اندیشهفلسفهخردگفتگوحکمتمعناپرسشفرهنگ
Philosophy
Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics by Shirzad Peik-Herfeh
Shirzad Peik Herfeh's lectures on political philosophy begin with a questionnaire for gauging political attitudes. The positions of U.S. presidential candidates and German political parties are plotted on a matrix, and the 'harm principle' is explained and critiqued.
Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics
Shirzad Peik-Herfeh
Faculty Member, Department of Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University
Audio of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics by Dr. Shirzad Peik-Herfeh
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Audio of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics, Session 1, Part 1
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Session 1, Part 1: A Panoramic, Problem-Oriented Presentation via a Multiple-Choice Questionnaire
Presentation: Posing over 60 multiple-choice questions;
Exercise: Examining students' answers and the reasons they offer for their own answers and against others' answers;
Production: Students attaining the ability to formulate new, indigenized questions based on the country's current issues.
The "Philosophy of Politics" lecture course begins with the display of over 60 multiple-choice questions via PowerPoint. In response to each question, students must choose one of the options: "Strongly Agree," "Agree," "Disagree," or "Strongly Disagree," and defend their answer against the answers of other students.
These questions have been prepared and arranged to ready students' minds and provide a general, problem-oriented picture of the tangible and concrete (not abstract) topics of "Philosophy of Politics." For this purpose, a matrix consisting of a horizontal axis and a vertical axis is displayed.
The horizontal axis measures "economic attitude," and its two poles are "Right" and "Left." The vertical axis measures "social attitude," and its two poles are "Authoritarian" and "Libertarian."
Furthermore, in the week before the lecture course begins, by visiting the website containing these questions and answering them, students receive a certificate that shows their position on the matrix and the politician closest to their attitude. Participation in the lecture course is conditional upon presenting that certificate.
Some of these questions are as follows:
1- I always support my country, even if my country is in the wrong.
2- No one chooses the land in which they are born; therefore, it is foolish to take pride in it.
3- Our race, compared to other races, possesses many superior characteristics.
4- Controlling inflation is more important than controlling unemployment.
5- It is a sad reflection on our society that something as vital as drinking water is now put into bottles and branded as a consumer product.
6- Sometimes government support for domestic production is necessary in the economy.
7- The wealthy should pay more taxes.
8- Those with high financial means have the right to use better healthcare services.
9- The freer the market, the freer the people.
10- Individuals with hereditary disabilities should not be allowed to reproduce.
11- No media outlet, even if completely impartial, should use public funding.
12- One particular advantage of a single-party state is that it prevents the disputes that delay progress in a democratic political system.
13- Abstract art, which represents nothing at all, should not be considered art at all.
14- Merchants and manufacturers are more important than writers and artists.
15- In helping the needy, the role of charities is more effective than the role of passing protective laws by the state.
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Audio of Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics, Session 1, Part 2
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Tables used in this session: (Download from Server 1 | Server 2)
Session 1, Part 2: US Presidential Election Candidates and German Political Parties
Presentation: Introducing the views of the candidates in the 2016 US presidential election (along with short biographies and an examination of their personal and official websites, Facebook pages, and campaign websites) and German political parties (along with their prominent figures and symbols); especially the anti-immigrant and populist party Alternative for Germany (AFD: Alternative für Deutschland), which at the time of the lecture was predicted to gain attention given the new circumstances in Germany, and after the lecture, it garnered a significant vote in the country's latest election.
US Presidential Election Candidates in 2016
Democrat
1- Bernie Sanders (Senator from Vermont).
2- Hillary Clinton (former US Secretary of State);
Republican
1- Ted Cruz (Senator from Texas);
2- Marco Rubio (Senator from Florida);
3- Donald Trump (billionaire from New York);
4- Jeb Bush (former Governor of Florida).
German Political Parties
1- AFD: Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany party)
2- CDU: Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)
3- SPD: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany)
4- FDP: Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party)
5- Die piraten: Piratenpartei Deutschland
6- Die Linke (The Left party)
7- Die Grünen (The Greens party)
Exercise: Students should be able to guess the responses of the US presidential election candidates and German political parties to the propositions in the first part of the lecture, and by examining the degree to which they are right/left, determine their approximate position on the horizontal axis, and by examining the degree to which they are authoritarian/libertarian, determine their approximate position on the vertical axis.
Production: Students propose new concrete propositions and ask their classmates to guess how U.S. presidential candidates and German political parties would respond to that proposition. Then, the students are divided into groups of four. Each group member proposes three propositions, and from the twelve new propositions, they select one to present as their group’s proposition. A representative from each group writes that proposition on the board, defends it, and asks the other students to guess how U.S. presidential candidates and German political parties would respond to it. At the end, after the representatives of each group have defended their group’s proposition, the best proposition is chosen by the students.
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Audio of Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics, Session 2
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Session 2: Explanation, Analysis, and Critique of the “Harm Principle”
Presentation: The presentation begins with the students’ concrete, everyday propositions. “Each of us is free, insofar as we do not harm the freedom of others.” This sentence is a simplification of what in moral philosophy is called the “harm principle”[1]. According to the “harm principle,” also called the “liberty principle”[2], society is morally permitted to coerce the individual, interfere in their personal affairs, prevent them from doing something[3], or punish them for having done it, only in one instance: when the individual has “harmed”[4] another person or persons. This means that even if an action is, in society’s belief, “foolish,” “deviant,” or “wrong,” as long as it causes no “harm” to anyone, the agent should not be prevented from performing it. The “harm principle” also restrains us from intervening in cases where we believe that doing or not doing something is to the agent’s own detriment or benefit. Restricting an individual’s freedom merely because their thought, speech, or action is incongruent with the majority of society or with customs, habits, and traditions is called the “tyranny of the majority”[5] or the “tyranny of custom”[6], and restricting their freedom for the sake of their own good is called “paternalism.”[7]
Exercise: After being organized into groups of four, the students examine the propositions from the first session based on the “harm principle.” Groups that disagree about the “validity” or “invalidity” of a proposition debate one another to prove their position. At this stage, the professor only plays the role of a moderator and manages the discussion. At the end of each debate, the professor explains each group’s fallacies by offering other concrete examples. Many of these fallacies are recurring. Among these, one can point to incorrect statements used in the discussion that students commonly employ. For example: “Every opinion is respectable”; “I won’t be pushed around.”
Production: Students should be able to assess and categorize various “crimes,” “penalties,” and “punishments” in the criminal laws of different countries. These range widely from the penalty of “not wearing a seatbelt while driving” to the punishment of “execution for mass drug trafficking.” After categorizing them, they judge them based on the “harm principle.” The most important goal at this stage is for students to attain the ability to identify in which cases the output of the “harm principle” is contrary to or contradicts their “settled moral judgments.” This ability enables both the critique of the “harm principle” and the adjustment of their “settled moral judgments.” This method is inspired by John Rawls’s method of “reflective equilibrium.”
[1] harm principle
[2] liberty principle
[3] In Persian texts, in the field of moral philosophy, one of the following equivalents is usually chosen for the English word ‘action’ and its synonyms: ‘fe’l’, ‘amal’, or ‘konesh’. Nevertheless, I consider the word ‘kār’ to be the most expressive, easiest to understand, and most tangible equivalent for this word. One of the most established usages of the word ‘kār’ is, precisely, identical to the English ‘action’. For example, consider these sentences: ‘What kind of kār was this that you did?’; ‘Who did this kār?’; ‘I didn’t do any kār.’ The possibility of using the verb form of ‘kār’—that is, ‘kardan’—and conjugating it is another advantage of using ‘kār’ compared to other equivalents.
[4] harm
[5] tyranny of the majority
[6] despotism of the custom
[7] paternalism
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Audio of Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics, Session 3
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Session 3: On Liberty by J. S. Mill
1- An analysis of the eighteen terms Mill uses in On Liberty to explicate the concept of “harm.”
2- The primary sources of Mill’s thought in On Liberty: Pestalozzi, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Goethe and the German Romantics, William Maccall, Josiah Warren, the United States Constitution, the authors of the Federalist Papers: Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia, Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, John Milton’s Areopagitica.
3- The history and significance of On Liberty.
4- The immense influence of On Liberty on contemporary philosophers of ethics, law, and politics: Berlin (Berlin, 1969), Rawls (Rawls, 1971), Ten (Ten, 1980; 1995), Hart (Hart, 1982), Gray (Gray, 1983; 1989), Berger (Berger, 1984), Feinberg (Feinberg, 1984-8), and Skorupski (Skorupski, 1989).
5- Harms that were considered illegitimate in the England of that day and which Mill in On Liberty regards as “legitimate grievances”; not “illegitimate harms”: Considering the inequality of wealth a harm and the socialists’ demand for the equalization of wealth, considering polygamy in the Mormon faith a harm and prohibiting it, and the like.
6- Instances of liberty in Mill’s On Liberty: “Liberty of thought or opinion,” “liberty of expressing thought or speech,” “liberty of feeling and sentiment,” “liberty of tastes and pursuits of what we like,” “liberty of choosing our own mode of life,” and “liberty of combination among like-minded individuals and founding associations.”
7- The offense of others at the expression of certain racist, xenophobic, and similar thoughts and feelings: Mill knows full well that “the expression of thought and feeling” as well as certain personal behaviors can result in the “offense” of others because others may deem them “foolish,” “perverse,” or “wrong.” Nevertheless, he removes these cases from the list of instances of the “harm principle” and places the blame for the possible “offense” arising from them on the “offended” person and their “intolerance”:
8- Persian translation of the main parts of On Liberty: This book has been translated into Persian twice so far. Both translations are “good” and “readable.” Nevertheless, in On Liberty, Mill uses at least 18 different words for “harm,” a distinction not observed in those two translations. Moreover, at least 3 other reasons also necessitate retranslating the main parts of On Liberty. These 3 reasons are: (1) the proposal of the “narrative theory of subjective harm”; (2) Chin Liew Ten’s new interpretation of On Liberty; and (3) Joel Feinberg’s explanation of the negative part of On Liberty; especially the ten principles that have been used throughout history to restrict liberty and legitimize coercion, which Mill considers illegitimate. These 3 items will be explained in detail in subsequent sessions.
9- One of the most important passages of On Liberty, analyzed in this lecture:
This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived (Mill, [1859] 1998:15-16).
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Audio of Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics, Session 4
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Session Four: Lecture on “Philosophy of Politics”
The “Narrative Theory of Subjective Harm”:
“Be not offended,” but “offend not”!
This session is the most important session of the “Philosophy of Politics” lecture series and contains a theory I put forward a few years ago and have since repeatedly adorned with the ornament of my dear ones’ critiques. Now, too, I look forward to the illuminating critiques and opinions of esteemed intellectuals. What led me to propose the theory of the “permissibility of mental harm” is a long-standing concern: our being “thin-skinned”! The slightest thing rubs us the wrong way! We quickly show an emotional and irrational reaction and deem it an “insult” to ourselves and “immoral.”
Every day we hear these sentences with an “intellectual pose”: “My intelligence was insulted!”; “My feelings were insulted”; “Such-and-such an act is immoral.” Then it suffices to ask according to which theory in “normative ethics” you make such a claim to realize that the gist of the matter is: “I dislike such-and-such a thought, speech, or act”! Or “I lack the capacity to hear opposing views” or “I lack the capacity to lose”! But uttering these sentences is not something just anyone can do; it requires a high degree of “mental health,” “honesty with oneself,” and “self-confidence.” If a person possesses these virtues, their relationship with themselves is clear, as is their relationship with others. And if they do not possess them, what then? They trouble themselves and inconvenience us! They must hide their lack of capacity; first from themselves, then from others. Behind what should they hide this great vice? They probably look for an even greater virtue so that it is well and truly hidden, and neither their flailing nor their limbs are visible! What is better than “ethics”? They utter one word—your action is “immoral”—and that’s that! This vicious, ignorant, arbitrary, and selfish use of words like “immoral” and “insult” cripples the standing of “ethics” in society in the long run. The “instrumental use” of “ethics,” especially with an “ugly intellectual pose,” is exactly like counterfeiting banknotes, which, if not stopped, will ruin the credibility of genuine banknotes as well.
Well, it is clear that most of the thoughts we think or things we do might offend someone, but if we consider every “offensive” thought, speech, or act to be “impermissible,” then we must sit in a corner and not even breathe loudly! What is the solution? “Harm” is not equivalent to “moral impermissibility.” “Harms” are numerous, and only some of them are “impermissible.” But which ones? Where do we draw the line? The theory of the “permissibility of mental harm” draws a distinction between “objective harms” and “mental harms.” “Objective harms,” such as acid attacks and rape, “are” “necessary” and “unavoidable”; that is, it is “impossible” for a human being “not to be harmed” by them. But (an important but) “mental harms” “are not” “necessary” and “unavoidable”; that is, they depend on the individual’s “capacity,” and it is “possible” for an individual “not to be harmed” by them. “Mental harm” does not necessarily cause an unpleasant state in all individuals who find themselves in that situation, and it is “possible” for other individuals to be in the same situation without any unpleasant state arising in them. Here we must reverse our proverb: the greater one’s “roof of capacity,” the less the “snow of offense” upon it! By taking advantage of the situation in which they were offended (and could have not been), an individual can recognize a flaw in their own character. For this reason, “mental harms” can be seen as the key to the elevation of one’s character, and by learning from unwarranted offense taken at them, one can reduce the scope of “harms” and increase the scope of “tolerance.”
The quintessence and core of the theory of the “permissibility of mental harm” is two words: “Be not offended! Offend not!”. According to this ethical recommendation, the ideal ethical model is someone who recognizes the right of others to cause them “mental harm” through their speech, actions, and thoughts, but who is always in a state of “vigilance” not to cause even “mental harm” to others; that is, “they are not offended, but they do not offend.” What has been narrated of the way of life of the noble Prophet of Islam(PBUH), especially the story of visiting the person who threw trash at him every day, is a brilliant example of this very ethical rule of “Be not offended! Offend not!”.
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Audio of the Philosophy of Politics Lectures, Session 5
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Session 5: The Unparalleled Tyranny of the "Middle Class":
"Semi-Literate Intellectuals" for the "Semi-Literate Middle Class"
Mill, in various places in On Liberty, compares those who, instead of finding their own suitable way of life through study and research, seek ready-made, classy prescriptions to follow, to "apes," "livestock," "sheep," and "steam engines," because "they have lost or given up something that is the distinguishing characteristic of a human being and sets him apart from other creatures." These individuals, who are constantly seeking a prescription for their lives from those who write prescriptions for others, cannot employ their human capacity for choice or refuse to do so. A person of human worth does not, in principle, allow anyone else to tell them what to do and what not to do; even if that program happens to be correct. In Mill's view, even holding correct opinions is not important in itself; the manner of arriving at them is what matters. Mill wants people to arrive at their opinions rationally, with knowledge of their importance and foundations, and to always be ready to revise and modify their opinions in light of new arguments, reasons, and evidence; not to place their human dignity and worth entirely at the disposal of another individual.
Mill considers the engine of an individual's growth and development to be within them, not outside them. The individual must find their suitable way of life through deep thinking, research, and introspection. Of course, this is very difficult and places a heavy responsibility on a person's shoulders. For this reason, most human beings prefer to shirk this responsibility by trampling on their freedom and placing it on the shoulders of someone they have made their "spiritual guide" precisely to escape the burden of responsibility arising from freedom. Mill calls these human beings "intellectual slaves"; slaves who, because they do not study and research themselves, are unaware of alternative interpretations and reasons concerning the good and the right, and consequently show no inclination to explore other ways of living. Hence, they seek to solve this problem and make things easy for themselves by finding a "spiritual guide."
It is precisely here that charlatans, wearing the mask of the elite, enter the arena and take the reins of individuals. In order to have social standing or to be, so to speak, classy, people try to get their prescription from someone who has prestige among those around them; oblivious to the fact that someone who is truly competent would never sit in such a position. Sitting in the position of offering general advice without reasoning, failing to reference the views of great thinkers or referencing them without citation in one's own words, and writing prescriptions for people's lives from the kitchen to the bedroom becomes the common currency of society, and people also prefer to escape their immense responsibility in this way. They remain docile, subservient, and obedient, and their beliefs and desires are not the product of their own conscious choices. They merely try passively to resemble the same dominant stereotypical attitude that is considered classy in their society or circle, and in this way, they imagine they are truly choosing. This is what Mill considers the greatest danger of all eras: "the tyranny of the majority." Everyone measures themselves against their social class and those around them; they attend lectures that have become fashionable, listen to music that is in vogue. Worse still, Mill says it reaches the point where even for recreation, the individual looks to see what kind of recreation is classy.
In our age, from the most classy social strata to the most classless, everyone lives under a hostile and terrified censorship. The individual or the family, not only in matters that affect others but even in matters that affect only themselves, does not ask: What do I prefer? Or what is more suited to my character and disposition? ... They ask: What is appropriate to my station? Or what do those who are my equals in wealth and position usually do in such cases? (Or even worse) What do those whose dignity and rank are higher than mine do? ... They think of nothing at all except to blindly imitate the customary practices of society. ... Even in the things people do merely for recreation and enjoyment, the first thing they think of is conformity with the crowd. Such people are conformists, and they always choose their actions and aims from among the things the common people do, and they avoid difference of taste or dissimilarity of conduct just as much as they avoid crimes and vile deeds; and the continuation of this state of affairs reaches a point where, as a result of this constant avoidance of their own nature, whatever human talent and capacity they possess completely withers away, and they can never again conceive a great aspiration or enjoy the real pleasures their hearts desire; in short, they have neither an opinion nor a feeling that has sprung from the soil of their own nature and belongs to themselves (Mill, [1859] 1998: 72).
Under such conditions, the level of all great matters is lowered and everything becomes pop. The mediocre in every field, craft, and art, since the level of their work is close to the average of society, are placed at the top and esteemed:
The ignorant have become masters, and out of fear/The learned have drawn their heads beneath the cloak
Any thinker whose level is above the average of classy society is eliminated and their words go unheard, because they invite people to inquiry, and inquiry is a very difficult task, and not everyone can bear the burden of responsibility arising from it. Hence, people gravitate toward someone who operates within the framework of that same average of classy society. Instead of inquiry, they use various tricks and classiness to induce people to imitate. Since the level of their thought is close to the level of thought of the average members of society, their words are pleasing to that crowd and warm them.
But why does society resist the different/classless behavior of individuals to such an extent? Mill's answer is that the scattered public opinions in society are always the opinions of the masses; that is, the thought of groups whose level of taste and thinking is low or average:
Average human beings often not only have average intellects but also average inclinations: their desires and aspirations are not great enough to impel them to do unusual things. Consequently, they do not understand those who possess great desires and aspirations, and they think these individuals are like savages and extremists, and for this reason they look upon them with the gaze of the wise man upon the fool (Mill, [1859] 1998: 81).
Mill considers the "tyranny of the classy crowd" to be the cause of the destruction of "civilization" in any land, and some societies of that era to be a clear example of such a society. This vicious cycle causes people whose level of taste and thinking is low to turn to those whose level of taste and thinking is low, like themselves. Ultimately, the further this society advances, the more it withers; its thinkers superficial, its artists vulgar, its intellectuals low-level—and you yourself can read the detailed tale of its end and outcome!
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Audio of Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics, Session 6
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Session 6, Part 2 (Download from Server 1 | Server 2)
Session 6: Joel Feinberg (1926-2004)
In this session, we turn to a philosopher who is a clear symbol of the immense influence of philosophy on our daily lives, and the judicial system of the United States today is, more than and before any other thinker, influenced by his theories. His four-volume collection — The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law — turned the "criminal laws" of the "United States" upside down, and for this reason, he is considered the most influential philosopher on "criminal law" in "America" in the last half-century. He accomplished the work that "J. S. Mill" (1806-1873) began with the proposal of the "harm principle." Hence, his Moral Limits is far more valuable than Mill's On Liberty. His goal is to present a "step-by-step guide" for writing a fully-fledged "moral" "constitution." He insists on the "identity" of "morality" and "law" and tries, by applying the "harm principle," to purge the "constitution" of unreasonable principles that "restrict freedom" or "legitimize coercion" and adorn it with the "principle of liberty." He appoints this "constitution," like a vigilant "guardian," to "safeguard" human "dignity" in the world and the "vast realm" of its "inviolable" "rights" and "freedoms." Joel Feinberg (1926-2004), former professor at the University of Arizona, is as great as he is unknown in "Iran." Feinberg, despite his tremendous impact in advancing "philosophy" and untangling complex knots in our time, is incredibly unknown in the Persian-speaking world. I hope this "lecture series" will be the beginning of deep philosophical research into his unparalleled theories.
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Audio of Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics, Session 7
Session 7, Part 1 (Download from Server 1 | Server 2) : What Does the Principle of Liberty Mean?
Session 7, Part 2 (Download from Server 1 | Server 2) : The Dual Nature of Freedom
Three "Moral Dilemmas" to Explain the "Dual Nature of Freedom"
1. Suppose someone's job application at a "private company" is rejected because they refuse to accept the company's conditions. Can that individual say that the company's "requirement" to accept those conditions contradicts the "principle of liberty" and therefore the company's decision is morally unjustified? This matter can also be viewed from another perspective, which is that the company can also, precisely based on this same "principle of liberty," say I have the right to choose my employees based on the characteristics I have specified. Both sides invoke the "principle of liberty," and to resolve this crisis, there seems to be no choice but to resort to a "decisive principle."
2. To better understand the “dual nature of the concept of freedom,” I will use a concrete dilemma that we encounter frequently these days in virtual spaces. Suppose someone, after examining the possibilities of several applications installed on their smartphone, decides to create a virtual group in one of them for a specific purpose. The group members are aware of the advantages and disadvantages of groups created in that application, as well as the scope of the group administrators’ authority, and they know, for example, that in this application, group administrators have the ability to delete messages and/or members. Furthermore, the group administrators, in order to maintain the group’s specialized character and its function in sharing and dividing knowledge, have themselves also established specific rules and regulations and have informed the members of them. Now, suppose the group administrators have decided to remove one of the members. Here, too, “the principle is freedom”; without a “cutting principle,” the matter runs into difficulty. The removed individual, by appealing to this principle, can say that their removal is contrary to freedom, and the group administrators can also, with regard to this same principle, say that they are free to do such a thing.
3. Allow me to propose another example. Suppose the managing editor of a newspaper with a particular line of thought asks the managing editor and editor-in-chief of another newspaper whose line of thought is completely opposed to theirs to select a certain op-ed for tomorrow’s column, or a certain photo as the front-page picture, or a certain headline as the lead headline. Does the refusal of that newspaper’s managing editor to accept this request constitute a violation of “freedom of expression”? With what “cutting principle” can the dual-sided problem of “the principle is freedom” be resolved?
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Audio of Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics, Session 8
Session 8: “Freedom” is not the supreme good!
Session 8, Part 1: Property as the Solvent of the Problem of Freedom’s Duality | The Priority of One’s Own Possession over Another’s Desire
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Session 8, Part 2: The Ten Foundational Principles of All Criminal Laws
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This session, by posing several questions about “freedom” and examining the answers of J. S. Mill and Joel Feinberg, attempts, in addition to resolving the ethical puzzles of the previous session, to point to the “common false, entrenched, and damaging beliefs” about “freedom” — especially among the “urban middle class” and some of the “Iranian elite.” These beliefs are:
- Neglect of “social bullying” and the “dominance of custom arising from the urban middle class”: The primary source of many of our problems is “the people”! This is while many “Iranian intellectuals,” instead of directly criticizing the beliefs, words, and deeds of the people, often point to the wrong address in their analysis of great issues and problems. Contrary to popular belief, criticizing the people is very costly. The “urban middle class,” with utter ruthlessness, “coldly suppresses” any belief that does not align with its prevalent and established beliefs. On the other hand, due to the exhausting struggle for livelihood and scrambling for survival, this class has little opportunity for in-depth analysis of issues.
Engaging with social issues for the middle class is often a way to fill leisure time and is on a par with shaking off the fatigue of a grueling work week by going to a restaurant or park on the weekend. Hence, it mostly seeks ready-made fare and a fast-food philosophy, not an in-depth analysis of issues from various perspectives. This class favors what is “ready-made,” “fast-food,” “soothing,” “pop,” “café-style,” and “feel-good” (note the abundant use of the term “feel-good” by a wide spectrum of people these days); it constantly mocks classes it deems inferior; contrary to its arrogant delusion, it is imitative and a follower from head to toe; it engages in “intellectual servitude” to attain “social mastery”; it has unquestioning and unexamined “faith” in certain modern concepts; and it is intensely averse to “gadflies disturbing its sweet morning slumber.” This is while the “urban middle class” is itself the source of a vast range of various kinds of problems in society, and the advancement of society depends on criticizing its beliefs, words, and deeds.
If “elites” trim their beliefs to match the “prevalent beliefs of the majority” and do not courageously criticize the “entrenched false beliefs of the people,” society will not become dynamic and progressive. In such a state, the emergence of the “intellectual” would be fundamentally impossible, and perhaps it would not be far off the mark to consider the product of “depth of speech” multiplied by “great popularity of the speaker” as always a constant value! As Mill rightly says, the “elites” of any society must step forward and, by shattering these false beliefs, advance society:
No one denies that initiative is a valuable component in human affairs. We are always in need of those who, in addition to discovering new truths and showing that things once considered true are now no longer true, also initiate new practices and are conspicuous examples of more enlightened conduct, and better taste and sense in human life. ... This requires the bull of the earth and the man of old, and among thousands, few are of this mettle. ... But these rare, precious ones of the age are the salt of the earth, and without them, life would turn into a barren salt marsh. It is they who both introduce new things that did not exist before and breathe new life into the body of things that already existed (Mill, [1859] 1998: 76).
- The absolute superiority of “freedom” over other “goods” and the “absolutization” of “freedom”: “Freedom” is neither the final link in the chain of “goods”; nor the “cause of all causes of happiness”; nor a “genie of the magic lamp”! “Freedom,” both in the “theory of value” of “classical utilitarians” like Bentham and Mill, who are “monists” and consider the final link in the chain of “goods” to be “pleasure”—not “freedom”—and in the “pluralist” theory of value of thinkers like Feinberg, is not like a trump card that can simply and in all cases beat any other “good.” According to Feinberg, “freedom” is not the only necessary means for a “good” and “happy” life, and other precious “goods” such as “health,” “talent,” “wisdom,” “friendship,” and the like are necessary for the emergence of such a life. Hence, in pursuing “goods,” one must proceed in a balanced, proportionate, and coherent manner. Giving more weight to “freedom,” compared to “security,” “comfort,” “tranquility,” and “welfare,” leads us astray. A “free” yet “insecure” society is nothing short of hell! Of course, the current conditions of the world, and especially the region, have convinced and are convincing a greater number to give a special place to “security” and “welfare” and their guardians within the complex network of “goods” and “desirable” things.
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Audio of Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics, Session 9
Session 9: The Greatest Danger of Democracy: The Tyranny of the Victorious Party, Factional Decisions, Absolute Elimination of the Rival, the Bullying of the Majority
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The tyranny of the majority is the greatest danger of democracy. Neglecting this point, creating a halo of sanctity around democracy, and refraining from criticizing it turns democracy into a tool for multiplying the unjust beliefs of the successful “majority” against the unsuccessful “minority.” A representative who has emerged from the ballot box in a democratic manner is, like anyone else, free in thought and speech, but in drafting and enacting laws (which lead to action), they must act within the framework of “human rights” and uphold human “dignity.” To guarantee this, two approaches, ex ante and ex post, can be employed. The ex ante approach could involve drafting and enacting conditions for candidacy and voting, and the ex post approach involves drafting and enacting “prohibitions” for laws drafted by representatives and reviewing those laws by a council whose duty is to safeguard the fundamental dignity, rights, and freedoms of human beings.
در جوامع پیشادمکراتیک یک حاکم مطلق بر جسم همه شهروندان حکم میراند اما در دمکراسی کسانی که نسبت به دیگر شهروندان، پرشمارتر، پرزَرتر یا پرزورتر هستند بر جان ایشان حکم میرانند. آنها هستند که زشت و زیبا، بد و خوب، ناروا و روا و ... را تعیین میکنند و دیگران را سرکوب میکنند. «دمُکراسی» چونان اسب چموشی است که اگر به لگام «حقوق بشر» رام نشود میتواند بلاخیز باشد و به بازتولید «خشونت» و سرکوب «اقلیت»های کمزور ژادی و نژادی و مانند آن کمک کند. این خطر در انتخابات دوقطبی و نیز حوزههای انتخابیهای که در آنها دو یا چند گروه نژادی و قومی (ترک/کرد؛ گیلک/تالش) و مانند آن وجود دارند ملموستر است و اگر به دارویی درمان نشود پایان انتخابات دمُکراتیک و جشن کامیابی، آغاز سرکوب حقوق و آزادیهای گروه یا گروههای ناکام خواهد بود. در تقابل گاه و بیگاه «دمُکراسی» با «حقوق بشر»، این «حقوق بشر» است که باید بر صدر نشانده و قدر نهاده شود؛ که «دمُکراسی» چیزی نیست جز ابزار تحقق آن.
این مشکل با پیدایش دولتهای دمکراتیک در جهان جدید رخ نمود. ایالات متحد نخستین جامعهای بود که در جهان مدرن این مشکل بزرگ دمکراسی را دریافت و اندیشمندانش به فکر چارهای برای حل آن افتادند. آنها دریافتند دمکراسی مستقیم، یعنی مراجعه مستقیم به آرای شهروندان و هر نفر یک رأی، میتواند بهسادگی یک نظام سیاسی را فشل کند. به همین دلیل شیوه برگزاری انتخابات در آمریکا با بیشتر کشورهای جهان متفاوت و براساس رأی الکترال است.
هر نفر یک رأی، به خطرهای بزرگی مانند ستمگری همیشگی اکثریت بر اقلیت ناکام میانجامد. از این رو، در فرآیند برگزاری انتخابات باید تمهیداتی اندیشیده شوند که جلوی این خطر بزرگ را بگیرند وگرنه مثلاً رییس جمهور یا رییس مجلس را تا ابدالدهر شهروندان استانهایی برمیگزینند که از استانهای دیگر پرشمارتر هستند. بسیاری از حکمرانان خطرناک تاریخ، مانند هیتلر، بهشیوهای کاملاً دمُکراتیک زمام امور را بهدست گرفتهاند. «اکثریت»ی که باورهای جاافتاده ژادگرایانه، نژادگرایانه و مانند آن دارد لابد کسی را برمیگزیند که نفت تشدید بر آن باورها میپاشد.
در تمرین دمُکراسی یک نکته اساسی باید جدی گرفته شود و آن اینکه دمُکراسی «بهترین بد» است؛ نه «بهترین خوب». توجه به این نکته در گرویِ سنجش دمُکراسی و اِشراف به معایب آن و تلاش برای رفع آنها است. «ستمگری اکثریت» بزرگترینِ این معایب است و اگر جدی گرفته نشود دمُکراسی، خود، میتواند به ابزاری برای تیشه زدن به ریشه حقوق و آزادیهای بنیادین آدمی در جامعه تبدیل شود.
اصطلاح «ستمگری اکثریت» یا «ستمگری گروههای دارای منافع مشترک»، در فلسفه سیاست، نخستین بار، در 22 نوامبر سال 1787، در دهمین مقاله فدرالیست (Madison, 1878) مطرح شد. جیمز مَدیسن (1836-1751)، چهارمین رییس جمهور آمریکا، نویسنده این مقاله بود و در آن بهتفصیل درباره این گونه از «ستمگری» سخن گفت.
مقالات مدیسن و همکارانش با عنوان مقالات فدرالیست مورد تحسین شمار زیادی از اندیشمندان قرار گرفت و در کنار نظریهای درباره عدالت جان رالز (Rawls, 1971) گرانسنگترین آثار ِآمریکا در اندیشه سیاسی شِمُرده میشوند.
یک سال بعد، جان اَدمز (1826-1735)، نخستین معاون اول و دومین رییس جمهور آمریکا، در جلد سوم دفاعی از قانون اساسی ایالات متحد آمریکا، به خطر لگدمال شدن حقوق و آزادیهای فرد بهوسیله اکثریت اشاره کرد.
دو سال بعد، اِدمند بِرک، دولتمرد، خطیب و نظریهپرداز سیاسی ایرلندی، در تأملاتی درباره انقلاب فرانسه (Burke, 1790)، با زبانی دیگر به همین مفهوم اشاره کرد و گفت: «ستمگری اکثریت، ستمگری به توان رسیده (چند برابر) است».
Forty-five years later, this term shone in Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America. Tocqueville, who had traveled to America on behalf of the French government to study the prison system of the United States, wrote the first volume of Democracy in America in French in 1835 and the second in 1840. In the fifteenth chapter of the first volume of this book, "The Unlimited Power of the Majority and Its Consequences," he spoke in detail about the "tyranny of the majority" and its examples in the newly established democratic republic of America. Tocqueville believed that even the ruthless punishments of Europe's despotic kings did not compare to the "social pressures" in America at that time in terms of the suppression of unconventional ideas: "American writers [no longer] risk being burned, but they are constantly exposed to slander and social persecution."
Thereafter, with the emergence of democratic governments from the nineteenth century to the present day, the "tyranny of the majority," as the greatest blight of democracy, drew increasing attention from thinkers. Nations that, after years of vicissitudes, effort, and cost, had finally achieved their ideal (democracy), suddenly faced a new phenomenon which, according to Tocqueville, even the absolute governments of the Middle Ages could not match in terms of the degree of suppression.
Lord Acton, the English historian, politician, and libertarian writer, in 1877, in The History of Freedom in Antiquity (Acton, 1877), considered the "tyranny of the majority" to be "one of the perennial evils of democracy."
Ayn Rand (1905-1982), the Russian-born American novelist, also defended "individual rights" against the "tyranny of the majority," stating that the "individual" is "the smallest minority on earth."
Lani Guinier published a collection of articles from the journal La Revue under the same title in 1994, and Herbert Marcuse analyzed the "tyranny of the majority" in his 1965 essay "Repressive Tolerance." In our time, Joel Feinberg (1926-2004) and Chin Liew Ten are the greatest philosophers who, inspired by the ideas of J. S. Mill, have explored the "tyranny of the majority" from a philosophical perspective in several different works and have proposed solutions for it.
The warnings of these philosophers about the possibility of everything being destroyed as a result of minority uprisings is a warning that must be taken seriously in our era as well. The trampling of minority rights by the majority, besides destroying freedom and growth and flourishing in society, also carries the risk of minority uprisings and the ruin of society's foundations. This is also true in cities where two or more main groups or ethnicities live. The group or ethnicity that has won victory through free council and parliamentary elections must, for the progress and prosperity of the city, act meritocratically and free from factional and ethnic biases in assigning posts and management positions, and win the hearts of individuals from other groups or ethnicities as much as possible. Otherwise, the result will be nothing but stagnation or regression for that city.
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Audio of Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics, Session 10
Session 10: Alexis de Tocqueville (1):
The Life and Times of Tocqueville
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Tocqueville is the greatest thinker to have spoken critically of democracy in the modern world. Political philosophers consider Tocqueville's Democracy in America to be on a par with Plato's Republic and its modern-day version. These two books are the most formidable works in the analysis of democracy, and, ironically, the most formidable works in the analysis of democracy have been written by its critics.
Tocqueville was born in 1805 into a family of ancient Norman lineage, from Normandy in the north of France. The Tocqueville house still stands there and remains in the hands of members of his family. Tocqueville's heirs still live in Normandy; although their line does not descend directly from him, for Tocqueville and his wife had no children. They are the descendants of one of Tocqueville's brothers and the perfect image of a courteous and generous French aristocrat. Tocqueville was deeply attached to his ancestral home. In 1828, after a long absence from his homeland and returning from a journey, he wrote in a letter to a friend: "Here I am, at last, in Tocqueville (he called his house by his family name). I am finally in Tocqueville; in my old, dilapidated family home. A league away (about 5 kilometers) I can see the port; the very port where William the Conqueror hoisted the sails of his ships for the journey to England. I am surrounded by Normans; the very ones whose names appear in the list of conquerors. I must confess that all this melts my heart like sugar."
He came from a family whose ancestors were present at the conquest of Normandy and had lived there for centuries. Tocqueville's ancestral home was only a few minutes from the coast of Normandy, where the great D-Day conquest of World War II took place. Nevertheless, the house miraculously remained intact. Tocqueville's mother and father were arrested during the French Revolution and spent about a year in prison, and the fall of Robespierre in 1794 saved them from the danger of execution. The young Tocqueville was born during the Napoleonic era and grew up in the conservative, authoritarian France of the post-revolutionary period. He studied law in Paris. It was at this time that he met and befriended another young aristocrat—Gustave de Beaumont. In 1830, when he was about 25 years old, for reasons that remain obscure to us, Tocqueville and his friend were commissioned by the new government of King Louis-Philippe to travel to the United States to examine its prison system.
Tocqueville's journey to America, which has been described in minute detail, lasted less than a year, beginning in May 1831 and ending in February 1832. In that one year, he traveled all over America; from New England in the north to New Orleans in the south. The result of this journey was two thick volumes, which he titled Democracy in America. The first volume of this book was published in 1835, about four years after the end of his journey, when he was only 30 years old. The second volume was published five years later, in 1840.
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Audio of Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics, Session 11
Session 11: Alexis de Tocqueville (2):
Democracy in America
A New Political Philosophy for an Entirely New World
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Tocqueville's Central Concern in Democracy in America
What is Tocqueville's concern in this book, and what question is he seeking to answer? In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "liberty" and "equality," hand in hand, step by step, advanced together. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all believed that we are all born "free" and "equal" in the "state of nature." The expiration date of old systems and societies under the absolute power of a single person had arrived, and liberty and equality were the two main features of the new democratic order, moving side by side and reinforcing one another.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, with the emergence of democracy in Europe and the New World, political philosophers gradually began to ponder whether the streams of liberty and equality might not flow in the same channel. Tocqueville, more than and before other political thinkers of that era, such as J. S. Mill and Benjamin Constant, realized that new democratic societies give rise to new forms of “social power” that can threaten individual freedom in society. By new forms of “social power,” Tocqueville meant the emergence of the “middle class” or “bourgeoisie” in the modern democracies of countries like France, England, and (more than and before them) the United States. Tocqueville’s concern or question, like that of Locke and political thinkers before him, was how “political power” can be controlled and its destructive effects mitigated.
Locke’s answer to this question, which the authors of the American “Constitution” elevated and esteemed, was the “division” and “fragmentation” of power. But Tocqueville was not very optimistic about this law-based solution for dividing and sharing power. He believed that in democratic societies, where the “majority” plays the same role that the “monarch” did in the old absolute monarchies, a purely legal solution cannot fulfill our purpose.
In Tocqueville’s view, one can never say that the new democratic states in America and Europe, which are administered by the people, are more just or less despotic than previous modes of governance. No person or group of persons holding political power can be given a blank check, and united power, or the will of the people, is just as untrustworthy as other forms of governance. Therefore, in the era of democratic governments, the main problem in political science is how to control the general will. Rousseau was never concerned about this problem. In his view, the general will never errs, and if the people rule with their combined capacities, they will not go astray, but Tocqueville was never so optimistic and did not consider the general will infallible.
What can and should be done to solve this problem? In democratic systems where the people have taken the place of the king and become as powerful as he was, who or what can assume that role and control parallel powers? Who or what possesses sufficient power to control the general will? How can democratic power be inspected? As Tocqueville says in the introduction to his book, the new world needs a new philosophy of politics, of which he is the founder, and in this respect, we are all children of Tocqueville. Tocqueville is the pioneer of guiding and controlling the democratic state and finding a way to combine popular government with political wisdom, and in this path, we are all his students. Despite various answers being proposed, how to link laws arising from the general will with political wisdom remains a fundamental problem in the world’s democracies. This is precisely what Tocqueville was deeply pondering.
In addition to this, Tocqueville in Democracy in America also seeks answers to two subsidiary questions. The first question concerns the calm and gradual replacement of the Ancien Régime with a democratic society founded on equality. Ancien Régime is a term the French used for the old aristocratic system, which was based on special privileges, hierarchy, difference, and inequality. How does this colossal social and political transformation from an old and unequal system to one full of equality of opportunity occur?
The second question, which Tocqueville does not ask explicitly but discusses throughout his book, concerns the difference in the form of democracy in America and revolutionary France. Tocqueville asks why democracy in America is so “calm” and “gentle.” Why is democracy in America the kind of democracy we today call liberal democracy, whereas democracy in revolutionary France dangerously veered toward massacre and despotism?
He is certain that all societies will sooner or later become democratic. What he is not certain about is the specific type of democracy in different societies. Only future leaders can answer the question of whether, in their society, democracy will be compatible with freedom or will itself turn into a new form of despotism.
These two questions (How does this change occur? and What will democracy look like in the future?) show that Tocqueville, like great figures such as Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, and others, wrote his book as a teacher of politics. He was not merely a chronicler of American customs and mores, but a teacher for the future statesmen of Europe.
How did Tocqueville answer these questions? What did he want to teach? In the final part of his introduction to the book, he writes: "Anyone who reads this book carefully will observe a fundamental idea throughout it."[1] What is this fundamental idea? The idea of equality. In the opening sentence of the book, he says: "Among the things that caught my attention during my stay in America, nothing struck my eye more than the equality of conditions."
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Audio of Lectures on the Philosophy of Politics, Session 12
Session 12 (Final Session): Democracy in the World After "Trump"
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Democracy is a quasi-sacred concept in the minds of many of us. This is while political thinkers have always viewed it with a mixture of fear and hope. Aristotle, in Politics, associates democracy with the "rule of the majority." "Rule of the majority" in fact means the rule of the poor and the weak for their own benefit. In Aristotle's view, the danger of democracy is that in it, one class of society, which is also the largest class, rules over the entire society and minorities, imposing its own benefit upon them. The ancients considered democracy a conflict between the rich and the poor. Even the American Founding Fathers and the authors of the Federalist Papers held such a view of democracy and found a solution to the problem of democracy, or what they called a "republican government." The problem of republican government was the majority faction, and Madison's solution to this problem was to "extend the sphere of government," to "multiply civil and political institutions as much as possible" to prevent the attempt to eliminate one group and instead strive to extend it. The greater the number of groups, the less the possibility that one of them will have permanent dominance over the others and that the tyranny of the majority will take shape.
The American founders were wary of democracy from the outset. Democracy carried a negative connotation for them, and they therefore preferred to call the structure of government in America a “republic,” not a democracy. James Madison, in the famous essay Federalist No. 10, says in this regard: “A pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. … [In such a government] there is nothing to check the … sacrifice of the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions. A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.” Madison then enumerates the two principal differences between a “republic” and a “democracy”: “The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.”
Hence, the founders of the United States devised measures to distance their system of government from pure, direct democracy. The specific, complex, and unique method of conducting “presidential elections in America” and the emphasis on elements such as the “electoral vote” are a prime example of these measures. The American founders, cognizant of the defects of democracy and its potential for the “quiet elimination of society’s elite,” strove as much as possible to distance themselves from pure, unadulterated, direct democracy and to install safety valves for it that would prevent the elimination of elites in society. They said, “without mincing words,” that in a direct democracy, “men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people.” They believed that in a large republic (and not in a democracy), the probability of electing competent individuals would be greater. Moreover, in a large republic compared to a small one, each representative is elected by a much larger number of votes. For this reason, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to succeed, and they can no longer employ their vicious tricks to win elections; tricks that are usually practiced in elections. Furthermore, the suffrage of the people will be more free, and will more likely center on those who possess the most attractive merit and the most established and stable characters. The wider you extend this sphere, so as to take in a greater variety of parties and interests, the less probable it is that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.
This is the very issue that Tocqueville addresses in a highly important chapter of his book titled “The Omnipotence of the Majority in the United States and Its Effects.” This chapter contains Tocqueville’s reading of the classical or traditional theory of “democratic tyranny” and his critique of it. In Tocqueville’s view, the Constitution of the United States, at its very beginning, placed and honored the majority with the phrase “We the People.” In the first volume of his book, Tocqueville devoted much of it to describing the drafting of the “Federal Constitution” and the “structure of power in America.” For this reason, it can be said that he was far less optimistic than Madison or the other authors of The Federalist Papers about solving the “problem of the tyranny of the majority in America.” Following Locke and Montesquieu, they believed that the “separation of powers” and the creation of a representative system were alone capable of solving this problem, but Tocqueville considered these solutions “necessary” but “insufficient.” He deemed these “purely legal instruments” alone “insufficient” for controlling what he called the “empire of the majority.” In his belief, legal guarantees for defending the “rights of minorities” against the cohesive force of public opinion accomplish nothing.
Now, after “Trump’s victory in the US presidential election,” this point has become more apparent than ever: that the American fathers’ fear of democracy and its potential for eliminating elites and its vicious tricks in winning votes was very well-placed. We have now realized that even the safety valves they had devised for democracy can be ineffective. It seems Tocqueville was right in considering the legal measures of the American fathers, who were influenced by philosophers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu, as “necessary” but “insufficient.”
Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America is an educational masterpiece in the “philosophy of politics,” whose audience is the actual and potential rulers of Tocqueville’s era and beyond. In the introduction to this book, in one of those aphorisms he often uses to emphasize an idea, Tocqueville says: “A world as instantly created as ours requires a new political philosophy”; a philosophy that, in addition to antiquity, separates itself even from its modern predecessors such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.
Tocqueville believed that the new liberalism required a “new political science for a world entirely new,” and this new political science is not even seen in the works of Montesquieu. Montesquieu’s new political science was written for a world in which modern democracy had not yet emerged, and it was the emergence of modern democracy in the United States that brought about a world “entirely new.”
In the modern era, the United States was the first real experience of the democratic republic that liberal philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau had dreamed of. During the ten months he traveled across it with his friend and colleague Gustave de Beaumont and wrote its account in his masterpiece Democracy in America, Tocqueville became closely acquainted with the “shortcomings of democracy” and warned his French compatriots. He considered “social tyranny” the “greatest harm of democracy.” Democracy multiplies the danger of social tyranny because it enables the successful majority to join hands and exclude and eliminate the unsuccessful minority in various ways.
Tocqueville’s precise observation of this democratic republic, especially the people’s treatment of writers whose theories were incompatible with popular beliefs, as well as of Black people and Native Americans, showed that political measures, such as the “separation of powers,” writing a new “Constitution,” and changing laws, alone cannot save society from the danger of “social tyranny” and the “tyranny of the majority.” Therefore, Tocqueville warned all nations that dream of democracy that, contrary to the common belief of the masses and even some political philosophers, to find the problems and predicaments of a society, one must look, more than and before “politics,” to the “character” and “culture” of each and every individual in that society. Democracy is a process—not an action—and is bottom-up—not top-down—and the “tyranny of the majority” or “social tyranny” is its perpetual twin; for which a native solution must be sought.
The philosophy of politics consists in providing people with the linguistic and rhetorical capacities to construct the past and imagine the future. As Aristotle said, language, or logos, gives us freedom of action and the ability to adapt to changing situations and to create new ones. Tocqueville, with a language for building the future of democratic societies, teaches us how to live in a democratic age. How to employ this language and apply it to the new situations and conditions that never even crossed Tocqueville’s imagination is a task we must undertake ourselves.
Yes! The new world requires an entirely new philosophy of politics. We must think of more safety valves for democracy. Democracy must be reconstructed in such a way that it does not lead to the elimination of elites. We require a teacher who instructs a handful of students to complete a four-year course, yet we consider everyone to have an equal right to express an opinion on a matter upon which the fate of society, the region, and the world hinges!
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Discussion13 comments
با سلام و مراتب تشکر جسارتا فایل های صوتی مربوط به جلسه 10 قابل دانلود نیست، گویا حذف شده است.
سلام و درود فایل ها اصلاح شد
باسلام و تشکر از مدیر محترم و فعال سایت وزین صدانت. جلسه دهم دانلود نمیشه اگر ممکنه لطفااصلاح بفرمایید. متشکرم.
سلام و درود اصلاح شد
ساینا خانم,اگه ممکنه من فایلهاتون رو برای صرفا استفاده شخصی بگیرم,رشته من مهندسی است و زندگی اجازه تحصیل در رشته فلسفه رو بهم نمیده,ولی بینهایت فلسفه رو دوست دارم,وقتی این جلسات رو گوش میدادم,گاهی اشک میریختم از اشتباهی که سالها پیش در انتخاب رشته کردم.شنیدن چنین کلاسهایی ارزوی من هست,خوشحال میشم اگه بتونم از چنین اصواتی استفاده کنم.سپاس
سلام من ارشد جامعه شناسی دارم و همه کلاس های ارشد و بعضا دوره لیسانس رو با ریکوردر ضبط کرد برای استفاده شخصی ام. سوال بنده اینه که از نظر حقوقی اشکالی نداره فایل های صوتی رو یک جایی (مثلا بلاگ) منتشر کنم؟ حقوقی یعنی نظر استاد و نیز نظر همکلاسی ها که در سر کلاس ارائه نظر می کردند. میشه موارد و زوایای حقوقی کار رو بدونم؟ ممنون میشم.
سلام کاش دست اندرکاران صدانت قبول زحمت میکردن، فایلها رو در اختیارشون میذاشتید تابه صورت ویرایش شده منتشر کنن، که ما هم بتونیم استفاده کنیم.
سوال ايشان بسيار در زمينه ي اين كه هيچكس سرزميني كه در آن به دنيا مي آيد انتخاب نمي كند پس نا بخردانه است كه به آن ببالد. بر مبناي استدلال اين استاد مي توانيم نتيجه بگيريم هيچكس به دنيا آمدنش ،انسان بودنش ، دينش و.... را انتخاب نمي كند پس نا بخردانه است كه به آن ببالد. اصلا باليدن به چيزي نا بخردانه است. چون دايره ي انتخاب ما انسان ها محدود به ساختار هاست. ساختار ها را ما انتخاب نمي كنيم بلكه درون آن ها ساخته مي شويم. گزينه هايي كه در برابر ما جهت امتخاب قرار دارند همه درون اين ساختار ها هستند پس اصلا به چيزي نباليم و از چيزي حمايت نكنيم.
چرا، دینش را می تواند انتخاب کند یعنی راه این انتخاب مسدود نیست ولی سود یا زیان آین انتخاب ، اجتناب نا پذیر است.بدیهی است که خوب یا بد بودن اجباری نیست هر چند که در زمینه نا مساعد اجتماعی ، برای خوب بودن تلاش بیشتری لازم است و البته پاداش زیاد تری هم دارد و عکس آین نتیجه برای گمراهان است یعنی گمراهی در یک زمینه خوب کیفر بیشتری دارد.
چیزی که در این درسگفتارها برام جالبه آشنایی با فیلسوفانی ه که تا حالا نمی شناختمشون. بعضیاشون مثل تکویل ازشون یا دربارشون به فارسی مطلب هست ولی خیلیاشون مثل فینبرگ اولین باره که به فارسی چیزی ازشون می بینم. متشکرم صدانت که صداهای گوناگون رو پخش می کنید.
من جلسه اولو فعلا گوش دادم که سوالات قشنگی بود و بیان مدرس نسبتا خوب بود. سپاس
سلام .به نظر می رسه جلسه ی چهارم در دو بخش می باشد که در تار نما در یک بخش ارایه شده است .
با سپاس از مطالب زیبای بانو قندی برای ایشون وهمه دست اندرکاران این سایت آرزوی موفقیت دارم