the discipline of philosophy. The situation is the same in the discipline of history.

Empirical historians, too, are often the target of postmodernist criticism because of their awareness and mastery of past eras and events. Christopher Butler recalls this accusation by Diane Purkiss [Professor of English Literature at the University of Oxford], who said that Keith Thomas [the Welsh historian] lends an air of truth to a myth that bases the historical identity of men on the “incapacity and voicelessness of women.” Thomas [for example in the book Religion and the Decline of Magic (1971)] provides evidence according to which the female witches who were blamed were often weak and helpless women who resorted to begging. Presumably, contrary to the existing historical evidence, he should have claimed that they were wealthy women and even superior to men. According to Butler: “It seems that Thomas’s empirical claims simply conflict with Purkiss’s organizational and inverse principles about the narration of historical events — and that Thomas’s narrative needed to support contemporary views aimed at empowering women.” (A Very Short Introduction to Postmodernism, p. 36)

When I myself wanted to write something about the subject of race and gender at the beginning of the seventeenth century, I encountered such a problem. My argument was that audiences of Shakespeare’s works had little difficulty understanding Desdemona’s affection for the black Othello, who was a Christian and a military commander in the Venetian army, because prejudice based on skin color was not very common before the Atlantic slave trade expanded in the later years of the seventeenth century; and that before this period, religious and national differences had a much longer history. A prominent university professor told me that these words were problematic and wanted to know how black communities in contemporary America would feel and react to my claim. If black people in America today feel bad about these claims, the implication is that either these claims are not true, or that it is morally incorrect to speak of them. As Butler says: “Postmodern thought sees culture as a set of narratives engaged in perpetual conflict, whose usefulness and impact depend more on the judgments of the communities that accept and disseminate them than on an independent standard of judgment.”

I am worried about the future of the humanities.

Nevertheless, the dangers of postmodernism are not limited to small groups within society focused on academic environments and the subject of social justice. Relativist ideas, sensitivity to language, and prioritizing identity over humanity or individuality have come to dominate a larger part of society. Speaking of feelings is far easier than the meticulous examination and assessment of evidence. The freedom to “interpret” reality based on personal values has led to the strengthening of the human tendency toward confirmation bias and emotional reasoning.

It has become common to note that the far right these days is exploiting identity politics and epistemological relativism in a manner very similar to the postmodern left. Of course, far-right attitudes toward subjects such as race, gender, and sexuality have always been controversial and oriented toward irrational and anti-scientific beliefs; but postmodernism has produced a culture that has had far greater appeal and impact in the public sphere. Kenan Malik [British writer, lecturer, and radio broadcaster] describes this shift as follows:

When I recently noted that the idea of “alternative facts” relies on “a set of concepts that have been employed by radicals in recent decades,” I did not mean that Kellyanne Conway [strategist and senior advisor to Donald Trump] or Steve Bannon [American media executive, strategist, and former advisor to the Trump administration] or, to a lesser extent, Trump himself, have studied the works of Foucault or Baudrillard [French philosopher and sociologist]... What I actually meant was that in recent decades, segments of the academic community as well as leftists have helped foster a culture in which relativistic beliefs about truth and knowledge are no longer considered problematic or alarming, thereby providing an opportunity for right-wing reactionaries not only to more comfortably reconstruct their regressive ideas but also to encourage and promote them.

Such a “set of concepts and notions” has exposed us to the danger of returning to the era before the Enlightenment; an age when “reason” was not only considered secondary and inferior to personal faith and beliefs, but was also seen as a sin deserving divine punishment. James K. A. Smith, a Puritan theologian and professor of philosophy [at Calvin University in Michigan, USA], quickly grasped the advantages of such a movement for Christianity and views postmodernism as a “new Pentecost” that “has been poured out to revive the dry bones of the church” (p. 18). In his book Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism?: Taking Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault to Church, he writes:

A thoughtful engagement with postmodernism will encourage us to look backward. As a result, we will see that many of the things that fall under the banner of postmodern philosophy have their gaze fixed on ancient and medieval sources, and this leads to a significant recovery of premodern ways of knowing, living, and human practice. (p. 25)

And that “postmodernism can be a catalyst and organizer for the church to revive its beliefs through it; not as a system of truth emerging from neutral reason, but as a story that requires ‘eyes to see and ears to hear.’” (p. 125)

We on the left should be afraid of what our “fellow travelers” have concocted and produced. Of course, not all the problems of today’s society are the fault of postmodern thought, and insisting on such a position would not be helpful. Moreover, the rise of populism and nationalism in the United States and across Europe is the result of the entrenched existence of the far right alongside the fear of Islamism; a fear that has arisen as a result of the refugee crisis. Adopting an inflexible stance of “anti-social justice warrior” and viewing everything through the lens of this characteristic of the left spectrum means nothing other than falling into the trap of confirmation bias and emotional reasoning. Although the left bears no responsibility for the formation of the far right, religious right-wingers, or secular nationalism, the responsibility for avoiding a rational approach to legitimate concerns, thereby making it harder to gain the support of moderate and centrist individuals, lies directly with the left itself. The left is the agent of its own fragmentation, absolutist demands, and divisiveness; practices that have made even far-right positions appear more rational and coherent by comparison.

The left, in order to regain its credibility, needs to recover a robust, coherent, and reasonable liberalism. To achieve this, we must rid ourselves of postmodern left discourse. We must place the universal principles of freedom, equality, and justice in direct opposition to the conflicts, contentions, and hierarchies of postmodern left discourse. Liberal principles must possess sufficient solidity and coherence to counter any effort that evaluates or restricts individuals based on their race, gender, or sexual orientation. We must speak to the concerns about immigration, globalization, and authoritarian identity politics that have led to the rise of the far right, rather than labeling those who talk about these issues as "racist," "sexist," or "homophobic" and accusing them of verbal violence. We can do all of this while simultaneously standing against those authoritarian segments of the right that are genuinely racist, sexist, or homophobic; the very ones who these days hide behind a reasonable-seeming antipathy toward the postmodern left.

Our current crisis is not about the conflicts between the left and the right, but rather a crisis concerning the alignment of the front of stability, rationality, humility, and universal liberalism against irrationalism, fanatical certainty, and tribal authoritarianism. Whether the postmodern left wins this current war or the post-truth right does, the future of freedom, equality, and justice will be equally dark and grim. Those of our like-minded colleagues who value liberal democracy and the fruits of the Enlightenment, the scientific revolution, and modernity itself must offer a better alternative.

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Translation: M. Moradi

Helen Pluckrose is a British author and cultural critic. What you read is a translation of the following original piece:

Helen Pluckrose, “How French “Intellectuals” Ruined the West: Postmodernism and Its Impact, Explained”, Areo Magazine, March 27, 2017.

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[1] Michel Foucault (2011) The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Routledge, p. 183.

[2] “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth”, Political Theory, 21, pp. 198-227.

[3] Christopher Butler (2002) Postmodernism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, p. 49.

[4] Michel Foucault & Noam Chomsky (2006) The Chomsky – Foucault Debate: On Human Nature. The New Press, p. 41.

[5] Jacques Derrida (1981) Positions. University of Chicago Press, p. 41.

[6] David Detmer (2003) Challenging Postmodernism: Philosophy and the Politics of Truth Prometheus Press, p. 26.

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