Mahmoud Dargahi's article “Shariati's Ashes and Tabatabai's Collyrium”

Shariati's Ashes and Tabatabai's Collyrium

Mahmoud Dargahi

With the ideological ashes that Al-e Ahmad and Shariati had rubbed in the eyes of Iranians, the eyes of many of them had become blind or dimmed. (Tabatabai, Seyyed Javad, National Revolution in the Islamic Revolution)

Tabatabai's onslaught in the series of articles "National Revolution in the Islamic Revolution" is reminiscent of Don Quixote's charges in a space devoid of opponents, against winds and windmills! A kind of cotton-stuffed champion in an era when, in the words of Akhavan, "the drum of the storm has fallen silent!" An era in which the prevailing conditions have tied the hands and mouths of Tabatabai's opponents and turned the community of revolutionary and idealistic intellectuals – again in Akhavan's words – into a graveyard where not even "the cry of an owl reaches the ear!" In this death-stricken and silent atmosphere, which is the outcome of the country's prevailing policies over the past four decades and has plunged all groups of committed and responsible intellectuals, in their various schools, into a kind of helplessness and political silence, confronting society with a despairing dead end; both Sabeti, the operator of the Shah's slaughterhouses, can emerge into the sunlight, assert himself, and consider himself a creditor of the revolution and revolutionary intellectuals! (See: In the Trap of Incident, a conversation with Parviz Sabeti) While in the early years of the revolution, such people did not dare to stick their heads out of a mouse hole! Both the spokesmen of the pre-revolution's neutral and ineffectual literature can summon Shamloo, as the prominent and loud voice of responsible and committed literature, to an interrogation, asking, "What change has this commitment, engagement, and responsibility of yours brought about in the world?" (Azad, 29) and sneer that "Shamloo hoped for a true dawn to break, but despite the poet, the night continued." (ibid., 140) and mock him, saying, "A poet who fights the oppressor to take his place, or, if he himself does not want it, to offer it to a just ruler, what does he do when he sees that the successor has also turned out to be a tyrant?" (ibid., 293) and both Seyyed Javad Tabatabai can roar out a challenge and drag the myths of faith and self-sacrifice through the mud! All of this, as Ubayd Zakani said, is the effect of the retrogression of the times, and in the words of Qa'em-Maqam: The playful wheel has many such tricks! And painfully, it has been the habit of history that continually – again in Akhavan's words – they have laid asses in the cradles of lions!

Of course, Tabatabai's practice over these past few decades has been to stir up dust, or—in his own words—to “tangle” with intellectual and political luminaries and to poison the intellectual atmosphere of society, rather than to evaluate and critique ideas. In these tanglings and antagonisms, what is absent is the etiquette of criticism, the ethics of dialogue, and the presentation of reasoning and proof. What fills the entirety of these writings of his is insult, slander, and the venting of blind prejudices and hatreds! But in the series of articles “National Revolution in the Islamic Revolution,” which are among his latest writings, this so-called philosopher of politics has reached the end of his tether and, intoxicated by a kind of scientific certainty and omniscience, has lumped together all contemporary intellectual currents, both religious and non-religious—so to speak—and, with a kind of opportunism and exploitation of the political situation that has arisen, which has left intellectual currents housebound with “a thorn in the eye and a bone in the throat,” has consigned left and right, old and new, all at once to the blade of his annihilation and rubbed salt in the wounds! The absence from today's political scene of the vanguard of the intelligentsia and luminaries such as Jalal, Shariati, Shamloo, Baraheni, Sahabi, Seyyed Javadi, Sa'edi, Golshiri, Rahimi, Forouhar, Arianpour, Nadooshan, and dozens of members of the Writers' Association, the organizers of the Ten Nights, leaders of political organizations, and other intellectuals of the revolutionary era, and the indifference of the intellectuals present on the scene to such fame-seeking assaults, has redoubled Tabatabai's audacity. Thinking that no one has the breath to stand against these boasts, he has closed his eyes to all scientific ethics and political decorum, torn all veils, and blackened and ruined all thoughts, ideas, and intellectual and political currents, from right to left, and from Iranian to non-Iranian, outright! In this political smear campaign, Shariati's consciousness-raising thought has become ashes; Taleghani and Bazargan are fossils; Montazeri is a driveler; Jazani is mentally retarded; the members of the National Front and the Freedom Movement are ashamed and disgraced; the Algerian liberation fighters are terrorists; Che Guevara is naive and ignorant; Foucault is an imbecile; Žižek is a buffoon; Marx is misunderstood; and so on... and if you continue in this manner to the end, on the entire globe there will remain only one person in whose work none of these flaws exist, and that person is none other than Seyyed Javad Tabatabai, the philosopher of politics! Such profanities, before arising from human responsibility and a search for remedies for the pains of a society, are a symptom of a kind of megalomania and scholarly arrogance in which Tabatabai is notorious, and the entirety of his works testify to this sickness and arrogance! That being the case, responding to these claims and clarifying the truth of the matter has no effect on Tabatabai's work; for he neither bows to reasoning—just as he did not bow to the reasoning of Dariush Ashouri, Sadegh Zibakalam, Hashem Aghajari, Hatem Ghaderi, and others (see: Mehrnameh, issues 3, 14, 26, 35)—nor does he recognize any document or writing other than his own to be cited. However, since this series of his articles has been widely disseminated and consequently has raised many doubts and questions for its readers, we deem it necessary and essential to address some of his baseless claims and clarify the matter, especially concerning what relates to Shariati and the 1979 revolution.

Contrary to the extravagant claims that Tabatabai puts forward in this series of articles in interpreting Iran's political issues, his estrangement from the issues of Iranian society, and especially the revolution that occurred in 1979, is painfully catastrophic. This estrangement has been demonstrated by some before in other forms in Tabatabai's work (for example, see: Mehrnameh, 15/178). This estrangement from reality is such that Tabatabai imagines that if Régis Debray's book “Revolution in the Revolution” had not been translated in 1966, an event like the 1979 revolution would not have occurred! And when this book was translated, Régis Debray's thought coursed through all traditional and intellectual currents, and due to its influence, “among shamefaced religious people like the National Front! to the Freedom Movement, and from political mullahs to the People's Mojahedin, who, under the influence of people like Ali Shariati, presented a totalitarian and guerrilla reading of Islam, it succeeded catastrophically in Iran” (Tabatabai, part 1). On the other hand, this theory of Régis Debray was among the liberation theories whose injection into Third World countries “was part of the imperialists' strategy to render nations wretched [or: to make nations wretched?].” (ibid.)

Tabatabai's political genius shines forth in these very two or three lines, having dissected all the problems of Iran's contemporary history and left no ambiguity whatsoever! In this interpretation of the revolution, all the forces of the '79 Revolution—that is, all the national, religious, and political currents, from the seminary clergy to Marxist intellectuals, and from the National Front to the People's Mojahedin, and the masses of people from the urban middle class to the villagers—having become acquainted with the ideas of Régis Debray, surrendered their reason to him and decided on revolution and overthrowing the government, and then, as easy as drinking water, brought the matter to a close. Before this book was translated, in this country, there was neither any news of a rift between the nation and the state, nor any trace of thinking about revolution and regime change, nor did Tabatabai's homeland lack anything in terms of security, tranquility, freedom, democracy, order, and law; that theory of revolution was also so that the imperialists might snatch all these blessings from the people of Iran! In addition to the fact that this conspiracy delusion is the most vulgar type of interpretation of the Iranian Revolution to be heard from the mouth of a political philosopher, Tabatabai's claims show that he knew nothing of the intellectual and doctrinal contradictions and differences among these various currents with one another, nor of the political situation of the country in those years, nor even of the events from the post-Constitutional era up to that day, while he is one of the most renowned researchers of the issues of the Constitutional era!

Tabatabai either does not know, or knows and out of stubbornness conceals, that pre-revolutionary Iran was the calm before the storm and a fire under the ashes, and this fire under the ashes had remained from at least half a century before the '79 Revolution, from the days when the ideals of the Constitutional Revolution and, later, the Oil Nationalization Movement were trampled by English and American coup plotters, and the people of Iran turned this historical indignity into a kind of ethnic memory and carried it with them year after year, bringing it to the threshold of the '79 Revolution, and then, in a display of power and solidarity, took revenge for all that repression, oppression, and insult, all at once, from the foreign coup plotters and their puppets, and in this act—in Fred Halliday's phrase—staged the largest demonstrations in human history before the eyes of the world (Halliday, 9) and with this act "astonished the world" (Eslami Nodushan, 20) and created a revolution which, when Michel Foucault saw scenes from it, said: "Iran, the spirit of a soulless world!" and in later years, called it "the eternal example of a mass movement and modern political consciousness that demanded stable economic behavior and political democracy under the shadow of the law" (Boroujerdi, Mehrnameh, 15/176)! But even before that, and even decades before Régis Debray's book was translated, this inflammation and restlessness had repeatedly flared up in various forms in corners of this land and created upheavals, and one of its last flames was the uprising of traditional believers following those political mullahs in '42, when there were still three years to go before the translation of "Revolution in the Revolution," and whatever interpretation we may have of these political movements and unrests, there is no doubt on this point that all of them emerged before the translation of "Revolution in the Revolution" and in confrontation with Tabatabai's "long-enduring national state"!

Moreover, none of these political currents, before the political atmosphere of society became inflamed and the leadership of events fell into the hands of guerrillas and radical organizations, had any intention of revolution, overthrow, or toppling the government. Shariati thought about changing minds, reforming religion, and intellectual transformation, not political revolution. Jalal and the members of the Writers' Association were concerned with freedom of writing and speech and the abolition of censorship. Members of the Freedom Movement asked the Shah to reign, not rule. The National Front thought about the constitution and national independence, and . . . and even Bazargan, representing these currents, had once warned the regime's operators: We are among the last groups who criticize and protest through legal activities and with political transparency; those who come after us will adopt other methods! And years after him, Engineer Sahabi also wrote in his memoirs that "in prison we came to the conclusion that our era and that of other national forces for leading social movements and struggles has come to an end ... thus everyone was in a state of waiting, awaiting events in society, awaiting the birth of a child from within the conditions of that day's society." (Sahabi, 305) And this child that emerged from within those conditions was precisely the guerrilla movements and armed conflicts with the government, whose birth even some figures affiliated with the regime, in the manner of Sahabi and Bazargan, had predicted, and one of them had said that if a lasting political transformation does not take place in Iran, a great explosion will occur (Nejati, 315). But despite all these warnings, ultimately "because the Shah did not lay down his machine gun, no other way remained to overthrow him except by taking up the machine gun." (Baraheni, 103) It was by summing up this set of issues that Sepanlu also said: "The violence of the Shah's system caused democratic struggles to turn into armed movements." (Sepanlu, 74) And Dowlatabadi confirmed these statements thus: "It was not I who fought the dictator, but the dictator and the dictatorial system itself that fought itself. Because by driving people away and repressing them, it isolated itself and turned the people into its sworn enemies." (Dowlatabadi, 221)

The members of the National Front, the Freedom Movement, and organizations such as the Writers’ Association sought the very demands that Tabatabai also considers among the most important achievements of Iran’s Constitutional Revolution—namely, law, freedom, and the rights of the nation! And had the Shah’s autocracy made room for these legal and legitimate demands, no one would have pursued revolutionary organizations, nor would a revolution have occurred in ’57. But the dictator of Iran and his agents never paid any heed to these legal demands and legitimate claims of the people, and lacked even the slightest prudence to align with some of the liberal and conservative political currents, separate them from the radical currents, and, even for a short while, weaken the forming front or delay the revolution! This arbitrariness and despotism, in the final years of the Shah’s rule, had even intensified with the strengthening of his police arm and intelligence organizations; to the point where he handed over any protest or criticism to the security organization and the apparatuses of repression and violence! This method of governance ultimately provided the motivation for unrest and rebellion among all political and non-political spectrums of the nation, from guerrilla organizations and intellectual associations—such as the Writers’ Association of Iran—to the most traditional religious and bazaar strata, and became the impetus for all those diverse intellectual, ideological, and other forces—Marxist, religious, nationalist, writer, poet, worker, shopkeeper, and employee—to stand together in a grand political alliance, face to face with the regime, and out of desperation resort to the last remedy, which was the overthrow and change of government! Solely in the hope that after achieving victory, their political, ideological, and national ideals—namely independence, freedom, justice, and so on—would be fulfilled; and of course, in the meantime, the current that had deeper roots among the masses of the people would win the game and determine the country’s political future. This was a point where there was no longer any path of return ahead; turning back from there meant returning to the slaughterhouse, to repression, bondage, prison, and torture! But the prospect visible on the horizon ahead was hope for deliverance and salvation, freedom and justice, and no trace or sign of what emerged in the years that followed was visible in the outlook of that day of the revolution or in the promises of its leadership! In those days, the nationalists had not heard the name of Régis Debray, the Freedom Movement did not know him, nor did the political mullahs, nor the vast urban and rural masses. And Shariati, who did know him, not only did not speak of his “revolution within the revolution,” but even warned his contemporary generations against heeding such imported ideas! (M,A,1/98)

Tabatabai is right that “when the confrontation] = revolution [ begins, the choice of weapon lies with the political power, and this same political power imposes upon the nation the weapon with which it will reclaim its rights.” (ibid., section 6) But to this statement of his it must be added that even the revolution itself is imposed upon the people by the established powers, as has been said in the interpretation of the French Revolution: “Louis XVI caused the fall of the Bastille.” (Bronowski 530) And the Iranian revolution also came about when the dictator of Iran had closed all peaceful and legal paths to any criticism, protest, proposal, and political and social participation, and intended to run the country single-handedly and as he himself wished! He who, in the early years of his reign, had made colorful promises of democracy and freedom of thought to the people, and had said that “since I am the king of a constitutional country, I see no reason not to encourage the formation of parties and, like dictators, support only one party of my own making” (Nejati, 496, quoting from Mission for My Country), in its final years, by establishing a single state party, was drawing a line in the sand for all intellectual, political, and ideological currents, declaring: “In the future [only] one party will exist; those who refuse to join that party must obtain passports and leave the country.” (ibid.)

In this series of articles, Tabatabai says nothing of these events; that is, he does not actually offer a political analysis, but rather weaves his own dreams and, alongside that, vents his grudges, settling scores with each and every intellectual and enlightened figure of his time! He who, in analyzing events like the Constitutional Revolution or issues such as political thought in the West, would—so to speak—split hairs and make fine distinctions, now, in examining the most sweeping revolution of contemporary history, which unfolded before his very eyes, makes astonishing generalizations! He says: "With the victory of the anti-national revolution [i.e., the 1979 Revolution], Iran's national consciousness, which had lost its principal dwelling, ... went in search of shelter." (Ibid., Part 13) He has even forgotten that a few years earlier, he had called that same revolution—which he now labels anti-national and a creation of the imperialists—the bringer of justice and freedom, and in interpreting it, had said that "the constitutional movement was a revolution of the kind aimed at establishing freedom, but this does not mean the Islamic Revolution was formed in opposition to freedom. Freedom and equality lie at the core of the intellectual system of all revolutions ... The Islamic Revolution gave precedence to the principle of equality and the quest for justice." (Tabatabai, 536)

Since Tabatabai—contrary to his own recommendations scattered throughout his other writings—views everything through the dark glass of his intellectual prejudices, he sees everything as gloomy, black, and arbitrary. This is why his series of articles holds no scientific value, for no trace of scientific methods can be seen in it. A scientific piece of writing, above all, classifies, differentiates, and separates the issues at hand, evaluating and analyzing each in its proper place, thereby demonstrating the coordinates and characteristics of each. This scientific method requires that, in this examination as well, the three important issues of the country's contemporary history—namely, the "pre-revolutionary regime," the "revolution," and the "post-revolutionary regime"—be examined and evaluated separately. Whereas, to achieve his aim, Tabatabai has conflated all three periods and, so to speak, lumped them all together to muddy the waters and steer the subject as he wishes. In this eccentric and arbitrary interpretation, he says nothing of the pre-revolutionary regime, which Tabatabai calls the "long-enduring national state" and which indications suggest he held dear to his heart; and the revolution, without any roots in Iran's history or society, is, through a kind of simplification, presented as arising from the translation of a foreign book that the imperialists had sent to disrupt the country's security and independence! And whatever has occurred in the decades following the revolution is deemed the inevitable result of the 1979 Revolution and the achievement of political intellectuals and pre-revolutionary revolutionary currents! And the whole matter is thus—so to speak—neatly tied up! But the truth is that a flawed analysis brings flawed consequences and devastating harms. It leaves the guilty and the innocent unrecognized and even swaps their places! Therefore, to clarify the matter, we will proceed with this writing by separating the three aforementioned issues and leave the judgment to the readers.

The Pre-Revolutionary Regime or the Long-Enduring National State:

In this lengthy writing, Tabatabai has addressed everything except that against which the Iranian Revolution arose, namely the pre-revolutionary regime. Yet, addressing the revolution without first understanding its historical and social contexts leads nowhere and even shrouds its story in ambiguity and obscurity. But Tabatabai, disregarding such matters, contents himself with saying: "What neither the spectrum of leftist groups nor the spectrum of religious groups knew was that their 'revolution within the revolution' took place in a country that had a long-enduring national state." (Ibid., Part 1)

This is all that Tabatabai's writing has yielded regarding the revolution and the pre-57 regime. According to these claims, the Iranian people were riotous anarchists whose heads ached to disrupt the order and system of the country, who had developed a problem with something called the state, and consequently decided to eliminate it! And that state was a national and popular one that had long-term aspirations for progress and advancement. Now, if someone were unaware of the events of the revolution and the pre-revolution era, and knew those events only through this writing of Tabatabai, they would see those forces as nothing but deranged madmen and saboteurs against civilization, order, and law! But let us see what the story is, what kind of state this long-term national state was, and what the Iranian revolution wanted?

If Tabatabai's meaning of the state being long-term is that it looked toward distant futures and dreamed of a great civilization; it is thought that the backward situation and its dependent economy and industry, which has been interpreted as an "unfinished industrial edifice" (Halliday, 178), meaning a hollow model, has already answered Tabatabai, and it is not thought that Tabatabai could show even a single indication of the possibility of such a civilization in the years before the revolution. The reason for this claim is that the Shah, during the display of Iran's 2,500-year civilization in 1971, did not even have a single Iranian-made carriage or cart to attach behind the horses, camels, and mules of previous eras to show that this historical civilization had continued into his time! But if this long-term aspiration means the historical roots of that state, that is, the historical continuity of the institution of monarchy with the political tradition of Iranshahr and the divine grace of kings—to which Tabatabai is also attached—then it is necessary to delve a little deeper into the matter to see what the historical circumstances of this long-term state were like and how far back its historical roots went?

If we take the state here to mean the collective body of the administrators of the pre-revolution regime, i.e., the government, those familiar with Iranian history know that this state was an anti-national, rootless, and subservient one that, after the suppression of the national Constitutional Movement and the independent, popular government of Mosaddegh by English and American coup plotters, was transferred to the Pahlavi dynasty. This state never gained national legitimacy, and as an example, the extent of its legitimacy can be seen in the country's contemporary literature, and especially in the views and thoughts of poets and writers such as Nima, Hedayat, Shamloo, Bozorg Alavi, Baraheni, Akhavan, Sa'edi, Forough, Sayeh, Rahmani, Shafiei Kadkani, Hamid Mosaddegh, Sepanlou, Dowlatabadi, Mujabi, Behrangi, and dozens of other poets and writers! The thought and works of each and every one of these poets and writers were created, from head to toe, against the existing situation of those days! No historical connection linked that state to the periods before it either! Furthermore, everyone knows these historical truisms: that there was fundamentally no such thing as a long-term national state in Iranian history for Tabatabai's long-term state to be one of its connected links. Multiple historical ruptures repeatedly severed the connection of pre-constitutional states; the Arab conquest, the Mongol invasion, the onslaught of Timur the Lame, the invasions of foreign tribes, who replaced one another and were overthrown by one another, left no room for the continuity of governments. These states were not national either, because in addition to not being Iranian and coming for plunder and pillage, they also pursued their policies with massacre, oppression, looting, eye-gouging, ear-cutting, and foot-breaking—in a word, "enmity with the people." Consequently, they had no base of support among the masses. These invading dynasties arrived like lightning, took the place of the preceding dynasty, and then departed like the wind, yielding their place to another invader. Sometimes, the rule of these foreign governments ended with just one or two individuals, and nothing called a dynasty was formed. In addition to all this, if rising against a government is wrong, then why did Tabatabai not speak this way in his interpretations of the Constitutional Revolution, while the Constitutional Revolution also disrupted Iran's political history and severed its past from its new eras, that is, it eliminated a medieval state and established a state and parliament on a new level, and in doing so, invalidated and discredited all the myths and legends of Iranshahr, divine grace, and lord-worship!

اما چنانچه مقصود طباطبایی از دولت، كابینه ها و یا صدراعظم های دوره ی پهلوی ها بوده باشد، باید گفت که در این صورت، قضیه قدری هم اسفناک تر است! زیرا افزون بر این كه این دولت ها هم مانند سلسله های شاهی، اتّصال به گذشته های دور نداشتند و بعضی از آن ها حتّی بیش از چند روز و چند ماه، و یا حد اكثر چند سال،  دوام نمی آوردند؛ هیچ یك از آن ها هم از نوع وزیرانی مانند خواجه نظام الملك – وزیر ایده آل طباطبایی و نظریه پرداز اختناق دینی – نبودند. نظام الملك وزیر قدرتمندی بود كه سلطان را درس كشورداری می داد و هم چنان كه طباطبایی در جای دیگر روایت كرده است، سلطان را تهدید می كرد كه: اگر قلم وزارت را از او دریغ دارد، كاری از شمشیر او ساخته نیست. در حالی كه وزیران دوره ی پهلوی ها و دوره های پیش از آن - به جز چند تنی مثل قائم مقام و امیر كبیر و مصدّق كه آن ها هم آبشان با دیكتاتورها و سرسپرده های بیگانگان به یك جوی نمی رفت. - برده های كر و كوری بودند كه گاه حتّی قدرت استعفا دادن هم نداشتند! اینان را در دوره ی قاجار، نوكر می خواندند و در دوره ی پهلوی ها، یک درجه هم سقوط کرده بودند وغلام خانه زاد شده بودند! وحقیقتاً هم كارشان هم جز غلامی و پابوسی و چاپلوسی چیز دیگری نبود. اینان برای نشان دادن اخلاص خود در ذلّت و بردگی، خود در برابر شاه تبدیل به چهارپا هم می کردند و «چهار دست و پا راه می رفتند.»( بولارد،32)

نخست وزیران این دوره ها، به تعبیر هویدا، منشی دفتر بودند، نه رئیس دولت. هویدا می گفت: نخست وزیر، رئیس دفتر اعلی حضرت است و منوچهر اقبال، نامه هایش را با عنوان «غلام خانه زاد» و «جان نثار» امضا می کرد.(میلانی،304) اینان دو خصلت مشترک داشتند و آن این بود که «همه مطیع منویات ملوکانه بودند، و هیچ کدام در میان مردم پایگاهی نداشتند»(همان،23) تاجایی که برخی از نشریه ها در وصف مسلوب الاختیار بودن هویدا می نوشتند، «که او حتّی از حقّ استخدام مستخدم منزل خویش هم محروم است.»(همان،232) گزارشی از وزارت خارجه ی امریکا نشان می دهد که «در زمان آغاز صدارت هویدا، در واقع دیگر استقلال و حرمت چندانی برای این مقام باقی نمانده بود.»(همان،226) او «نخست وزیری را در حدّ نامه بری دربار تنزّل داده بود تا بر سر کار بماند.»(بهنود،617)  یك نخست وزیر- منوچهر اقبال-در پاسخ به خبرنگارها، برنامه ی دولت خود را، فقط و فقط اجرای منویات شاهانه اعلام کرده بود.»( همان،423) ونه ارائه ی طرح و تدبیر برای ادره ی كشور!  و نخست وزیر دیگر که گویا متملّق تر از اقبال بود، اعلام کرده بود که «ما آمده ایم تا سپر بلای اعلی حضرت شویم و خودمان برای باقی ماندن سلطنت، قربانی کنیم.»(همان،479) منوچهر اقبال «که در فروردین 1336 به نخست وزیری رسید، و همه جا خود را غلام خانه زاد شاه می خواند، یک بار در حضور یکی از دوستان قدیم خود، ]و بی آن که شاه در آن جا حضور داشته باشد[  لیوان آب را از روی میز برداشته و گفته بود که من بدون اجازه ی اعلی حضرت همایونی این آب را نمی خورم.»(نجاتی،93) و وزیر خارجه ی او هم -عباس خلعت بری-  به سفیران کشورها می گفت که «او صرفاٌ یک پیام آور است و در تمام امور مهم و نیز غالب امور کم اهمیت، شخص اعلی حضرت تصمیم می گیرند.»(استمپل،37) اما در این مسابقه ی رذالت و بندگی، سرانجام، عَلَم گوی سبقت از همه می بَرَد و به مدیران جراید اعلام می کند که «دیگر برای شاهنشاه، عنوان شخص اوّل مملکت به کار نرود، زیرا شخص اوّل مملکت به این معنی است که شخص دوم و سوم و چهارمی هم ]در این كشور[ هست، در حالی که اعلی حضرت، رهبرند و تمام ملّت فرمانبر او.»(بهنود،599)

کسانی که در این نظام رئیس دولت می شدند، به جای چرخانیدن امور کشور و ارا ئه ی طرح و برنامه، هر روز کشف تازه یی در تملّق گویی و ذلت سیاسی نشان می دادند و در لجن مال کردن شخصیت خود بر یکدیگر پیشی می گرفتند! و آنگاه دیگر وقتی که با نام وزیر و وکیل روی کار می آمدند، پس از مدّتی تمرین بردگی، تبدیل به موجودات حقیری می شدند که شاه، به شیوه ی پدر خود، هراهانتی را نثار آن ها می کرد و هیچ کدام از آن ها سر بلند نمی کرد که در روی اعلی حضرت نگاه کند! شاه در جلسه ی هیأت دولت، اعضای آن دولت را یابو می خواند و می گفت: «شما ها مانند یابو هستید، اگر رکاب بزنم، ازجای خود می کَنید، اگر آرام بمانم، از جا حرکت نمی کنید!»(نجاتی،489)

The Shah, having surrounded himself with these blind and deaf nags, and equating monarchy with ruling over a bunch of slaves and nags in the guise of ministers and deputies, became the unrivaled master of the political arena and statecraft, steering the course of governance in a direction whose outcome was nothing but the severing of his own power's roots! Henceforth, heedless of minister, deputy, and law, and relying on abundant oil revenues, the purchase of military weapons, the employment of colonial experts, and the establishment of one of the most fearsome police organizations of his era—SAVAK—he had formed one of the darkest dictatorships of the 20th century, advancing his rule through suppression, violence, and intimidation. Post-coup Iran, although still a fire beneath the ashes, had not forgotten the signs of liberalism and constitutionalism, nor had it lost the fervor of its political demands, safeguarding these political demands through movements such as the National Resistance Movement, armed guerrilla movements, and overt and covert political efforts; yet the reign of terror that the Shah, in collusion with the intelligence agencies of Britain, America, and Israel, had spread across the entire country, extinguished every movement and closed every aperture to the nation. The Shah, having lived through the experience of the freedoms of the 1940s and the subsequent national movement of Mosaddegh, and bearing bitter memories of the empowerment of political currents and the free press in years past, this time deployed the mechanisms of a police state in such a way that no path remained before the nation but submission and silence, or uprising and revolution. In those years, "the three intelligence agencies of America, Britain, and Israel simultaneously had active espionage bases and political services in Iran" (Fardust, 364). The CIA and "M.I.6, or the British Intelligence Service, had spread their network throughout the cities and were present everywhere in various guises, such as shopkeepers and tradesmen, and even imposed its costs on SAVAK" (ibid., 350), aiding the Iranian security organization—SAVAK—in creating repression and terror, such that massacre, suppression, and "torture, in a manner even more severe than the Inquisition in [medieval] Spain, dominated all of Iran" (Katouzian, 286).

The Shah, who was sinking day by day deeper into the madness of autocracy and the pit that his homegrown slaves had dug before him, was using these instruments of terror and intimidation to take revenge on political and intellectual currents for the years gone by; and the more terror and violence SAVAK employed in this task, the more secure the Shah believed his reign to be. Hence, he had given this police organization a free hand throughout the country to silence every voice. He had made SAVAK agents, and especially their chiefs, the unchallenged masters of the country, and the terror of these agents, who lay in ambush in every corner, weighed heavily upon all intellectual and cultural circles, and especially the nation's universities. The operators of this so-called security organization, in order to flaunt their power and work out their own complexes, refrained from no crime, devising new methods of torture and killing every day. Thus, "SAVAK's name stood at the top of the blacklists of international human rights bodies" (Fardust, 450). As Time magazine once wrote, "Although it cannot be determined precisely in which country in the world the methods of torture are more severe, in the opinion of prominent international experts, Iran and Chile rank first in terms of torture and the application of horrific methods. The French newspaper Le Monde identified Iran as one of the countries that, with thousands of prisoners, the application of pressure and repression, and the ever-increasing extent of human rights violations, has worried the world human rights organization" (Nejati, 2/17). And "the Sunday Times newspaper described SAVAK as the agent of the suppression of intellectuals, the torture of opponents and prisoners, and the most horrific police apparatus in the world" (ibid., 18). The Secretary-General of Amnesty International stated in 1975 that "no country's file on human rights violations is as black as the file of the Iranian government" (Halliday, 93). In SAVAK's dreaded prisons, various forms of torture "from beatings, whipping, electric shocks, pulling out nails and teeth, enemas of boiling water into the rectum, hanging heavy weights from the testicles, strapping the prisoner to metal tables that had turned white from intense heat, and so on..." (ibid., 95) were common. Furthermore, "burning the body with an electric stove, burning sensitive points with cigarette fire, beating with cables, sawing, rape, the use of bottles, [staging] mock executions, and other horrific tortures" (Khamei, 94) were normal and prevalent. Also, the Brazilian torture method, the iron bed, the seesaw, the iron and electric chair, and injections (ibid.).

But amidst all this, the "Aryamehr Frying Pan"—a gift from the crown-bearing father of the nation to his children—was apparently more famous than other types of torture and, like "Anushirvan's Chain of Justice," was registered in the name of the Shahanshah Aryamehr. The predatory SAVAK agents took pleasure in every kind of harassment and torture and would torture a prisoner as much as was possible. They "had amputated the leg of one of the guerrillas, which had become infected, so that he would stay alive and they could continue the torture" (Maysami, 380). "Reza Baraheni's little finger was broken, and they said they would break another finger of his each day" (Halliday, 96). And "Mokh Vartan's brain was drilled with a bit" (Bazargan, 466). According to Fardust, "in the Army's counter-intelligence, all the toenails of 12 people had been pulled out" (ibid., 386).

SAVAK, on behalf of the Shah, was tasked with spreading its intelligence network throughout society, casting every alley, street, and home into terror. To this end, “5,000 official SAVAK experts made use of the services of around 100,000 informants” (Naraghi, 132). They infiltrated every nook and cranny of people’s lives, especially political and intellectual currents, as far as they could—even into the coffins of the dead! Such that “the coffin of a farmer’s wife who had died in Germany and had been sealed there by the police of the city of Angers for shipment to Iran, when delivered to her relatives in Iran, was found to have been broken open by SAVAK agents and the covering of the deceased’s body torn to shreds for inspection” (Keshavarz, 10). They sought to pull a thread from anywhere and thereby achieve their aims! They were suspicious of any piece of writing. Dowlatabadi recounts: “They had taken a page of paper from a young man on which the Abjad numerals were written and were beating him, saying: ‘Decode these codes!’ And however much that young man said, ‘Sir, these are Abjad letters,’ they insisted it was a cipher and he must decode it” (Dowlatabadi, 20). But even more curious was that these agents, “while searching a student dormitory, saw a book in one room titled ‘Inequalities’ and arrested the student who occupied the room on the charge of possessing a Marxist book, subjecting him to interrogation and torture. After some time, during which the student denied the accusation, it turned out that the book was a mathematics textbook about equations and inequalities!” (Cheshmandaz-e Iran, no. 123, p. 12)

The shadow of SAVAK’s terror weighed upon the entire country like a black plague, casting all intellectual, political, and religious circles, and even the interiors of homes, into dread and fear; to the extent that “in all ministries, semi-governmental organizations, and universities, anyone who had any connection to political affairs felt the security pressure” (Stempel, 48). But alongside this apparatus of terror, the Shah of Iran also had a military arm that worked hand in hand with SAVAK to safeguard repression and political suffocation in the country: the commandos and special guard forces of the Shah. To create terror and put an end to resistance from cultural circles, such as universities, the Shah ultimately used these forces. The commandos and royal guards had suppressed university protests several times and turned the university scene into blood and soil, the most familiar example being the assault on the university on 16 Azar 1332 (December 7, 1953). In this assault, the aforementioned forces behaved so savagely and reduced the university to such a state that its directors and administrators found their presence on the university council futile, and immediately “the chancellor and the university council resigned, declaring that such conduct had been unprecedented since the Mongol invasion” (Katouzian, 269). But the battle of 16 Azar was not the Shah’s only battle with the university; even afterward, the Shah did not lift the shadow of military forces from the universities. For in Bahman of the year 1341 (February 1963), “a group of army commandos with full equipment stormed the University of Tehran, disrupted a large demonstration taking place on its grounds, savagely beat and injured and maimed many young men and women, smashed doors, windows, and even laboratory equipment, and hurled students, desks, chairs, and library books out of the windows” (ibid.). In short, they came, burned, broke, and left! Dowlatabadi says: One day, I had gone to give a lecture on the general situation of contemporary art and literature at the invitation of students of the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Tehran. I noticed a strange and peculiar atmosphere; that is, I saw armored personnel carriers stationed on Ibn Sina Street, opposite the university (Dowlatabadi, 11). That is, a government would deploy tanks, cannons, and armored personnel carriers to the universities to confront a literary lecture, as if it had come to fight a foreign army!

One of the Shah’s great errors lay precisely in this confrontation with the universities. As it happened, this strategic error was, in fact, the Shah’s political strategy! He spent oil revenues on purchasing heavy weaponry to flaunt his power before the universities. In this insane arms hoarding, there was no plan or scheme for war with foreign forces, even though in war with a foreign power, his army and forces had no efficacy whatsoever! And according to “the American ambassador, this Imperial Army was a paper tiger” (Nejati, 61).

The Shah, who imagined that through massacre and repression he had eliminated the domestic opposition forces and, consequently, fulfilled all his power-hungry desires in removing and suppressing opposing political currents and overcoming intellectual and enlightened forces, and had brought the matter to a conclusion, suddenly found himself faced with a new obstacle: the American elections and the possibility of the Democratic faction coming to power! And then, to remove this obstacle, he committed a grave political error: supporting the Republican faction and investing in its victory! But this political error, which the Shah had also committed once in the 1340s, destabilized his support base, and with the victory of the Democratic Party in the elections, all his despotic dreams were blown to the winds, and the dictator of Iran lost the game.

The coming to power of the Democrats in America and the opening up of the political space provided an unexpected opportunity for political currents in Iran and wrested control of affairs from the Shah and his security organization. The fire beneath the ashes blazed up and brought the volcano of revolution to eruption. The Shah, who had been caught off guard by the greatest popular protest against him, awoke from his rabbit-like slumber when it was far too late; consequently, none of his new stratagems—such as promises to make amends for the past, changing prime ministers, and even admitting his own faults and mistakes—proved remedial, for all the opposition political currents had, over the preceding years, seen through him and regarded none of these false promises as effective. Only one path lay before him: reliance on the army and military forces to suppress the protests and massacre the people! But the breadth of the revolution was such that no room remained even for these dictatorial measures; the body of the Shah’s army, confronted with the scenes of revolution, was melting away day by day, and soldiers and even the senior military cadre—who were, in any case, drawn from these very millions-strong masses—were breaking away from the army and joining the people. At times they would stand against the regime and fight! The air force, which was among the most educated strata of the military, turned its back on him and created a great problem for the government. But the Shah’s greater problem was securing America’s agreement to suppress and deploy the military machine against the people’s revolution, and in fact “his final decision depended on whether the Western powers would seek to support or abandon him; for without their backing, the Shah would inevitably be defeated by the opposition.” (Naraghi, 238) Yet in those days, as the Shah awaited an explicit signal from America to massacre the people, the answer he heard from the White House was that “instead of being impatient in the face of events, he had better be patient, make his own decision, and not expect a government whose principal slogan was the necessity of respecting individual freedoms to help him suppress the people.” (Abrahamian, 754) And in a telephone conversation, the President of the United States “expediently recommended that the army be barred from displaying extreme violence.” (ibid., 760) And thus, since none of his stratagems proved effective, he found the solution in leaving the country, and it has been said that “his departure from the country meant that hardline military figures—such as Oveissi and Badrei—would be given the opportunity to resolve the problems through a military coup.” (Behnoud, 843) As “eight army generals, intent on carrying out a coup, had prepared a headquarters for covert operations, and the bulk of their plan was based on bombing sensitive areas, controlling the cities, arresting and executing individuals known for their opposition, and seizing radio and television. Through Ardeshir Zahedi, they had been assured that the Shah would support their operations.” (Behnoud, 911) But the suppression of a national and popular revolution whose principal slogans were independence and freedom stood in glaring contradiction to the political propaganda of the American Democrats; consequently, America gave no promise of assistance to Iran’s generals, and Sullivan had even warned the Shah against adopting such a course! The complexity of the situation had thrown American politicians into disarray and discord in confronting the Iranian revolution. Sullivan and the State Department stood on one side, and Brzezinski and the American military on the other; the first group advocated flexibility and the prevention of massacre and coup, while Brzezinski’s group supported the coup and the plan of Iran’s generals. In truth, the Iranian revolution had also bewildered the operators of the White House, and they were faced with a complex event over which they had no power of decision whatsoever; these two groups had even clashed fiercely with one another over the Iran issue. Thus it was that the White House’s hardline faction, led by Brzezinski, after hearing of Sullivan’s warning to the Shah, “immediately convened the council to review Iran’s affairs and sharply criticized the State Department, saying you have become headstrong and fanciful!” (Behnoud, ibid.) These clashes between the two factions continued, and the President of the United States, like the Shah, was hesitant in adopting final measures.

The Americans, who considered the unfolding situation to be the result of the Shah's blunders, were furious about these blunders and consequently reluctant to help him stay in power. However, since the collapse of the Shah's regime would bring down one of the West's great barriers against the Soviets, they saw no alternative but to support him. Thus, in these encounters, they both humiliated him and sought a solution to prevent the monarchy's collapse, but the reality was that it was already too late, and even American intervention could not alter the course of events! So, although America eventually accepted Brzezinski's plan, according to which a coup would be launched in Iran to prevent the revolution's decisive and rapid advance toward power, by the time they were decoding the embassy's encrypted telex to convey the message to the head of the U.S. military advisory mission in Tehran—and the U.S. ambassador—both had taken refuge in safe locations under pressure from the people who intended to enter and occupy the embassy, and were searching for Engineer Bazargan and members of the Revolutionary Council to come to their rescue." (Behnoud, 928)

In any case, the Americans had lost all hope for the Shah's future, and when Huyser did not visit the Shah in Tehran, the Shah realized that in the Americans' eyes, he was a spent force (Behnoud, 863), and Blumenthal, after meeting with the Shah, had said that "he did not think this man, in such a state, was capable of making decisions and exercising power in political affairs." (Nejati, 175) Sabeti, the main SAVAK operative, quotes Hassan Toufanian as saying, "When Sullivan and Huyser came out from seeing the Shah, I said: 'What happened?' Sullivan said: 'His Imperial Majesty has decided to leave the country.' I went in and asked the Shah what happened. He said: 'No, they instructed us to leave. What does this mean? We had not done wrong by Britain and America, why did they do this to me?'" (Sabeti, 485) So much for Tabatabai's long-lasting national government! But the revolution:

Revolution

From very ancient times up to our own era, two different and even contradictory interpretations of revolution have existed. One group of the intellectual and religious leaders of nations has seen revolution as something "on a par with war, famine, drought, plague, and other natural calamities of the heavens and earth" (Bashiriyeh, 24), and consequently, has regarded it as an evil phenomenon. Or, based on the justification and distortion of religious decrees, they have declared it forbidden and prohibited. As Qadi Abu Bakr al-Baqillani issued a fatwa stating: "Even if the Caliph is corrupt, commits oppression, seizes the community's wealth, flays the skin of the people under the whip, sheds the blood of the innocent, tramples the [religious] law, and abolishes divine limits and ordinances, he is not to be deposed, and rising against him is not obligatory; rather, he must be admonished!" (Ravandi, 3/437) And Hafiz Yahya al-Dimashqi, who is said to have been the Sheikh of Dar al-Hadith and a commentator on Sahih Muslim, "considered rebellion against the Caliph and ruler and waging war against him forbidden by the consensus of Muslims, even if that ruler and Caliph is corrupt and oppressive!" (Ibid., 438)

اما دوشادوش این‌گونه نظریه‌پردازان سیاسی و اعتقادی، تعدادی از رهبران فکری ملّت‌ها هم، از دوره های باستان تا دوره های جدید، انقلاب را تنها راه پیشِ روی مردم برای دست‌یافتن به حقوق و مطالبات خود دانسته‌اند. کنفوسیوس گفته بود: «اگر فرمانبر ملزم است از فرمانروای خود تمکین و تبعیت داشته باشد، فرمانروا نیز به‌نوبة خود موظف است گروه تابعان و فرمانبران را در تحت حمایت خود گیرد؛ و وسایل رفاه ایشان را فراهم سازد... اگر چنین نکرد، فرمانبران حق دارند از راه طغیان، حکومت او را واژگون سازند»( همان،1/264) در زمانه ی ما نیز، علاوه بر روشنفکران انقلابی، تعدادی از متفکران مکتب لیبرال و حتی محافظه كارانِ جا افتاده ی انگلیسی و امریکایی نیز، در موقعیت‌های اضطراری به تجویز انقلاب، حتّی در شکل خشونت بار آن، دست زده‌اند. در اعلامیه ی استقلال امریکا آمده بود که “شورش بر جباران، به معنای فرمانبرداری از پروردگار است و جفرسون انقلاب را راه پیش گیری از حکومت جبارانه می دانست!»( برونوفسکی،516) کارل پوپر، نظریه پردازِ تغییرات تدریجی اجتماعی هم ، علی‌رغم عناد آشتی ناپذیری که با تفکر انقلابی دارد، در برهه‌های خاصی از تاریخ یک جامعه، انقلاب سیاسی ــ آن هم شکل قهرآلود آن را ــ مجاز می‌داند: «در یك حكومت غیردموكراسی تنها یك راه برای حصول به اصلاحات معقول وجود دارد وآن سرنگون‌ساختن قهرآلود دولت است»( پوپر،422 ) و جانسون، مدافع دیگر لیبرالیسم  در تجویز انقلاب، حتّی در سطح فیزیکی خشونت بار، گفته است که «خشونت اجتماعی پاسخ مناسب به مقاومت سرسختانه [ازسوی حکومت] است. این خشونت بدان دلیل روی می‌دهد که نخبگان حاکم راه‌های شناخته‌شده ی تغییر غیر خشونت‌بار را مسدود کرده‌اند؛ به‌عبارت دیگر، انقلاب ادامه ی سیاست است در سطح اقدام فیزیکی خشونت‌بار!»( کوهن،180)

در هرحال بدیهی است که انقلاب یا تغییر یک حکومت، وقتی رخ می‌دهد که «طبقه‌ای از انسان‌ها برای خروج از وضعیت فلاکت‌بار خویش، راه دیگری جز دست‌زدن به انقلاب نمی‌بینند»(همان،41) انقلاب به تعبیر کرین برینتون «نشانه ی یک عصر نوین»( برینتون،227) و به گفته ی ویکتور هوگو «لاروِ تمدّن»(میلانی،35) است و از نظر سیاسی «به وخیم‌ترین ناهنجاری‌ها و ناکارآمدی‌های رژیم پیشین پایان می‌دهد»(برینتون، همان جا) همین معنی را ‌هانا آرنت، متفکر مشهور آلمانی تبار نیز تأیید کرده است: «انقلاب سرنگونی حکومت به‌وسیله ی تنگدستان و ایجاد دموکراسی»(آرنت،240) است، زیرا «هدف انقلاب با مفهوم آزادی پیوند خورده است»(همان،20) و «مفهوم جدید انقلاب از این تصور جداشدنی نیست که مسیر تاریخ ناگهان از نو آغاز می‌گردد»( همان،36) و با همه ی ناسپاسی و عنادی که مخالفان انقلاب، در حق انقلاب‌ها نشان داده‌اند، «آزادی از انقلاب مایه می‌گیرد»(همان،38)

Thus, if we understand revolution in the sense used by Brinton, Hugo, and Arendt, and evaluate the 1979 revolution against the political, social, and economic situation of the previous regime, the invalidity of Tabatabai's ramblings becomes more apparent, and the 1979 revolution must be regarded as the sign of a new era and a prelude to democracy, not a program for the bankruptcy and misery of the people. But the difference between these two issues is that Tabatabai evaluates the Iranian revolution by its unintended consequences and aftermath, not by its grand ideals such as freedom and justice, which were trampled underfoot by monopolistic ambitions; and obviously, such evaluations are nothing but a distortion and misrepresentation of the event! This method of analysis ultimately leads astray; for if the value of a thought or action is demonstrated by its unintended consequences, there is no thought or action in the history of human life that has not led to an unintended outcome! Just as religion, mysticism, democracy, freedom, socialism, and even science… have brought about such unintended outcomes! Democracy and elections were, in truth, a kind of remedy for escaping slavery and the domination of dictators and autocracy, but when they fell into the hands of political powers, various dictatorships emerged from within them, and as a result, dictators who in the past came to power by the sword and massacre now emerge from ballot boxes! And science, which emerged to organize human life, has ended up creating the most terrifying means of destroying life, such as atomic weapons, genetic manipulation, and the production of mass-murder viruses… and as Adorno said, “its moral claims have been damaged to the point of death, and it seems to have lost its reputation through its practical applications!” (Campalani, 136) Freedom, which was the great ideal of humanity in all historical periods, has ended up in striptease, obscene displays, and nauseating pornography! Socialism, which proclaimed equality, turned into Stalinism, terror, repression, and genocide; and religion, which came to break the chains of slavery and bondage and initially freed many of these bonds and chains from the hands and feet of the faithful and taught brilliant lessons in ethics, piety, and integrity, later, in the hands of religious authorities and the administrators of religious governments, turned into chains and shackles, power-worship, corruption, lies, and falsehood, and brought matters to such a pass that a priest, after years of living in the church, finally found the solution in fleeing from it and said in a press interview: “Show me one religious government in history that is not tainted with corruption,” and the interviewer could find no answer but silence! (Cubitt, 147) Yet what does religion have to do with these corruptions? What does Jesus have to do with the Inquisition? What do the Prophet and Ali have to do with what the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs did? What does Ali's Nahj al-Balagha have to do with the actions of religious governments? And even what do Marx and Engels have to do with what happened in Soviet Russia? As Eagleton said: What happened in the Soviet Union was Marxist in the same sense that the Inquisition was Christian! (Eagleton, 18) All these are the unintended consequences of religion, revolution, science, democracy, socialism, and so on, brought about by this domineering two-legged creature, and there is no guarantee that Tabatabai's national revolution would not meet a similar fate, and some signs of it are even visible today! The 1979 revolution must also be evaluated by its early days and the magnificent freedom and unity it brought in those years, not by the consequences and aftermath that are the result of the monopolistic ambitions of those running affairs and have become a pretext for Sabeti, Tabatabai, and a host of dubious individuals to discredit the authentic, stalwart intellectuals of the revolutionary era and its self-sacrificing guerrillas!

Contrary to Tabatabai's baseless propaganda, democracy, law, and human rights—which separate the new world from previous eras—are the achievements of revolutions such as the French Revolution, the Constitutional Revolution, and other revolutions. As Alain Touraine stated, “Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States entered modernity through revolution and the rejection of despotism” (Touraine, 80). Of course, some of these revolutions also led to killing and bloodshed, but whatever the case, they ultimately changed the face of human societies, rendering despotism, oppression, and discrimination illegitimate and discredited, and transforming the Europe of the Inquisition into a modern and free Europe, and Qajar society into post-Constitutional Iran. A world in which the legitimacy of despotic governments has vanished, and no dictator sleeps soundly and peacefully—as in previous eras—but is constantly anxious about losing the power that the people have delegated to him!

Tabatabai says: “There was something called a state in Iran that the revolution aimed to destroy [destroy?]” (ibid., section 7). But was there not a state confronting the Constitutional Revolution, or the revolutions of England, France, and Russia? Or were those states not as long-lasting as this state? Or is there not a state confronting this national revolution that Tabatabai promotes? It is obvious that revolutions take shape against states, and no revolution emerges in a vacuum! The pre-revolution state was also one of these states! But its administrators had neither royal lineage, nor was that state long-lasting, nor was it national and popular, nor did it have a historical connection to the dynasties before it. Moreover, in the new world and after the revolutions of England and France, no state is assessed by the length of its duration; if that were the case, neither in England would revolution, change of monarchy, and regicide have occurred, nor in France, nor in Russia, nor anywhere else! For several centuries now, nations have measured these states by their functions, and as the famous English economist Bentham said, “We must judge them solely on the basis of the performance of governments’ duties toward them, and accepting them merely because they have existed for a long time is not possible!” (Bronowski, 557)

Tabatabai sees all these issues as confused and topsy-turvy, and because he sees them as confused, he also writes in a confused manner! That is why his writing is full of rambling. In this text, the 1979 Revolution occurred both as a result of the influx of Régis Debray's ideas, and as the result of the ashes that Shariati threw into people's eyes, and as the revenge of the sheikhs and maraji' against the system of the rule of law, and as other things. – Of course, it should not go unsaid that Tabatabai at one time also marched under the banner of one of these sheikhs and maraji', and his picture is preserved in the Shargh newspaper, 20/3/88. – The only thing absent is the socio-political roots and factors that generated the revolution. Whereas if we consult the writings of researchers such as John Foran, Nikki R. Keddie, Stempel, Fred Halliday, Ervand Abrahamian, Asef Bayat, Katouzian, Mohsen Milani, Reza Baraheni, Eslami Nodushan, and others—who have dissected the Iranian Revolution using scientific and academic methods—the invalidity of Tabatabai's propagandistic and emotional slogans becomes clear, and we then find the story to be of a different hue. In these writings, the roots of the revolution have been found in the realities of Iranian society, in the daily lives of the people, in the needs of the political and intellectual community, in the regime's inefficiencies and its subservience to the West, and the influence of foreign powers in the pillars of the country, in addition to political autocracy, the violation of the people's social rights, the poverty and helplessness of the lower classes of society, severe repression and censorship in the country's intellectual atmosphere, disregard for the religious values of the masses and the agitation of traditional segments of society, and the response to any protest and discontent with suppression, intimidation, imprisonment, and torture, and so on. In these studies, the protests of the Iranian people, in an evolutionary process and after testing all political and peaceful paths, ultimately culminated in revolution and regime change! Now, place the totality of these—so-called—facts of Iranian society of that day against what Tabatabai has fabricated on his own, so that you may better grasp the degree of credibility of his statements.

By turning a blind eye to the most prominent slogan of the revolution, namely independence, Tabatabai portrays the 1979 Revolution as an attempt to transform the Iranian nation into an ummah, and to dissolve it into a coalition of territories under an Islamic caliphate: “The attempt to transform one of the oldest nations into an ummah-people was the greatest mistake committed by both the religious and anti-religious factions of the 1979 Revolution.” (ibid., Part 1) Yet he says nothing about the subservience of the previous regime and the transformation of this ancient nation into one of the unofficial colonies of the West! Something that open eyes had seen even from across the oceans: “By 1977, the Shah had become so close to the United States that he seemed to be working more for American purposes than for Iran’s!” (Stempel, 115)

Extricating the country from the clutches of colonialists and restoring its independence and national prestige was the principal slogan of all political and revolutionary currents, and if, in later years, schemes were put forward for establishing a caliphate, or for annexing Iran into a larger ummah and disregarding its political independence—though, of course, no such idea has existed to date, except in what is called the Axis of Resistance, which is something different from what Tabatabai speaks of—these schemes would have been nothing but a perversion of the values of the 1979 Revolution! Moreover, if Tabatabai considers Shariati’s thought to be the motive for the Iranian Revolution and regards him as its principal theorist, then logically the Iranian people must have learned from Shariati that “nationalism is not a reactionary retreat, a crawling into one’s narrow mold and closing the door to humanity; rather, the true path to genuine humanism passes through the realization of nationalities, as the realization of the human personality of a collective, and conversely, what is called the primacy of the human species, humanism, or internationalism, and on this basis negates national authenticities, is a path that ultimately leads to imperialism!” (Shariati, 27/123) As we see, Shariati does not even accept humanism at the cost of relinquishing nationalism!

The National Revolution and Tabatabai’s Collyrium

Tabatabai, who has called the great revolution of the Iranian people in 1979 an “anti-national revolution,” sees the protests of recent months—which sociologists and political scientists have called a protest movement or, at most, a “super-movement”—as a national and global revolution, and even discerns a trace of miracle in it: “The miracle of the renewal of national unity and awareness of it has occurred and has made the nation aware of its rights.” (ibid., Part 6) This inverted perception of matters, in the words of Rumi—which, as it happens, Tabatabai has repeatedly quoted and emphasized in his own writings—is a clear instance of the blinding by God, which this time operates through Tabatabai’s collyrium. It seems that Tabatabai’s collyrium, which was supposed—unlike Shariati’s ashes—to bring sight and insight to the generations of his time, has, before anyone else, disabled his own eyes, and as a result, he does not see any of the realities of Iranian society and its afflictions correctly or in their proper place! And instead of precise analysis and interpretation of matters, he speaks of miracles and wonders! And there is no doubt that resorting to miracles is because Tabatabai does not wish to acknowledge the creators of this awareness of national rights, who are, in truth, the very survivors of the 1979 generation. The same generation that Tabatabai has “kept under observation for four decades and has concluded that, with such a low level of consciousness, they lack the talent for such things!” (ibid., Part 11) The very same people who, during these years, grappled with the situation prevailing over the country, knocked on every door, and strove as much as they could to set the country’s affairs in order and to restore the ideals of the 1979 Revolution and the trampled values of religion, and by paying heavy costs—imprisonment, exile, migration, unemployment, and forced inactivity—spoke for forty years of the people’s rights, freedom, and the law. And this, precisely in those very days when Seyyed Javad Tabatabai was engaged in profound and scholarly research and publishing voluminous and weighty works.

These movements, contrary to Tabatabai's interpretation of them, are a continuation of the Reform Movement and the Green Movement, and it must even be said that they are the continuation of the very demands of the Iranian people, from the Constitutional Revolution and the National Movement to the 1979 Revolution and beyond, which in the 2010s even bowed to moderation; but the totalitarianism of those running affairs blocked the path of all those peaceful movements, suppressed their forces, and turned the affair into fire under the ashes! Those running affairs thought that by sidelining rivals, sabotaging their work, and making the country's political space monolithic, they had embraced the desired outcome! But it was precisely at this point that the fire under the ashes flared up, and if the door continues to turn on the same hinge and arrogance and indifference are shown toward the people's demands, given the widespread discontent visible throughout society, there is no doubt that these movements will one day gain national scope, and the flame will become a volcano and the movement a revolution! But a country that, over the past forty years, has seen one revolution, one war, and several armed conflicts and political uprisings, does not have the capacity to bear these heavy costs; may rationality and prudence, of which no trace has yet been seen, come into play and think of a remedy before the storm strikes.

But let us see what a national revolution is and what its signs are. A revolution is national when it either raises the banner of nationalism and national identity, issues nationalist slogans, and stands against foreign threats and aggression, or—like the 1979 Revolution—has a spread across all social strata. Whereas the protests of recent months still have none of these signs of being national. What is seen in Iran today is very far from a "national revolution," and as we said, a wrong analysis of a phenomenon brings wrong and destructive consequences, especially when that phenomenon is a political one like a protest movement or a revolution. But if we see the realities before us correctly, it must be said that the Iranian nation, in the face of these movements, is positioned in three separate branches, or in other words, has split into three parts: one part is seen in these very protest movements, another part is the forces of the regime and a spectrum of the masses who believe in it, and the third branch or part is the silent, gray majority who, despite all their dissatisfaction with the existing situation, have not yet stepped into the arena for various reasons, and if they one day join these protests, a storm will roar across the entire country. But before such an event, calling these movements a revolution, sending the young generation into the arena of urban clashes, and oneself shouting slogans from outside the fray and being a spectator to the affair, both imposes heavy costs on these movements and, when these movements do not gain national scope and are suppressed, the result will be nothing but failure and disillusionment for the young generations, followed by intellectual crises and destructive reactions.

But these movements, even if they gain scope and turn into a revolution, have two very difficult passes ahead that must be taken into account: first, confrontation with the forces of the regime and the masses who believe in it, which brings the risk of a civil war, and political rationality makes avoiding it inevitable and shows the solution to lie in staying away from any violence and street clashes. A protest movement must advance its work with a peaceful approach and refraining from any violence, provocation, and insult, and by precisely defining its political lines and presenting a clear manifesto and a defined program through successive resolutions, prevent the infiltration of suspicious currents; otherwise, they will infiltrate its ranks and, in its name, set fire to both the Quran and the mosque, engage in murder, looting, and destruction, and also... and for years, such movements have gotten nowhere! And each time, after the rival's show of force and the emergence of that second part, i.e., the forces of the regime and the strata that believe in it, they have retreated, and the cat-and-mouse game has continued in this same form and manner for years, each year with fresh losses and casualties! Likewise, an authentic movement must also refrain from handing its banner to certain individuals, like some striptease performers, so that the matter of its demands is not trivialized.

با این وصف، گردنه ی دشوار بعدی پس از پیروزی و به هنگام سهم خواهی ها و تقسیم غنایم پیش خواهد آمد. آنان که انقلاب ایران را به یاد می آورند می دانند که آن اتحاد پرشکوه ملّی، چگونه از همان ماه های اول، پایمال تفرقه و درگیری های سیاسی و فروپاشی شد! امروز که خبری از چنان اتحادی هم در میان جریان های مختلف جنبش دیده نمی شود، و به روایت برخی از افراد فعال در آن، حتّی این جریان ها پرچم های یکدیگر را هم پایین می کشند و علیه یکدیگر شعار می سازند، چگونه می شود از وقوع یک انقلاب ملّی سخن گفت؟ اگر این واقعیت ها در محاسبات جنبش به کار گرفته نشود؛ پایان کار چیزی جز فاجعه نخواهد بود! با این وصف، طباطبایی نه تنها اعتنایی به چنین محاسبه هایی ندارد؛ بلکه در تفسیر این جنبش های اعتراضی تعبیرهایی را به كار می گیرد كه با واقعیت ماجرا انطباق دارد! نظریه پرداز انقلاب ملی كه در شعارپردازی های خود حد و مرزی نمی شناسد، بی اعتنا به این گونه واقعیت های آشكار، قدمی دیگر به پیش می گذارد و این انقلاب ملی را یک انقلاب جهانی هم می خواند!  اما این كه یك چگونه انقلاب ملی می تواند انقلاب جهانی باشد؛ معمایی است كه فقط دانش سیاسی سید جواد طباطبایی می تواند از آن رازگشایی كند! این که ایرانیان خارج از کشور در تظاهرات علیه وضع موجود، به حمایت از جنبش های داخلی برخاسته اند، آن را تبدیل به انقلاب جهانی نمی کند.

طباطبایی تلاش بسیار می کند تا این جنبش ها را رویاروی نسل های سیاسی دهه های گذشته قرار دهد. می گوید: «در این انقلاب ملی، نسل متفاوتی از ایرانی، پا به میدان گذاشته است كه از او شگفتی ها پدید خواهدآمد. . .  آگاهی ملّی در جست و جوی سرپناه هم فهمیده بود که هیچ امیدی به بیشترین افراد نسلی که انقلاب کرده بود؛ نمی توان داشت. ایدئولوژی انقلابی، بیشتر از آن روح و جسم نسل انقلابی را تباه کرده بود که بتوان امیدی به رستگاری آن داشت.»(همان، بخش14) در حالی که بیشتر نظریه پردازان و سخن گویان و یا حمایت کنندگان این جنبش – در داخل و خارج از کشور - از همان نسل های انقلاب بوده اند و تا کنون اصیل ترین صداهای آن از میان همان نسل ها برخاسته است، و تردیدی نیست که در غیبت آن ها، جنبش از خلاء فکری دردناکی آسیب می بیند. این جنبش به قدری وابسته به آن نسل هاست که نه تنها از سنّت های آن استفاده می کند؛ بلکه برخی از شعارها و سرودهایش هم، تکرار یا تقلید سرودها و شعارهای انقلاب 57است! و حتّی گاهی پاره یی از شعارهای آن انقلاب را می گیرد، اما نمی تواند پاره ی دوم آن را از پیش خود بسازد؛ مثلا می گوید”این گل پرپر ماست – هدیه به میهن ماست.» در حالی که باید می گفت “هدیه به کشور ماست » و حد اقل، قافیه ی آن را درست می کرد! در هر صورت، علی رغم خط فاصلی که طباطبایی بین آن نسل انقلاب کرده و این جنبش می کشد، این جنبش اگر از تجربه های آن نسل ها استفاده کند، گرفتار بیراهه روی، رادیکالیسم، و در نتیجه، دچار هزینه های سنگین نخواهد شد.

طباطبایی در تبیین این تئوری های ناپخته به قدری شتابکاری کرده است که حتّی تناقض برخی از ایده های این جنبش را با بعضی از مبانی فکری خود از یاد برده است و هیچ توجه ندارد که تا امروز،  در انتقاد از راهبرد های سیاسی روشنفکران معاصر، چاره ی کار کشور را، نه در روی آوردن به برخی از الگوهای سیاسی جهان مدرن و آنچه که در دموکراسی های غربی دیده می شود، بلکه در نوسازی سنّت که در تعبیر طباطبایی معادل سنّت های فقهی است.( ر.ک: طباطبایی: حکومت قانون و نیز: آقاجری، مهرنامه35) این تفکر طباطبایی در میان مقلدان او هم راه گشوده بود و برخی از آن ها، از روشنفکران دینی خرده می گرفتند که “نقطه ی اشتراک بازرگان و شریعتی و سروش، نادیده گرفتن فقه اسلامی و تلاش برای تخفیف آن بوده است.»(قوچانی، مهرنامه ی2) حال پرسش این است که آیا طباطبایی مطالبات این جنبش ملّی را که برخی از پرچم داران آن، پرچم دار استریپ تیز هم هستند؛ با قانون های فقهی برآورده خواهد کرد؟

و اما خاکستر شریعتی!

For Tabatabai, Shariati is not an intellectual problem or issue to be examined and critiqued; rather, he is a nightmare that has haunted his life for years and has never left him! This is why, wherever he goes and whatever he speaks or writes about, he sees the specter of Shariati and his nightmare confronting him, and consequently, in every piece of writing, he also directs taunts and insults at him. This is why, in all these years that he has railed against and cursed Shariati and his ideology, even holding him responsible for all the events of recent years, he has not devoted even a single page to examining and critiquing Shariati. All there is, is vilification, cursing, and character assassination! This method of working shows that Tabatabai is not one for criticism and reasoning, and he does not critique Shariati's thoughts—just as he does not critique many of his contemporaries—but rather drags them through the mud. In the scattered fault-finding that Tabatabai has carried out regarding Shariati's thought, nothing called a scientific rule or method of criticism, and most importantly, moral conscience, is visible. What exists is belligerence devoid of ethics and filled with malice and stubbornness. Whereas scientific responsibility and the etiquette of criticism require that, instead of such misguided paths, the entire body of Shariati's works and the foundations of his thought—or that of anyone else—and especially the evolution of his ideas, be used as a means of evaluation and judgment. Shariati has around 36 volumes of collected works, meaning several times the works of Tabatabai, who has lived twice as long as Shariati and had several times his opportunities for reading and writing! How can this voluminous and dense record be ignored and Shariati's case be settled with a measure of curses and insults? Whatever this thought may be, it has been more influential than any other thought in contemporary Iran and has preoccupied several decades of post-revolution Iran, and consequently, it is more deserving of scrutiny and evaluation than any other thought. But Tabatabai, with no regard for these clear realities, imagines that with a few lines of refutation and insult, one can settle the matter of such a thought, then push it aside and take its place! Some of his imitators also, occasionally, fuel his delusions and advertise for him that: "We are now facing a new generation of Muslim scholars who are both Iranian and Islamic, who are aware of traditions and know the modern world. [Meaning Shariati, Bazargan, and Soroush were unaware of these things!] They do not see the relationship between religion and politics as one of identity; but they believe in the interaction of religion and politics [here, religion is equivalent to jurisprudence], and consider the separation of religion from politics impossible, as it neither corresponds to the reality of life nor arises from the truth of religion." (Quchani, ibid.) These retinues and entourages, over the past years, have resorted to every unethical act they could to discredit Shariati and pave the way for Tabatabai! Once, with shallow analyses, they declared backward reactionary currents like ISIS to be born of Shariati's Protestantism, complete with a photo and malicious details on the magazine cover! Another time, they wrote the intellectual "reformer" (mosleh), again on the magazine cover, with the letter 'sin' so it would be read as "armed" (mosallah), meaning the theoretician of guerrillas and radical currents, and yet another time they engaged in another disgusting game!

اما برخلاف همه ی این دروغ ها و تبلیغ های طباطبایی و خدم و حشم او، و یا ردیه نویسانی كه شریعتی را به رادیكالیسم و شتاب برای انقلاب و براندازی و تغییر حکومت متهم كرده اند؛ انتشار اسناد ساواك درباره ی شریعتی و دو تحلیل جداگانه كه بر آن نوشته شد، و به ویژه تحلیل درخشان علی سروش، نشان داد كه شریعتی پس از بازگشت به ایران، پیش از هر چیز، قصد فعالیت فرهنگی و در پیش گرفتن یك مشی معتدل و میانه رو سیاسی داشته است.( ر.ک: علی سروش، شریعتی و دیالکتیک مبارزه ) این است كه جز در برهه های كوتاهی از آن سال ها، كه فضای ملّتهب جامعه و فشار  گروه های سیاسی، برخی از سخن رانی های او را تحت تاثیر قرارداده است، بیشتر فعالیت های او، فعالیت فرهنگی و در شكل درس-گفتار و مدرسی، با درون مایه های فكری و آموزشی بوده است. افزون بر این، در هیچ یك از آثار او اثری از مسائل سیاسی روزمره دیده نمی شود و چنانچه مجموعه ی آثار او را كه در 36 جلد فراهم آمده است؛ از این دیدگاه بررسی كنیم، راهبرد فكری و فرهنگی در یكایك آن ها خطّ اصلی و پررنگ اندیشه ی اوست. شریعتی می كوشید كه ذهن ها را تغییر دهد و نه مهره های حكومت را! و از قضا، این شیوه ی كار او، پیوسته آماج انتقاد و پرخاش گروه های تندرو و تشكل های سیاسی و چریكی قرار می گرفت و شریعتی به سازش كاری و بُریدگی و بی راهه بردن مبارزه ی سیاسی و حتی هم كاری با رژیم متهم می شد. اما با آن كه گه گاه، این گونه انتقادات را در محاسبات خود به حساب می گرفت و لحن سخن رانی های خود را قدری تندتر و بی پرواتر می کرد – و البته حجم این سخن رانی ها در برابر آثار دیگر او چندان هم به چشم نمی آید -  هیچ گاه استراتژی آگاهی بخش و بیدارگرانه ی خود را تغییر نمی داد، و مرعوب فضای سیاسی غالب، نمی شد، هر چند كه این كار را به بهای سنگینی از اعتبار خود تمام کند! این بود که  یک بار، در سال1344یعنی چند سال پس از ناتمام ماندن ترور شاه، که « در محافل روشنفکران مخالف، حادثه با صورت گسترده یی مورد بحث قرار می گرفت و اکثر آنان از عقیم ماندن نقشه ی ترور، خشمگین و متاسف بودند؛ دوستان شریعتی از وی در مورد این واقعه نظرخواهی کردند، و در کمال ناباوری با این استدلال او مواجه شدند که: مملکت بسیار خوش بخت بود که گلوله ی شمس آبادی به هدف نخورد، زیرا جامعه ی ما، نه از لحاظ فکری و نه از لحاظ ذهنی، به مرحله یی نرسیده است که بتواند آنچه را که قرار است پس از شاه روی کار بیاید؛ بپذیرد. عجله کردن، نتیجه یی جز فاجعه نخواهد داشت!» (رهنما،198) در این روزها شریعتی فقط سی و دو سال داشته است!

Of course, this piece does not intend to carve out a desirable and respectable face for Shariati in order to conform to the times; this is what emerges from his works and thought. It is evident that judging the work of an intellectual like Shariati, who was caught in a difficult political situation, encircled by the Shah's security organization, the custodians of traditional religion, and radical political groups—with each of whom he had to compromise in some way—is not the same as other kinds of judgment. In this judgment, one must take into account all these influential factors that provided the context for his intellectual-political endeavors, and make the evolution of his thought and political conduct the basis for any interpretation of his thought. In such an interpretation of Shariati's thought, we will see that, contrary to Tabatabai's propaganda, not only is there no trace of political hastiness or an effort for "this lamb, Obeidollah, come forth" (ibid., section 11), but Shariati takes a risk and warns his contemporary generations against any political hastiness and radical strategies, cautioning revolutionary and guerrilla organizations that "revolution, more than anything else, requires a revolution in vision and a revolution in the mode of thinking." (Collected Works, 2/167) And for this task, "two generations, three generations must do [cultural] work and then reach a result, because if we reach a result within ten years, we will revert ten years back! I negate all premature revolutions." (Collected Works, 20/500) And "there is always time for politicking, for serving the people, and so on, but for learning, the time is right now and it is passing. Without substance, the dough is unleavened, and an illiterate person's politics is nothing but rootless clamor. The value and depth of any work depends on the degree of self-awareness, the growth of personality, and the capital and richness of a person's thought and culture." (Collected Works, 1/80) And "in this world and under this sky, nothing is uglier and more repulsive than a progressive intellectual and pretentious blusterer who thinks himself scientific, yet knows nothing beyond a few pamphlets, photocopies, and anthologies handed to him!" (ibid./92) And "this mission is begun by true and great-thinking intellectuals, not with guns, clamor, common and superficial politicking, changing regimes, swapping people, and creating adventures and incidents; not with daily preoccupations, fashionable struggles, and the latest-model leftisms...; not with translating, imitating, and quoting from Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao, Beckett, Brecht, and Régis Debray [take note, Tabatabai], but with proclamation, and their weapon is the word..." (ibid./98)

Where in these thoughts, which mostly came to Shariati's lips in the last years of his life, is there any trace of political agitation or a call for revolution within the revolution? Can one speak more explicitly than this in denying revolution, especially the revolution that Lenin and Régis Debray had taught? What should Shariati have said or done for Tabatabai to believe that in his thought there is absolutely no place for Régis Debray's revolution within the revolution? Furthermore, Shariati's "What Is to Be Done?" shows the solution to lie in awareness, culture, study, research, investigation, and the extraction of cultural resources... and ends up in libraries, research and theater groups, lessons, classes, music education, literary schools, writing styles, and even architecture, urban planning, clothing, and cosmetics... and not in armed conflicts, guerrilla warfare, preparing for revolution, and the like! (See: M,A, 20) And his revolutionary self-construction is achieved through "work," "worship," and "social activity" (See: M,A, 2), and not through combat training, weapons familiarization, and street clashes from safe houses! And his advice to the young generations of his time is this: "If you do not want to fall into the hands of any dictator, do one thing: read and read and read!" (M,A, 1/63) and not fight and fight and fight! And his lofty ideals are the triangle of "mysticism, equality, freedom" (M,A, 2). But since he does not trade freedom for any price, he has no hesitation in giving Western democracy precedence over the suffocation of Eastern socialism: "As we see today, capitalism has more honor than socialism. There, a human cry is sometimes heard, but here there is nothing but suffocation..." (M,A, 23/348) In recounting the life of Ali, he emphasizes, above all, his silence and seclusion at home, and not his wars and jihad! And even in the most inflamed days, coinciding with the execution of members of the Mojahedin organization, when Shariati delivered his fiery speeches, namely "Martyrdom" and "After Martyrdom," under the influence of this event, his advice is this: "Those who remained must do the work of Zaynab." And the work of Zaynab means propagation and cultural work. Those who witnessed the inflamed political atmosphere of those years know that uttering these thoughts and pointing to these paths, as opposed to guerrilla and organizational paths, was considered nothing but sabotage and leading astray, and consequently brought much disrepute and discredit! But Shariati, who did not intend to gain personal prestige or deceive the generations facing him, never shied away from paying such costs!

Shariati not only did not think of political revolution; but, contrary to the perception of his critics, he also did not prescribe a specific form of government for after the revolution. Shariati's critics – like Tabatabai – imagine, or insinuate, that in "Ummah and Imamate" Shariati laid out a plan for a religious government or caliphate; whereas Shariati, two years after presenting "Ummah and Imamate," clarifies this matter and explicitly states that: "Such a system ended in the seventh century AD (first century AH) with the Imamate of the 12 individuals" (M,A, 15/47). And for his own time, he thinks of nothing other than democracy; to the extent that he considers democracy "the most progressive and most Islamic form of government" (M,A, 5/48). And even years before the talk of revolution and religious government arose in Iran, in response to the question of what religious government is, summarizing and drawing conclusions from the historical experience of caliphates and religious governments, he says: "Religious government is a regime in which, instead of political figures, religious figures occupy political and state positions; in other words, religious government means the rule of the clergy over the nation. The natural effects of such a government are, first, despotism; because the cleric considers himself the vicegerent of God and the executor of His commands on earth, and in such a case, the people have no right to express opinions, criticize, or oppose him! ... In Islamic society, the factor for religious government does not exist" (M,A, 22/197)

Tabatabai, disregarding or unaware of all these signs of free-thinking and broad-mindedness in Shariati's works, has called his thought indebted to the "spirit of Marxism" (The Rule of Law, 638)! Now, by presenting one more fact of Shariati's free-thinking, I will bring this writing to an end and leave the final judgment to the reader of this text to say whether, in what I narrate of Shariati, the "spirit of Marxism" and ideological leftism is more apparent, or in the eradication that Tabatabai has launched in these years, the "spirit of Fascism" and intellectual genocide?

“It is a common principle in the dominant religious judgment of the believers of a faith that the denier of a particular religion is, in the eyes of its believer, considered a denier of [the principle of] religion itself. Likewise, someone who denies the common principles of several different religions is regarded by all these religions as an irreligious element. Whereas, if we define religion based on the original concept and the common spirit of all religions, we will find even these famous heretics and anti-religious materialists in history to be more religious. . . . In history, if we do not confine religion to specific dogmatic frameworks of beliefs and exclusive rituals, and instead take its transcendent truth—which is love, virtue-orientation, piety, renouncing one’s base self, magnanimity, bringing about responsibility, a desire for beauty, and martyrdom [= intuition]—as the criterion of assessment, many of these figures condemned by religions in history, who were branded with irreligion on their foreheads by the custodians of temples and the official authorities of religions, were more religious and purer in faith than those who accused them of blasphemy and killed or burned them in the name of religion! Who can doubt that the chaste Epicurus, Galileo and the faithful Bruno, the mystic Suhrawardi and the loving Ayn al-Quzat, and even the free-thinking, truth-worshipping Abu al-Ala, were more religious than all the dry, demagogic, caliph-worshipping mullahs who duped the people? If we consider religion to be being human, truthfulness, freedom, truth-worship, purity of heart, magnanimity, self-sacrifice, and enmity toward ugliness, baseness, and oppression, and not merely specific mental forms, particular doctrinal titles, dogmas, rituals, and codified, formulaic beliefs!”

References:

Azad, Peyman: Dar Hasrat-e Parvaz, Hirmand, 1374/ Eslami Nodushan, Mohammad Ali: Sokhan-ha ra Beshnavim, Sherkat-e Sahami-ye Enteshar, 1370/ Eagleton, Terry: Marxism va Naqd-e Adabi, translated by Akbar Masoum Beigi, Nashr-e Digar, 1383/ Bazargan, Mehdi: 60 Sal-e Khedmat va Moqavemat, Rasa, 1375 / Baraheni, Reza: Dar Enqelab-e Iran Che Shodeh Ast va Che Khahad Shod!, Ketab-e Zaman, 1358/ Bashiriyeh, Hossein: Enqelab va Basij-e Siasi, Daneshgah-e Tehran, 1384/ Bullard, Sir Reader William: Nameh-ha-i az Tehran, translated by Gholam Hossein Mirza Saleh, Negah-e Moaser, 1388/ Behnoud, Masoud: Az Seyyed Zia ta Bakhtiar, Javidan, 1370 / Sabeti, Parviz: Dar Damgah-e Hadeseh, published abroad / Khamei, Anvar: Khaterat-e Adabi, Siasi, va Javani, Nashr-e Goftar, 1372/ Dowlatabadi, Mahmoud: Ma Niz Mardomi Hastim, Nashr-e Parsi, 1370/ idem: In Goft o Sokhan-ha, Sales, 1398 / Rahnema, Ali: Mosalmani dar Jost-o Juy-e Nakuja Abad, Gam-e No, 1381/ Sepanlou, Mohammad Ali: Tarikh-e Shafahi-ye Adabiat-e Moaser-e Iran, Sales, 1373/ Sahabi, Ezzatollah: Nim Qarn Khaterah va Tajrobeh, Farhang-e Saba, 1388/ Soroush, Ali: Shariati va Dialektik-e Mobarezeh, Bozorgmehr, 1378/ Shariati, Ali: Majmu'eh-ye Asar 1, 2, 5, 15, 20, 22/ Tabatabai, Seyyed Javad: Hokumat-e Qanun, Sotoudeh, 1386/ Fardoust: Zohur va Soqut-e Saltanat-e Pahlavi, Ettela'at, 1371/ Katouzian, Homayoun: Eqtesad-e Siasi/ Campalani, Christian de: Tarikh-e Falsafeh dar Qarn-e Bistom, translated by Baqer Parham, Agah, 1382/ Keshavarz, Fereydoun: Khaterat-e Siasi, Nashr-e Ani, 1380/ Grousset, René: Chehreh-ye Asia, translated by Gholam Ali Sayyar, Farzan-e Ruz, 1375/ Meysami, Lotfollah Meysami: Az Nahzat-e Azadi ta . . ., Samadieh, 1382/ Milani, Abbas: Mo'ammay-e Hoveyda, Akhtaran, 1380/ idem: Negahi be Shah, Canada, 2013 / Milani, Mohsen: Sheklgiri-ye Enqelab-e Eslami, translated by Mojtaba Attarzadeh, Gam-e No, 1388/ / Nejati, Colonel Gholam Reza, Tarikh-e Siasi-ye 25 Saleh-ye Iran, Rasa, 1379/ Naraghi, Ehsan: Az Kakh-e Shah ta Zendan-e Evin, translated by Saeed Azari, Rasa, 1373 / Halliday, Fred: Diktatori va Tose'eh-ye Sarmayehdari dar Iran, translated by Fazlollah Nikayin, Amir Kabir, 1358