Mehdi Iranmanesh: Introducing the book 'Religion on the Scales of Ethics' by Abolghasem Fanaei

Mehdi Iranmanesh: On both sides of religious and secular discourses, and sometimes within the wide spectrum of diverse religious interpretations, we witness disputes. On one side, secular philosophers have risen in opposition to religious thought. They grant primacy to the human being and consider the history of religion to be a history of misunderstanding. On the other side, some custodians of religious law reject any narrative other than the jurisprudential reading. In the meantime, criticisms of official religion arise from time to time, requiring a response. Usually, most criticisms directed at official religion either target those “rulings” of traditional jurisprudence that are “unethical,” or “beliefs” that are not based on a reason-commending “ethics of belief.” But since, according to the model defended by Abolghasem Fanaei, this category of “unethical” rulings and beliefs are in fact fundamentally not “religious,” therefore the religion that is introduced within the framework of his proposed ethics and purified of unethical beliefs and rulings is far more resistant to intra-religious and extra-religious critique. More resistant also in the sense that many who, motivated by the defense of religion, attacked contemporary secular culture, and with the ambiguity they had in understanding the meaning of religion or the meaning of the secular, remained incapable of a rational and acceptable defense of religion, and sometimes, due to the weakness of their reasoning, ended up losing religion or any meaningful religious experience. Not only attacking secular culture, but attacking secular ethics without knowing what it really is and what its relationship with religious ethics could be, is a baseless endeavor.

The Theory of the “Ideal Observer”: A Superior Discourse in the Realm of Religious and Secular Ethics

Introducing the book ‘Religion on the Scales of Ethics’ by Dr. Abolghasem Fanaei, presented by Dr. Mehdi Iranmanesh

On both sides of religious and secular discourses, and sometimes within the wide spectrum of diverse religious interpretations, we witness disputes. On one side, secular philosophers have risen in opposition to religious thought. They grant primacy to the human being and consider the history of religion to be a history of misunderstanding. On the other side, some custodians of religious law reject any narrative other than the jurisprudential reading. In the meantime, criticisms of official religion arise from time to time, requiring a response. Usually, most criticisms directed at official religion either target those “rulings” of traditional jurisprudence that are “unethical,” or “beliefs” that are not based on a reason-commending “ethics of belief.” But since, according to the model defended by Abolghasem Fanaei, this category of “unethical” rulings and beliefs are in fact fundamentally not “religious,” therefore the religion that is introduced within the framework of his proposed ethics and purified of unethical beliefs and rulings is far more resistant to intra-religious and extra-religious critique. More resistant also in the sense that many who, motivated by the defense of religion, attacked contemporary secular culture, and with the ambiguity they had in understanding the meaning of religion or the meaning of the secular, remained incapable of a rational and acceptable defense of religion, and sometimes, due to the weakness of their reasoning, ended up losing religion or any meaningful religious experience. Not only attacking secular culture, but attacking secular ethics without knowing what it really is and what its relationship with religious ethics could be, is a baseless endeavor.

In this context, Dr. Fanaei, as a religious reformist thinker, has engaged in a logical confrontation with both ends of the spectrum that are both claimants and custodians, and has presented deeper and, of course, more controversial perspectives. Like other religious reformist thinkers, he must be considered both a defender of “religion” and a defender of “the human being.”

In fact, he seeks to answer the question: on what basis can we, or should we, as Muslims, regulate our relationship with non-Muslims—religion or ethics? Inevitably, there must be principles that, independent of adherence to a specific religion, are common to all, so that based on them we can live together in peace. But these common principles are to be found in “ethics.” Yet, unfortunately, there is no uniform conception or understanding of ethics either:

In the modern era, Muslims' understanding of ethics differs greatly from that of Westerners. Muslims consider ethics to be an individual and otherworldly matter that deals with the inner and esoteric dimensions of the human being, and therefore, they primarily expect it to help purify souls and secure their otherworldly happiness and salvation, and secondarily, to assist in regulating the social relations of human beings. However, in the modern era, the primary expectation from ethics is the regulation of human relations and social institutions and the provision of collective, worldly welfare and happiness for human beings, and its effect on individual, otherworldly happiness and salvation is of secondary importance. (p. 39)

It is for this very reason that the author believes that moral philosophy in the modern era holds the same role and position as jurisprudence in Islamic civilization; indeed, moral philosophy is the jurisprudence of the modern world, and moral philosophers are the jurists of the modern world. Hence, they have entered the field with this attitudinal backing.

Not only does he consider ethics to be independent of religion for numerous reasons, but he also believes in the theory of the primacy of ethics over religion, and rightly emphasizes that if religion is not properly understood, it does not make the realization of ethical principles more certain, but rather fundamentally precludes it. And for it to be properly understood, our understanding of religion must be weighed on the scales of ethics; and for this reason, he names this book 'Religion on the Scales of Ethics.'

In this book, it is stated that each of the concepts of 'religion' and 'ethics' has general and specific meanings; the general meaning of religion includes religious experience, principles of belief, ethics, and Sharia, and the specific meaning of religion is equivalent to Sharia. Likewise, the general meaning of ethics includes the ethics of conduct, belief, thought, and research, and the specific meaning of ethics solely includes the ethics of conduct. In his view,

Muslim philosophers, besides limiting the domain of ethics to the ethics of conduct and paying no attention to the ethics of belief and research, have also reduced social ethics to jurisprudence within the domain of the ethics of conduct. But in the modern era, ethics encompasses all three domains of conduct, belief, and research, and social ethics is not reduced to anything else. (pp. 51-52)

He presents a theory, both from an interpretive (ijtihadi) perspective and from the standpoint of a moral philosopher, that both resolves existing ethical conflicts and, from a superior discursive perspective, addresses the conflict existing between certain readings of secular ethics and religious ethics. For he knows well that these readings, at the level of existing discourses, are sometimes so irreconcilable and incompatible that there is no logical or rational way to resolve the conflict between them.

He views his project, namely the 'Religion and Ethics Project,' as a 'philosophical,' 'theological,' and 'ethicological' project, not an 'intellectual' one, although he believes that the theoretical and practical consequences of this project may also provide justification for including it under intellectual projects.

In an interview, he says:

The author firmly believes that 'philosophizing' and 'intellectual activity' are two different categories, and each has its own specific goals, tools, etiquette, ethics, and audiences. Mixing these two together and ignoring their significant differences, especially ignoring the ethical considerations pertaining to each of these two domains under the pretext of the other, the least harm it does is to ruin and render both dysfunctional, yielding very undesirable results.

He claims that those who assign no role to reason and rationality in the domain of ethics reduce ethics either to the current and actual emotions and feelings of human beings, or to the arbitrary decree and will, or the expediential consideration, of God the Lawgiver. Such readings of secular ethics and religious ethics are irreconcilable and incompatible, and there is no logical or rational way to resolve the conflict between these readings. However, if we accept a theory that acknowledges the role of rationality in the domain of ethics, the difference between religious ethics and secular ethics can be resolved.

He rightly believes that although in one sense one can have a “religious ethics,” this ethics is not a substitute for “secular ethics” (in a supra-religious, not atheistic, sense); rather, it falls within the framework of “supra-religious ethics” and is subordinate to it. Religion cannot relieve human beings of their moral duties or exempt them from obeying moral commands. But which ruling is a justified moral ruling upon which human moral duties can be based?

A justified moral ruling is a ruling that is, first, issued by an “ideal observer” and, second, the ideal observer views the matter from a “moral point of view”:

A justified moral ruling is the ruling of an ideal observer who views the matter from a moral point of view. (p. 199)

For this reason, he endeavors to enumerate the characteristics of an ideal observer and a moral point of view.

With the help of the “ideal observer” theory (the acceptance of which is, in fact, a requirement of rationality in the realm of ethics), he both offers a new account of the difference between religious ethics and secular ethics and demonstrates that if we accept the “ideal observer” as the arbiter of ethics, the conflict between religious and secular ethics will be resolved.

But what is the correct method for recognizing the ruling of the ideal observer? The correct method is not to rely exclusively on reason or revelation. The correct method is to reconcile the content of revelation with the judgment of reason, and this reconciliation must be achieved through a process of assessment, comparison, and two-way movement, not by assuming one as given and certain and tampering with the other, nor by conditioning the authority of reason’s judgment on achieving absolute certainty, which is equivalent to suspending reason.

He not only draws the reader’s attention to the correct method of recognizing the ideal observer’s ruling but also points to the identification of the different presuppositions that can be held about the ideal observer. He also believes that religious ethics and secular ethics, by changing the different presuppositions they might have about the instance of the ideal observer, can lead to a single normative ethics. For example, if the intention and presupposition of those who say ethics is religious is that moral norms originate from the will and desire of the God of ethics (= God as the ideal observer), then no difference will remain between religious and secular ethics. Because in this view, the will of the God of jurisprudence, and consequently the Sharia—meaning the totality of religious rulings—is subordinate to ethics, not the other way around, and religious laws are not only not arbitrary, without criteria, rules, or standards, but are also bound by moral standards and values.

But if the presupposition of those who say ethics is religious is that moral norms originate from the will and desire of the God of jurisprudence (= God the Lawgiver), then those who say ethics is secular (supra-religious) and not religious are correct.

The “ideal observer” theory also has important and fateful consequences for the epistemology of ethics and the epistemology of jurisprudence, and one of those consequences is that jurisprudential interpretations of religious rulings are valid only to the extent that they are compatible with the requirements of this theory and model. This is because the ruling and will of the God of ethics takes precedence over the ruling and will of the God of jurisprudence. Although the God of jurisprudence, by virtue of being the Creator, Owner, or Benefactor, has the right to make something obligatory or forbidden, this right is not absolute but is bound by ethical constraints, because this right itself is a moral right, and one cannot ignore other moral rights and values by invoking a moral right.

Among the other merits of this book is that by presenting a superior discourse (the discourse of the ideal observer), it offers a solution for resolving the paradox of religious ethics and also reconciling religious and secular ethics.

The paradox of religious ethics is resolved by saying that, from the perspective of the religious, the ultimate authority in ethics is God, but not as “Creator,” “Owner,” or “Lawgiver,” but as the “ideal observer,” because moral command and prohibition are the “guiding” ruling of the ideal observer. (p. 254)

This discourse (the discourse of the ideal observer) shows that:

Ethics can be both religious and secular (supra-religious) at the same time: it is religious because moral oughts and ought-nots originate from the will and command of God as the ideal observer (and this is the reasonable and acceptable meaning of the divine command theory), and it is secular because moral oughts and ought-nots originate from the will and command of the human being as the ideal observer. And these two ethics coincide, because the judgment of the ideal observer is, in any case, one. And the theoretical disagreement between the religious and the non-religious regarding the existence or non-existence of God, or His involvement or non-involvement in human moral guidance, will have no effect on the values of social morality. (p. 255) ‎

He also points out that the morality of religion and God's observance of moral values is a consequence of God's attributes, virtues, and perfections, not something imposed upon Him from without:

God's observance of moral values is not something imposed upon Him from without; that is, it is these very attributes, virtues, and perfections

of God Himself that prevent an immoral or anti-moral act or decree from issuing from Him. (p. 254)

He considers the error of some proponents of "religious ethics" to lie in their assumption that moral oughts and ought-nots originate from the will and command of the "God of jurisprudence" and not from the will and command of the "God of ethics." Likewise, he considers the error of some proponents of "secular ethics" to lie in their assumption that moral oughts and ought-nots originate from the will and command of the existing human being, who is in a non-ideal state, and not from the will and command of the ideal human being. The common feature of ethical systems based on both aforementioned views is that they negate rationality in the realm of ethics and have become opposed to and incompatible with one another.

The disagreement arises from this: "We consider the religiousness of ethics to mean the dependence of moral values, oughts, and ought-nots on the will of the 'God as Lawgiver,' and its secularity to mean the dependence of these values, oughts, and ought-nots on the actual desires and wills or the conventions and contracts of human beings who are not in an ideal state." (p. 258)

On this basis, since in reality the God as Lawgiver and the God of ethics are one, one can speak of the "ethics of legislation," and in a sense, this book could perhaps also be called "The Ethics of Legislation" and "The Propriety of the Station of Lawgiving." But it must be added that the benefit and importance of his work is not limited to the exposition of the "ethics of legislation"; rather, its true importance also lies in presenting a desirable and suitable model for regulating the relationship between human beings and God. This model relies on the "ideal observer" theory, which has vast differences from the "slave and master" model. In this model, the human being's need for God in the realm of action and behavior is a need for an ideal observer, not the need of a slave for their master. And although the human being is also God's servant and bondsman, since servitude is different from slavery, in light of this theory, servitude becomes compatible with human dignity, whereas slavery is incompatible with human dignity. In other words, servitude, bondage, and submission to God's decree are compatible with human dignity when they are understood to mean obedience to the ideal observer.

He considers the long-standing dispute among moral philosophers and theologians over whether moral values are rational or religious to be based on the incorrect presupposition that these norms are either subject to God's will and desire or independent of His will and desire. He also compares this theory with certain views of the Mu'tazila and Ash'ariyya:

The difference between this theory and the Ash'ari theory is that they consider good and evil to be subject to the will and aversion, and the command and prohibition of God as Creator, or Owner, or Lawgiver, and they do not posit any objective and independent criterion for the will and aversion, and the command and prohibition of the God of jurisprudence. In other words, the Ash'ariyya place the God as Lawgiver in the seat of the ideal observer and reduce ethics to jurisprudence. But according to the ideal observer theory, the judgment of the ideal observer can be discovered through reason, intuition, and moral experience, because the will and aversion, and the command and prohibition of the ideal observer have criteria and standards, and those standards can be known through reason.

He also notes that:

The difference between the Ideal Observer theory and the Mu'tazila view on good and evil is that, according to the Mu'tazila view, we fundamentally do not need an ideal observer in the position of recognizing a moral judgment. The Mu'tazila considered the perception of good and evil to be self-evident and easily accessible. However, moral values and norms are not always self-evident, and moral judgments are not always of the type of good and evil. (p. 260)

Furthermore,

in the position of discovering secondary and particular moral norms and discovering instances of good and evil, the Mu'tazila took refuge in revelation and tradition, and like the Ash'arites, they reduced ethics to jurisprudence. But, as is shown in this book, the validity and authoritativeness of jurisprudential rulings are conditional upon these rulings being compatible with the will of the Ideal Observer and not contradicting his decree. Therefore, one cannot discover God's decree and will as the Ideal Observer through jurisprudential sources and by using the common research method in jurisprudence. (p. 260)

In other words:

Referring to the Ideal Observer through the conventional method in jurisprudence is not possible, because jurisprudence is responsible for recognizing the rulings of God the Lawgiver, which is other than the God of ethics. (p. 259)

But moral beliefs are independent of jurisprudential beliefs, and his theory also provides a rational support for jurisprudence. As he says:

In the conventional and accepted method in the seminaries, "Sharia" occupies the place of "social ethics," and the science of jurisprudence takes the place of the science of ethics, and in the conflict between jurisprudential beliefs and moral beliefs, the principle is the precedence of the former, unless there is definitive and certain proof in favor of the moral belief in question. But in our proposed method, the science of jurisprudence does not replace the science of ethics ... At the same time, the science of ethics also does not replace the science of jurisprudence, and jurisprudence, within the framework of ethics, enjoys rational support. (p. 252)

And that jurisprudence, within the framework of ethics, enjoys rational support, relies in part on a view in which the authoritativeness of the apparent meanings of transmitted texts is also made contingent and conditional upon measuring their content against the moral intuitions arising from reason and conscience. As he says:

One cannot take the authoritativeness of apparent meanings for granted and, for example, claim based on it that "Islam does not accept human rights" or that "Islamic human rights are different from Western human rights." The authoritativeness of the apparent meanings of transmitted texts is contingent and conditional upon measuring their content against the moral intuitions arising from reason and conscience. Without such comparison and measurement, no apparent meaning is authoritative, and it cannot be attributed to God and considered as the ruling of Islam. Such an act is an innovation in religion and has no logical or rational support. (p. 253)

And based on this, he concludes that the right of God and human rights are both moral rights and do not originate from God's legislative will. Therefore, just as the right of God does not originate from His legislative will, human rights also do not originate from His legislative will, and thus human rights cannot be restricted by a religious ruling. God can choose not to create human beings, but He cannot create them and then violate their rights or grant the right to violate these rights to any of His servants.

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Bibliographic Information for the Book Religion on the Scales of Ethics:

Author: Abolghasem Fanaei Format: Octavo Binding: Paperback Publisher: Serat Language: Persian Number of Pages: 274 Publication Year: 2005 Edition: 1st ISBN: 9645633176

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